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PETITIONER: THE PABBOJAN TEA CO. LTD., ETC.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, LAKHIMPUR, ETC.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 18/08/1967

BENCH: MITTER, G.K. BENCH: MITTER, G.K. WANCHOO, K.N. (CJ)

CITATION:  1968 AIR  271            1968 SCR  (1) 260  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1969 SC  78  (19,21,35)  RF         1975 SC2238  (22)

ACT: Minimum  Wages  Act,  1948 (11 of 1948),  s.  20--Orders  of Authority--Civil  Court’s jurisdiction,  if  barred--Lettera Challan Workers, if "ordinary unskilled labour".

HEADNOTE:  By a notification under the Minimum Wages Act minimum wages were  fixed for ’ordinary unskilled labour’ in  certain  Tea Plantations  in Assam.  The  respondent-Deputy  Commissioner issued notices to the appellants that a number of  employees were  not paid in accordance with the prescribed  rate,  and required  them to pay the outstanding wages  with  requisite amount   of  delayed  compensation  to  the   employees   in conformity with s. 20(3) of the Act.  The appellants  denied the  liability  stating that these  employees  were  Lettera Challan-workers  who  were incapable of  performing  a  full normal  working  day’s  work, so  they  were  ’not  ordinary unskilled  labour’.  The authority did not hold any  enquiry or  receive any evidence beyond meeting the managers of  the appellants where the Government, Labour Officer was  present and  it  held that in the absence of an order  of  exemption under s. 26, Lettera Challan Labour (in spite of the  amount of  work performed) was to be treated as  ordinary  labour.. The appellants filed civil suits which the Subordinate Judge dismissed  holding  that  under the Minimum  Wages  Act  the orders  of the Authority. were final and suits were  barred. The High Court upheld the decision of the Subordinate Judge. Held: The appeals must be allowed Determination  of the question whether the  jurisdiction  of civil courts is excluded or not depends on the terms of  the particular   statute  under  construction.    Exclusion   of jurisdiction  is  not  to  be  readily  inferred  but   such exclusion  must  either be explicitly expressed  or  clearly implied.  On an analysis of the provisions of the Act  under consideration,  it is clear that although the  Act  provides that it is the duty of the authority to give proper  hearing to  the parties ..allowing them to tender such  evidence  as they think proper before making an order which may have far- reaching  consequences and which is final under s. 20(6)  of

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the  Act,  the  Act  is not a complete  Code,  as  there  no provision for appeal or revision from the direction of  the, authority  under  s.  20(3); nor  is  any  further  scrutiny provided  by any higher authority against the imposition  of penalty,.   The Act in terms does not bar the employer  from instituting a suit when his claim is that he has been called upon  to pay wages and compensation to persons who  are  not governed  by  the  notification  under  the  Act.   In  such circumstances it is impossible to hold that the  legislature meant  to  exclude the jurisdiction of civil  court.  [265B; 266E-F; 271E; 271H-272H] Secretary  of State v. Mask & Co. 67 I.A. 222  Wolverhampton New Water Works Co. v. Hawkesford, [1859] 6 C.B. (N.S.) 336, Pyx  Granite  Co.  Ltd. v. Ministry  of  Housing  and  Local Government  [1960] A.C. 260, Raleigh Investment Co. Ltd.  v. Governor  General  in Council, 74 I.A, 50, Firm  and  Illuri Subbayya Chetty & Sons v. The State of Andhra Pradesh [1964] 1 S.C.R. 752, Kala Bhandar v. Municipal 260 261 Committee,  [1965] 3 S.C.R. 499, Kamala Mills Ltd. v.  State of  Bombay, [1966] 1 S.C.R. 64, K. S. Venkataraman & Co.  v. State  of Madras, [1966] 2 S.C.R. 229 and Firm Radha  Kishan (deceased)  represented  by Hari  Kishan  v.  Administrator, Municipal Committee, Ludhiana, [1964] 2 S.C.R. 273, referred to. "Lettera Challan" workers do not fall within the  expression "Ordinary  unskilled  workers" which  means  such  unskilled workers as work for the prescribed period of a full day.  On the evidence adduced it is clear that the "lettera  challan" labour only works for half the day and is unwilling to  work for  the  prescribed  period of full day.  Such  a  case  is covered  by  the  proviso to s. 15 and such  labour  is  not entitled to wages for a full normal working day. [272F-G]

