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PETITIONER: THE OKARA ELECTRIC SUPPLY CO.  LTD., AND ANOTHER

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE STATE OF PUNJAB AND ANOTHER

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 13/11/1959

BENCH: GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. BENCH: GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P.(CJ) SUBBARAO, K. GUPTA, K.C. DAS SHAH, J.C.

CITATION:  1960 AIR  284            1960 SCR  (2) 239  CITATOR INFO :  R          1969 SC 239  (14)  RF         1989 SC1741  (11)

ACT: Constitution--Electricity  undertaking-Grant  of   temporary sanction   for   supplying  energy-Condition   imposed   for compulsory   acquisition  of  undertaking  on   Payment   of compensation-Whether    ultra   vires-Statute    authorising imposition  of such condition-Whether infringes  fundamental rights-Indian Electricity Act, 1910 (IX of 1910), s.  28(1)- Constitution of India, Arts. 19(1)(f) and Art. 31.

HEADNOTE: Section 28(1) of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 authorised the State Government to grant sanction to a non-licensee  to engage  in  the  business  of supplying  energy  on  "  such conditions   in  this  behalf  "  as  it  may  fix.   By   a notification  dated May 26, 1948, issued under S. 28(1)  the first  respondent granted sanction to the first  petitioner, to  engage in the business of supplying energy  to  Muktsar. Clause  11 of the notification provided that the  Provincial Government   shall   have  the  option  of   acquiring   the undertaking at anytime after October 21, 1950, after  giving one year’s notice and that it shall pay the price of  lands, buildings, works, material and plant that may be acquired at the  fair  market  value.  On January  3,  1958,  the  first respondent issued a notice exercising the option given under cl.  11  and  intimated to the first  petitioner  that  upon expiry of one year its undertaking shall vest and become the absolute  property of the first respondent.  On  January  4, 1959,   the   first  respondent  took  possession   of   the undertaking  in  pursuance of the notice.   The  petitioners contended that cl. 11 of the notification was ultra vires S. 28 and that if cl. 11 was justified by S. 28 then S. 28  was void as it offended Arts. 19 and 31 of the Constitution.  Held,  that cl. 11 of the notification was intra  vires  S. 28.   A  statutory provision which dealt with the  grant  of sanction to 240

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a person to engage in the business of supplying energy must, having  regard  to  the special features  of  the  business, necessarily  deal with the position which would arise on the termination  of the sanction ; so it could be  assumed  that such  statutory  provision  would  make  adequate  provision empowering   the  State  Government  to  provide   for   the compulsory  acquisition  of the assets of  the  supplier  on payment  of  proper compensation.  Though S. 28(1)  did  not specifically  provide for compulsory acquisition on  payment of  compensation, the expression " such conditions  in  this behalf " in S. 28(1) in the context would include conditions dealing with the position which would inevitably arise  when the business came to an end.  The sanction under S. 28 being necessarily temporary it was in the interest of  the:grantee himself  that  some  provision  was  made  for  payment   of compensation to him.  A condition for ’acquisition like  cl. 11 was, therefore, within the scope of S. 28(1).   New  Orleans  Gas Light Co. v. Louisiana  Light  and  Heat Producing  and  Manufacturing Co. 115 U.S. 650; 29  L.   Ed. 516, referred to.     Held,  further, that S. 28 was valid and did not  offend either Art. 19 or Art. 31.  The Act could not be  challenged on the ground of violating Art. 31(2) as it was an  existing law  which  was  saved  by  clause  (5)  of  the  Art.   31. Similarly,  it was saved by S. 299(4) of the  Government  of India  Act,  1935,  from  an attack  under  s.  299(2).  The restrictions  imposed  by S. 28 of the Act  were  reasonable restrictions imposed in the interests of the general  public within  the  meaning of Art. 19(5).  Such  limitations  were generally imposed on the business of supplying energy.

