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PETITIONER: THE NAGPUR ELECTRIC LIGHT AND POWERCO., LTD. & OTHERS

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: K.   SHREEPATHIRAO

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 11/04/1958

BENCH: DAS, S.K. BENCH: DAS, S.K. BOSE, VIVIAN DAS, SUDHI RANJAN (CJ) AIYYAR, T.L. VENKATARAMA GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B.

CITATION:  1958 AIR  658            1959 SCR  463

ACT: Termination  of  Service-Company  Employee-Standing   Orders -Construction-Employees and workmen-Distinction.

HEADNOTE: The services of the respondent, an employee of the appellant company,  were  terminated in accordance with  the  Standing Orders   of  the  company,  approved  by   the   appropriate authorities   under   the  provisions  of   the   Industrial Employment  (Standing  Orders) Act, 1946,  and  the  Central Provinces  and  Berar Industrial  Disputes  Settlement  Act, 1947.   Standing Order NO. 2(a) defined " employees "  as  " all  persons ... employed in the Office or Mains  Department or  Stores  or  Power  House or  Receiving  Station  of  the Company  ... whose names and ticket numbers are included  in the departmental musters ". The Standing Orders also defined the term " workman " and provided that every workman  should have a ticket.  No ticket had been issued to the  respondent by  the company, and consequently his ticket number was  not included   in  the  departmental  muster.   The   respondent challenged  the  validity  of  the  order  terminating   his services by an application made before the High Court  under Art.  226  of the Constitution on the grounds,  inter  alia, that the Standing Orders in question were confined to  those employees  only to whom tickets were issued, and that as  no ticket  was issued to him he was not an employee within  the meaning of the Standing Orders which did not therefore apply to  him and, consequently, the termination of  his  services under Standing Order No. 16(1) was illegal: Held,  (1) that the words " whose names and  ticket  numbers are  included  in the departmental musters  "  occurring  in Standing Order NO. 2 (a) should be read as " whose names and ticket  numbers,  if any, are included in  the  departmental musters "; Cortis v. The Kent Water Works Company (1827) 7 B. & C. 314; 108 E. R. 741 and Perumal Goundan v. The  Thirumalarayapuram jananukoola Dhanasekhara Sangha Nidhi, (1918) I.L.R. 4I Mad. 624, applied. (2)that under the Standing Orders, in which a distinction is

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made between ’employees’ and ’workmen’, while every  workman must  have a ticket, there may be employees who may have  no tickets  the  possession  of  which  is  not  an   essential characteristic of an employee; and, (3)that  the  Standing Orders apply to all  employees  for whose benefit they have been made. 464 Accordingly,  the  Standing Orders were  applicable  to  the respondent and the termination of his service in  accordance with Standing Order No. 16(1) was valid and, therefore,  the application made by him to the High Court must fail.

JUDGMENT: CIA, IL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.5 of 1958. Appeal  by special leave from the judgment and  order  dated September  26,  1956,  of the former Nagpur  High  Court  in Letters  Patent  Appeal No. 66 of 1956, arising out  of  the judgment  and order dated April 14, 1956, of the  said  High Court in Misc.  Petition No. 6 of 1956. M.   C. Setalvad, Attorney-General of India, B. Sen, D.   B. Padhya and I. N. Shroff, for the appellants. R. V. S. Mani, for the respondent. 1958.  April II.  The Judgment of the Court was delivered by S.K.  DAS  J.-This is an appeal by  special  leave.   The appellants before us are the Nagpur Electric Light and Power Co. Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the Company), a  public limited  company having its registered office at  Nagpur  in Madhya  Pradesh,  its Manager, and Assistant  Manager.   The respondent,  Shreepathi  Rao,  joined  the  service  of  the Company as a typist on a salary of Rs. 30 per month in July, 1936.   He rose in rank from time to time and was  appointed Deputy  Head Clerk in 1947 in the grade of  Rs.  120-10-225. Since  1952 he has been receiving a basic salary of Rs.  245 per month.  On November 28, 1955, an explanation was  called for  from him with regard to the issue of certain  bills  to consumers of electricity called ".high tension consumers  ", without  having  certain  " notes  for  the  information  of consumers  "  printed  at  the  back  of  the  bills.    The respondent  submitted  his  explanation  on  the  next  day, marking  a  copy  thereof to one of  the  directors  of  the Company.  On December 2,1955, he was again asked to  explain why  he  marked  a copy of his explanation  to  one  of  the directors.   The  respondent  submitted  an  explanation  in respect of this matter also.  On the same date, he was  again  asked  to explain as to how and  why  certain  " double  adjustments " had been made in the accounts of  1954 relating  to the consumers’ department of the  Company,  the allegation  being  that  a sum  of  Rs.  1,05,894-7-7  which represented  the amount of bills of the Central Railway  had been  deducted  twice  in  the  accounts.   The   respondent submitted  an explanation on December 3, 1955, in  which  he said that the charge was vague and that, after 1949, he  was not  in any way concerned with the preparation of  summaries and   annual  statements  of  accounts  of   the   consumers department.  On December 5, 1955, an order of suspension was made against the respondent which stated that the order  was to  take  immediate  effect and to  remain  in  force  until further  orders,  pending  some  investigation  against  the respondent.   Two  days  later,  on  December  7,  1955,   a memorandum  was  served on the  respondent  terminating  his services with effect from January 31,1956.  The  memorandum, so far as it is relevant for our purpose, read- We  hereby give you notice under Standing Order  16(1)  that