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 288-291  of 1966. Appeals  by special leave from the judgment and order  dated December  7, 1962 of the Assam High Court in  First  Appeals Nos. 16-19 of 1967. P.   K.  Goswami and R. Gopalakrishnan, for  the  appellants (in all   the appeals). H.  R. Gokhale, Naunit Lal and B. P. Singh,  for  respondent No.1 .(in all the appeals). The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Mitter, J. The central question in these appeals is, whether the civil court had jurisdiction to entertain the suits  and grant the reliefs claimed. The facts are as follows:-By a notification dated March  11, 1952  the  Governor of Assam fixed the minimum  wages  which were  to  come into force with effect from March  30,  1952, consisting of basic wages and dearness allowance in terms of cl. (i), sub-s. (1) of s. 4 of the Minimum Wages Act,  1948, at  the rates specified in the Schedule to the  notification payable to the employees employed in tea plantations in  the different  districts of Assam.  Under the notification,  the rates  were  to be exclusive of concessions enjoyed  by  the workers  in  respect  of supplies of  food-stuff  and  other essential  commodities and amenities which were to  continue unaffected.   Further, the existing tasks and hours of  work were  to continue until further orders.  The Schedule  shows that  the notification was to apply to  "ordinary  unskilled labour"  which  was again sub-divided  into  three  classes,

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namely,  (a) adult male (16 years and above); (b) adult  and female (16 years and above) and (c) working children  (below 16  years and above 12 years).  The rates were again  to  be different  in the different districts of Assam  which  were, broadly speaking, divided into three sections.  On April 16, 1952  the Government of Assam published the  Minimum  ’Wages Rules  which  fixed the number of hours in the  case  of  an adult  for a normal working day to nine hours, subject to  a maximum of 48 hours in a, week, On June 2, 1953, the  Deputy Commissioner of Lakhimpur served a notice on the manager  of one 262 of  the appellants, Borhapjan Tea estate to the effect  that the  minimum wages prescribed had not been paid to a  number of  employees in accordance with the prescribed  rate.   The addressee  was  required to pay the  outstanding  amount  of wages  with the requisite amount of delayed compensation  to the  employees  in conformity with s. 20(3) of  the  Minimum Wages  Act  and report compliance on or before the  10th  of June, 1953.  The manager was further directed to show  cause why  prosecution should not be sanctioned for  violation  of the provision of the said Act.  A list of the employees with their  names  was given showing 24 men labourers,  58  women labourers  and  one  girl labourer.   Similar  notices  were issued  to  the  managers of the  other  tea  estates.   The managers submitted written replies to the authority  denying liability  for payment of the amount claimed in the  notice. By  order dated June 2, 1954 the above  mentioned  authority directed  the  different tea estates to pay  the  difference between the full minimum wages and the amounts actually paid to  the  labourers.  It does not appear that  the  authority concerned  held any inquiry or received any evidence  beyond meeting the managers of the four tea estates at the premises of  the Doom-Dooma Club where the Government Labour  Officer was  also present.  He however recorded an order dated  June 2, 1954 to the effect that the contention of the managements of  the tea estates that the Lettera Challans who by  reason of  their old age, infirmity and physical defects etc.  were incapable  of  performing a full normal working  day’s  work could  not be accepted.  According to the order, "the  point for  decision  was,  whether a Lettera  Challan  worker  was entitled  to  the  same rate of  wages  as  ordinary  labour working  full  normal  working days".  From  the  order,  it appears that the authority concerned knew of the  employment of  this kind of sub-normal workers by various  tea  estates but  he held that, in the absence of an order for  exemption by  the  Government in terms of S. 26 of the  Minimum  Wages Act, he had to guide himself by the notification  mentioned. He  held further that under the Act and the  Rules,  Lettera Challan labour, in spite of the amount of work (time or task rate) performed by them was to be treated as ordinary labour entitled  to  wages  for a full normal  day.   He  therefore directed  that  the tea estates should  pay  the  difference between the full minimum wages and the amount actually paid, together with compensation which he fixed at three times the amount  payable to each worker.  The tea estates filed  four separate  suits  for a declaration that the  orders  of  the Deputy  Commissioner,  Lakhimpur  dated June  2,  1954  were illegal  and  void and without jurisdiction  and  a  further declaration   that  the  employees   mentioned   (sub-normal workers)  were  not entitled to full minimum  wages  without performing  a  normal  day’s task  of  without  working  the prescribed  number of working hours.  The Subordinate  Judge framed  a,  number  of issues including  one  regarding  the maintainability of the suits, heard evidence and came to the

