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PETITIONER: THE MYSORE STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: BANGALORE WOOLLEN, COTTON AND SILK MILLS LTD. & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 15/11/1962

BENCH: DAS, S.K. BENCH: DAS, S.K. KAPUR, J.L. SARKAR, A.K. HIDAYATULLAH, M. DAYAL, RAGHUBAR

CITATION:  1963 AIR 1128            1963 SCR  Supl. (2) 127  CITATOR INFO :  R          1964 SC1230  (9)  R          1964 SC1305  (11,23)  C          1991 SC 101  (211)

ACT: Electricity-Revision of rates of supply by Government  after expiry of agreement Dispute raised by consumer-If liable  to arbitration-Electricity  (Supply) Act, 1948 (54 of 1948)  s. 76,49,60, Indian Electricity Act, 1910 (9 of 1910) S. 52.

HEADNOTE: Disputes   arose  between  the  respondent  mills  and   the appellant Board relating to the payment of revised rates  to the appellant  or its predecessor, the Government of  Mysore under the      Electricity  (Supply) Act, 1948 Prior to  the constitution of the Board under that Act in September, 1957, the  Government,  of  Mysore was  generating  and  supplying electricity  under  the Electricity Act of  1910.   In  1945 agreements were entered into; between the Government and the respondents  for  supply of electricity to them  at  certain rates for a period of five years.  The agreements expired in 1949-50.   In  March,  1953, the  Government  increased  the rates.   It  again  increased the rates  from  April,  1956. These revisions were not made by the Government under s.  49 of  the 1948 Act as that section came into, force  in  1957. The respondents did not pay at the enhanced rates and  moved the  High  Court  under Art. 226  of  the  Constitution  for restraining  the Government as also the Board,  which  after its constitution was added’ as a party, from levying at  the increased  rates.   It was urged on their  behalf  that  the State Government was not entitled to increase the rates  and that  the  dispute  between them on the  one  hand  and  the Government  and  the  Board  on the  other  with  regard  to increased  rates  was liable to be  decided  by  arbitration under s. 76 of the Act of 1948, which had come into force in the  State  of Mysore on December 30 1956.  The  High  Court decided the first point in favour of the Government but  did not  decide  the second.  The respondents did  not  pay  the arrears at the revised rates and the Board threatened to cut

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off  the  supply.   The  respondents  then  nominated   then arbitrator  under  s.  76  of  the  Act.   The  Board  filed applications  before the District judge under s. 33  of  the Arbitration  Act for a declaration that the depute  was  not deferrable to arbitration 128 under   s.  76  of  the  -Electricity  (Supply)  Act.    The additional  District  Judge  who heard the  matter  held  in favour  of the Board.  The respondents moved the High  Court in  revision.   That Court held that s. 76 applied  and  the respondents  were entitled to call for an arbitration.   The Board  appealed to this Court.  It was urged on  its  behalf that  in view of the decision of the High Court on the  writ petition, the claim of reference to arbitration under s.  76 of  the  Act  was  barred  by  res-judicata  and  that   the expression  "other  person" in sub-s. (1) of  that  section, read  ejusdem  genesis  could  not  include  a  consumer  of electrical  energy nor was such a consumer entitled  to  the benefit of sub-s. (2) of that section as no provision of the Act  of 1948 read with the Act of 1910 authorised  reference of such a dispute to arbitration. Held,  that  it  was well-settled that  in  order  to  judge whether a decision in an earlier litigation operated As  res judicata   the  court  must  consider  the  nature  of   the litigation, the issue raised in it and the actual  decision. The right of the Government or the Board to revise the rates and the right of the respondents if any, to raise a  dispute as  to the revised rates and seek arbitration  thereupon,  a question  which was expressly left open by the  High  Court, were  two different matters and the decision on  the  former could not operate as res judicata in respect of the latter. The  relevant provisions of the Act of 1910 and the  Act  of 1948,  read  together, made it clear that the  Mysore  State Government  in the years 1953-56 was free to  contract  with the  consumers of electricity to supply at such rates as  it thought   fit.  when  therefore  the  agreements  with   the respondents  came to an end in 1949-50 it was not  bound  to continue the supply at the old rates.  The matter rested  in the  region of contract, express or implied, and  could  not raise a question under the Electricity (Supply) -Act of 1948 so as to attract s. 76 of that Act. It  was not correct to say that ss. 49 and 60 of the Act  of 948  brought the dispute within the purview of the  Act  and that,  therefore,  it was to be  determined  by  arbitration under 1. 76(1) of the Act.  The revision of the rates  could not be aid to be for any of the purposes of the 1948 Act  as required  by  s.  60 of the Act nor did s. 49  of  the  Act, properly construed, attract s. 76(1). Ryota of Garbandho v. Zamindar of Parlakimedi (1943) R.   70 I. A. 129, referred to.  129 None of the provisions of,the 1910 Act or the 1948 Act under which  certain questions were to be determined  by  arbitra- tion,   mention  the  present  dispute  as  a   matter   for arbitration either under s. 52 of the former or s. 76 (2) of the later. Although the words used by s. 76 (1) were of wide amplitude, it  obviously  implied that the question must  be  one  that arose  under  the  Act or had relation to it,  It  would  be anomalous to hold that a dispute regarding revision of rates made by the Government before the Board was constituted  was one under the Act of 1948. Since the dispute could not be said to have arisen under the Act of 1948, it was not necessary to decide whether the rule of  ejusdeme generis applied in interpreting the  expression

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"other person" in s. 76(1) of the Act. Per  Hidayatullah,  J.-The dispute relating to  revision  of rates  was  not one that could be  referred  to  arbitration under s.  76 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948.  It  was not  necessary  to  invoke the rule of  ejusdem  generis  to interpret the expression  "other person" in that section  so as to bring a consumer disputing the rates thereunder  since no provision in the Act permitted such inclusion. William  v.  Golding,  (1865) L. R. I C.  P.  69,  held  in. applicable. Although  s. 76 of the Act is very wide in its  language,  a qualification  has  to be read into it that the  dispute  it contemplates  must  be  one relating to a  matter  with  the purview  of  the Act.  The Electricity Act of 1910  and  the Electricity (S ply) Act of 1948, read together, clearly show that  a dispute between the Government or the Board  on  the one  hand and a consumer on the other relating to  rates  of supply, apart from any contract entered into, cannot at  all arise under the Act of 1 948.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION :Civil Appeals Nos. 629 to  632 of 1961. Appeals from the judgment and orders dated August 19,  1960, of the Mysore High Court in C.R.P. Nos. 6 11 to 613 and  622 of 1959. M. C. Setalvad,Attorney-General for India. T.     Rangaswami Ayyanyar, B. R. L. Iyengar and P.  D.     Menon,for      the appellants. 130 A.   V. Viswanatha Sastri, D.  N. Mukherjee and B.     N. Ghosh, for respondent No. 1 (in C. A. No. 629/61). N.   C. Chatterjee, V. L. Narasimhamoorthy and S. S. Shukla, for respondent No. 1 (in C. A. No. 630/61). V.   L.  Narasimhamoorthy and S. S. Shukla,  for  respondent No. 1 (in C. A. Nos. 631 and 632/61). 1962.  November 15.  The judgment of S. K Das, Kapur, Sarkar and   Dayal,   JJ.,  was  delivered  by  S.  K.   Das,   J., Hidayatullah, J., delivered a separate judgment. S.  K.  DAS, J.-These are four appeals on a  certificate  of fitness  granted  by  the High Court of  Mysore  under  Art. 133(1)(c) of the Constitution.  The appeals have been  heard together  and  this  judgment will  govern  them  all.   The appellant  is the Mysore State Electricity Board,  Bangalore (hereinafter  referred  to  as the Board) in  all  the  four appeals.  The respondents are four textile mills, each  mill being respondent in one of the appeals.  These four  textile mills are : (1) the Bangalore Woollen, Cotton and Silk Mills Ltd., Bangalore, 12) the Minerva Mills Ltd., Bangalore,  (3) Sri Krishna Rajendra Mills Ltd., Mysore, and (4) the  Mysore Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd., Bangalore. The  appeals raise a common question of law,  viz.,  whether under  s. 76 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948  (LIV  of 1948),   the  respondents  are  entitled  to  call  for   an arbitration  in respect. of an alleged dispute between  them and  the Board relating to the revision of rates payable  by them  for electric energy supplied by the appellant  or  its predecessor   The  provisions  of  two  Acts,   the   Indian Electricity  Act,  1910  (IX of 1910)  and  the  Electricity (Supply)  131 Act,  1948  (LIV of 1948), have to be  considered  in  these appeals,  and  it  will be convenient to  cite  the  Indian-

