http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 10  

PETITIONER: THE MANAGEMENT OF EXPRESS NEWSPAPERS LTD.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: B. SOMAYAJULU AND OTHERS

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 18/04/1963

BENCH: GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. BENCH: GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. WANCHOO, K.N. GUPTA, K.C. DAS

CITATION:  1964 AIR  279            1964 SCR  (3) 100  CITATOR INFO :  E          1972 SC1872  (13)

ACT: Industrial Dispute--"Working journalist"--Construction-Tests prescribed--Part time employee satisfies the test prescribed if,  can  be  excluded from the  purview  of  the  section-- "Avocation,"  Meaning  of--Working  Journalists   Industrial Disputes Act, 1955 (1 of 1955), s. 2 (b).

HEADNOTE:     The  reapondent’s services as a correspondent at  Guntur under  the appellant were terminated.  The Andhra  Union  of Working  Journalists,   Elluru,  took  up  the  respondent’s cause and alleged that his services  had been terminated  by the  appellant   without  any justification and  that  as  a working  journalist,  he was entitled to  reinstatement  and compensation. the dispute was referred to the Labour  Court, Gunrut, by the Government of Andhra Pradesh.  The  appellant raised preliminary objections before the Labour Court, which were  all rejected.  On the merits, the appellant  contended that  the avocation of a moffusil correspondent was not  the respondent’s  principal  avocation, and so,  he   could  not claim  the  benefit of the status of  a  working  journalist under  s.  2 (b) of the Act. The Labour  Court  decided  the matter against the respondent solely on the ground that as a part  time  worker  he could not be regarded  as  a  working journalist,  and  it made no finding on the question  as  to whether  his  principal  avocation  at  the  time  when  his services  were terminated could be said to satisfy the  teat prescribed by the definition under s. 2 (b) of the Act.  The award  was challenged by the respondent by a  writ  petition before  the  High Court of Andhra Pradesh.  The  High  Court held that the respondent was a working journalist under s. 2 (b) of the Act and so it set aside the award.  On appeal  by certificate  the appellant’s  principal contention  in  this Court  was that the High Court was in error in holding  that the  respondent was a working journalist under s. 2  (b)  of the Act.     Held  that whenever an employee working in  a  newspaper establishment    claims    the   status   of    a    working journalist,

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 10  

101 he has to establish first that he is a journalist, and  then that  journalism is his  principal   avocation  and  he  has been employed as such journalist.  In proving the fact  that he  is a journalist, the employees specified in  the  latter clause  of s. 2 (b) of the Act need not prove anything  more than  this  that they fail under one or the  other  category specified  in the said clause.  But that only  proves  their status  as journalist; they have still further to show  that their  principal avocation is that of a journalist and  that they   have   been  employed  as  such  by   the   newspaper establishment in question.     The  object  of  the artificial extention  made  by  the including  clause  is  not to dispense  with  the  two  main conditions prescribed by the definition before a  journalist can be regarded as a working journalist.     Having  regard  to the context of s. 2 (b) it  would  be inappropriate  to adopt the dictionary or  the  etymological meaning  of the word  "avocation" in  construing  s 2  (b)of the Act. Held further that normally employment contemplated by 2  (b) would  be full time employment but part-time  employment  is not excluded from s. 2 (b)  either.  On a fair  construction of  s. 2  (b),  it would be  impossible to hold that a  part time employee who satisfies the test prescribed  by s. 2 (b) can  be  excluded  from  its  purview  merely  because   his employment is part time.     In the present case,  the onus to prove the issue as  to whether  the  work of a  correspondent   was  his  principal avocation  at  the  relevant   time in  the   light  of  the relevant  facts. as well as, the issue as to whether he  was in  the exclusive employment of the appellant lies  on   the respondent  and it is only if he establishes  the fact  that he is a  working journalist, the question as to  determining the relief to which he is entitled may arise.