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conclusion  that the decision or orders of the  Deputy  Com- missioner  were all final in terms of the Minimum Wages  Act and the suits were barred "under the provisions of the Act". The 263 learned  Judges of the High Court of Assam, by  a  majority, upheld the decision of the Subordinate Judge. The  evidence of the managers of the tea estates was to  the effect that in each tea garden there was a number of workers described as Lettera Challans who were unwilling to  perform the  normal  tasks which were available to  them  as  normal labourers,  that they worked for only half the day and  were unwilling to work for the full day as other labourers. In  order  to  determine  whether  a  suit  challenging  the decision  of the authority under the Act is maintainable  or not,  it is necessary to take a, note of the object  of  the Act  and  its provisions in general.  The  Act  was  clearly aimed  at  providing for fixing minimum rates  of  wages  in certain   employments  which  were  defined   as   scheduled employments.   An  ’employee’  meant  any  person  who   was employed  for  hire  or reward to do any  work,  skilled  or unskilled, manual or clerical, in a scheduled employment  in respect of which minimum rates of wages had been fixed.   S. 3  empowered the appropriate government to fix  the  minimum rates  Of  Wages  payable  to,  employees  employed  in   an employment  specified in Part I or Part II of  the  Schedule and  in an employment added to either Part  by  notification under s. 27.  Under sub-s. (2) of s. 3 Government might  fix a  minimum  rate of wages for time work, a minimum  rate  of wages for piece work, a minimum rate of remuneration in  the case of employees employed on piece work for the, purpose of securing to such employees a minimum rate of wages on a time work  basis, and a minimum rate (whether a time rate  or a piece  rate) to apply in substitution for the  minimum  rate which  would otherwise be applicable in respect of  overtime work  done  by employees.  The section  also  empowered  the Government  to  fix different minimum rates  in  respect  of different scheduled employments as also different classes of work   in   the  same  scheduled  employment   for   adults, adolescents, children and apprentices as also for  different localities.   Under  s. 4 the minimum rate  of  wages  fixed might consist of basic rate of wages and a special allowance at  a rate to be adjusted or a basic rate of wages  with  or without  the  cost  of  living  allowance.   S.12  made   it obligatory on the employer to pay to every employee  engaged in a scheduled employment Wages at a rate not less than  the minimum rate of wages fixed by the notification.  Under s.13 it was open to the appropriate government to fix the  number of  hours of work which were to constitute a normal  working day  in regard to any scheduled employment.  S. 15  provided as follows:               "If  an employee whose minimum rate  of  wages               has been fixed under this Act by the day works               on  any  day on which he was  employed  for  a               period less than the requisite number of hours               constituting  a normal working day, he  shall,               save  as  otherwise hereinafter  provided,  be               entitled  to receive wages in respect of  work               done by him on 264               that day as if he had worked for a full normal               working day:               Provided,  however,  that  he  shall  not   be               entitled  to receive wages for a  full  normal               working day-

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             (i)  in any case where his failure to work  is               caused by his unwillingness to work and not by               the  omission of the employer to  provide  him               with work, and               (ii) in such other cases and circumstances  as               may be prescribed." S. 20 with the marginal note "claims" is divided into  seven subsections.  Sub-s. (1) empowers the appropriate government to  appoint a person of the qualifications mentioned  to  be the  authority to hear and decide all claims arising out  of payment of less than the minimum rates of wages.  Sub-s. (2) provides  for  the application to the said authority  for  a direction  under sub-s. (3) in all cases where  an  employee has any claim of the nature referred to in sub-s. (1).  Such application  may be made inter alia by the employee  himself or  any legal practitioner or any official of  a  registered trade union.  Sub-s. (3) runs as follows:-               "When any application under sub-section (2) is               entertained,  the  Authority  shall  hear  the               applicant  and the employer, or give  them  an               opportunity  of  being heard, and  after  such               further  inquiry  if any, as it  may  consider               necessary, may, without prejudice to any other               penalty  to which the employer may  be  liable               under this Act, direct-               (i)  in  the case of a claim  arising  out  of               payment  of  less than the  minimum  rates  of               wages,  the  payment to the  employee  of  the               amount  by which the minimum wages payable  to               him exceed the amount actually paid,  together               with  the amount of such compensation  as  the               Authority  may  think fit, not  exceeding  ten               times the amount of such excess-,               (ii)  in  any other case, the payment  of  the               amount due to the employee, together with  the               payment of such compensation as the  Authority               may  think fit, not exceeding ten rupees,  and               the  Authority  may  direct  payment  of  such               compensation in cases where the excess or  the               amount  due  is paid by the  employer  to  the               employee   before   the   disposal   of    the               application." Sub-s.  (4)  empowers the authority to levy  a  penalty  not exceeding  Rs. 50/- if he is satisfied that the  application was  either malicious or vexatious.  Sub-s.  (5)  prescribes for the manner of recovery of the amount directed to be paid under the section.  Under sub-s. (6) "every direction of the Authority under this section shall be final". 265 Sub-s.  (7) clothes every Authority appointed  under  sub-s. (1) with the powers of a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure  for  the  purpose  of  taking  evidence  and   of enforcing  the  attendance of witnesses and  compelling  the production  of  documents etc.  S. 24  contains  an  express provision for the bar of suits of certain kinds.  It reads:               "No  Court  shall entertain any suit  for  the               recovery  of  wages in so far as  the  sum  so               claimed-               (a)   forms  the  subject  of  an  application               under  section 20 which has been presented  by               or on behalf of the plaintiff,or               (b)   has  formed the subject of  a  direction               under that section in favour of the plaintiff,               or               (c)   has  been  adjudged  in  any  proceeding