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your  services will stand terminated as from  31st  January, 1956. The Company’s Managing Director is satisfied that it is  not in the interests of the business of the Company to  disclose reasons’ for terminating your services." On December 19, 1955, a notice was served on the Company  on behalf  of  the respondent wherein it was  stated  that  the order of suspension dated December 5, 1955, and the order of termination  dated December 7, 1955, were illegal and  ultra vires and a request was made to withdraw the said orders and reinstate the respondent within 24 hours, failing which  the respondent  said  that  he would take legal  action  in  the matter.   On December 26, 1955, the Company sent a reply  to the notice denying the allegations, and the company  further stated that it had no desire to enter into a discussion with the respondent as to the propriety of the orders passed. On  January 2, 1956, the respondent filed a  petition  under Art. 226 of the Constitution in the High Court 466 at  Nagpur in which he prayed for the issue  of  appropriate writs  or directions quashing the orders of  suspension  and termination  dated December 5, 1955, and December  7,  1955, respectively  and  asking for certain other  reliefs.   This petition  was  heard by a learned single  Judge  on  certain preliminary  objections  raised by the  present  appellants, and,  by  an  order  dated April 14,  1956,  he  upheld  the preliminary  objections  and dismissed  the  petition.   The preliminary  objections taken were these: it was urged  that the  service of the respondent was terminated in  accordance with  the  Standing Orders of the Company, approved  by  the relevant authorities under the provisions of the  Industrial Employment  (Standing  Orders)  Act,  1946  (XX  of   1946), hereinafter  referred to as the central Act, and also  under the provisions of the Central Provinces and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act, 1947 (C.  P. and Berar Act XXlll of 1947),  hereinafter  called  the  local  Act;  and  if   the respondent  had  any  grievance against  the  said  Standing Orders,  his  only  remedy was to get  the  Standing  Orders amended  as provided for in the relevant Act, but he had  no right  to  move  the  High  Court  under  Art.  226  of  the Constitution  for quashing the orders passed against him  or for reinstatement, etc.  Alternatively, it was urged that if the  Standing  Orders  did  not apply in  the  case  of  the respondent  as was the respondent’s case, then the  Ordinary law  of master and servant applied, and the only  remedy  of the  respondent  was  to  sue the  Company  in  damages  for wrongful  dismissal.   On these preliminary  objections  the learned  Judge  held  (1) that the  respondent  was  not  an employee  within  the  meaning of the  Standing  Orders  and therefore his case was not governed by the Standing  Orders; (2)  that  the relationship between the appellants  and  the respondent was contractual and not statutory and the  remedy of  the  respondent was to sue the Company  in  damages  for wrongful dismissal; and (3) as for amendment of the Standing Orders  so as to include the respondent and persons  in  his category, the only remedy open to the respondent was to take action  under the relevant Act by approaching  a  recognised union to move in the matter.                      467 On  the dismissal of his petition, the respondent  preferred an  appeal under el. 10 of the Letters Patent.  This  appeal was  heard and allowed by a Division Bench on September  26, 1956,  on the findings that (1) the Standing Orders did  not apply  to the respondent, though he was an  employee  within the meaning of that expression in s. 2 (1) of the local  Act