JUDGMENT:     CIVIL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.  202  of 1562.     Appeal from the judgment and order dated March 10, 1961, of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Writ Petition No. 677 of 1958.     A.V. Viswanatha Sastri,  Jayaram and  R. Ganpathi  lyer, for the appellant.                 ’ 102 V.K.  Krishna  Menon,  M. K. Ramamurthi, R.K.  Garg,  S.  C. Agarwal and D.P. Singh, for the respondent No. 1. K. R. Chaudhuri and P.D. Menon, for respondent No. 2 1963. April 18.  The Judgment of the Court was delivered by     GAJENDRAGADKAR J .- The principal question which  arises in this appeal is whether the respondent B. Somayajulu is  a working   journalist   under  s.  2(b)  of    the    Working Journalists   Industrial Disputes Act 1955, (No. 1 of  1955) (hereinafter called ’the Act’).   That  question  arises  in this  way.   On  February  19,  1935,  the  respondent   was appointed  a Correspondent at Guntur by the  appellant,  the management   of the  Express  Newspapers  Ltd. He  did  that work  continuously  until   October, 20, 1955 on which  date his  services were terminated. The Andhra Union  of  Working Journalists,  Elluru, then took up the   respondent’s  cause and  alleged  that his services had been terminated  by  the appellant  without any justification and that as  a  working journalist,   he   was   entitled   to   reinstatement   and

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 10  

compensation for the period during which he was not  allowed to work by the appellant in consequence of the order  passed by the appellant terminating his services.  This dispute was referred   by   the  Government  of   Andhra   Pradesh   for adjudication  to  the Labour Court,  Guntur.   The  question referred  for adjudication was whether  the  termination  of services  of  Mr.  B. Somayajulu,  Correspondent  of  Indian Express Newspapers at Guntur was justified? If not, to  what relief  was  he  entitled?  Before  the  Labour  Court,  the respondent  claimed  that  in  addition  to   reinstatement, compensation should be awarded to him from October 13,  1955 to  May  1, 1956 at Rs. 75/-per mensem and thereafter up  to the 103 date  of  reinstatement at the rate prescribed by  the  Wage Board  for Working Journalists under the provisions  of  the Act. The  appellant disputed this claim on several  grounds.   It urged that the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the reference, because the appointment of the respondent had been  made  at Madras, the money due to him  was  sent  from Madras, and so, the appropriate Government which could  have made  the reference was the  Madras Government and  not  the Government  of  Andhra  Pradesh.   This  argument  has  been rejected  by  the Labour Court. It was also urged  that  the reference was invalid since the order of reference in  terms did  not  refer  to section 10 (1) (c)  01’  the  Industrial Disputes  Act  under  which  the power  to  refer  had  been exercised.   The  Labour Court repelled this  contention  as well.  Then it was alleged that the dispute referred to  the Labour Court for its adjudication was an individual  dispute and  had  not  been properly sponsored by  any  Union.   The Labour  Court was not impressed even by this plea.  That  is how the preliminary objections raised by the appellant  were all rejected.     On  the merits, the appellant urged that the  respondent was  not a working journalist under s. 2(b) of the Act.   In support  of  this  plea  the  appellant  averted  that   the respondent was a part-time correspondent unattached to   any particular  newspaper establishment that a year or so  later he was appointed as a selling agent  of the publications  of the appellant, such as the Express Newspapers,  Dinamani and Andhra  Pradesh at Guntur which assignment was given to  him on  his depositing Rs. 6,000/which was later raised  to  Rs. 7,000/-.  According to the appellant, as such selling agent, the respondent was making on an average about Rs. 1,500/-per mensem  as  commission, whereas, as a correspondent  he  was first  paid  on lineage basis and later  an  honorarium  was fixed at Rs. 50/- which was subsequently 104 raised to Rs. 75/- p.m.  This latter amount was paid to  him until   his  services  were  terminated.    The   appellant, therefore,  contended  that  the  avocation  of  a  moffusil correspondent was not the respondent’s principal  avocation, and  so, he could not claim the benefit of the status  of  a working journalist under s. 2(b) of the Act.     The  Labour  Court took the view that  parttime  workers were  outside  the  purview of the  Act.  It  also  referred incidentally to the commission which the respondent received as a selling agent and made some observations to the  effect that  the  payment  to  the respondent for  his  work  as  a correspondent  was very much less than the commission  which he received from the appellant as its selling agent.  It  is common  ground  that  some  time  before  the   respondent’s services  as  a correspondent were terminated,  his  selling

