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PETITIONER: THE GUJARAT UNIVERSITY, AHMEDABAD

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: KRISHNA RANGANATH MUDHOLKAR AND OTHERS

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 21/02/1962

BENCH: SHAH, J.C. BENCH: SHAH, J.C. SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P.(CJ) IMAM, SYED JAFFER SUBBARAO, K. WANCHOO, K.N. AYYANGAR, N. RAJAGOPALA

CITATION:  1963 AIR  703            1963 SCR  Supl. (1) 122  CITATOR INFO :  R          1964 SC1823  (6,34,35)  R          1970 SC2079  (10)  R          1971 SC1731  (12)  RF         1979 SC  83  (2)  RF         1987 SC2034  (16,17)  RF         1988 SC 305  (7)

ACT: University   Education--Fixation  of  exclusive  medium   of instruction--Legislative      Competence      of       State Legislature--Constitution  of India, Art. 254  (1),  Seventh Schedule,  List  I,  Entry 66, List  II,  Entry  11--Gujarat University  Act, 1949 (Bom. 56 of 1949) as amended by Act  4 of  1961, ss. 4, 18, 20, 22, 38A--University Statutes,  207, 208 209.

HEADNOTE: The  second respondent joined the First Year Arts  Class  of the   St.  Xavier’s  College,  affiliated  to  the   Gujarat University,  where  instruction  was  imparted  through  the medium  of  English and after successfully  completing  that course  sought  admission to the classes preparing  for  the Intermediate Arts Examination of the University through  the medium  of English.  The Principal of the  college  informed him that in view of the provisions of the Gujarat University Act,  1949,  and  statutes 207, 208 and 209  framed  by  the Senate  of the University, as amended in 1961, he could  not be  admitted  without the sanction of the  University.   The first respondent (father of the second respondent) 113 moved  the  Vice-Chancellor but sanction was  refused.   The respondents then moved the High Court under Art. 226 of  the Constitution  for  writs requiring the  university  and  the Principal  of the College not to enforce the  provisions  of ss.  4 (27) 18(1) (XIV) and 38 A of the  Gujarat  University Act  and  Statutes 207, 208, 209 and that Court  holding  in favour of the respondents issued the- writs prayed for.  The State  and  the University filed separate  appeals  to  this

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Court.  It was contended on behalf of the University that s. 4  of  the Act conferred power on the University  to  impose Gujarati or Hindi as the exclusive medium of instruction and examination,  and that the impugned provisions  were  valid. The  questions  for  determination  were,  (1)  whether  the Gujarat University had the power under the Act to  prescribe Gujarati  or Hindi or both as exclusive medium or  media  of instruction   and  examination,  (2)   whether   legislation authorising   the  University  to  impose  such  media   was constitutionally valid in view of Entry 66 of list I of  the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. Held,   (Per   Sinha,  C.  J.,  Imam,  Wanchoo,   Shah   and Ayyangar,JJ.),  that  neither under the  Gujarat  University Act, 1949, as originally enacted nor as amended by Act 4  of 1961,  was  power  conferred on  the  University  to  impose Gujarati  or Hindi or both as exclusive medium or  media  of instruction or examination and since no power was  conferred on the University the Senate could exercise no such power. Clause (27) of s. 4 of the Act, which alone expressly  dealt with   the  subject  of  medium  of  instruction,   properly construed, did not indicate that the Legislature was therein indirectly  dealing  with  the  subject  of  prescribing  an exclusive  medium of instruction.  From the use of the  word "Promote" read in the context of the indefinite article "a", it was clear that the University was not empowered to impose Gujarati  or  Hindi as exclusive medium of  instruction  and examination.   Use  of  the definite article  "the"  in  the proviso in relation to English as the medium of  instruction supported this view. Since cl. (27) was not intended to authorise the  imposition of Gujarati or ’Hindi or both as exclusive medium or  media, cl.  (28) of s. 4 could not also be held to do so.  Nor  did ss.  18, 20, 22 or any other section of the Act confer  that authority. A  corporation has ordinarily an implied power to carry  out its  objects;  but  that rule could not by  itself,  in  the absence  of  express provisions in the  Act,  authorise  the University to impose an exclusive medium of instruction. The letter dated August 7, 1949, addressed by the Government of India to the Universities and Provincial Governments 114 requesting  them to gradually replace English as the  medium of  instruction at the University stage by the  regional  or State  language could not affect the interpretation  of  the plain language of the Act. Nor  could the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the  Act, which  proposed to empower the University to adopt  Gujarati or  the  national  language as the  medium  of  instruction, justify the court in assuming that the proposal was  carried out, the Statement of Objects and Reasons must be ignored in interpreting the statute. It  was not correct to say that legislation prescribing  the medium or media of instruction in higher education and other instructions  must  fall within Item  11 of List 11  of  the Seventh  Schedule  to  the Constitution.   The  use  of  the expression "subject to" in that Item clearly indicates  that legislation  in  respect of matters excluded  by  that  Item cannot be undertaken by the State Legislature. Hingir-Rampur  Coal Co. v. State of Orissa, [1961] 1  S.C.R. 537, referred to. Item  11  of  List  II  and  Item  66  of  List  I  must  be harmoniously  construed  and where they  overlap  the  power conferred by Item 66 on the Parliament must prevail over the power conferred on the State Legislatures by Item 11. The  test  of  the  validity  of  a  State  Legislation   on