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Electricity  Act, 1910, as the 1910 Act and the  Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948, as the 1948 Act. We proceed first to state the facts which have led to  these four  appeals.  The 1910 Act and the 1948 Act were  extended to  the  State  of Mysore on April 1, 1951, by  the  Part  B States (Laws) Act, 1951 (III of 1951).  But the sections  of the two Acts did not come into force in the State of  Mysore all at once.  Some sections of the 1948 Act came into  force at  once,  and some came into force on later dates.   It  is sufficient  for our purpose to know that s. 76 of  the  1948 Act came into force in Mysore on December 30, 1956; and s. 5 thereof  came into force on September 30, 1957.   The  Board was  constituted  under s. 5 by  a  Government  notification dated September 27, 1957, to come into effect from September 30,  1957.   Prior  to the constitution of  the  Board.  the Government  of  Mysore was generating  electric  energy  and supplying  it  to  consumers of both high  mention  and  low tension power.  On different dates in the year 1945, written agreements  were  entered  into between  the  Government  of Mysore and the four textile mills for the supply of electric energy  to  these textile mills at the rate of O. 55  of  an anna per unit of day power and O. 35 of an anna per. unit of night  power,  subject  to the payment  of  certain  monthly minimum charges.  These agreements were for a period of five years  and  expired on different dates in  1949-50.   By  an order dated March 23, 1953, the Government of Mysore revised the  rates for the supply of electric energy  and  increased the same to O. 65 of an anna per unit of day power and O. 45 of an anna per unit of night power.  Subsequently, an expert committee,  under Chairmanship of Prof.  M. S. Thacker,  the then  Director of the Institute of Science,  Bangalore,  was appointed to go into the question of rationalisation of  the rates for power supply in the State of Mysore. 132 On  the recommendation of that Committee, the rates for  the supply  of  electric energy were again revised  with  effect from  April  1, 1956.  This was done by means  of  an  order dated  March 1, 1956.  On April 26, 1956, the  four  textile mills filed four writ petitions in the High Court of  Mysore in  which  they prayed that the State  Government,  and  the Board  (which  Board, after its constitution  in  1957,  was added   as  the  second  respondent  to  the  pending   writ petitions)  be  restrained from levying  or  collecting  the increased rates as per the order of March 1, 1956, and  that they be directed to continue to levy the same rates for  the supply  of  electric energy as were agreed  to  between  the parties in the agreements of 1945.  Two points were urged in support  of  these writ petitions.  One was that  the  State Government  was not legally competent to increase the  rates for the supply of electric’ energy.  The second point  urged was  that there was a dispute between the textile mills  and Government and later the Board, with regard to the rates for the  supply  of electric energy and such a dispute  must  be decided  by arbitration as provided under s. 76 of the  1948 Act.  We shall read s. 76 of the 1948 Act at a later  stage. We may here observe that of the two points urged in  support of  the writ petitions, the High Court dealt only  with  the first  point  and held that the Government of  Mysore  ’was’ legally  competent  to revise the rates for  the  supply  of electric  energy.  The second point arising out of s. 76  of the 1948 Act the High Court did not decide.  It said that it expressed  no opinion as to "’whether or not the  contention of  the textile mills that the dispute was covered by s.  76 of  the 1948 Act and should, be determined  by  arbitration" was sound.  The High Court expressed the view that  question

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would  have to be determined if and when the  textile  mills wanted to enforce their rights under the procedure laid down under the Arbitration Act, 1940 (X of 1940).  On the finding that the Government of  133 Mysore was legally, competent to revise the rates, the  four writ  petitions  were ;dismissed on January  29,  1958.   By March  31,  1958,  the four textile mills  were,  in  heavy: arrears  with regard to the payment of the  increased  rates for  the supply of electric energy to them, though they  had paid  in  full  according  to ,the  old  rates.   After  the constitution of the Board in September, 1957, the Board made repeated  demands  on the basis of the increased  rates  and asked  the textile mills; to clear all arrears due  by  them according  to the revised rates.  The textile  mills  having failed to do so, they were informed that the Board would cut off  the supply in exercise of its power under s. 24 of  the 1910  Act.   The textile mills thereupon  contended  that  a dispute had arisen between them on one side and the Boar  on the other and the dispute had to be submitted to arbitration n  under the provisions of s. 76 of the 1948 Act.  The  four textile-mills then nominated their arbitrator.  On  November 13,  1958,  the  Board filed four  applications  before  the District  judge, Bangalore, under s. 33 of  the  Arbitration Act,  in which it asked for a declaration that  the  dispute between the four textile mills and the Board was not  liable to  be referred to arbitration under s. 76 of the  1948  Act and also for a direction to restrain the four textile  mills from seeking arbitration in respect of the alleged  dispute. These  four  applications gave rise  to  four  miscellaneous cases  which  were  dealt with  by  the  learned  Additional District judge, ,Bangalore, by a common order.  The  learned Additional  District  judge allowed the petitions  and  held that the-four textile mills were not entitled to the benefit of  s. 76 of the 1948 Act, because the dispute  between  the Board  and  the four textile mills as to the rates  for  the supply  of electric energy was not liable to be referred  to arbitration  under  that section. The order of  the  learned Additional District judge :by which he disposed of the  four petitions  was  dated April 17, 1959.  From that  order  the textile mills preferred petitions in revision to the High Court of Mysore. Four  such  petitions  were filed in  respect  of  the  four miscellaneous  cases.   By a common order dated  August  19, 1960,  the  High  Court allowed the  petitions  in  revision holding  that  s.  76  of the  1948  Act  applied,  and  the respondent  textile  mills  were entitled  to  call  for  an arbitration  in respect of the dispute between them and  the Board  in the matter of the revised rates.  The  Board  then asked  for  and obtained a certificate of fitness  from  the High  Court and on that certificate of fitness,  these  four appeals  have come to this court from the a fore said  order of the    High  Court dated August 19, 1960. It may  perhaps be stated here that after the constitution of     the  Board in   1957,  another  expert  committee  was   appointed   to rationalise  the various tariffs prevailing in the State  of Mysore  with regard to the supply of electric energy and  on the  re-commendations  of  this  Committee  the  rates  were revised  a  third time.  But these last revised  rates  came into effect from July 1, 1959, when presumably the  revision petitions in the High Court were pending. Before  we embark on a discussion of the principal  question involved in these appeals, it is perhaps necessary to say  a few words about the interrelation of the two Acts, the  1910 Act and the 1948 Act.  Section 70 of the 1948 Act  indicates