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;  (2)  the  conditions of  the  respondent’s  service  were governed by the provisions of the local Act and on a  breach thereof,  the respondent had a right to move the High  Court for  appropriate orders under Art. 226 of the  Constitution; and (3) as the termination of the service of the  respondent was  without statutory authority, it must be  vacated.   The Division  Bench accordingly allowed the appeal, quashed  the orders of suspension and termination of service and declared that  the  respondent  continued to bean  employee   of  the Company on terms which were applicable to him on the date of his suspension, namely, December 5, 1955.  There was also  a direction   to  the  Company  to  pay  back  wages  to   the respondent. The  appellants  herein then moved this Court  and  obtained special  leave  to  appeal from the order  of  the  Division Bench,  dated  September 26, 1956.  The present  appeal  has been  brought  in pursuance of the  order  granting  special leave to the appellants. The first and foremost question which arises for decision in this  appeal is whether the Standing Orders of  the  Company apply  to the respondent.  We have already stated-and it  is not  in dispute--that the Standing Orders were  approved  by the  certifying officer under the provisions of the  central Act and by the Labour Commissioner under s. 30 of the  local Act.  It is necessary to explain here the general scheme  of the  provisions  of the two Acts under  which  the  Standing Orders were approved.  Under the central Act, the expression " Standing Orders " means rules relating to matters set  out in  the Schedule, and s. 3 requires that within  six  months from the date on which the central Act becomes applicable to an industrial establishment the employer shall submit to the certifying officer five copies of the draft Standing  Orders proposed by him 468 for  adoption in his industrial establishment.   Sub-section (2)  of s. 3 lays down that provision shall be made in  such draft for every matter set out in the Schedule which may  be applicable  to the industrial establishment and where  model Standing  Orders have been prescribed, the draft  shall   so far  as  practicable, in conformity with  such  model.   The Schedule  refers to the matters which are to he provided  by Standing  Orders,  and item 8 of the Schedule relates  to  " termination  of  employment, and the notice  thereof  to  be given  by  employer and workman We may state here  that  the central  Act contains a definition of " workman " which,  at the material time in this case, meant any person employed in any industrial establishment to do any skilled or unskilled, manual  or clerical, labour for hire or reward, but did  not include any member of the armed forces.  Sections 4 to 10 of the  central Act deal with (a) conditions for  certification of  Standing Orders, (b) certification of  Standing  Orders, (e)  appeals, (d) date of operation of Standing Orders, (e) register of Standing Orders, (f) posting of Standing  Orders and (g) duration and modification of Standing Orders.  There are similar provisions in the local Act,Chapter IV of  which deals  with Standing Orders.Sub-section (1) of s. 30 of  the local Act lays down-- Every employer, in respect of any industry to which this Act has been made applicable under subsection (3) of section  1, shall, within two months of the (late of such  notification, submit  to  the Labour Commissioner for  approval,  in  such manner  as may be prescribed, a copy of the Standing  Orders concerning the relations between him and his employees  with regard to all industrial matters mentioned in Schedule 1. " Item 8 of Schedule I of the local Act is again " termination