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University   education   or  education  in   Technical   and Scientific  Institutions not covered by Entry 64 of List  I, would  be  whether such legislation impinges  on  the  field reserved   for  the  Union  by  Item  66  of  List,  I   and prejudicially  affects  coordination  and  determination  of standards,  and  not the existence of  some  definite  Union Legislation  to  that  end.  If there  be  one,  that  would prevail over the State legislation under Art. 254(1) of  the Constitution.   Even if there is no such legislation,  State law trenching upon the Union field must still be invalid. Item 66 of List I cannot be narrowly construed and the power it  confers extends to all ancillary or  subsidiary  matters which can be fairly and reasonably comprehended by it,  such as  disparities  resulting from the adoption of  a  regional medium of instruction resulting in a falling of standards in higher education.  The word ’co-ordination’ does not  merely mean  evaluation  but  also  harmonising  relationship   for concerted action.. The power under this Item is absolute and not conditioned by the existence of a state of emergency  or unequal standards calling for its exercise. Since  medium  of instruction is not an item in  the  legis- lative  Lists, it necessarily falls within Item II  of  List II, as 115 also within items 63 to 66 of List I and in so far as it  is a  necessary incident of the power under Item 66 it must  be deemed to be excluded from Item  11 of List II. If  a legislation imposing a regional language or  Hindi  as the  exclusive medium of instruction is likely to result  in lowering of standards, it must necessarily fall within  Item 66 of List I and be excluded to that extent from Item II  of List II. Per Subba Rao, J.-Under what entry a legislation falls  must be decided by the scope and effect of the legislation and by its  pith  and substance.  Case-law has  laid  down  various tests  to get at the core of the legislation but no case has yet  held  that  even  if  the  pith  and  substance  of   a legislation  falls  within  one entry, it is  liable  to  be struck  down  on the ground that it may possibly  come  into conflict  with  another by a co-ordinate  legislature  under another  entry.  If the impact of a State law on  a  Central subject  has  the  effect of wiping  out  or  abridging  the Central  field,  then  the State law may be  held  to  be  a colourable exercise of power and that in pith and  substance it  falls  not  under the State entry but  under  the  Union entry.   The  case-law  does  not,  however,  recognise   an independent principle of direct impact outside the  doctrine of pith and substance. Prafulla Kumar v. Bank of Commerce, Khulna, A.I.R. 1947 P.C. 60,.   State of Bombay v. F. N. Balsara, [1951] S.C.R.  682, A. S. Krishna v. State of Madras, [1957]  S.C.-R. 399, Union Colliery Co. of British Columbia Ltd. v. Bryden [1899]  A.C. 580,  Bank  of  Toronto v. Lambe, [1882]  12  A.C.  575  and Attorney General for Alberta v. Attorney General for Canada, [1939] A.C. 117, discussed. The well-settled rules of interpretation are that the widest amplitude should be given to the language of the Entries and when they overlap this Court should reconcile and  harmonise them.  So construed, it was clear that medium of instruction was  included in Entry 11 of List II and not in Entry 66  of List  I which relates to "co-ordination" and  "determination of standards".  The State legislature could, therefore, make a  law  empowering the University to  prescribe  a  regional language  as  the  exclusive  medium  of  instruction.   The Gujarat University Act was thus within Entry II and did  not