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that  relation.  It states inter alia that no  provision  of the  1910  Act or any rules made thereunder shall  have  any effect  so  far  as  it is  inconsistent  with  any  of  the provisions  of the 1948 Act; where, however, the  provisions of the two Acts are not inconsistent, the provisions of  the 1948 Act shall be in addition to, and not in derogation  of, the  1910 Act.  It would, therefore, be necessary for us  to refer  to  the relevant provisions of the two  Acts  on  two points which bear upon the principal question mooted  before us.   These  two points are-(a) what are the powers  of  the Board or  its predecessor Government to revise the rates  for  the supply of electric energy and can a dispute be raised by the textile mills with regard to such revision; and (b) what are the  provisions  in  the  two Acts  for  the  settlement  of disputes  by arbitration and who are the persons who can  be parties  to such a dispute ?  In considering  the  aforesaid two  points, a distinction has to be kept in mind.   We  are concerned  in this case with two periods.  The first  period is  from  1953  to September 30, 1957, when  the  Board  was constituted.   The second period is the period of the  Board commencing from September 30, 1957, till November 13,  1958, when  the  applications under s. 33 of the  Arbitration  Act were made.  As we have stated earlier, the revision which is in  dispute in these cases took place in the  first  period, that  is,  before the constitution of the  Board.   We  have pointed  out earlier that the third revision of  rates  took effect from July 1, 1959, when the revision petitions in the High Court were pending. We  think  it  advisable  and convenient  to  refer  to  the relevant provisions of the two Acts at a later stage and  in their relation to the points which we have stated above.  We do not think that quoting the sections at this stage and out of  relation to the two points Which fall for  consideration will serve any useful purpose.  ’We, therefore, desist  from quoting the relevant sections at this stage, but are content to  refer  here to the difference in the scheme of  the  two Acts, namely, the 1910 Act and the 1948 Act. Very briefly put, the scheme of the 1910 Act was. to empower the  State  Government,  on  an  application  made  in   the prescribed  form  and on payment of the prescribed  fee,  if any,  to grant a license to any person to  supply.  electric energy  in  any specified area.  A per-son  holding  such  a license  was called the licensee.  The State Government  had certain powers to give directions to the licensee in  regard to the  supply  of electric energy, and to control    the  dis- tribution  and consumption of electric energy etc.   Section 28  of  the 1910 act laid down that no person other  than  a licensee  shall engage in the business: of supplying  energy to the public except with the previous sanction of the State Government  and  in accordance with such conditions  as  the State  Government may fix in that behalf.  Therefore,  under the  1910  Act there were two classes of persons  who  could supply  electric energy, a licensee and a  sanction  holder. The  1948 Act made some radical changes in the scheme.   One such change was that the expression ’licensee’ was given  an ex-tended meaning to take in not merely a licensee  licensed under  Part  II of the 1910 Act but also a  person  who  had obtained  sanction  under  s.  28  of  the  1910  Act.   The expression did not, however, include’ the State  Electricity Board  which  was constituted for the first time  under  the 1948  Act.   Next, the 1948 Act brought into  existence  two important  authorities, one called the  Central  Electricity Authority  under  s. 3 of the Act and the  other  the  State

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Electricity  Board  constituted  under  s.  5  of  the  Act. Section  26  of the 1 48 Act, to which a detailed  reference will  be  made later, lays down that subject 1948  Act,  the Board  shall, in respect of State, have all the  powers  and obligation licensee under the 1910 Act, and the 1948 to  the provisions of the whole of a  Act shall be deemed to be  the license  of  the  Board for the purposes of  the  1910  Act. There  is  a  proviso  which  excepts  the  Board  from  the obligation of certain provisions of the 1910 Act.  Chapter V of the 1948 Act contains provision  indicating the nature of the  works which the State Electricity Board  may  undertake and its trading procedure; it includes provisions giving the Board  power  to establish its own  generating  stations  to supply  electric  energy  to license and  to  other  persons requiring such supply Under the 1948 Act, every licensee has to company with such reasonable directions as the Board from time to time 137 may  give for the purpose of achieving the  maximum  economy and  efficiency  in  the  operations  of  the   undertaking. Chapter  VI  deals, with the Board’s finance,  accounts  and audit and in it occurs s. 60 which says inter alia that  all debts and-, obligations incurred, all contracts entered into and  all matters and things engaged to be done by,, with  or for  the  State Government for any of, the purposes  of  the 1948 Act before the first constitution of the Board shall be deemed to have been incurred,. entered into or engaged to be done by, with or for the Board etc.  Chapter VII deals  with miscellaneous  provisions one of which is arbitration  under s.  76,  a  section which we shall quote so far  as  it  is, relevant for our purpose.               "70.   ARBITRATION.-(1) All questions  arising               between  ’the State Government or the  Board,.               and  a  licensee  or  other  person  shall  be               determined by arbitration.               (2)   Where any question or matter is, by this               Act,, required to be refer-red to arbitration,               it shall be so referred-               (a)   in  cans where the Act so  provides,  to               the  Authority  and  on  such  reference   the               Authority  shall be deemed to have  been  duly               appointed as Arbitrators, and the award of the               Authority shall be final and conclusive; or               (b)   in other cases, to two arbitrators,  one               to be appointed by each party to the dispute.                (3)  Subject   to  the  provisions  of   this               section,  the  provisions of  the  Arbitration               Act,  1940  (10 of 1940) shall  apply  to  the               arbitrations under                this Act.                xx xx     xx xx." 138 The arguments presented before us on behalf of the appellant may  be  put  in  two categories : (1)  the  first  line  of argument  is  that the question of the power to  revise  the rate  for the supply of electric energy to the four  textile mills  during  the  first  period  (1953  to  1956)  by  the Government  of  Mysore  having  been  decided  against   the respondents  by the High Court on the writ  petitions,  that decision is binding on them and the respondents cannot raise a  dispute  as  to it by reason of the  application  of  the principle  of res judicata, (2) the second line of  argument is  that on a proper construction of sub-section (1)  of  s. 76,  it  should  be  held that  the  words  "mother  person" occurring therein must be read ejusdem generis or noseitur a

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soocis  with ’licensee’ and so read, a consumer of  electric energy  will  not be entitled to the benefit  of  that  sub- section; furthermore., sub-s. (2) of s. 76 will not help the respondents, because no provision of the 1948 Act read  with the  1910  Act  requires to be  referred  to  arbitration  a dispute of the nature which is alleged to have arisen in the present case between the Government or the Board on one side and the textile mills on the other. We  shall now deal with these two arguments in the order  in which we have stated them.  First, as to the argument based, on the principle of res judicata.  We may first refer to the pleadings  in the writ petitions.  In paras, 7 and 8 of  the affidavits  which the textile mills filed in support of  the writ  petitions,  they  raised two main  contentions  :  (a) firstly,  that  the Government of Mysore had "’no  right  to increase  the rates for supply of electrical energy  in  the manner they have done"; it was stated that there were  prior agreements  (referring  to the agreements of 1945)  and  the supply  had to be made at the same old rates since  all  the terms and conditions of the agreements were observed by both the  parties; (b) secondly, it was stated that the  increase of rates was arbitrary and unfair by reason 139 of the provisions of the Sixth Schedule of the 1948 Act.   A reference  was made to s. 26 of the 1948 Act and  the  Sixth Schedule  thereof.  That Schedule inter alia  provides  that the  licensee  shall so adjust his rates for  the  sale  of’ electricity by periodical revision that his clear profit  in any year shall not, as far as possible, exceed the amount of "reasonable  return" determined in accordance  with  certain rules  laid down in the Schedule.  It was pleaded on  behalf of  the textile mills that it was possible to find out  from the  rules  the maximum rate which a licensee  could  charge under  the  rules, and in view of those rules,  the  revised rates fixed by the Government of Mysore were unfair and  ex- cessive.                The  prayer which was made in the writ  peti-               tions was in these terms :               "The High Court may be pleased to issue A writ               of  prohibition or a writ of mandamus or  such               other  appropriate  writ, direction  or  order               restraining   the  respondent   (meaning   the               Government of Mysore and later the Board) from               levying  or collecting the increased rates  as               per the Government order dated March 1,  1956,               and   that  the  respondent  be  directed   to               continue  to  levy  at  the  rates  agreed  to               between  the  parties  in  the  agreements  of               1945." The  decision of the High Court on the writ petitions  makes it clear that the only point which was urged before the High Court on behalf of the textile mills was that under s. 26 of the 1948 Act the Board had all the powers and obligations of a  licensee under the 1910 Act and as the provisions of  the Sixth  Schedule  and the Seventh Schedule of  the  1948  Act were, under s. 57 of that Act, deemed to be incorporated  in the license of every licensee, the Board which had the  same obligations  as a licensee could not demand charges for  the supply of electricity 140 which  were not in consonance with the principles laid  down in those Schedules.  This argument was repelled by the  High Court, and the High Court pointed out that the Board was not a  licensee within the meaning of the 1948 Act and  was  not subject to the rules of the Sixth Schedule thereof.  Section