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             under  that  section  not to  be  due  to  the               plaintiff, or               (d)   could   have   been  recovered   by   an               application under that section". Under  s. 25 any contract or agreement by which an  employee relinquishes or reduces his right to a minimum rate of wages etc,  is to be null and void.  Sub-s. (1) of s. 26  empowers the appropriate government, subject to such conditions as it may  think fit to impose, to direct that the  provisions  of the Act shall not apply in relation to the wages payable  to disabled employees. Our task is to ascertain whether the above provisions of the Act  impose a bar on the institution of suits of the  nature described  in this case either expressly or impliedly.   The question  of  maintainability of civil  suits  to  challenge actions  purported to have been taken under certain  special statutes has engaged the attention of this Court in a number of  cases in recent years as also of the Judicial  Committee of the Privy Council before the establishment of this Court. Under  s. 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure "the courts  have jurisdiction  to try all suits. of a civil nature  excepting suits  of  which  their cognizance is  either  expressly  or impliedly  barred".  In Secretary of State v. Mask &  Co.(1) the  question  was, whether the order of  the  Collector  of Customs  on  an appeal under s. 188 of the Sea  Customs  Act from a decision or an order passed by an officer of  Customs as  to  rate of duty leviable under a  tariff  excluded  the jurisdiction of the civil court to entertain a challenge  on the  merits of the decision of the Officer of  Customs.   It was  pointed  out  that the determination  of  the  question depended  on  the  terms of  the  particular  statute  under construction  and  decisions on other  statutory  provisions were not of material assistance except in so far as  general principles of construction were laid down.  The Board relied upon  the exposition of law by Willes, J.  in  Wolverhampton New Waterworks Co. v. Hawkesford(2) that-               "where a liability not existing at common  law               is created by a statute which at the same time               gives  a  special and  particular  remedy  for               enforcing it" (1) 67 I.A. 222, 237. (2) [1859] 6 C.B. (N.S.) 336. 266 the  party  must  adopt  the form of  remedy  given  by  the statute.  S. 188 of the Sea Customs Act was one of a  number of  sections  contained in Chapter XVII of  the  Act  headed "Procedure relating to offences, appeals etc." and  included ss.   169  to  193.   S.  182  provided  for  liability   to confiscation  or increased rates of duty in  certain  cases. S. 188 laid down that any person deeming him-self  aggrieved by  any  decision or order passed by an officer  of  Customs under the Act may, within three months from the date of such decision  or  order, appeal therefrom to the  Chief  Customs Authority, or, in such cases as the Local Government directs to any officer of Customs not inferior in rank to a Customs- Collector and empowered in that behalf by name or in  virtue of  his  office by the Local Government.   Such  officer  or authority  may thereupon make such further enquiry and  pass such  order  as  he  thinks  fit,  confirming,  altering  or annulling  the decision or order appealed against and  every order passed in appeal under this section was to be, subject to the power of revision conferred by s. 191, final. According to the Judicial Committee ss. 188 and 191 contain- ed a precise and self-contained code of appeal in regard  to obligations which were created by the statute itself, and it