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 10  

agency had also come to an end.  From the award made by  the Labour Court, it is clear that the Labour Court decided  the matter against the respondent solely on the ground that as a part-time  worker  he could not be  regarded  as  a  working journalist,  and  it made no finding on the question  as  to whether  his  principal  avocation  at  the  time  when  his services  were terminated could be said to satisfy the  test prescribed by the definition under s. 2(b).     The award made by the Labour Court was challenged by the respondent  before the Andhra Pradesh High Court by  a  writ petition  under  Articles 226 and 227 of  the  Constitution. The  High  Court has held that the respondent is  a  working journalist under s. 2(b) and so, it has set aside the  award passed  by the Labour Court. There is no specific  direction issued  by the High Court remanding the proceedings  between the  parties to the Labour Court for disposal on the  merits in  accordance with law, but that clearly is the  effect  of the  order.  It is against this decision that the  appellant has come to this Court with a 105 certificate issued by the said High Court; and on behalf  of the   appellant,  the  principal contention  raised  by  Mr. Sastri   is  that the High Court was in  ,error  in  holding that the respondent was a working journalist under s. 9,(b).     The  Act which applied  to the proceedings  between  the parties was the Act No. 1 of 1955. This Act came into  force on  March   12,  1955.  It consists  of  only  3   sections. Section  1   gave  the  title  of  the  Act;  s.  2  defined ’newspaper’  and ’working journalist’  by  clauses  (a)  and (b);  and s. 3 made a general provision that the  provisions of  the  Industrial  Disputes Act, 1947 applied  to,  or  in relation  to, working journalists as they applied to, or  in relation  to  workmen within the meaning of  that  Act.   In other words, the  scheme of the Act was to define  newspaper and  working  journalist and to make the provisions  of  the Industrial Disputes Act applicable to working journalists.     This  Act  was  followed  by  the  working   Journalists (Condition  of  Service) and Miscellaneous  Provisions  Act, 1955 (No. 45 of 1955).  This Act consists of 21 sections and makes   some  specific  provisions  applicable  to   working journalists,  different from the relevant provisions of  the Industrial Disputes Act. Section 2 (f) of this Act   defines a  working journalist.  The  definition prescribed by  s.  2 (f) of this Act is identical with the  definition prescribed by s. 2 (b) of the earlier Act, and so, for the purposes  of the  present  appeal, whatever we say about  the  scope  and effect of the definition. of s. 2 (b)in the earlier Act will apply to the definition prescribed by s. 2 (f)of the latter. Act.   Section 3 of this latter Act makes the provisions  of the  Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, applicable  to  working. journalists.  Sections ,4 and 5 make special  provisions  in respect of retrenchment and gratuity.  Section 6  prescribes the hours of work; s. 7 deals with problem of leave  106 s.  8  provides for the constitution of a Wage Board;  s.  9 deals  with  the  fixation of wages; s. 10  requires  ’  the publication   of   the  decision  of  the  Board   and   its commencement,  while  s.  11  deals  with  the  powers   and procedure  of the Board.  Section 12 makes the  decision  of the  Board binding and s. 13 gives power to the   Government to  fix  interim  rates  of  wages.  These   provisions  are contained   in   Chapter  II.  Chapter  III  consists  of  2 sections 14 and 15 and they make applicable to the newspaper employees  the  provisions  of  the  Industrial   Employment (Standing  Orders) Act, 1946 and the  Employees’   Provident