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26 of the 1948 Act is in these terms               "Subject  to the provisions of this  Act,  the               Board  shall., in respect of the whole  State,               have  all  the  powers  and-obligations  of  a               licensee  under the Indian  Electricity  Act,,               1910,  and this Act shall be deemed to be  the               licensee of the Board for the purposes of that               Act." The High Court expressed the view that having regard to  the definition clause in s.2(6) which in clear terms stated that the Board was not a licensee within the meaning of the  1948 Act,  s. 26 was of no assistance to the textile mills.   The High Court decided that the plea of the textile mills  based on  the provisions of s. 26 read with the Sixth Schedule  of the 1948 Act was unsound and could not be accepted. Now,  the  question is, does this decision  operate  as  res judicata  in the matter of a reference to arbitration  under s.76 of the 1948 Act when the High Court, in express  terms, left  that  question  open ? The  learned  Attorney  General appearing  for  the appellant has put his  argument  in  the following  way.  He has submitted that s.26 of the 1948  Act came  into  force in Mysore on September 30, 1957,  and  the disputed  revision of rates was made by the  Government   of Mysore  in 1956 when s.26 of the 1948 Act was not  in  force there;  but  under  s.60 of the 1948 Act,  all  matters  and things  engaged  to  be  done by,  with  or  for  the  State Government  for any of the purposes of the 1948  Act  before the  first  constitution of the Board, ,shall be  deemed  to have been done by, with or for the Board etc; therefore, the Board  was  entitled to ask for payment of  all  arrears  of electric charges at 141 the rates revised by the State Government Provided the State Government  had  the  right to revise  the  rates  in  1956. That  right having been found for the State  Government  and against latter could not re-agitate reference to arbitration under  the textile mills., the  question and ask for a  s.76 of the 1948 Act. As  against this line of argument, it has been submitted  on behalf  of  the  textile mills that  having  regard  to  the pleadings in the writ petitions and the decision of the High Court there-on, all that the High Court decided was that the Sixth  Schedule of the 1948 Act did not apply to  the  Board and the revised rates could not be challenged on the  ground that  there was no compliance with the principles laid  down in that Schedule.  The question whether the dispute shall be determined  by arbitration under S. 76 of the 1948  Act  was specifically  left  open by the High Court  and,  therefore, that  question  cannot be shut out by the operation  of  the principle of res judicata. We  do  not think that these appeals can be decided  on  the narrow  ground  of res judicata.  There  was  some  argument before  us  as to whether a decision on a  question  of  law operates  as res judicata, and the learned Attorney  General relying  on  the  Full Bench decision in  the  Province.  of Bombay  v.  The  Municipal  Corporation  of  Ahmedabad(1)has contended that a decision given by a court on a question  of law  may not bind the same parties when they are  litigating with regard to a matter different from the one on which  the decision was given : but a decision of law would the binding between the same parties as res judicata if the right that a party  claimed was the same in the former litigation  as  in the  later.  We do not think that it is necessary for us  to consider  in  the abstract to what extent a  decision  on  a question  of law, operates as res judicata between the  same

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parties.It is well settled that in order to decide whether a (1) A. I. R. 1954 Bom. 1. 142 decision in an earlier litigation operates as res  judicata, the  court must look at the nature of the  litigation,  what were the issues raised therein and what was actually decided in it.  In the cases before us the High Court decided on the writ petitions that the Board was not a licensee within  the meaning  of s. 26 of the 1948 Act and was not bound  by  the principles  laid down in the Sixth Schedule  thereof.   This was  the  actual decision of the High Court.  It  is  indeed true that what becomes res judicata is the ".,matter"  which is actually decided and not the reason which leads the court to  decide the "’matter." We find it difficult, however,  to agree  with  the learned Attorney General  that  the  matter which   was   actually  decided  on  the   writ.   petitions necessarily  embraced or included the question of the  right of the textile mills to call for an arbitration under s.  76 of  the 1948 Act.  The right of the State Government  or  of the Board to revise the rates, and the right, if any, of the textile  mills to raise a dispute as to the  revised  rates, are  two  different matters and the decision on  one  cannot operate as res judicata with regard to the other.  As to the right  of the textile mills to call for an arbitration,  the High Court, in express terms, left that matter open. While we do not agree with the learned Attorney General that these  cases  can  be decided on the narrow  ground  of  res judicata,  we do think that a much larger  question  arises, and  this  question  has two  facets,  namely,  whether  the alleged  dispute  about the revision of rates  made  by  the State  Government in 1956 is a question which at  all  comes under the 1948 Act and if it does, do the textile mills come within the category of "other person" occurring in s.  76(1) of that Act ? Let us first consider whether the dispute at all comes under the 1948 Act.  What were the powers of the State  Government to revise the rates in  143 1953-1956 ? No provision of the 1910 Act as it stood at  the relevant  time has been brought to our notice which  imposed any  restriction  on the State Government in the  matter  of charging  for the electric energy which it supplied,  though s.  23  of  the  1910 Act and some of  the  clauses  in  the Schedule  of that Act imposed restrictions on a licensee  in the  matter of charging for electricity which  the  licensee supplied.    The  State  Government  was  not,  however,   a licensee, either under the 1910 Act or the 1948 Act, and was not  bound by those restrictions.  Speaking  generally,  the Board takes the place of the State Government under the 1948 Act.  Section 49 of the 1948 Act states,               "Subject to the provisions of this Act and  of               any regulations made in this behalf, the Board               may supply electricity to any person not being               a  licensee upon such terms and conditions  as               the  Board  may from time to time  fix  having               regard to the nature and geographical position               of the supply and the purpose for which it  is               required :               Provided  that  in fixing any such  terms  and               conditions  the  Board shall  not  show  undue               preference to any person." It  is worthy of note that this section came into  force  in Mysore on September 30, 1957, and the revision of rates made in 1953-1956 by the State Government was not in exercise  of