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enabled the appeal to be carried to the supreme head of  the executive government.  The Board observed:               "It  is  difficult to  conceive  what  further               challenge  of  the order was  intended  to  be               excluded  other than a challenge in the  civil               courts." The well known dictum of this judgment to be found at p. 236 is  that  the  exclusion of the jurisdiction  of  the  civil courts  is  not to be readily inferred, but  such  exclusion must  either be explicitly expressed or clearly implied  and even  if  jurisdiction was excluded the civil  courts  would still  have  jurisdiction to examine into  cases  where  the provisions  of  the Act had not been complied with,  or  the statutory  tribunal  had not acted in  conformity  with  the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. In  Pyx  Granite Co. Ltd. v. Ministry of Housing  and  Local Government(1) Viscount Simonds observed:               "It  is  a principle not by any  means  to  be               whittled  down that the subject’s recourse  to               Her Majesty’s courts for the determination  of               his  rights  is not to be excluded  except  by               clear words." In Raleigh Investment Co. Ltd. v. Governor General in  Coun- cil(2)  where  the  plaintiff-appellant  had  filed  a  suit claiming a declaration that certain provisions of the Indian Income-tax  Act purporting to authorise the  assessment  and charging  to tax of a non-resident in respect  of  dividends declared or paid outside British India, but not brought into British  India, were ultra vires the legislative  powers  of the Federal Legislature and for repayment (1) [1960] A.C. 260, 286.     (2) 74 I.A. 50, 62. 267 of  the  sums mentioned, the  Judicial  Committee  observed, while dismissing the appeal, that               "In  construing the sections it is  pertinent,               in  their  Lordship’s  opinion,  to  ascertain               whether  the  Act  contains  machinery   which               enables  an assessee effectively to  raise  in               the  courts the question whether a  particular               provision  of  the Income-tax bearing  on  the               assessment made is or is not ultra vires.  The               presence of such machinery, though by no means               conclusive, marches with a construction of the               section    which   denies    an    alternative               jurisdiction to inquire into the same  subject               matter." The Judicial Committee examined the different provisions  of the Indian Income-tax Act in some detail including s. 67  of the  Act  and came to the conclusion that as  the  machinery provided  by  the Act could be effectively  adopted  by  the assessee complaining of ultra vires assessment "jurisdiction to  question  the assessment otherwise than by  use  of  the machinery  expressly provided by the Act would appear to  be inconsistent with the statutory obligation to pay arising by virtue of the assessment." It must be noted at once that the above extreme  proposition of  law  has  not found favour here.   This  Court  was  not prepared to accept the dictum in the judgment to the  effect that   even  the  constitutional  validity  of  the   taxing provision  would  have  to be  challenged  by  adopting  the procedure  prescribed  by the Income-tax  Act-see  Firm  and Illuri  Subbayya  Chetty  &  Sons v.  The  State  of  Andhra Pradesh(1).  In this case, the Court had to examine  whether s.  18-A of the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1939  excluded the jurisdiction of civil courts to set aside or modify  any

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assessment made under the Act.  S. 18-A there provided  that no  suit  or  other proceeding shall,  except  as  expressly provided  in  this Act, be instituted in any  court  to  set aside or modify any assessment made under this Act.  It  was common  ground that there was no express provision  made  in that  Act  under which the suit could be said to  have  been filed.  It was there emphasised that:               "..............while  providing for a  bar  to               suits  in ordinary civil courts in respect  of               matters  covered by s. 18-A,  the  legislature               has  taken the precaution of safeguarding  the               citizens’  rights  by providing  for  adequate               alternative  remedies.  Section 11 of the  Act               provides for appeals to such authority as  may               be   prescribed;  s.  12  confers   revisional               jurisdiction  on the authorities specified  by               it, s. 12-A allows an appeal to the  appellate               Tribunal;  s. 12-B provides for a revision  by               the  High Court under the cases  specified  in               it; s. 12-C provides for an appeal to the High               Court;  and s. 12-D lays down that  petitions,               applications and appeals to High Court  should               be  heard  by  a Bench of not  less  than  two               Judges......  It could thus be seen  that  any               dealer who (1)  [1964] 1 S.C.R. 752, 760. 268               is aggrieved by an order of assessment passed’               in  respect  of his  transactions,  can  avail               himself  of  the  remedies  provided  in  that               behalf by these sections of the Act.  It is in               the  light  of  these  elaborate   alternative               remedies  provided by the Act that  the  scope               and effect of S. 18-A must be judged." In Kala Bhandar v. Municipal Committee(1)-a suit for  refund of  excess tax purported to be recovered under  the  Central Provinces  and  Berar Municipalities Act  (2  of  1922)-this Court  examined the principles laid down in the above  cases and said:               "Further, one of the corollaries flowing  from               the  principle  that the Constitution  is  the               fundamental law of the land is that the normal               remedy  of  a  suit  will  be  available   for               obtaining  redress against the violation of  a               constitutional  provision.   The  court  must,               therefore, lean in favour of construing a  law               in  such a way as not to take away this  right               and render illusory the protection afforded by               the Constitution." The Court found that there was no machinery provided by  the Act for obtaining a refund of tax assessed and recovered  in excess  of the constitutional limit and that  the  machinery actually  provided by the Act was not adequate for  enabling an  assessee to challenge effectively the  constitutionality or legality of assessment or levy of a tax by a municipality or  to  recover from it what was realised under  an  invalid law. In Kamala Mills Ltd. v. State of Bombay(2) this Court had to examine  the  question  whether a suit filed  by  the  Mills challenging assessments made under the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1946  was  barred under the provisions of s. 20.   The  said section read as follows:               "Save  as is provided in S. 23, no  assessment               made and no order passed under this Act or the               rules  made thereunder by the Commissioner  or