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 10  

Funds   Act,  1952.   Chapter  IV   contains   miscellaneous provisions,   such  as  those relating  to the  recovery  of money due from an employer under s. 17, penalty under s.  18 and  indemnity  under s. 19. Section  20 confers  the  rule- making  power on the Central Government, and s.  21  repeals the earlier Act.       In  dealing  with  the  question  as  to  whether  the respondent  can  be said to be a  working  journalist,  iris necessary  to read the definition prescribed by s. 2 (b)  of the Act:               "Working  journalist’  means  a  person  whose               principal  avocation is that of  a  journalist               and who is employed as such in, or in relation               to,  any establishment for the  production  or               publication  of  a  newspaper  or  in,  or  in               relation  to,  any news agency  or   syndicate               supplying  material  for  publication  in  any               newspaper, and includes an  editor, a  leader-               writer,   news  editor,  subeditor,   feature-               writer,         copy-tester,         reporter,               correspondent,  cartoonist,  news photographer               and  proof-reader,  but does not  include  any               such person who--                    (i) is employed mainly in a managerial or               administrative capacity, or               107                  (ii)   being  employed  in  a   supervisory               capacity, exercises, either by the nature   of               the duties attached to the office or by reason               of the powers vested in him, functions  mainly               of a managerial nature." It   is  plain  that  the  definition  prescribed   by   s.2 (b)consists  of  two parts; the first part provides  what  a working journalist means, and the second part brings  within its  purview  by an artificial extension  certain  specified categories  of  newspaper  employees.  It would  be  noticed that  the first part provides for two conditions which  must be satisfied by a journalist before he can be .held to be  a working journalist.The first condition is that he must be  a journalist   whose   principal  avocation  is  that   of   a journalist,  and  the second condition is that  he  must  be employed as such in, or in relation to, any establishment as there  specified.  The first question which arises  for  our decision  is whether the two conditions thus  prescribed  by the  first part of the definition govern the  categories  of newspaper  employees  included  in  the  definition  by  the artificial extention made by the including clause.  The High Court  has taken the view that the categories  of  employees who  are  included  in the definition  by  name,  need   not satisfy  the  two conditions prescribed by the  first  part. The argument is that since a  correspondent,  for  instance, has been named in the second clause, the whole object of the legislature  was  to make him a working  journalist  without requiring  him tO satisfy the two conditions prescribed   by the  first  part.   In our  opinion,  this  construction  is plainly  erroneous.  The object of the second clause was  to make  it clear that the employees specified in  that  clause are journalists and nothing more.  The word "journalist" has not  been  defined in the Act and the legislature  seems  to have  thought  that  disputes may  arise  as  to  whether  a particular  newspaper  employee  was a  journalist  or  not. There Can, of course, be no difficulty about an editor or 108  a  leader-writer,  or a news editor or a  sub-editor  being regarded as a journalist; but it was apparentIy  apprehended