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the powers given to the Board under s. 49.  The position  in 1953-1956  was that the State Government of Mysore was  free to contract with the consumers of electric energy to  supply at  such rates as it thought fit.  The agreements which  the State  Government  had entered into with  the  four  textile mills in 1945 had come to an end in 1949-1950 and the  State Government  was  not bound to continue  to  supply  electric energy  to those mills at the old rates.  The matter  rested in the region of 144 contract, express or implied and. it could not said to raise a  question  kinder the 1948 Act- If it was not  a  question which arose under the 1948 Act s.  76  thereof would not  be attracted thereto. Learned counsel for the respondents has sought to meet  this difficulty ’in the following way.  He has first referred  to s.  60 of the 1948 Act.  It :is perhaps necessary  to  quote sub-s. (1) of that section here.               "60 (1).  All debts and obligations  incurred,               all contracts entered into and all matters and               things engaged to be done by, with or for  the                             State  Government for any of the  purposes   o f               this Act before the first constitution of  the               Board shall be deemed to have been  incurred,,               entered into or engaged to be done by, with or               for  the Board; and all suits or  other  legal               proceedings instituted or which might but  Tor               the issue of the notification under Subsection               (4)  of section I have been instituted  by  or               against the State Government may be  continued               or instituted by or against the Board." The argument is that the revision of rates made by the State Government in 1956, looked at either as a matter of contract between  the  parties  or as something  done  by  the  State Government in exercise of its powers to fix such rates as it thought  fit, shall be deemed under sub-s. (1) of s.  60  to have  been  done by the Board, and if at the time  when  the revision  was made there was a dispute between  the  parties which, dispute has continued with the Board by reason of the Board demanding the arrears at the revised rates, it must be held  that the dispute arises under the 1948 Act and may  be determined by arbitration under s. 76 (1) thereof.   Learned counsel for the respondents has further argued that even  if the  Board had revised the rates in exercise of  its  powers under s. 49 a section which we had earlier  145 quoted, such power would be subject to the provisions of the 1948 Act and would attract S. 76.  There fore, the  argument of learned counsel for the respondents is that the effect of ss. 60 and 49 is that the dispute is one which arises  under the  1948  Act  and must be  determined  by  arbitration  as required by S. 76 (1). We  doubt the correctness of this line of argument.   First, as  to S. 60 of the 1948 Act.  The revision of  rates  which was made by the State Government in 1953-1956 rested, as  we have  said earlier, either on contract or on the  unilateral action  of  the State Government.  In either  case,  it  was outside the 1948 Act and was not referable to any  provision thereof.   A pre-requisite condition for the application  of S.  60 is that the contract made by the State Government  or the thing done by it must be "for any of the purposes of the 1948  Act." If it was for the purposes of that Act  and  was entered  into or done by the,, State Government  before  the first  constitution of the Board, then the contract  or  the

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thing done shall be deemed to have been made or done by  the Board  and all suits or other legal proceedings which  might have  been instituted against the State Government could  be instituted  against the Board.  We have earlier pointed  out that  there was no provision in the 1910 Act as it stood  at the  relevant time which applied to the State Government  in the  matter  of  the rates which  it  charged  for  applying electricity to consumers.  In the 1948 Act also, there is no section  which regulates the State Government in the  matter of  what it will charge for electric energy supplied by  it. That  being  the  position,  how can it  be  said  that  the revision of the rates by the State Government gave rise to a question under the 1948 Act ? We  now  turn  to S. 49.  That section came  into  force  in Mysore, we have said earlier, on September 146 30,  1957.  That section applied to the Board after  is  was constituted.   It  had no application in 1956,  and  we  are unable to see how it can be said that any dispute as to  the revision of rates made by the State Government in 1956 was a question  which  arose  under the  1948  Act.   The  learned Attorney  General has indeed accepted the position that  the Board  is the successor-in-interest of the State  Government and the supply of electricity is one of the purposes of  the 1948 Act.  That does not, however, mean that the revision of rates  in  1956 and a dispute raised as  to  such  revision, became a question under the 1948 Act by reason of the demand made  by  the  Board of the arrears due in  respect  of  the revised rate.  The true nature of the question remained what it was in 1956, namely, the right of the State Government to revise the rates, a right which has no reference to the 1948 Act. Furthermore,  we are unable to accept the argument  advanced on  behalf of the respondents that the expression  ""Subject to  the provisions of this Act" occurring in s. 49  attracts s. 76.  Section 49 seems to give the Board a right to supply electricity  to  any person not being a licensee  upon  such terms  and conditions s the Board may from time to time  fix having regard to the nature and geographical position of the supply  and  the purposes for which it is required.   ’  The proviso to the section states that in fixing any such  terms and conditions, the Board shall not show undue preference to any person.  We are unable to agree with the learned counsel for  the respondents that the section contemplates that  the consumers  may raise a dispute with regard to the terms  and conditions  and on such a dispute being raised, it shall  be determined  by arbitration as required by s. 76 (1)  of  the 1948 Act.  The expression "Subject to the provisions of this Act"   merely  means  that  if  there  are  any   provisions regulating the Board in the matter  147 of supplying electricity to any person not being a licensee, then  the  supply  by the Board will  be  subject  to  those provisions.   No  provision has been brought to  our  notice which regulates the Board in the matter of the charges which it  may  fix  for the supply of electricity.   It  has  been argued  before us that the expression "having regard to  the nature  and  geographical  position of the  supply  and  the purposes for which it is required" indicates that a  dispute may arise between the Board and the consumer of  electricity in the sense that the consumer may allege that in fixing the charges  for  the  supply of electricity the  Board  had  no regard to the nature and geographical position of the supply and  the purposes for which it was required. The  expression ,,have regard to" or "having regard to" has been the subject

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of  judicial  interpretation.   In  Ryots  of  Garbandho  v. Zamindar  of  Parlakimedi (1) their Lordships of  the  Privy Council dealt with the meaning of the expression.  They said               "The  view  taken  by  the  majority  of   the               Collective  Board  of Revenue  in  making  the               order  dated  October 19, 1936, which  is  now               complained  of,  is that the   requirement  to               "having regard to" the provisions in  question               has no more definite or technical meaning than               that of ordinary usage, and only requires that               these provisions must be taken into considera-               tion." We do not therefore think that expression contemplates  that a Consumer of electricity can raise a dispute as against the Board  on the footing that the Board did not pay due  regard to  the nature and geographical position of the  supply  and the purposes for which it was required. It  is  necessary here to refer to those provisions  of  the 1910  and  1948 Acts which require certain questions  to  be determined by arbitration.  In the (1)  (1945) L.R. 70 I.A. 129,168. 148 910 Act, the main section dealing with arbitration s.  52 which was in these terms at the relevant time.               "Where  any matter is, by or under  this  Art,               directed to be determined by arbitration,  the               matter shall, unless it is otherwise expressly               provided  in  the license of  a  licensee,  be               determined  by such person or persons  as  the               State  Government may nominate in that  behalf               on the application of either party; but in all               other respects the arbitration shall be subject               to  the  provisions of  the  Arbitration  Act,               1940.               xx         xx       xx        xx       XX." The  section lays down that where any matter is by or  under the  1910 Act directed to be determined by arbitration’  the matter shall be determined by arbitration in the manner laid down  in that section.  The scheme is that arbitration  will take place only when any matter is by or under the 1910  Act directed to be determined_by arbitration.  There are several sections, such as s. 7 A, s. 13(2), s. 14 (3), s. 15 (5), s. 16 (3), s. 19 (2), s. 21 (4), s. 22, ss. 22-A (2) and s.  32 (3)  which  require  certain matters  to  be  determined  by arbitration.   None of these, however, relate to  the  rates for  the supply of electricity by the State Government.   In the 1948 Act the main section dealing with arbitration is s. 76  which we have already set out earlier in this  judgment. There is some difference in the scheme of s. 76 from that of s.  52.  Section 76 is in two parts : the  first  subsection states, in general terms that all questions arising  between the State Government or the Board on one side and a licensee or  other  person  on  the  other  shall  be  determined  by arbitration;  the second sub-section states that  where  any question  or  matter  is  by the 1948  Act  required  to  be referred  to  arbitration, it shall be so  referred  to  the persons  specified  in  cls. (a) and (b);  in  cl,  (a)  the authority named by the Act shall be the              149 arbitrator  and  in cl. (b) the reference shall  be  to  two arbitrators,  one  to  be appointed by  each  party  to  the dispute.   Sub-section  (2) to s. 76  corresponds,  more  or less, to s. 52 of the 1910 Act, but sub-sec. (1) of s. 76 is more general in nature.  The 1948 Act also contains  several provisions  besides s. 76 (1) which require certain  matters