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of  employment, notice to be given by employer and  employee ". The other sub-sections of s. 30 lay down the procedure to be  followed  for  the approval of Standing  Orders  by  the Labour  Commissioner,  appeal by an aggrieved  person,  etc. Sections  31 and 32 lay down the procedure for an  amendment of  the  Standing  Orders  either at  the  instance  of  the employer or at the 469 instance of a representative of employees.  It is worthy  of note  that  sub-s. (1) of s. 30 requires every  employer  to submit  to  the Labour Commissioner a copy of  the  Standing Orders   concerning  the  relations  between  him  and   his employees with regard to all industrial matters mentioned in Schedule 1. The local Act defines the expression "  employee " and, at the relevant time, it meant any person employed by an  employer  to  do any skilled  or  unskilled,  manual  or clerical  work  for  contract  or  hire  or  reward  in  any industry.   It  is worthy of note that the definition  of  " employee " in the local Act corresponds more or less to  the definition of " workman " under the central Act.  There  are some minor differences in the definition of the two  expres- sions in the two Acts, but with those differences we are not concerned in the present case. The  Standing  Orders  with which we are  concerned  in  the present case came into force on November 14, 1951, and it is convenient  at this stage to refer to the relevant  Standing Orders.   Standing Order no. 2 defines  certain  expressions used in the Standing Orders.  It states- In  these Orders, unless there is anything repugnant in  the subject or context (a)  "  employees  "  means all  persons,  male  or  female, employed  in  the Office or Mains Department  or  Stores  or Power  House or Receiving Station of the Company, either  at Nagpur  or  at  Wardha whose names and  ticket  numbers  are included in the departmental  musters. (b)  " The Manager " means the person appointed as such and includes  the  Assistant Manager and in relation  to  Wardha establishment " the Resident Engineer ". (c)  " Ticket " includes a Card, pass or token. (d)  "  Workman " means such categories of employees as  may from  time  to  time be declared to be " Workman  "  by  the Management ". Standing  Order  no.  3 classifies  employees  into  certain categories and Standing Order no. 4 deals with tickets.   In substance, it says that every workman, permanent 6 470 or temporary, shall have a ticket or card, and an apprentice shall  have an apprentice card; the tickets or cards  issued shall  be  surrendered  when the workman  is  discharged  or ceases  to belong to the class of employment for  which  the card  or ticket is issued.  It is to be noticed  that  under the  definition clause " workman " means such categories  of employees  as  may  from time to time  be  declared,  to  be workmen by the management and Standing Order no. 4 makes  it clear that every workman, permanent or temporary, will  have a  ticket.  Standing Order no. 16 deals with termination  of employment,  and cl. (1) thereof, relevant for our  purpose, must be quoted in full- " For terminating the employment of a permanent employee,  a notice  in writing shall be given either by the employer  or the  employee,  giving  one calendar  month’s  notice.   The reasons  for  the  termination  of  the  services  will   be communicated to the employee in writing, if he so desires at the  time of discharge, unless such a communication, in  the

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opinion  of the Management, may directly or  indirectly  lay the  company  and the Management or the person  signing  the communication  open to criminal or civil proceedings at  the instance of the employee, or the Company’s Managing Director is satisfied that it is not in the interests of the business of  the  Company to disclose the reasons and  so  orders  in writing.  " Now, it is not in dispute that the respondent is a ’workman’ within  the meaning of the Central Act and an ’employee’  as defined in the local Act.  The. controversy before us is  as to  whether  he is an  employee’ within the meaning  of  the Standing  Orders.  Admittedly, no ticket has been issued  to the  respondent  by the Company; his ticket  number  cannot, therefore,  be  included in the  departmental  muster.   The learned Judges of the High Court held that the inclusion  of the name and ticket number in the departmental muster was an essential  characteristic of an ’ employee’ as  defined  for the  purpose  of the Standing Orders, and the mere  fact  of employment  in the Office, Mains Department,  Stores,  Power House or Receiving Station of the Company was not enough  to make a, 471 person  so employed an ’employee’ within the meaning of  the Standing  Orders, and as the respondent did not  fulfil  the necessary  condition  of having his name and  ticket  number included  in  the  departmental’  muster,  he  was  not   an ’employee’ as defined for the Standing Orders, which did not therefore apply to him.  On behalf of the appellants, it  is contended  that  regard  being had to the  context  and  the entire  body of the Standing Orders, the aforesaid  view  of the High Court is not correct, and on a proper construction, inclusion of the name and ticket number in the  departmental muster  is not an essential characteristic of an  ’employee’ as  defined for the Standing Orders.  It is rightly  pointed out  that if the possession of a ticket and a ticket  number is  taken as an essential characteristic of an ’  employee’, then  there is hardly any difference between  an  ’employee’ and a ’workman’ as defined in the Standing Orders; because a ’workmen’  means  such categories of employees as  may  from time  to time be declared to be workmen, and under  Standing Order no. 4 all workmen must have tickets.  If a person  em- ployed by the company must have a ticket before he can be an employee, and if workmen are such categories of employees as have  tickets,  the distinction between the  two  disappears and. it is difficult to understand why two definitions  were necessary. On  a consideration, however, of’ the subject or context  of the  Standing Orders, read in their entirety and in  harmony with  one  another,  it  becomes  at  once  clear  why   two definitions  are  necessary  and  what  is  the  distinction between the two classes-, employees ’ and ’ workmen’-in  the landing Orders.  The expression ’ employee’ denotes a larger group-namely, all persons, male or females who are  employed in  the  Office, Mains Department, Stores, Power  House,  or Receiving  Station  of  the Company,  either  at  Nagpur  or Wardha.   ’Workmen’  denotes  a smaller  group,  viz.,  such categories of employees as have been declared to be workmen, and  who must have a ticket.  Such a distinction is  clearly intelligible  in  an  industrial  establishment,  where  for security and other reasons a system of tickets or passes  is necessary for those who 472 work in the Power House or Mains Department or other  places where essential machinery is installed while others, such as the  clerical  staff, may work in an office  building  where