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 10  

that a difficulty may arise, for instance, in the case of  a correspondent,  a proof reader, a cartoonist, a reporter,  a copy-tester,  or a feature writer, and so,  the  legislature took  the  precaution  of providing  specifically  that  the employees enumerated in the latter clause are to be regarded as journalists for the purpose of the definition  prescribed by  s. 9, (b). The object of the  artificial extension  made by the including clause is not to dispense with the two main conditions prescribed by the definition before a  journalist can  be  regarded as a working journalist. There can  be  no doubt  that  even the employees falling under  the  extended meaning  must be employed as such.  It is thus obvious  that the  second requirement prescribed by the first clause  that the  journalist must be employed as such in, or in  relation to, any establishment for the  production or publication  of a  newspaper, as therein specified, has to be  satisfied  by the  employees  falling  under the  latter  clause,  because unless   there   was  an  employment    by   the   newspaper establishment,  no relationship of employer and employee can arise,  and the journalists specified  in the latter  clause could not, therefore, claim the status of working journalist qua the employer who manages the journal in question.   Once it is realised that the. test of employment must govern  the employees  specified in the latter clause, it  would  become clear that the High Court was in error in assuming that  the extended  artificial  definition of the  working  journalist dispensed   with   both the conditions   prescribed  by  the first part of the said definition.  That is why we think the extension  was  made  by the word "includes"  only  for  the purpose  of  removing any doubt as to  whether  the  persons specified in the said clause are journalists or not. What is true  about the condition as to employment is  equally  true about the other condition that a journalist can be a working journalist only where it is 109 shown  that journalism is his principal avocation. In  other words, the position is that whenever an employee  working in the newspaper  establishment claims the status of a  working journalist   he  has  to  establish  first  that  he  is   a journalist,  and  then  that  journalism  is  his  principal avocation  and he has been employed as such journalist.   In proving  the  fact that he is a  journalist,  the  employees specified in the latter clause need not prove anything  more than  this  that they fall under one or the  other  category specified  in the said clause.  But that only  proves  their status  as journalist; they have still further to show  that their  principal avocation is that of a journalist and  that they   have   been  employed  as  such  by   the   newspaper establishment in question.     That  takes  us to the question as to what is  meant  by avocation?  The  High  Court thought  that  the   dictionary meaning  of the word "avocation" which showed that it  meant "a distraction or diversion from one’s regular  employment", could be adopted in the context  of s. 2 (b).  In support of this view, the High Court has cited a passage from Fowler in Modern  English Usage.  Fowler says "Avocation originally  a calling away, an interruption,  a distraction, was for  some time  commonly  used as a synonym for vocation  or  calling, with  which it is  properly in antithesis.  This  misuse  is now  less  common,  and the word is generally  used  in  the plural,  a person’s avocations being the things  he  devotes time to, his persuits or engagements in general, the affairs he  has to see to; his vocation as such is neither  excluded from, nor necessarily included m, his avocation."   Applying this. dictionary meaning of the word ’ ’avocation" the  High

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 10  

Court  has held that even if the respondent has  to  satisfy the  first  condition prescribed by the first part of  s.  2 (b), it can be held that he satisfied the said test, because the  work of a correspondent in his case can be safely  said to be his principal avocation in the sense of 110 distraction or diversion from his regular employment. In our Opinion, in applying mechanically the dictionary meaning  of the word "avocation"without due regard to the context of  s. 2  (b)  the  High  Court has  adopted  a  somewhat  pedantic approach.  One has merely to read the definition to  realise the word "avocation" used in s. 2 (b) cannot possibly mean a distraction or diversion from one’s regular employment.   On the  contrary, it plainly means one’s vocation,  calling  or profession.  The  plain idea underlying s. 2 (b) is that  if a  person is doing the work, say of a correspondent, and  at the same time is pursuing some other calling or  profession, say  that  of a lawyer, it is only where his  calling  as  a ’journalist can be said to be his principal calling that the status of a working journalist can be assigned to him.  That being the plain object of s. 2 (b), it would, think, be,  on the  whole,  inappropriate to adopt the  dictionary  or  the etymological  meaning of the word "avocation" in  construing s.  2 (b).  We ought to add that Mr. Menon who appeared  for the  respondent  did  not attempt to  support  the  approach adopted  by  the  High  Court in dealing  with  this  point. Therefore,   when   a  question   arises  as  to  whether  a journalist can be said to be a working journalist, it has to be shown that journalism of whatever kind contemplated by s. 2 (b) is the principal avocation of the person claiming  the status  of a  working  journalist  and that naturally  would involve  an enquiry as to the gains made by him by  pursuing the career of a journalist as compared with the  gains  made by   him by the pursuit of other callings  or   professions. It is obvious that this test will be merely academic and  of no  significance  in  the case of  full   time  journalists, because in such cases the obvious presumption would be  that their full time  employment is their principal avocation and no  question of comparing their income from journalism  with income from other sources can arise. In fact, the  status of such full time journalists as 111 working  journalists  will not be affected even if  in  some cases  the income received by them from such employment  may be found to be less than, say, for instance, the income from their ancestral property. This test assumes significance and importance only in the case of journalists who are  employed on parttime basis. Reverting  to the second requirement of employment which  we have  already  seen  must  obviously  govern  the  employees failing  under the latter part of s. 2 (b) if they seek  the status   of  working  journalists,  it  is  plain  that   an employment must be proved, because that alone will    create a  relationship  of employer and employee     between   them and the newspaper establishment.  Unless there is an employ- ment,   there can be no    conditions of service  and  there would be no scope for making any claim under the Act.   Thus the   requirement   of employment postulates  conditions  of service  agreed  between the parties subject  to  which  the relationship of master and servant comes into existence.  In the   context,   employment  must   necessarily    postulate exclusive  employment, because a working  journalist  cannot serve two employers, for that would be inconsistent with the benefits  which  he is entitled to claim from  his  employer under   the   Act.   Take  the   benefit   of   retrenchment