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to  be referred to arbitration.  These provisions are s.  19 (4), s. 40, s. 44 (3), s. 45(3), S. 55 (2) and some  clauses of  the  First  and  the Fourth  Schedule.   Some  of  these provisions  constitute  the Central  Electricity  Authority, constituted  under s. 3 of the 1948 Act, as the  arbitrating authority.   Section  19  (4) states that  if  any  question arises under sub-s. (1) thereof as to the reasonableness  of the terms or conditions or time therein mentioned, it  shall be  determined as provided in s. 76.  Now, s. 19  (1)  deals with  the powers of the Board to supply electricity  to  any licensee  or  person requiring such supply in  any  area  in which  a scheme sanctioned under Ch.  V is in force.  It  is clear that s. 19 (4) does not apply in the present case.  If it did, then the respondents might  be intitled to claim  an arbitration under sub-s. (2) of s. 76. Thus,  it appears from what we have stated above, that  none of  the provisions of the 1910 Act or the 1948 Act make  the present dispute a matter directed or required to be referred to  arbitration either under s. 52 of the 1910 Act or s.  76 (2)  of the 1948 Act.  Therefore, the respondents  can  call for  an arbitration under s. 76 (1) of the Act, if they  can establish that the dispute in the present case is a question which  arises  under the 1948 Act.  It is indeed  true  that sub-s. (1) of s. 76 uses words of wide amplitude.  It states that "all questions arising between the State Government  or the Board and a licensee or other person shall be determined by  arbitration." We, however, think that it is implicit  in the sub-section that the question is one which arises  under the 1948 Act.  Obviously, it could not have 150 been  contemplated  that any question  arising  between  the State Government on one side and any person  on  the   other shall  be  determined  by arbitration.   If  that  were  the meaning of the sub-section, then all litigation between  the State  Government  on one side and any person on  the  other will  have to be referred to arbitration.  We do  not  think that  can be the meaning of the sub-section.  When the  sub- section  states  " all questions arising between  the  State Government  etc.,"’it must mean questions which arise  under or  have  relation to the 1948 Act.  A dispute  between  the Government  and a private citizen or a dispute  between  the Government  and  its employee, unrelated to  the  1948  Act, cannot be subject of an arbitration under this  sub-section. If that be the correct interpretation, then the respondents, before they can succeed, must establish that the dispute  as to revision of rates made by the State Government in 1956 is a  dispute  which arises under the 1948 Act.   It  would  be anomalous  to  hold  that a dispute  regarding  revision  or fixing  rates of supply made by Government before the  Board was  constituted  arises  under the 1948 Act,  when  even  a revision of rates made by the Board under s. 49 of the  1948 Act   will  not  be  referable  to  arbitration.   We   are, therefore,  of the view that the dispute in these  cases  is not one which arises under the 1948 Act. Now,  we  proceed  to  the  third  and  the  last  question. Assuming that the dispute is one which arises under the 1948 Act, do the respondents, viz., the four textile mills,  come within  the  expression "  other person" occurring  in  sub- section  (1)  of s. 76 ?  The learned Attorney  General  has very  strenuously contended that the scheme of s. 76 (1)  is that in the matter of a dispute, the State Government or the Board  is placed on one side as a party to the  dispute  and the  licensee  or other person is placed on the  other,  and having  regard  to the entire scheme of the  1948  Act,  the expression "other person" must take

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151 colour from the word licensee’ preceding it.  He has further contended  that the word ’licensee’ in the ’context  of  the 1910  and the 1948 Acts denotes a genus or category  and  on the  application  of the principle of  ejusdem  generis  the expression "other person" means persons who are of the  same genus  or category.  He points out that under the 1910  Act, licensee’ means a per-son licensed under Part 11 of that Act to  supply electric energy and " consumer’ means any  person who is supplied with energy by a licensee or the  Government or by any other person engaged in the business of  supplying energy  to the public under the 1910 Act or under any  other law for the time being in force. There  is, however, another class of persons who may  supply electric  energy and that class consists of persons who  may be called sanction-holders under s. 28 of the 1910 Act.  The 1948  Act  includes  both these classes of  persons  in  the definition of licensee, but does not include the Board.  The argument  of  the learned Attorney General  is  that  having regard  to  these definition clauses,  the  word  "licensee’ denotes  a genus or category of persons who supply  electric energy  to  consumers.  There is a third  class  of  persons (other than the Board) who may supply electric energy and it is  this class of persons who are sought to be  included  by the expression "other person" occuring after the  expression ’licensee’.  It is clear from s. 49 of the 1948 Act that the Board  may  supply  electricity to any person  not  being  a licensee  upon  such terms and conditions as the  Board  may from  time  to time fix.  A similar power is  given  to  the Board  also  under ss. 18(c) and 19(1) of  the  Act.   These persons  to  whom the Board may supply electricity  may,  in their  turn, supply electricity to consumers on  such  terms and  conditions  as the Board may lay down.   It  is  clear, therefore, that the 1948 Act contemplates a class of persons (other   than  licensees)  who  may  get  their  supply   of electricity 152 from  the Board and may, in their turn, supply the  same  to consumers within the meaning of the definition of that  word in  the  1910  Act.  The argument of  the  learned  Attorney General  is  that  it  is this  class  of  persons  who  are contemplated  by the expression other person"  occurring  in sub-s. (1) of s. 76. The  learned  Attorney  General has sought  to  fortify  his argument by the further circumstance that s. 76(1) obviously does  not  contemplate  that as between  a  licensee  and  a consumer,  there  can be a dispute in respect of  which  the consumer  can  call for an arbitration.  It is  argued  that this  is  obvious from the scheme of s.  76(1)  because  the licensee or other person is put on the same side, vis-a-vis, the  State  Government or the Board.  The  argument  of  the learned  Attorney General is that it will be incongruous  to hold  that  s. 76(1) does not take in a  dispute  between  a licensee and a consumer, but takes in a dispute between  the State Government or the Board on one side and a consumer  on the other, and he points out that so to hold will be to  put the  Government or the Board in a much worse  position  than the licensee.  He has drawn our attention to the proviso  to s. 26 of the 1948 Act which excludes the Board from  certain clauses of the Schedule to the 1910 Act and thereby  exempts the Board from arbitration in respect of matters referred to therein.   The  argument is that in view of the  proviso  to s.26 of the 1948 Act, it could not have been contemplated by the Legislature that the Board would be in a worse  position than a licensee.