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security  demands  are  either  nonexistent  or  much   less insistent.   This distinction means that all  ’workmen’  are ’employees’, but all ‘ employees’ are not ’workmen’ for  the purpose of the Standing Orders, and the inclusion of  ticket numbers  in the departmental musters will be  applicable  to those  employees only to whom tickets have been issued;  but such  inclusion  is not an essential  characteristic  of  an employee. Let us now see if such a distinction is consistent with  the Standing  Orders  as a whole.  Standing Order no.  3,  which classifies  employees, defines a probationer in cl. (c)  and says  that a probationer means an employee who is  appointed in  a clear vacancy on probation for a period not  exceeding twelve  months, etc.  Standing Order no. 4 does not  require the issue of a ticket to a probationer; yet a probationer is an employee.  It is thus obvious that the Standing Orders do make a distinction between ‘employees’ and  ‘ workmen’,  and there  may also be employees who have no tickets.   Some  of the  Standing Orders apply to workmen only, e. g.,  Standing Orders  12, 13, 14 and 15.  Other Standing Orders  apply  to all  employees, whether they are workmen or  not.   Standing Order  no. 16 falls in the latter category ; it  applies  to all employees. Standing Order no. 8 (b), we think, makes the position still more clear.  It says- "  Any  employee,  who  after  marking  his  attendance   or presenting  his ticket, card, or token, as the case may  be, is found absent from his proper place of work during working hours  without permission or without any sufficient  reason, shall  be liable to be treated as absent for the  period  of his absence." If  every employee has to have a ticket, it is difficult  to understand why this Standing Order should make a distinction between an employee who marks his attendance and another who presents  his ticket, card or token.  Such a distinction  is easily  understandable when some employees do not possess  a ticket, card or token, 473 so  that they merely mark their attendance; while those  who possess a ticket, card or token present it. It  has  been  suggested that Standing Order no.  4  is  not exhaustive in the matter of issue of tickets; it talks of an issue  of  a ticket to every permanent workman,  a  card  to every  badli workman, a temporary ticket to every  temporary workman,  and  an apprentice card to every  apprentice.   It does not prescribe the issue of a pass or token, though  the definition  of  a ’ticket’ includes a pass  or  token.   The suggestion  further is that Standing Order no. 2 (a)  itself authorises the issue of tickets to other employees, so  that there  may  be one kind of tickets issued to  workmen  under standing  Order no. 4 and another kind of tickets  to  other employees under Standing Order no. 2 (a).  On this view, it, is  suggested  that the alternatives mentioned  in  Standing Order  no.  8  (b) really amount to an option  given  to  an employee  either  to  mark his  attendance  or  present  his ticket.   It  is,  however,  difficult  to  understand   the necessity of an option of this kind when every employee must have  a  ticket, particularly when the exercise of  such  an option  is  likely  to defeat the  very  purpose  for  which tickets  are issued in an industrial establishment.   We  do not,  however, think that the case of the respondent  is  in any  way strengthened by holding that Standing Order  no.  2 (a)  itself  authorises the issue of  tickets  to  employees other than workmen.  Even on that construction, the  failure of  the Company to issue tickets under Standing Order no.  2