JUDGMENT:   ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Petition No. 19 of 1959.   Petition  under Article 32 of the Constitution  of  India, for enforcement of fundamental rights.   Veda   Vyasa,  S.  K.  Kapur  and  Ganpat  Rai,  for   the petitioners.    S.     M.  Sikri,  Advocate-General  for  the  State   of Punjab,    N.     S. Bindra and D. Gupta, for the respondents.   1959.  November  13.   The  Judgment  of  the  Court   was delivered by   GAJENDRAGADKAR  J.-The  Okara Electric  Supply  Co.  Ltd., which  is a Joint Stock Company and Shrimati V.  V.  Oberoi, one  of  the  principal shareholders  of  the  said  company (hereinafter  called petitioners 1 and 2 respectively)  have filed  the present petition against the State of Punjab  and the Punjab 241 State  Electricity Board (hereinafter called  respondents  1 and 2 respectively) in which they have claimed a writ, order or direction in respect of a notice issued The by respondent 1 on January 3, 1958.  The petition was presented on January 3,  1959  and it claimed an order or  writ  restraining  the respondents  from  giving  effect to the  said  notice.   It appears  that on January 4. 1959, in pursuance of  the  said impugned  notice  the  respondents took  possession  of  the petitioners’  property  in  question, and so,  by  an  order passed  by  the learned Chamber Judge the  petitioners  were allowed  to make an additional claim for a writ or order  or direction   in   the  nature  of  mandamus   directing   the respondents  to  hand  over  to  the  petitioners  the  said property  in question.  This petition is made on the  ground

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that the impugned notice and action taken by the respondents in  pursuance  of it are illegal and unauthorised  and  they affect  the petitioners’ fundamental rights under  Arts.  19 and 31 of the Constitution.  The  first petitioner was granted sanction under s.  28  of the  Indian Electricity Act, 1910 (9 of  1910)  (hereinafter called the Act) authorising it to engage in the business  of supplying  energy at Muktsar by Government Notification  No. 1766-1 & C-48/28784 published on May 26, 1948.  By virtue of the  said sanction the first petitioner has ever since  been engaged in the business of supplying electric energy at  the said  place and for the purpose of its business it  has  set tip  an electricity undertaking at considerable  cost.   On, January  3, 1958, the Secretary to respondent 1, P.  W.  D., Irrigation  and  Electricity  Branches,  Chandigarh,  issued notice  against the first petitioner purporting to  exercise the  option  given  to respondent 1 by cl. 11  of  the  said notification.  By this notice the first petitioner was  told that  respondent 1 had exercised its option under  the  said clause,  and -that on -the expiry of the period of one  year after the receipt of the notice by the first petitioner  its undertaking  shall vest in and become the absolute  property of respondent 1.  The first petitioner has been having bulk supply from P. W. D. Electricity branch of respondent 1, and, 31 242 according  to the petition, respondent 1 could not and  will not  take  over  the plant and yet  has  ordered  the  first petitioner that it cannot sell the plant without  permission of respondent 1. The imposition of this condition is  wholly illegal and it amounts to an unreasonable restriction on the petitioners’  right  to carry on business and  to  hold  and dispose of its property.  The  petition alleges that cl. 1 1 of the  notification  on which the impugned notice is founded is ultra vires s. 28 of the  Act,  and that alternatively, if the inclusion  of  the said clause in the notification is justified by s. 28 of the Act,  s. 28 itself is ultra vires since it  offends  against Arts.  19  and  31  of the Constitution.   It  is  on  these allegations  that originally the petition claimed  an  order against the enforcement of the notice and subsequently added the prayer for a writ of mandamus directing respondent 1  to restore to the petitioners possession of the property  which has been taken over by’ respondent 1 after the filing of the present petition.  The claim thus made is denied by both the respondents.   It is urged that the petitioners cannot challenge the  validity of cl. 11 which was accepted by them before the Constitution came  into force.  It is further urged that the said  clause is justified by the provisions of s. 28 of the Act and  that both  the said clause and s. 28 are intra vires  and  valid. The  respondents further alleged that after  possession  was taken of the property of the first petitioner in exercise of the  option  under  cl. 11 the  first  petitioner  had  been repeatedly called upon by the respondents to assist them  in making  a  proper  valuation  of the  assets  of  the  first petitioner taken over by the respondents.  In fact an amount of Rs. 60,000 has been paid to the first petitioner in  part payment  by way of compensation and it has been accepted  by it  though  under protest; but the work  of  completing  the valuation of the total assets has been delayed and  hampered by the non-cooperative attitude of the first petitioner.  Thus  the first question which falls to be decided on  this petition is whether cl.  11 of the notification is