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affect the Union Entry which does not necessarily involve  a particular medium of instruction. Calcutta Gas Co. v. The State of West Bengal [1962] Supp.  3 S. C. R. I applied, 116 When  an  act confers a power on a corporation such  as  the University, it impliedly grarnts the power of doing all acts which are essentially accessary for exercising a that power. The provisions of the Act leave no manner of doubt that  the University  had  the  implied power  to  prescribe  for  the purposes   of  higher  education  a  number  of   media   or instructions  or  even a sole and  exclusive  medium.   That power  is implicit in cl. (1) of s.4 and the  other  clauses thereof.   Clause  (27)  did  not  curtail  that  power  but conferred  an  additional  power, to promote  the  study  of Gujarati  or  Hindi  and  the  use  of  them  as  medium  of instruction   and  examination;  the  proviso  to  it   also corresponds with the scheme.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION :Civil Appeals Nos. 234 and 262 of 1962. Appeals from the judgment and order dated January 24,  1962, of the Gujarat High Court in, Special Civil Application  No. 624 of 1961. J.  C.  Bhatt,  H. K. Thakore and V. J.  Merchand,  for  the appellants (in C.A. No. 234/62) and respondents nos. 2 and 3 (in C.A. No. 262/62). N. A. Palkhivala, C. T. Daru, J. B. Dadachanji, O. C. Mathur and  Ravinder Narain, for the respondent No. 1 (in both  the appeals.) M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General of lndia J. M.     Thakore, Advocate-General for the State of Gujarat, M. G. Doshit  and R. H. Dhebar, for the respondent No. 3 (in C.A. No.  234/62) and the appellant (in C. A. No. 262 of 1962). I. M. Nanavati and 0. Oopalakrishna, for the intervener  (in C.A. No. 234/62). Frank  Anthony,  Charanjit  Talwar, P. O.  Agarwala,  J.  B. Dadachanji, O. C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for Intervener No. 2 (in both the appeals). 1962.   September 21.  The judgment of Sinha, C.  J.,  Imam, Wanchoo, Shah and Ayyangar, JJ., was delivered by Shah,  J., Subba Rao,J. delivered a separate judgment.  117 SHAH  J.-Shrikant son of Shri Krishna Madholkar appeared for the  Secondary School Certificate  examination held  by  the State of Bombay in March, 1960, and was declared successful. He  took instruction in the various subjects prescribed  for the examination through the medium of Marathi (which is  his mother-tongue) and answered the questions at the examination also  in  the medium of Marathi.  Shrikant  joined  the  St. Xavier’s College affiliated to the University of Gujarat, in the First Year Arts class and was admitted in the section in which  instructions  were  imparted through  the  medium  of English.  After successfully completing the First Year  Arts course in March, 1961, Shrikant applied for admission to the classes  preparing for the Intermediate Arts examination  of the University through the medium of English.  The Principal of  the  College  informed  Shrikant that  in  view  of  the provisions  of  the Gujarat University Act,  1949,  and  the Statutes  207, 208 and 209 framed by the Senate of the  Uni- versity,  as  amended  in  1961 he  could  not  without  the