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(a)  will not deprive the employees of their real status  as employees  and of the benefit of the Standing  Orders.   The direction for the issue of tickets will, in that view of the Standing  Order,  be an enabling provision only and  not  an essential characteristic of an employee.  Further,  Standing Order  no.  4 provides for the surrender of  tickets  issued thereunder but Standing Order no. 2 (a), if it is  construed as enabling the Company to issue tickets, makes no provision for the surrender of tickets when the employee ceases to  be an  employee.  This absence of any provision  for  surrender applicable to such tickets 474 clearly implies that issue of tickets is not contemplated by the Standing Order no. 2 (a) itself. On behalf of the respondent, however, the main argument  has been  of  a different character.  It has  been  argued  that there  need  not  be  one set of  Standing  Orders  for  all employees,  and  the  Standing  Orders  in  question   being confined to those employees to whom tickets had been issued, the respondent who had no ticket was outside their  purview, and  the result was that the Company had committed a  breach of the statutory provision in s. 30 of the local Act in  the sense  that no Standing Orders had been made in  respect  of the  respondent and employees like him to whom  tickets  had not  been  issued.  It hag been argued that,  therefore,  no action  could be taken against the respondent  either  under the Standing Orders or even under the ordinary law of master and  servant.   We  are unable to accept  this  argument  as correct.   We  have  pointed out that  the  Standing  Orders themselves make a distinction between ’employees’ and ‘work- men’,  and there may also be employees who have no  tickets. To  hold that the Standing Orders apply to  those  employees only  to whom tickets have been issued will  make  employees synonymous  with workmen-a result negatived by two  separate definitions  given in Standing Order no. 2. The central  Act as well as the local Act contemplate the making of  Standing Orders  for  all employees in respect of matters  which  are required to be dealt with by Standing Orders.  The  Standing Orders  in question were not objected to as being  defective or incomplete by workmen, and they have been approved by the appropriate  authority  and  they  must  be  construed  with reference  to their subject or context.  In the  absence  of compelling  reasons to the contrary, it should be held  that they apply to all employees for whose benefit they have been made.   We  see no compelling reasons for holding  that  the Standing  Orders  do not apply to the  respondent.   In  our view,  and  having regard to the subject or context  of  the Standing  Orders, the words whose names and  ticket  numbers are included in the departmental musters " in Standing Order no. 2 (a) do 475 not  lay down any essential characteristic of  employee  and are applicable only in cases where tickets have been  issued to an employee.  The essential content of the definition  of an  employee is employment in the Office, Mains  Department, eta., of the Company either at Nagpur or Wardha, and that of a  workman  the necessary declaration by the  Company  which would entitle him to a ticket under Standing Order no. 4. There  is also another relevant consideration which must  be borne in mind in construing the Standing Orders in question. Section  30 of the local Act imposes a statutory  obligation on  the employer to make, Standing Orders in respect of  all his  employees  and  a breach of  the  statutory  obligation involves  a  criminal liability.  That being so,  the  court would be justified, if it can reasonably do so, to  construe

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the  Standing Orders so as to make them consistent with  the compliance of the said statutory obligation. We  are not unmindful of the principle that in construing  a statutory  provision or rule, every word  occurring  therein must be given its proper meaning and weight.  The  necessity of  such  an interpretation is all the more important  in  a definition clause.  But even a definition clause must derive its  meaning from the context or subject.  In Courts v.  The Kent Waterworks Company (1), the question for  consideration was  the interpretation of the appeal clause in an  Act  for Paving, Cleansing, Lighting, etc., of the Town and Parish of Woolwich  (47  Geo. III, Sess. 2, cap.  CXI).  By  the  16th section  of  the statute, " the commissioners  are  to  make rates  upon  all and every the person or persons who  do  or shall  hold,  occupy,  possess, etc., any  land  within  the parish  ".  The statute also gave a right of appeal  to  any person  or  persons aggrieved by any rate., but  the  appeal clause  required the person or persons appealing  against  a rate to enter into a recognisance; the question was if  this requirement  was intended to exclude corporations  from  the purview  of  the ap. peal clause, as  corporations,  it  was urged,  cannot enter, into a recognisance.  In  interpreting the appeal clause, Bayley J. observed- (1) (1827) 7 B. & C. 314; 108 E. R, 741. 476 "But  assuming that they cannot enter into  a  recognizance, yet  if they ire persons capable of being aggrieved  by  and appealing against a rate, I should say that that part of the clause which gives the appeal applies to all persons capable of  appealing, and that the other part of the  clause  which requires  a recognizance to be entered into applies only  to those   persons   who  are  capable  of  entering   into   a recognizance, but is inapplicable to those who are not." The same principle of interpretation was applied in  Perumal Goundan  v. The Thirumalarayapuram Jananukoola  Dhanasekhara Sangha  Nidhi  (1),  in construing  the  Explanation  to  O. XXXIII,  r.  1, of the Code of Civil Procedure,  which  says inter  alia that " a person is a pauper............ when  he is  not entitled to property worth one hundred rupees  other than his necessary wearing apparel and the subject matter of the  suit  ". The question was if  the  aforesaid  provision applied to companies.  It was held that it would be wrong to construe the provision to mean that only persons who possess wearing apparel can sue as paupers.  We are of the view that the  same rule of construction should apply in  the  present case,  and  the words " whose names and ticket  numbers  are included  in  the  depart. mental  musters  "  occurring  in Standing Order no. 2(a) should be read as " whose names  and ticket  numbers,  if any, are included in  the  departmental musters  " and should apply in the case of  those  employees only  who  possess  tickets and  whose  ticket  numbers  are capable  of being entered in departmental musters; they  are not intended to exclude employees who do not possess tickets or  to  whom tickets have not been issued  and  consequently whose names only are so entered. The learned Judges of the High Court were influenced by  the circumstance that in an earlier- case D. C. Dungore v. S. S. Dandige  Miscellaneous Petition No. 134 of 1954  decided  by the same High Court on September 23, 1955) the Company  took tip the stand that the Standing Orders applied to  employees to  Whom tickets had been issued-a stand different from  and inconsistent with that taken in the present case, (1)  (1917) I.L.R. 41 Mad. 624. 477 It may be pointed out, however, that 1).  C. Dungore of  the