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The learned Attorney General has also drawn our attention to ss.75 and 77 of the 1948 Act.  According to him, sub-s.  (3) of  s.  75  gives a clue to the meaning  of  the  expression "’other per-son" occurring in s. 76 (1).  Sub-section (3) of s.  75  states  inter alia that the Board  may  require  any licensee  or  person  supplying electricity  for  public  or private  purposes or generating electricity for his own  use to  153 furnish  it with such information and accounts  relating  to such supply or generation and in such form and manner as the notice  may  specify.   This  subsection,  so  the   learned Attorney  General has argued, shows that there  are  persons other  than  licensees who may as required.  by  the  Board, supply  electricity for public or private purposes  or  even generate  electricity for their own use.  According  to  the learned-  Attorney  General, these are the persons  who  are referred to as "other persons’ in s. 76 (1).  Section 77  is the penal section and read with s.4 it ,makes it clear  that there  is  a third class of persons  besides,  licensees  or sanction-holders  who may supply electricity for  public  or private  purposes.   Section 4 states that it shall  be  the duty of each State Electricity, Department or other licensee or  person  supplying  electricity  for  public  or  private purposes  or generating electricity for its or his own  use, to  furnish  to  the  Central  Electricity  Authority   such accounts,  statistics and returns as may be  required.   All these indicate clearly enough that besides licensees holding a licence under Part II of the 1910 Act and sanction holders holding  a sanction under s. 28 of the 1910 Act, there is  a third class of persons who may supply electricity for public or private purposes.  This third class of persons is subject to control by the State Government, The Central  Electricity Authority  or  the Board.  The contention  of  the,  learned Attorney General is that a dispute between this third  class of persons on one side and the State Government or Board  on the  other  is the dispute contemplated by the  use  of  the expression  "other person" occurring in sub-s.(1) of s.  76. The  learned  Attorney General has placed  reliance  on  the decision in Williams v. Golding(1).  There the question  for consideration was the meaning to be given to the  expression "’or other person" in the 108th section of the  Metropolitan Building  Act,  1855 (18th and 19th Vict. c. 122).   It  was held  that the expression "’or other person"  meant  persons ejusdem generis with a district surveyor, that (1)  1865 (1) L.R.C.P. 69. 154 is, persons having an official duty.  The decision in United Towns  Electric  Co.  v.  Attorney-General-Newfoundland  (1) explains  the  application  of  the  principle  of   ejusdem generis,  and  it  was held that there is no  room  for  the application of that principle in the absence of any  mention of  genus,  since the mention of a single species  does  not constitute a genus. As  against  these  contentions  of  the  learned   Attorney General,  it  has been argued on behalf of  the  respondents that the main principle on which we must proceed is to  give to  all  the words of s. 76 their common meaning ;  and  the ejusdem  generis rule which is not automatically  applicable really  means that there is implied into the  language  some restriction  which  is  not there ; it  is  argued  that  no restriction can be implied from the language of s. 76 so  as to  exclude  a consumer from the expression  "other  person" occurring  in  sub-s.  (1) of s. 76.  It  has  been  further submitted that the word "licensee’ preceding the  expression

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’other  person’  does  not denote a  genus  or  category  of suppliers  of electricity so as to attract the operation  of the  rule  of  ejusdem  generis.  in  this  connection   our attention has been drawn to ss. 28, 34, 39, 41 and 43 of the 1948 Act. These contentions urged on both sides would require  careful consideration in a more appropriate  case where   a  dispute arises under the 1948 Act.  In view of our   finding,however, that the dispute in the present    case does not arise under the  1948  Act,  the question whether the  rule  of  ejusdem genesis  applies  or  not in  interpreting  s.76  is  purely academic.   We  do not propose to  determine  that  academic question here. Before  we  conclude,  we  may  refer  to  another  argument advanced  by  the  learned Attorney  General.   The  learned Attorney  General has submitted that if a  question  between the Board and a consumer is to be (1)  1939-1 All.  E.R. 423.  155 referred  to  arbitration,  then in cases  where  the  Board itself  supplies electric energy there may be  thousands  of consumers  each  of whom may raise a dispute  and  call  for arbitration.   In  that event, there will  be  thousands  of arbitrations   and   the  legislature   could   never   have contemplated  such a situation.  This is really an  argument based   on   inconvenience,  and  we  do  not   think   that inconvenience  is  a  decisive  factor  in  interpreting   a statute. Learned  counsel for the respondents drew our  attention  to s.51-A of the 1910 Act.  That section states that where  the State Government engages in the business of supplying energy to the public, it shall have all the powers and  obligations of  a  licensee  under the 1910 Act.   There  is  a  proviso similar  to  the proviso to s.26 which  excludes  the  State Government  from the operation of some of the provisions  of the  Act.   This  section  is  of  no  materiality  for  the consideration of the cases before us, for it was inserted in the 1910 Act in 1959.  For  the reasons given above, we allow these  appeals,  set aside  the  orders of the High Court  dated      August  19, 1960,  and restore those of the Additional  District  judge, Bangalore  dated  April  17, 1959.  The  appellant  will  be entitled to its costs throughout,one hearing fee. HIDAYATULLAH, J.-I agree that this appeal should be allowed. I  am  of the opinion that this is not the kind  of  dispute which can come within s. 76 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948.  That section provides               "76.   Arbitration.-(1) All questions  arising               between the State Government or the Board  and               a licensee or other person shall be determined               by arbitration." 156 I  am of opinion that the ejusdem  generis rule  invoked  by the appellant to interpret ’other person’ in the section  is not  required  ’to limit the generality  of  the  expression because  a consumer disputing rates cannot come  within  the expression "other person",regard being had to the provisions of the Act. The facts of the ’case have been set out exhaustively by  my brother Das and for my purpose I need only mention that  the respondents  in these appeals are four  companies  receiving electrical  energy  in  their  mills  from  the   appellant. Formerly  there  was a contract under which-  the  rate  was fixed  but the contract expired sometime in 1949-50 and  the State  Government  has  now fixed  the  rates  higher.   The

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respondents have paid the charges for the energy consumed by them  at  the old rates and large arrears  have  accumulated representing  the difference between the charge at  the  old and  the new rates.  The first revision of rates, it may  be mentioned, Was in 1953 and the second in 1956.  The  present appellant was constituted in 1957 and in all proceedings  to which reference has been made in the judgment of my  learned brother,  the  appellant  has been  joined.  The  respondent companies  admit that they are liable to pay for the  energy consumed  by  them  at  the, rates  agreed  in  the  expired agreements  but demur to payment at the new rates  and  this has  raised a dispute which they claim must be  referred  to arbitration as required by s.76. The short question in this appeal is whether such a  dispute is  compulsorily referrable to, arbitration.  Of course,  if the dispute is one to which s. 76 applies and the respondent companies in their position as consumers, are proper parties to take advantage of s. 76, then the dispute, such as it is, must  be referred.  The language of s. 76 is both  wide  and intractable.  But a dispute need not go to arbitration if it is not a dispute to which s. 76 can apply.  157 Also,  the section can hardly be invoked if consumers  (such as  the  respondents)  do not  come  within  the  expression ",other  person  on  the principle  of  ejusdem  generis  or otherwise. The  Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 (54 of 1948) was  passed in  1948  and it was a measure, as the long  title  and  the preamble  show, to rationalise the production and supply  of electricity  and generally for taking measures conducive  to electrical  development.  The Act deals with the  supply  of electrical  energy  and its  rationalisation,  whether  such energy be generated by a State Government, State Electricity Board, a licensee under the Indian Electricity Act, 1910  (9 of  1910)  or a person who, having obtained  sanction  under section  28  of  the  1910 Act, engages  in  the  supply  of electrical energy.  The Electricity (Supply Act, ’1948, does not  deal with other matters relating to the supply and  use of  electrical energy which are governed by the earlier  Act of 1910.  The latter Act deals with the grant of licenses to produce  electrical energy,and contains provisions  for  the supply,  transmission  and  use  of  electrical  energy   by licensees  and  non-licensees  and  generally  with  matters connected  thereto.  Both the Acts are required to  be  read together but where they differ the later Act prevails.  Both the  Acts provide for arbitration in disputes.  The  Act  of 1910 provides this by s. 52. which reads               "52.   Where any matter is, by or  under  this               Act directed to be determined by  arbitration,               the  matter  shall,  unless  it  is  otherwise               expressly   provided  in  the  license  of   a               licensee,  be- determined by’ such  person  or               persons  as the State Government may  nominate               in  that behalf on the application  of  either               party;   but   in  all  other   respects   the               arbitration shall be subject to the provisions               of the Arbitration Act, (1940).               158               Provided that where the Government or a  State               Electricity Board is a party to a dispute, the               dispute shall be referred to two  arbitrators,               one  to  be  appointed by each  party  to  the               dispute." This section enjoins arbitration only in disputes which  are expressly  directed  by  the 1910 Act to  be  determined  by