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sanction  of the University permit him to attend classes  in which  instructions  were  imparted through  the  medium  of English.   Shri Krishna, father of Shrikant then  moved  the Vice-Chancellor  of  the University for sanction  to  permit Shrikant  to attend the "English medium classes" in the  St. Xavier’s College.  The Registrar of the University  declined to  grant  the request, but by another letter  Shrikant  was "’allowed  to keep English as a medium of  examination"  but not for instruction. A  petition  was  then filed by Shri  Krishna  Madholkar  on behalf  of  himself and his minor son Shrikant in  the  High Court  of  Gujarat  for a writ or order  in  the  nature  of Mandamus  or  other writ, direction or order  requiring  the University  of Gujarat to treat ss. 4(27), 18 (i) (xiv)  and 38A  of the Gujarat University Act, 1949, and Statutes  207, 208  and  209 as void and inoperative and  to  forbear  from acting 118 upon  or enforcing those provisions and requiring the  Vice- Chancellor  to treat the letters or circulars issued by  him in connection with the medium of instruction as illegal  and to forbear from acting upon or enforcing the same, and  also requiring  the  University to forbear from objecting  to  or from  prohibiting the admission of Shrikant to "the  English medium  Arts  class,"  and requiring the  Principal  of  the College  to  admit Shrikant to the  "English  medium  Inter- mediate  Arts  class"  on  the  footing  that  the  impugned provisions  of the Act, Statutes and letters  and  circulars were void and inoperative. The  High Court of Gujarat by order dated January 24,  1962, issued  the writs prayed for.  The University and the  State of  Gujarat  have  separately appealed to  this  Court  with certificates of fitness granted by the High Court. The  judgment  of  the High  Court  proceeded  upon  diverse grounds which are summarised in their judgment as follows               (1)  Statutes  207 and 209 in so far  as  they               seek  to lay down and impose  Gujarati  and/or               Hindi  in  Devanagri script as media  of  ins-               truction and examination in institutions other               than  those maintained by the  University  are               unauthorised and therefore null and void,  for               neither  s. 4(27) nor any other  provision  of               the  Act empowers the University to  lay  down               Gujarati  or Hindi as a medium of  instruction               and  examination  in such institutions  or  to               forbid  the  use  of English as  a  medium  of               instruction  and examination for and  in  such               institutions;               (2)   In  any  event, the University  has  the               power only to lay down Gujrati or Hindi as one               of  the medium of instruction and  examination               and not as the only medium of instruction 119               and  examination  to the  exclusion  of  other               languages;               (3)  The  proviso  to cl. 27 of s.  4  of  the               Gujarat University Act as amended by Act 4  of               1961 constitutes an encroachment on the  field               of Entry 66 of List I of the Seventh  Schedule               to  the Constitution and is  therefore  beyond               the  legislative competence of the  State  and               the  Statutes 207 and 209 made thereunder  are               null and void ; and               (4) Even if on a true construction of s. 4(27)               and other provisions of the Act the University