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             any person appointed under s. 3 to assist  him               shall  be  called into question in  any  civil               court, and save as is provided in sections  21               and 22, no appeal or application for  revision               shall  lie  against  any  such  assessment  or               order." After examining the various sections of the Act including S. 5  the  charging section, s. 10 imposing  an  obligation  on dealers  to make returns, s. 11 dealing with the  assessment to tax and the procedure to be followed in respect  thereof, s.  11-A dealing with turnover which had escaped  assessment and  the right to prefer an appeal and a revision under  ss. 21 and 22 of the Act, the Court said:               "It  would thus be seen that  the  appropriate               authorities  have been given power in  express               terms to examine the (1) [1965] 3 S.C.R. 499.     (2) [1966] 1 S.C.R. 64, 75. 269               returns  submitted by the dealers and to  deal               with..the   question   as   to   whether   the               transactions  entered into by the dealers  are               liable  to  be  assessed  under  the  relevant               provisions of the Act or not.  In our opinion,               it   is   plain  that  the  very   object   of               constituting appropriate authorities under the               Act  is  to  create  a  hierarchy  of  special               tribunals to deal with the problem of  levying               assessment of sales tax as contemplated by the               Act.   If we examine the  relevant  provisions               which    conferred   jurisdiction    on    the               appropriate authorities to levy assessment  on               the  dealers  in respect  of  transactions  to               which  the  charging section  applies,  it  is               impossible  to escape the conclusion that  all               questions  pertaining to the liability of  the               dealers to pay assessment in respect of  their               transactions are expressly left to be  decided               by  the appropriate authorities under the  Act               as matters falling within their  jurisdiction.               Whether or not a return is correct; whether or               not  transactions which are not  mentioned  in               the  return, but about which  the  appropriate               authority  has  knowledge,  fall  within   the               mischief of the charging section; what is  the               true  and  real  extent  of  the  transactions               which  are  assessable; all these and   priate               authorities   themselves............       The               whole  activity of assessment  beginning  with               the  filing of the return and ending  with  an               order   of   assessment,  falls   within   the               jurisdiction of the appropriate authority  and               no  part  of  it can be  said  to  continue  a               collateral   activity   not   specifically:and               expressly included in the jurisdiction of  the               appropriate authority as such." it  was in the light of these provisions of the Act that  s. 20 had to be  examined and this Court held that  "the  words used  were so wide that even erroneous orders of  assessment made  would be entitled to claim its protection against  the institution of a civil suit"-see   [1966]  1 S.C.R. at  page 78. To quote the words of the judgment itself :               "In   every  case,  the  question  about   the               exclusion of the jurisdiction of civil  courts               either  expressly or by necessary  implication               must be considered in the light of the