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243 justified  by s. 28 of the Act.  The notification  consists of  14  clauses and it sets out exhaustively the  terms  and conditions  on which sanction had been granted to the  first petitioner  under s. 28 of the Act.  For the purpose of  the present  petition  it would be enough to refer to  11  only. This  clause provides that the provincial  Government  shall have  the  option  to acquire the undertaking  at  any  time October  21  1950, provided firstly That not less  than  one Year-,’  notice in writing of the election to acquire  shall be  served upon the supplier by the  Provincial  Government; provided secondly that the generating station shall not form part  of the undertaking for the purpose of  acquisition  if the undertaking is acquired after grid supply from the  East Punjab  Public  Works Department,  Electricity  Branch,  has reached Muktsar; provided thirdly that the price to be  paid to the supplier for such lands, buildings, works,  materials and  plant as may be acquired by the  Provincial  Government under this clause will be the fair market value at the  time of  purchase (without any addition in respect of  compulsory purchase  or of goodwill or of any profits which may  be  or might have been made from the undertaking) such value to  be in  case of difference or dispute determined by  arbitration in  the  manner  prescribed in s. 52 of  the  Act;  provided fourthly that the Provincial Government shall pay the  price of  the property acquired under this clause within a  period of six months after the price has been determined." Mr. Veda Vyas, for the petitioners, contends that the condition which gives respondent 1 the option to acquire the property of the petitioners is ultra vires.  We  are  concerned  with s. 28 as it  stood  prior  to  its amendment by Act 32 of 1959.  Section 28(1) reads thus : "  No  person, other than a licensee, shall  engage  in  the business  of  supplying  energy  except  with  the  previous sanction of the State Government and in accordance with such conditions  as the State Government may fix in this  behalf, and any agreement to the contrary shall be void." 244 The Act which was passed in 1910, to amend the law  relating to  the supply and use of electrical energy was intended  to provide for and regulate the supply of  energy  by  granting licences  and so the provisions in respect of  licences  are dealt with by ss. 3 to 27 in       Part  11.   Part  III  in which  s.  28 occurs deals with the supply  of  energy  non- licensees.   It  appears that the  Legislature  intended  to adopt  the  course of sanctioning the supply  of  energy  by lion-licensees as a temporary measure and in areas  wherever it  was expedient to do so.  A person other than a  licensee cannot  engage  in the business of supplying  energy  except with  the previous sanction of the State Government  and  s. 28(1)  authorises the State Government to impose  conditions subject  to  which  it proposes  to  grant  sanction.   This position  is  not  disputed; but the argument  is  that  the conditions  which  can be legitimately imposed  in  granting sanction must be such as would relate to or have bearing  on the business of supplying energy.  Such conditions " in this behalf  ", it is urged, cannot include any conditions as  to compulsory acquisition of the property of the person to whom sanction  is intended to be given.  The acquisition of  such property does not relate and has no bearing on the  business of  supplying energy and is in no manner connected with  it. It would be competent to the State Government to provide for the  area  of supply, the aerial lines, the  nature  of  the supply,  the  limitation  of prices to be  charged  for  the supply of energy and the purchase of energy in bulk.   These