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earlier  case was not an employee within the meaning of  the relevant  Act,  and  there could be no  Standing  Orders  in respect  of  his conditions of service.   Moreover,  in  the matter of construction of a statutory provision no  question of  estoppel arises, and the learned Judges had pointed  out that the respondent himself thought that the Standing Orders applied to all employees.  We have rested our decision as to the  applicability  of the Standing Orders not on  what  the appellants or the respondent thought at one time or another, but   on  a  true  construction  of  the   Standing   Orders themselves,  including  the definition  clause  in  Standing Order no. 2(a). We  take  the  view that the Standing Orders  apply  to  the respondent.  This is really decisive of the appeal,  because if  the  Standing  Orders apply to the  respondent  and  his service  has  been terminated in  accordance  with  Standing Order  no. 16(1), the writ application which the  respondent made to the High Court must fail. The  learned Attorney-General appearing for  the  appellants addressed  us  on  the scope and ambit of Art.  226  of  the Constitution,  and he contended that even if the  respondent had  been wrongfully dismissed by his private employer,  the proper  remedy was by mean,,; of a suit and not by  invoking the  special  writ jurisdiction of the  High  Court.   These contentions  raise important questions, but we do not  think that we are called upon to decide them in this case. Lastly, it has been urged oil behalf of the respondent  that even  if  we  hold that the Standing  Orders  apply  to  the respondent, we should remand the case to the High Court  for a  decision  on  merits  of  other  points  raised  by   the respondent, because the question whether the Standing Orders apply or not was treated as a preliminary issue by the  High Court  and no decision was given on other points.  We  asked learned Advocate for the respondent what other points remain for decision oil his writ application, once it is held  that the Standing Orders apply to the respondent and 6 478 his service has been terminated in accordance with  Standing Order  no.  16(1).   Learned Advocate then  referred  us  to Standing  Order  no. 18, which provides  for  penalties  for misconduct,  and submitted that the provisions thereof  have not  been complied with by the appellants.  He  particularly referred  to cl. (e) of Standing Order no. 18 and  submitted that  the order of suspension passed against the  respondent was  in violation of the safeguards mentioned therein.   The short  answer to this argument is that no penalty  for  mis- conduct  has been imposed on the respondent  under  Standing Order no. 18.  The Company paid his salary to the respondent from the date of suspension to January 31, 1956, which  also showed  that  no order was passed by way of  punishment  for misconduct.   The Company chose to terminate the service  of the respondent in accordance with Standing Order no. 16, and did not think fit to proceed against the respondent for  any alleged misconduct, and it was open to the Company to do so. So  far  as  Standing Order no 16.  is  concerned,  all  the requirements  thereof have been complied with.   That  being the  position,  no other point remains for decision  in  the present case. The  result, therefore, is that the appeal succeeds  and  is allowed.   The  judgment and order of the High  Court  dated September  26, 1956, are set aside and the writ petition  of the respondent is dismissed.  In view of the stand which the appellants had taken in the earlier case with regard to  the Standing Orders, we think it proper to say in this case that

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the parties must bear their own costs throughout.                Appeal allowed.                      479