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             is   authorised  to  prescribe  a   particular               language  or languages as medium or  media  of               instruction  and  examination  for  affiliated               colleges and to prohibit the use of English as               a  medium  of instruction and  examination  in               affiliated     colleges,    the     provisions               authorising the imposition of exclusive  media               and  the  Statutes  and  circulars  issued  in               pursuance  thereof  are  void  and  infringing               Articles   29   (1)   and  30   (1)   of   the               Constitution. We  have  declined  to  hear  arguments  about  the  alleged infringement of fundamental rights under Articles 29  (1)and 30  (1) by the Act assuming as it authorises  imposition  of Gujarati  or  Hindi as an exclusive medium  of  instruction, for, in our view, the petition suffers from a singular  lack of  pleading  in  support of that case,  and  even  the  St. Xavier’s College authorities who had at one stage adopted  a noncontentious attitude but later supported the case of  the petitioner,  did not choose to place evidence on the  record which  would  "  justify  the  Court  in  entering  upon  an investigation  of  this plea of  far  reaching  .importance. Manifestly,  the  decision  of  the  question  whether  such legislation  infringes Arts. 29 (1) and 30(1)  depends  upon proof  of  several  facts such as existence  of  a  distinct language, script or culture of a 120 section  of  citizens  for whom  the  St.  Xavier’s  College caters  or the existence of a minority based on religion  or language  having  been by the enactment  of  the    impugned legislation  obstructed  or likely to be obstructed  in  the exercise   of  its  rights  to  establish   and   administer educational  institutions  of its  choice.   We,  therefore, express no opinion on the question whether the provisions of the  Act and the Statutes and circulars issued infringe  any fundamental  rights  of  any  section  of  citizens  or  any minority religious or linguistic.  We must, however, make it clear that we refuse to decide the question not because  the petitioner had no right to maintain the petition under  Art. 226 of the Constitution as contended by the University.  and the State of Gujarat, but because of the paucity of pleading and evidence on the record. Two  substantial  questions  survive  for  determination-(1) whether  under the Gujarat University Act, 1949, it is  open to the University to prescribe Gujarati or Hindi or both  as an exclusive medium or media of instruction and  examination in  the  affiliated colleges, and  (2)  whether  legislation authorising  the  University  to  impose  such  media  would infringe  Entry  66  of  List I,  Seventh  Schedule  to  the Constitution. St.  Xavier’s  College was affiliated to the  University  of Bombay  under Bombay Act 4 of 1928.  The Legislature of  the Province of Bombay enacted the Gujarat University Act, 1949, to  establish  and incorporate a  teaching  and  affiliating University  "as  a  measure  of  decentralization  and   re- organisation"  of University education in the province.   By s. 5(3) of the Act, from the prescribed date all educational institutions admitted to the privileges of the University of Bombay  and  situate within the University area  of  Gujarat were  deemed  to  be  admitted  to  the  privileges  of  the University  of  Gujarat.   Section  3  incorporated  by  the University  with  perpetual succession and  a  common  seal. Section  4  of  the Act enacted a  provision  which  is  not normally found in similar Acts constituting 121

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Universities.   By  that.  section  various  powers  of  the University   were  enumerated.   These  powers   were   made exercisable by diverse authorities of the University set out in  s.  15.   We are concerned in  these  appeals  with  the Senate, the Syndicate and the Academic Council.  Some of the powers  conferred by S. 4 were made exercisable by s. 18  by the  Senate.   The Senate was by  that  section  authorised, subject  to conditions as may be prescribed by or under  the provisions of the Act, to exercise the powers and to perform the  duties  as  set out in sub-s. (1).  By  s.  20  certain powers  of  the  University were  made  exercisable  by  the Syndicate,  and by s. 22, the Academic Council was  invested with  the  control and general regulation of, and  was  made responsible  for, the maintenance of standards  of  teaching and  examinations  of the University and was  authorised  to exercise  certain powers of the University.  The powers  and the  duties of the Senate are to be exercised and  performed by  the  promulgation  of  Statutes,  of  the  Syndicate  by Ordinances  and of the Academic Council by Regulations.   In 1954,  the  Gujarat University  framed  certain  Regulations dealing  with the media of instruction.  They  are  Statutes 207, 208 and 209.  Statute 207 provided               (1)  Gujarati shall be medium  of  Instruction               and Examination.               (2)  Notwithstanding  anything in  clause  (1)               above’ English shall continue to be the medium               of  instruction and examination for  a  period               not exceeding ten years from the date on which               section 3 of the Gujarat University Act  comes               into force, except as prescribed from time  to               time by Statutes.               (3)  Notwithstanding  anything in  clause  (1)               above.-  it  is  hereby  provided  that  non--               Gujarati  students and teachers will save  the               option,  the former for their examination  and               the  latter  for their teaching work,  to  use               Hindi as themedium, if they so desire. 122               The  Syndicate  will regulate this  by  making               suitable Ordinances in this behalf, if, as and               when necessary.               (4)  Notwithstanding  anything  in  (1),  (2),               (3)  .above,  the medium  of  examination  and               instruction  for modern Indian  Languages  and               English may be the respective languages. Statute  208  provided that the medium  of  instruction  and examination  in all subjects from June, 1955, in First  Year Arts,  First  Year Science and First Year  Commerce  in  all subjects and from June, 1956, in Inter Arts’ Inter  Science, Inter Commerce and First Year Science (Agri.) shall cease to be  English  and shall be as laid down  in  Statute  207(1). This  Statute further provided that a student or  a  teacher who  feels that he cannot "use Gujarati or  Hindi  tolerably well’  would be permitted the use of English in  examination and  instruction respectively up to November,  1960,  (which according to the academic year would mean June, 1961) in one or  more  subjects.   Statute  209 is  to  the  same  effect enumerating  therein  the permitted use of English  for  the B.A., B.Sc., and-other examinations.  After the constitution of  a separate State of’ Gujarat, Act 4 of 1961 was  enacted by  the Gujarat State Legislature.  By that Act the  proviso to  s. 4(27) was amended so as to extend the use of  English as  the medium of instruction beyond the  period  originally contemplated and s. 38A which imposed an obligation upon all affiliated  colleges and recognised institutions  to  comply