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and  other  similar conditions can be properly  regarded  as conditions " in behalf of " the business if supplying energy ;  but  the  condition  of  compulsory  acquisition  of  the supplier’s  property cannot be treated as falling  under  s. 28(1). In  support of this construction reliance is placed  on  the provisions  of ss. 5 and 6 which specifically deal with  the question about the acquisition of the undertaking.   Section 3 of the Act provides for the granting of licences and s.  4 for  the  revocation  and  amendment  of  licences.   Having provided  for  the grant, revocation and  amendment  of  the licences s. 5 deals inter                             245 alia  with  the  question of  paying  compensation.  to  the licensee whose licence has been revoked similary s. 6  makes appropriate  provisions for compensation  where  the licence of  local  authority has been revoked.  Section  7  makes  a provision  for the purchase of an undertaking and lays  down the  procedure for determining the value of the  properties. The  petitioners urge that where the Legislature thought  it necessary  to acquire properties of the licensees either  on the  revocation or the cancellation of the licences  it  has made express provisions in that behalf; a similar  provision would  have  been  made in respect  of  persons  other  than licensees to whom sanction is granted under s. 28 if it  was in the contemplation of the Legislature that the  properties of  such  persons  may be  acquired.   Thus  presented,  the argument  no  doubt appears to be  plausible.   Prima  facie there is. some force in the contention that conditions "  in this  behalf " in the context should mean  conditions  which are relevant to or connected with the business of  supplying energy.  In deciding this question, however, it is essential to bear in mind the Specialnature    of   the    article, viz., energy for the supply ofwhich     sanction     is granted, and to take intoaccount the scheme of the  Act in regard to the conditions which are intended to be imposed on the business of its supply. In this connection it would not be unreasonable to ascertain how  the  supply  of. energy is  regulated  in  England  and America.   It  is  clear  that  the  Act  is  based  on  the provisions  of  the English law and it would  be  useful  to inquire,  whether  conditions  for the  acquisition  of  the supplier’s property were treated as a part of the conditions on  which the supplier was allowed to carry on the  business of  supplying  electricity.  This aspect  is  considered  by Halsbury  under  the heading Acquisition of  undertaking  by -Local  Authority  In Local Authority ", it is  observed,  " within whose jurisdiction the area of supply or any part  of it is situated may within six months after the expiration of 42  years  or any shorter period specified  in  the  special order from the coming to force of the said 246 order ... by a notice in writing require the undertakers  to sell and thereupon the undertakers must sell too them  their undertaking  or so much -of it as within  its  jurisdiction) upon terms of paving the then value of all lands, buildings, works,  materials and plant of the undertakers  suitable  to and  used by them for the purpose of the undertaking  within such jurisdiction such value to be determined by arbitration in case of difference (1)".  It would thus appear that where sanction was given to a person for carrying on the  business of supplying electricity under a special order, a  condition was  introduced in the said order itself for the  compulsory acquisition  of  the  undertaking  on  payment  of  adequate compensation to the person concerned.

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 Subsequently,  after the passing of the Electric  Lighting Act, 1909, powers to supply electricity were not granted  by provisional  orders but a large number of such orders  still remained in force; and, as Halsbury has observed, " many  of these  orders  are in a standard form but a  number  contain special clauses of which the most common is a clause  giving special purchase rights to local Authorities.  These special orders were confirmed by Acts and contained special  clauses for the protection of county bridges, for the breaking up of streets,  for the connection of the generating stations  and systems  of  different  undertakings and  the  use  of  such generating  stations  in  common for  the  purpose  of  such undertakings  " (2).  It is thus clear that where a  licence was  given  to a person to supply electricity  it  generally included the right of the licensing authority to acquire the licensee’s property on terms and conditions included in  the licence by the provisional order.  The  American  lawyers describe the right or  privilege  to supply electricity as a franchise.  This right falls under a class  of rights " in public streets which are  granted  for furtherance  of public purposes but which involving as  they do  the right to use the streets in (1)  Halsbury’s "Laws of  England", Vol. 12, 2nd  Ed.,  page 597, Art. 1152. (2)  Halsbury’s  "Laws of England", Vol. 12, 2nd  Ed.,  page 668, footnote (t). 247  various ways, give rise to a series of questions as between the   grantee  of  the  right  on  the  one  hand  and   the municipality  or abutting owners on the other " Dillon in  " Muncipal   Corporations  "  further  observes  that  "   for convenience these rights are described as franchises to  use the  public streets and highways, and whether  correctly  or incorrectly denominated franchises, they answer in essential respects to the definition and elements of a franchise  from the State ". " The business of furnishing water and light ", observes  the author, " when carried on by a corporation  or individual,  of  necessity involves the use of  streets  and highways  of the municipality; and the right to  lay  pipes, mains  and  conduits, and to erect poles and  stretch  wires therein  and  to  maintain,  operate  and  use  them,  is  a franchise vested in the State, and it can only be  exercised by  a  corporation or individual pursuant to  the  authority granted by the State "(2).  The  question  of  the purchase of works  of  companies  by municipality  is  also  considered by  Dillon:  "    Where a municipal corporation has granted a franchise to a water  or gas company to construct its plant, to use the city  streets for  pipes and mains, and to furnish water or light  to  the city  and  its  inhabitants,  it  has  been  held  that  the legislature  under special constitutional  restrictions  was without  authority  to  compel  the  city  to  purchase  the property or plant of the company if it desired to acquire or construct   works  of  its  own;  but  in  the  absence   of constitutional  limitations  statutes  may  be  enacted  and contracts made which in their effect prevent  municipalities from  establishing water works of their own until they  have at  least  offered  to purchase the  works  of  corporations organised  and  existing  within their limits  "  (3).   The learned author also says that " If a municipality stipulates in  a contract with a water or other public service  company that  it shall have the- right to purchase the works of  the company at a time and in a   (1)     Dillon’s  "Municipal Corporations", 5th Ed.,  Vol. 111, P. 1905, S. 1210.