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 8 of 10  

compensation,  or gratuity, or hours of work, or leave;  how is it possible for a journalist to claim these benefits from two or more employers? The whole  scheme of the Act by which the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act have been made applicable      to    working     journalists,   necessarily assumes the  relationship of employer and employee and  that must mean exclusive employment by the employer on terms  and conditions   of  service  agreed   between    the   parties. Normally,  employment contemplated by s. 2(b) would be  full time  employment; but part-time employment is  not  excluded from s. 2(b) either.  Most of the employees 112 falling under the first clause of s. 2 (b) or even under the artificial  extension prescribed by the later clause  of  s. 2(b) would be full time employees.  But it is  theoretically possible  that  a  news-photographer,  for  instance,  or  a cartoonist may not necessarily be a full time employee.  The modern  trend of newspaper establishments appears to  be  to have  on  their rolls full time employees alone  as  working journalists;  but on a fair construction of s. 2(b),  we  do not  think  it would be possible to hold  that  a  part-time employee who satisfies the test prescribed by s. 2(b) can be excluded  from its purview merely because his employment  is part time.     The position, therefore, is that the Labour Court was  m error  in  making a finding that the respondent  was  not  a working  journalist on  the ground that he was a  part  time employee, whereas the High Court is in error in holding that the respondent is an employee because he has not to  satisfy the  test that journalism is his principal avocation. As  we have  held,  the  respondent can be said  to  be  a  working journalist only if he satisfies the two tests prescribed  by the  first  part of s. 2(b).  The test that he  should  have been employed as a journalist would undoubtedly be satisfied because  it  is common ground that since 1935  he  has  been working  as a correspondent of the appellant at  Guntur  and the payment which the appellant made to him by whatever name it was called was also regulated by an agreement between the parties;  in  its  pleadings, the  appellant  has,  however, disputed  the  fact  that  the  respondent  was  exclusively employed.  by  it and so, that is one question  which  still remains  to be tried. The further question which has  to  be considered  is  whether the respondent satisfies  the  other test:  "was  his working as a  correspondent  his  principal avocation  at the relevant time"?  The  definition  requires that  the  respondent  must  show  that  he  was  a  working journalist at the time when his services were terminated;   113 and that can be decided only on the evidence adduced by  the parties.   Unfortunately,  though  the Labour Court has made certain  observations on this point, it has  not  considered all  the evidence and has made no definite finding  in  that behalf.   That  was  because it held that  as  a  part  time employee,  the  respondent was outside s.  2(b).   The  High Court has no doubt purported to make a finding even on  this ground  in  the alternative, but, in our opinion,  the  High Court should not have adopted this course in dealing with  a writ  petition under Articles 226 and 227.  Even in  dealing with   this  question, the High Court appears to  have  been impressed  by  the fact that in discharging his  work  as  a correspondent the respondent must have devoted a large  part of  his  time;  and  it took the view  that  the  test  that journalism   should  be  the  principal  avocation  of   the journalist  implied a test as to how much time is  spent  in doing the work in question?  The time spent by a  journalist