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             words used in the statutory provision on which               the plea is rested, the scheme of the relevant               provisions, their object and their purpose." The Court further said:      "Whenever  it  is urged before a civil court  that  its jurisdiction  is excluded either expressly or  by  necessary implication to entertain claims of a civil nature, the court naturally  feels  inclined to consider  whether  the  remedy afforded by an alternative provision prescribed by a special 270               statute  is sufficient or adequate.  In  cases               where  the  exclusion  of  the  civil  courts’               jurisdiction  is expressly provided  for,  the               consideration as to the scheme of the  statute               in question and the adequacy or sufficiency of               the  remedies  provided  for  by  it  may   be               relevant  but cannot be decisive.   But  where               exclusion is pleaded as a matter of  necessary               implication, such considerations would be very               important,  and in conceivable  circumstances,               might  even  become decisive.  If  it  appears               that  a statute creates a special right  or  a               liability  and provides for the  determination               of the right and liability to be dealt with by               tribunals   specially  constituted   in   that               behalf,  and  it further lays  down  that  all               questions  about the said right and  liability               shall  be  determined  by  the  tribunals   so               constituted,  it becomes pertinent to  enquire               whether  remedies  normally  associated   with               actions in civil courts are prescribed by  the               said  statute or not.  The relevance  of  this               enquiry  was accepted by the Privy Council  in               dealing  with s. 67 of the Income Tax  Act  in               Raleigh  Investment Co.’s case(1) and that  is               the  test  which is usually,  applied  by  all               civil courts." We  may  also note the case of K. S. Venkataraman &  Co.  v. State  of Madras(2) where the above authorities  were  again examined  at some length.  Here too the main  question  was, whether  the suit was not maintainable under s. 18-A of  the Madras  General  Sales  Tax Act, 1939.  It  was  held  by  a majority  of this Court that the validity of an order by  an authority acting under the provision of a statute which  was ultra  vires  would be open to challenge in a  civil  court. Referring  to  the  case of  Firm  Radha  Kishan  (Deceased) represented by Hari Kishan v. Administrator, Municipal  Com- mittee, Ludhiana(3) it was said that:               "  a suit in a civil court will always lie  to               question the order of a tribunal created by  a               statute, even if its order is, expressly or by               necessary implication made final, if the  said               tribunal  abuses  its power or  does  not  act               under   the  Act  but  in  violation  of   its               provisions." There can be no question in this case that the minimum Wages Act  cuts across the contract between the employer  and  the employee and wherever applicable the employer is obliged  to pay the minimum wages or take the consequences of failure to pay  it.   Any employee who feels himself aggrieved  by  the refusal of the employer to pay the minimum wages fixed under the Act has the right to make a complaint either by  himself or through the prescribed agents to the Authority  mentioned in the Act.  Under sub-s. (3) of s. 20, the Authority has to hear  the  applicant  and  the  employer  or  give  them  an

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opportunity  of being heard and could ,straightaway  give  a direction as regards the alleged non-payment (1) I.A. 50.                   (2) [1966] 2 S.C.R. 229. (3)  [1964] 2 S.C.R. 273. 271 of  the minimum rates of wages and such compensation  as  he thinks fit not exceeding ten times the amount of the  excess of  the minimum wages over that which was paid.  It is  true that the sub-section provides for a further inquiry but such inquiry  is to be at the discretion of the  authority.   The nature  and scope of the inquiry would depend on  the  exact controversy  raised  in  the case.  If it be  of  a  trivial nature, the tribunal can probably deal with it in a  summary manner, but where it is alleged that the notification  under the Act is not applicable to a. certain class of workers  it is the duty of the authority to give a proper hearing to the parties allowing them to tender such evidence as they  think proper  before making an order which may  have  far-reaching consequences.   The  authority  in  this  case  instead   of recording  any  evidence and properly  hearing  the  matter, disposed of it in a perfunctory manner which could hardly be called  a  hearing.  As a matter of fact, the  only  inquiry which  took place in this case was a, very informal  one  in the premises of the Doom-Dooma club for the space of half an hour  or so when the Authority had a talk with the  managers of  the  tea estates.  There is no provision for  appeal  or revision against the direction of the Authority although  he may levy a penalty to the extent of ten times the amount  by which  the minimum wages overtop the payment actually  made. Whatever he says is the final word on the subject.  All this can  but lead to the conclusion that s. 20 was not aimed  at putting  a, seal on the adjudication, if any, under it.   It was  to  be of a nature which suited the discretion  of  the officer  concerned  although he was given the  powers  of  a civil court in certain respects.  In such a situation, it is impossible to hold that the legislature meant to exclude the jurisdiction of civil courts to go into the question of non- payment of minimum wages claimed as final.  In our  opinion, sub-s. (6) of s. 20 merely shows that the discretion of  the Authority could not be questioned under any provision of the Act.   It  does not exclude the jurisdiction  of  the  civil court  when the challenge is as to the applicability of  the Act to a certain class of workers. It  is  pertinent to note that s. 24 of the Act  creates  an express  bar  in  respect of a  particular  kind  of  suits, namely,   suits   for   recovery   of   wages   in   certain eventualities.   The  obvious  intention  was  that  a  poor employee  was  not  to be driven to fit--  a  suit  for  the payment of the deficit of his wages but that he could  avail himself  of the machinery provided by the Act to  get  quick relief.   It  does  not  in  terms  bar  the  employer  from instituting a suit when his claim is that he has been called upon  to pay wages and compensation to persons who  are  not governed by the notification under the Minimum Wages Act. On  an  analysis of the provisions of the Act, we  find  (1) suits  of  the  nature  to be found in  this  case  are  not expressly  barred by the Act; (2) there is no provision  for appeal or revision from the direction of the authority given under  s.  20(3) of the Act; and (3)  the  authority  acting under  s. 20(3) might levy a penalty which might be as  high as ten times the alleged deficit of payment which 272 again  is not subject to any further scrutiny by any  higher authority.   In view of our findings as above, as  also  the fact  that  the  authority  in  this  case  disregarded  the