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 (2)     Dillon’s  ,Municipal Corporations", 5th Ed.,  Vol. 111, p. 213637 S. 1304.  (3) Ibid, P. 2183, s. 1312, 248 manner specified, and if such stipulation is inserted in and becomes   a   part  of  a  grant  of  the   right   to   use Electric  the streets and public places of the  municipality for  the  purpose  of laying mains and  pipes,  the  corpor- ation is estopped to deny the authority of the  municipality to make and enforce the stipulation " (1).   In  New Orleans Gas Light Co. v. Louisiana Light and  Heat Producing and Manufacturing Co. (2), it has been held by the Supreme  Court  of the United States of America that  "  the manufacture and distribution of gas by means of pipes, mains and  conduits  placed  under legislative  authority  in  the public  ways of a municipality, is not an ordinary  business in  which everyone may engage as of common right upon  terms of  equality;  but is a franchise, relating  to  matters  of which the public may assume control and, when not  forbidden by  the  organic  law of the State, may be  granted  by  the Legislature  as a means of accomplishing public  objects  to whomsoever, and upon what terms, it pleases ". In that  case the  question which arose for decision of the court  related to the validity of the constitutional prohibition upon State laws  impairing  the obligation of contracts but  with  that aspect  of  the matter we are not concerned in  the  present appeal.  It thus appears that American lawyers describe  the business  of  supplying energy as well as  the  business  of supplying water and gas as a franchise, and it also  appears that  in granting licence or sanction to a person to  engage in  such  business, a condition is usually imposed  for  the compulsory  acquisition of the business when the licence  or sanction comes to an end.   Let  us  look at this question from a practical  point  of view.   If  a person is granted sanction to  engage  in  the business of supplying energy it is not denied that s.  28(1) would justify the imposition of a time limit on the grant of sanction.  If sanction is granted for a specified number  of years,  and  it  comes to an end what would  happen  to  the constructions  made  by  the supplier  for  the  purpose  of supplying energy ? He (1)  Ibid.   P. 2187, S. 1312. (2) 115 U.S. 650; 29  L.  Ed. 516. 249 cannot dismantle them because thereby he would cause  damage to  public property such as streets, and so he  cannot  take them away.  In such a case the Legislature may well  provide for  the  acquisition  of such  constructions  in  order  to safeguard  the  interest  of the person  to  whom  temporary sanction  is granted.  Such a provision also serves  another public  purpose. It guarantees the availability of  suitable constructions   and  works  which  may  be  used   for   the continuance of the supply of electricity by another  agency. In other words, the statutory provision which deals with the grant  of sanction to a person to engage in the business  of supplying energy must, having regard to the special features of  the business, necessarily deal with the  position  which would  arise on the termination of the sanction; and  so  it would  not  be  unreasonable to assume  that  the  statutory provisions  which  deals with this question would  think  of making adequate provision empowering the State Government to provide for the compulsory acquisition of the assets of  the supplier  on payment of proper compensation.  It is  in  the light  of this special feature of the business of  supplying energy that we must construe s. 28(1) of the Act.

