16 September 1996
Supreme Court
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THE PATIALA CENTRAL COOPERATIVEBANK LTD. Vs THE PATIALA CENTRAL COOPERATIVEBANK EMPLOYEES UNION & ANR.


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PETITIONER: THE PATIALA CENTRAL COOPERATIVEBANK LTD.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE PATIALA CENTRAL COOPERATIVEBANK EMPLOYEES UNION & ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       16/09/1996

BENCH: SEN, S.C. (J) BENCH: SEN, S.C. (J) JEEVAN REDDY, B.P. (J) MAJMUDAR S.B. (J)

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                       J U D G M E N T                           W I T H          [Civil Appeal No.4074/88; and 4075-76/88]      S.B. Majmudar, J.      I  have  gone  through  the  judgment  prepared  by  my esteemed learned  brother Sen,  J. I  am in entire agreement with the  finding reached  by learned  brother Sen, J., that the Agreement  governed  by  the  provisions  of  Industrial Disputes Act,  1947 (hereinafter  referred to  as ’the Act’) dated 28th  May 1973 which had a life of four years, expired on 31st  March 1977  which had  thereafter even  though  its effects continued  as per  Section 19 sub-Section (2) of the Act and  were binding  on the  parties, the entire agreement including the  clause relating  to  dearness  allowance  was terminated by  one of  the parties to the Agreement, namely, the  Central   Cooperative  Bank   when  the   administrator appointed  under   Section  28  of  the  Punjab  Cooperative Societies Act, 1961 issued a notice dated 25th February 1978 under Section  19(2) of  the Act  for terminating  the  said Agreement and  when the said termination was ratified by the Directors of  the Bank  by Resolution No.7 at the meeting of the Board  of Directors held on 9th April 1978. Consequently that  Agreement   ceased  to   operate  thereafter.  I  also respectfully agree  with the  finding of  my learned brother that this  aspect of  the case was not disputed on behalf of the Employees’  Union in  the counter  affidavit affirmed by Maninderjit Singh,  Joint Secretary  of the Employees’ Union and consequently  the fact  that notice  was given  on  25th February 1978  terminating the Agreement dated 28th May 1973 is not in dispute.      However on  the aforesaid finding reached by my learned brother  on   the  facts   of  this  case  and  to  which  I respectfully agree, in my view, on further question survives for consideration  in the  present  litigation  between  the parties,  namely,   whether  Section   84-B  of  the  Punjab Cooperative  Societies   Act,  1961   inserted   by   Punjab

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Legislature by  Amending Act 26 of 1981 was repugnant to the provisions of  Sections  9A  and  19(2)  of  the  Industrial Disputes Act which was a Central Legislation. The High Court has taken  the view,  ignoring the factual position that the Agreement in  question had stood terminated with effect from 25th February  1978, that  Section 84-B was repugnant to the aforesaid provisions  of the Act and as the enactment of the sad Section  was covered  by Entry 22 of the Concurrent List III of  Schedule VII  of the  Constitution of  India dealing with ‘Trade  Unions, Industrial  and Labour  Disputes’,  the said provision  to the  extent of  repugnancy became void as per Article 251 read with Article 254 of the Constitution of India as  admittedly the said provision Inserted by amending Act 26 of 1981 was not reserved by the State Legislature for consideration of  the President  and had  not  received  his assent as  required by  Article 254  sub-Article (2)  of the Constitution. In  my opinion  the said exercise was not open to the High Court on the admitted facts of the present case. That even  under Section 19(2) of the Act the said Agreement had  ceased   to  operate   from  25th   February  1978  and consequently there remained on question of any repugnancy of Section 84-B  on the  hand and  Sections 9A and 19(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act on the other. In short that question did not  arise for  consideration of  the High  Court on the aforesaid well  established facts on record. In my view once this factual  conclusion is arrived at as rightly arrived at by my  learned brother  Sen, J., on occasion arises for this Court nor  did it  arise for  the High  Court to go into the legislative competence  of the State Legislature in enacting Section 84-B  and to  examine and  pronounce upon  the  said question. On this short ground, therefore, I would set aside the decision  of the  High Court  declaring Section  84-B as ultra vires  the State  Legislature on account of repugnancy of Section 84-B with the provisions of Sections 9A and 19(2) of the  Industrial Disputes  Act. The  appeal of the bank is required to  be allowed  on this  short ground  keeping  the question of  vires of Section 84-B open for consideration in an appropriate  case. However,  with great  respect I do not concur with the view of my learned brother Sen, J., that the said section will operate even de hors the binding agreement under Section  19(2) of  the Act.  On this  aspect  I  would express on  opinion as  that question,  in my view, does not arise for consideration on the facts of the present case. I, however, agree with the final conclusion to which my learned brother Sen,.,  has reached  that these appeals are required to be allowed, but on the aforesaid different reasoning.