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provision as to hearing and inquiry contained in the Act for all  practical  purposes, we hold that the civil  court  had jurisdiction to entertain the suits. The question next arises as to whether the plaintiff’s  made out  any case for relief.  In our view, the plaintiffs  were clearly  entitled to relief.  The notification  dated  March 11, 1952 was clearly applicable only to "ordinary  unskilled labour".   The  word  ’ordinary’ has in  our  opinion,  some significance.  It means "usual, not exceptional".  In  other words, ordinary unskilled labour must mean unskilled  labour prepared to work and working in the ordinary way.  If  under r. 24 of the rules framed under this Act the period of  work is fixed at nine hours a day, a labourer who cannot work for more  than half of it, does not fall within the category  of ordinary  unskilled labour.  A lettera challan  cannot  work due to his incapacity, old, age, infirmity, etc.   According to’  the evidence of the ’managers of the tea gardens,  they were unwilling to work for more than half the day because of their  physical  condition.   It was due to  their  want  of physical  strength to work for nine hours a day and not  the inability   or  unwillingness  of  the  employer   to   find employment  for them for a full day.  Take for instance  the ’facts  in  Pabbojan  Company’s  case.   According  to   the evidence  of  its manager, the labour force  in  the  estate consisted  of 1650 labourers while the number of  sub-normal workers  was  83  before  March  30,  1952.   It  cannot  be suggested that if the tea garden could provide work for 1567 labourers  working nine hours a day, it could not do so  for an  additional number of 83 persons.  As the  manager  said, these  persons  were unwilling to perform the  normal  tasks which  were  available  to them as  normal  labourers.   The manager   also  said   that  lettera  challans   (sub-normal workers)  always go off at 11 or 12 midday.  Take again  the evidence  of Bairagi, a worker of the Rupai Tea Estate.   He said  that  some years before he was examined in  court,  he used  to work as a carpenter.  As a result of a fall from  a house,  he had pain on his chest and approached  the  doctor and requested him to enter his name as lettera challan.   He frankly admitted that he got into lettera challan because he could  not  complete  the full task.  The  evidence  of  the managers  and  of  this the only witness on  this  point  on behalf  of  labour  establishes beyond  doubt  that  lettera challan could not work a full day and as such they were not ordinary  unskilled  labour.  As such their  case  would  be covered  by  the  proviso to S. 15 and  they  would  not  be entitled  to  receive wages for a full normal  working  day, because of their unwillingness to work.  It does not  matter whether  some of the lettera challans could also be said  to be  disabled employees who would come within the purview  of S. 26(1) of the Act.  From the evidence of the managers,  it is  clear  that the system of lettera challans had  been  in force for very many years.  The record does not show nor are we in a position to guess why an exception was not made in their case in the notification.  But 273 even  in the absence of any mention of lettera  challans  in the  notification, sub-normal workers who are  unwilling  to work  for more than half a day are not entitled  to  receive what  ordinary unskilled labourers working nine hours a  day get.   The  object  of the Act is to  ensure  some  sort  of industrial peace and harmony by providing that labour cannot be exploited and must at least be provided with wages  which are  fixed  at certain minimum rates.  It would  go  against such  a principle if the courts were to uphold that  persons who cannot work for more than half a day should receive what

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others  working a full day get.  However, that is  a  matter which the appropriate government may consider. We  therefore  hold that the orders of the defendant  No.  1 dated  June  2,  1954 were not binding  on  the  plaintiffs- appellants.   We declare that the subnormal workers  of  the tea  estates (commonly known as Lettera challans)  were  not entitled  to  full minimum wages without  performance  of  a normal  day’s task or without working the prescribed  number of  hours.  We also direct a perpetual injunction  to  issue against  the defendant No. 1 restraining him from  enforcing the  orders dated June 2, 1954.  The appeals  are  therefore allowed’ and the decrees passed by the Subordinate Judge and the  High  Court of Assam are set aside.  There will  be  no order as to costs. Y.P.                Appeals allowed. 274