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Besides,  the  provisions  of ss. 5, 6  and  7  also  afford assistance  in  the matter.  They clearly show that  in  the case of a licence specific provisions have been made for the acquisition  of  the undertaking in cases of  revocation  or cancellation of licences.  The reason for thus providing for compulsory acquisition of licensee’s undertaking is  equally relevant  in  the case of the sanction with which  s.  28(1) deals.   It  is true that s. 28 does  not  specifically  and expressly provide for compensation as the other sections do; but  that must be because recourse to the provisions of  Pt. III was intended not to be the rule but only as a  temporary measure  wherever it was deemed necessary to do so;  and  so the  Legislature left it to the State Government to  provide for  compulsory  acquisition in the light  of  the  guidance given by the provisions contained in ss. 5, 6 and 7. Let  us  then look at s. 28(1) in the light  of  these  con- siderations.  It authorises the State Government to 32 250 give  sanction  to  a person to engage in  the  business  of supplying   energy  on  conditions  in  that  behalf.    The expression " such conditions in this behalf " in the context should    -take    in   conditions    dealing    with    the Position  which  would inevitably arise  when  the  business comes   to   an   end.   There  is   no   doubt   that   the grant of sanction contemplated by s. 28 cannot be permanent. It-was  always  bound to be temporary, issued on an  ad  hoc basis  according to the requirement of each case,  and  when granting  sanction for a specified number of years it is  in the  interest  of the grantee himself  that  some  provision should  be  made  for payment of  compensation.  to  him  in respect  of the investment made by him in carrying  out  the business  of  supplying energy when otherwise  it  would  be difficult  for  him to collect his assets  in  that  behalf. That  is why we think that the relevant words should not  be given  a  narrow  and limited  construction  for  which  the petitioners  contend.  In our opinion, the context  requires that  the  said  words should receive a  wider  and  liberal construction.   A  condition  for  the  acquisition  of  the property  of the petitioners, like cl. 11 would,  therefore, fall  within  the scope of s. 28(1).  The challenge  to  the validity  of this condition on the ground that it  is  ultra vires s. 28(1) must accordingly fail.   If  s. 28 permits the imposition of such a condition  does it violate Art. 19 or Art. 31 of the Constitution ?  That is the  next  question  which must be considered.   It  is  not seriously  disputed  that Art. 31(2) on  which  reliance  is placed by the petitioners cannot be of much help to them for Art. 31(5) provides inter alia that nothing in cl. (2) shall affect the provisions of any existing law other than the law to which the provisions of cl. (6) applies.  It is  conceded that  cl. (6) does not apply to the Act, so that it  follows that Art. 31(2) cannot be invoked to challenge the  validity of  the  Act. Mr. Veda Vyas attempted to  contend  that  the vires of the Act could be challenged if not under Art. 31(2) at  least  under s. 299(2) of the Government of  India  Act, 1935;  but  he  realised that he was up  against  a  similar difficulty created by the provisions of s. 299(4) which says that nothing in s. 299 shall affect the provisions 251 of  any law in force at the date of the passing of the  Act; and  he  conceded that in 1910 when the Act was  passed  the Legislature  was competent to -pass it and it then  suffered from  no infirmity.  That is why though an attempt was  made to  press into service  Art. 31(2) it  was  ultimately given

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up.  We need not, therefore, discuss this point any further.  In  regard  to the attack on s. 28 on the  ground  that  it offends  Art.  19(f)  or (g) the  answer  is  obvious.   The limitations  imposed by s. 28 quite clearly  are  reasonable restrictions  and have been imposed in the interests of  the general  public  within  the meaning of  Art  19(5)  of  the Constitution.  As we have already seen such limitations  are generally  imposed on the business of supplying  energy  and their  reasonableness  cannot be and has in  fact  not  been seriously  challenged.  Therefore, we have no hesitation  in holding that the vires of s.  28   cannot  be   successfully challenged. Incidentally  we  may  observe  that on  the  day  when  the Constitution came into force what vested in the  petitioners was  the property subject to the liability imposed on it  by cl.  11 of the notification; and so, when  the  Constitution came into force the only rights which the petitioners had in their  property  in  question  were  rights  of  a   limited character which were subject to the exercise by the State of its  election  to  acquire  the  said  property.   In   this connection  the  respondents rely on, the decision  of  this Court in Director of Endowments, Government of Hyderabad  v. Akram  Ali(1)  and  seek to urge that the  exercise  of  the option  given to respondent 1 by cl. 11 of  the-notification cannot be successfully challenged as ultra vires under  Art. 19 of the Constitution; we do not, however, think it  neces- sary  to  decide this point because it was  fairly  conceded before us that if s. 28 is valid and is construed to include a condition like cl.  It of the notification no other  point would survive. There  is  one more minor point to which  reference  may  be made.   In the petition the validity of the notice given  by respondent   to the petitioners prohibiting them from dealing with the property was (1)  A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 60. 252 challenged;  but  that  is no longer  a  matter  in  dispute between  the  parties since respondent I  has  in  substance withdrawn the said notice.  This fact, however, would  be relevant on the question of costs. The result is the petition fails but in the circumstances of this case there would be no order as to costs.                                  Petition dismissed. 253