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 9 of 10  

in discharging his duties as such may no doubt be  relevant, but it cannot be decisive.  What would be relevant, material and decisive is the gain made by the part time journalist by pursuing  the  profession of journalism as compared  to  the gain made by him by pursuing other vocations or professions. In  dealing with this aspect of the matter, it may no  doubt be relevant to bear in mind the fact that some months before his  services  as  a  correspondent  were  terminated,   the respondent’s selling agency had come to an end, and so,  the Labour  Court may have to hold an enquiry into the  question as  to  whether  the  respondent proves  that  the  work  of correspondent  was his principal avocation  at the  relevant time in the light of the relevant facts.  The onus to  prove this issue as well as the issue as to whether he was in  the exclusive   employment   of  the  appellant  lies   on   the respondent,   because  his  claim  that  he  is  a   working journalist  on these grounds is disputed by  the  appellant, and  it  is  only if he establishes the fact that  he  is  a working journalist that the 114 question  as  to  determining  the relief  to  which  he  is entitled  may arise.  We, therefore, allow the  appeal,  set aside the order passed by the High Court and remand the case to  the  Labour Court with a direction that it  should  deal with the dispute between the parties in accordance with  law in  the light of this judgment.  There would be no order  as to costs..     Before  we  part  with this appeal,  however,  we  would incidentally like to refer to the fact that the test of  the principal  avocation  prescribed by s. has  presumably  been adopted by the legislature from the recommendations made  by the  Press  Commission  in its report.   In  paragraph  505, dealing  with  the  question of  working   journalists,  the Commission  observed that it thought that "only those  whose professed avocation and the principal means of livelihood is journalism should be regarded as working .journalists,"  and it  added  that  "we have deliberately  included  the  words "professed  avocation"  because we have  come  across  cases where  persons belonging to some other professions, such  as law, medicine, education, have devoted part of their time to the supply of news to and writing articles for,  newspapers. It  may  be that in the case of some of  them,  particularly during  the  earlier  years of  their  professional  career, income  from  the practice of their own profession.  But  it would  not, on that account, be correct to classify them  as working journalists. so long as their professed avocation is other  than  journalism."  It  would  be  noticed  that  the expression "professed avocation" has not been adopted by the legislature  instead,  it  has  used  the  words  "principal avocation".   That is why we are inclined to take  the  view that   the   time  taken  by  a  person  in   pursuing   two different.professions  may  not be decisive; what  would  be decisive  is  the income derived by him from  the  different professions   respectively.    It  does  appear   that   the legislature  was inclined to take the view that if a  person following the profession of law in 115 the  early  years  of his career received  more  money  from journalistic  work and satisfied the other tests  prescribed by  s.  2(b),  he may not be excluded  from  the  definition merely because he is following another profession.  To  that extent, the provision of s. 2(b) departs from a part of  the recommendation made by the Press Commission.     In  regard to part time employees who, as we have  held, are  not  necessarily  excluded from s.  2(b)  the  position

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 10 of 10  

appears  to  be  that  the  report  by  the  Wage  Committee appointed  by the Union Government under the  provisions  of Act  45 of 1955, shows that the Committee treated some  part time  employees as working journalists.  In  paragraph  103, the  committee has observed that it had provided  a  regular scale  or retainer for part time correspondents, and it  has added  that the remuneration in accordance with  that  scale will be available to the part time correspondents  only  if, in accordance with  the definition in paragraph 23, Part II, of   its  recommendations,  their  principal  avocation   is journalism. The Committee noticed the fact that many of  the part    time    correspondents   employed    by    newspaper establishments would not fall within the definition if their principal avocation is something else and journalism is only a  side business, and it added that the problem of the  said class of part time correspondents was not within the purview of   its   terms   of  reference,  and  so,   it   made   no recommendations in regard to that class.                             Appeal allowed.                              Case remanded. 116