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arbitration and admittedly none of those provisions applies. Section 76 is more general. It enjoins that "all  questions" arising between the State Government or the Board on the one hand  and a licensee or other person on the other  shall  be determined by arbitration.  Though the section does not  say this,  the question must be one which can, arise  under  the Supply Act.  The section does not mean, notwithstanding  its extreme  width, that disputes which have no relation to  the Supply  Act  or  its provisions must  also  be  resolved  by arbitration for to hold so would mean that neither the State Government  nor the Board can sue or be sued in courts.   It is,   therefore,   quite  plain  that  one   must   read   a qualification into the section that the dispute must be  one touching  a  matter within the Supply Act.   Some  of  these disputes  are  required by the Act itself to go  before  the Central  Electricity Authority, one of its duties  being  to "act  as  arbitrators in matters arising between  the  State Government  or the Board and a licensee or other  person  as provided  in this Act", vide s. 3 (1) (II).  Other  disputes arc  required  to  go before two arbitrators  :  one  to  be appointed  by  each party.  Indeed the four  companies  have nominated their arbitrator, given a notice to the Board  and the Board has filed in the District Court four  applications under  s. 33 of the Arbitration Act, in which it  has  asked for  a  declaration  that the dispute is not  liable  to  be referred to arbitration.  This declaration was given by  the Additional District judge, Bangalore, but it was  159 disallowed by the High Court of Mysore by an order passed on revision.  The High Court granted certificates on which  the present appeals were filed. Before dealing with the arguments, it is necessary to  refer briefly  to the scheme of the two Acts to  discover  whether this kind of dispute as to rates can arise between the State Government  or the State Electricity Board on the  one  hand and the consumer on the other, so as to require a  reference to  arbitration.   The  1910 Act deals with  the  supply  of energy  by licensees and the transmission and  use  thereof. It regulates the grant of licenses to licensees and  confers on  the  Government the right to control  the  distribution, supply and consumption of electrical energy.  In addition to the  licensees  the  1910  Act  gives  power  to  the  State Government   (s.   28)  to  sanction   generation,   supply, transmission  and use of electrical energy by persons  other than  the licensees.  The 1910 Act also contains  provisions for  supervising  the work of licensees  and  persons  given sanction under s. 28 with a view to seeing that they observe the provisions of the Act.  The 1910 Act contains a schedule divided to-day into XVI clauses.  Formerly, two more clauses which  were numbered XI and XI A were also in  the  schedule bringing the number of clauses to XVIII.     -Clauses XI and XI A were omitted by the Indian    Electricity   (Amendment) Act 1959 (32 of1959).    Clauses IX,X, XI, XIA and XII  deal with charges   for  the supply of electrical energy and  the fixation  of the rates. Under  the  Electricity  (Supply)  Act  of  1948  the  State Electricity  Board has all the powers and obligations  of  a licensee  under the Indian Electricity Act, 1910, and  under s.  26 of the 1948 Act that Act itself is deemed to  be  the license  of  the Board for the purpose of that  Act.   There are, however, two exceptions to this, The first exception is mentioned in the proviso 160 to  s.  26 by which certain provisions of the 1910  Act  are made inapplicable to the Board and these include clauses  IX

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to  XII  of  the schedule which deal with  charges  for  the supply of electrical energy.  The other exception is in  the definition   of  "licensee"  in  which  it  is   said   that notwithstanding   the,   provisions  of  s.  26   the   term "’licensee" as used in the Supply Apt 1948, does not include the Board.  In other words, though the Board carries on work as a licensee for the purposes of the 1910 Act, it is not  a licensee  in  the  true sense of the  word  And  duties  and obligations  of  a  licensee in the matter  of  charges  and fixing of rates for consumption of electrical energy are not applicable to the Board.  It is, therefore. quite clear that no  dispute  between a consumer and  the  State  Electricity Board  can  arise under the 1948 Act in the  matter  of  the rates at which the Board supplies electrical energy.  In the present  cases, there is a still stronger reason for  coming to  the conclusion that there was no dispute under  the  Act which  could  be referred to arbitration because  the  rates ’were fixed by the State Government in 1953 and 1956 and the Board   itself  came  into  existence  in  1957.   When   we questioned Mr. Vishwanath Sastri, how he said that this  was a dispute arising under the 1948 Act, he referred us to s.60 of  the Supply Act which makes the Board a successor of  the State Government in respect of the matters to which the" Act applies.    He  said  that  if  the  State  Government   was incompetent to revise the rates in 1953 and 1956, the  board as  its successor would be the appropriate party with  which the  dispute can be raised.  In my opinion such,  a  dispute between the State Government or Board on the one hand and  a consumer on the other in respect of the rates of  electrical energy (apart from any contract that might have been entered into)  does  not  arise  under the 1948  Act  at,  all.   No provision  of  the 1948 Act has been brought to  our  notice which  would embrace such a dispute’ and as I  have  already pointed out above that it is only a dispute arising ’under 161 the  1948  Act  which,  can  be  compulsorily  referred   to arbitration. The  next question is whether a consumer is included in  the expression  "’other person".  The  learned  Attorney-General seeks to-apply the ejusdem generis rule and argues that  the expression  "’other  person" must take its colour  from  the word  immediately  preceding i. e., licensee.  He.  took  us through the two: Acts to show who were the persons who could be  said  to belong to the genus "licensee"  and  said  that persons  generating electricity with the sanction  of  :the. State  Government  under  s. 28 of the 1910  Act  would,  be another  such class belonging to the same genus.  He  relied upon  the  case of William V.’ Golding (1), to  support  his contention that even a single; category ’may’ be regarded as a  genus to control the amplitude of the general words  next following.   That  case  arose under an  Act  in  which  the expression."District  Surveyor"  was followed by  the  words "’other  person" and the words " other person" were given  a limited  meaning  on  the ejusdem  generis  principle.   The section  gave  protection to  ’persons  exercising  official duties  and  was  in  the nature  of  a  public  authorities protection clause and the words "’other person" could not be extended  to cover a private party not  performing  official duties.   I doubt whether that ruling can be applied to  the present  case.  I have already stated that the dispute  must be  one which can arise under the Act- If the whole  Act  is scanned  it will be found that consumers have no’  place  in it.   Wherever  the Act uses the word "   other  person"  it invariably means persons who generate and supply  electrical energy  and not those who consume it.  The only  section  to

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which our attention was drawn in which a dispute was  likely to  arise  between  the Electricity  Board  and  a  possible consumer  (not  a licensee as defined in the Act)  is  s.49. That section requires that the Board. may supply electricity "to any person not being a licensee upon (1)  (1865) L. R. I C. P. 69, 162 such terms and conditions as the board may from time to time fix having regard to the nature and geographical position of the supply and for purposes for which it is required without showing  undue  preference to any  person.   Mr.  Vishwanath Sastri  contended  that a dispute might arise if  the  Board unreasonably  refused  to supply electricity  to  a  private consumer or showed undue preference to someone else and such a  dispute might be taken to arbitration under s. 76.  I  do not  wish to pronounce any opinion upon this matter  because the present dispute is not a dispute of this character.  For these  reasons I am of opinion that the Additional  District judge,  Bangalore,  was right in  granting  the  declaration sought  by the appellants.  11 would, therefore,  set  aside the  order  of  the  High Court  and  restore  that  of  the Additional  District  judge, Bangalore, with  costs  on  the respondents throughout.  One hearing fee. Appeals allowed.