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with the provisions relating to the media of instruction was enacted.  It was provided by s. 38A(2) that if an affiliated college or recognised institution contravenes the provisions of  the Act, Rules, Ordinances & Regulations in  respect  of media   of   instruction  the  rights  conferred   on   such institution  or college shall stand withdrawn from the  date of  the  contravention and that the college  or  institution shall   cease  to  be  affiliated  college   or   recognised institution  123 for  the purpose of the Act.  The Senate of  the  University thereafter  amended Statutes 207 and 209.  Material part  of Statute 207 as amended is as follows :-               (1)   Gujarati   shall   be  the   medium   of               instruction and examination:               Notwithstanding anything contained in  subitem               (1)  above,  Hindi  will be  permitted  as  an               alternative medium of instruction and examina-               tion in the following faculties :               (i)   Faculty of Medicine,               (ii)  Faculty  of  Technology  including   En-               gineering, and               (iii) Faculty of Law ; and               (iv)  in   all  faculties  for   post-graduate               studies ;               (2)  Notwithstanding  anything  contained   in               clause (1) above, English may continue to.  be               the medium of instruction and examination  for               such  period and in respect of  such  subjects               and  courses of studies as may, from  time  to               time, be prescribed by the Statutes under sec.               4(27)  of the Gujarat University Act  for  the               time being in force.               (3)  Notwithstanding  anything  contained   in               clause  (1) above, it is hereby provided  that               students and teachers, whose mother-tongue  is               not Gujarati will have the option, the  former               for their examination and the latter for their               instruction  to use Hindi as the  medium.,  if               they so desire.               (4)  Notwithstanding  anything  contained   in               clauses (1) & (3) above, it is hereby provided               that   the  affiliated  Colleges,   recognised               Institutions  and University  Departments,  as               the case may be, will have the option to 124 use,  for  one  or  more subjects,  Hindi  as  a  medium  of instruction and examination for    students  whose   mother- tongue is not  Gujarati. (5)  Notwithstanding  anything in clauses (1), (2), (3)  and (4)  above,  the medium of examination and  instruction  for modem  Indian  languages and English may be  the  respective languages. Statute   209  as  amended  provides  that  the  medium   of instruction   and  examination  in  all  subjects   in   the examinations  enumerated therein shall cease to  be  English and  shall  be as laid down in Statute 207 as  amended  with effect  from  the  years mentioned  against  the  respective examinations.               The  Registrar  of the  University  thereafter               issued a Circular on June 22, 1961,  addressed               to  Principals of Affiliated Colleges  stating               that  the Vice-Chancellor in exercise  of  the               powers vested in him under s.  11(4)(a) of the               Act was pleased to direct that-

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             (i)  Only those students who have  done  their               Secondary  education  through  the  medium  of               English  and who have further continued  their               studies  in First Year  (Pre-University)  Arts               Class  in  the year 1960-61  through  English,               shall be permitted to continue to use  English               as  the  medium of their  examination  in  the               Intermediate  Arts Class for one year i.e.  in               the year 1961-62, and               (ii)   The  Colleges  be  permitted  to   make               arrangements   for  giving   instructions   to               students  mentioned in (i) above  through  the               medium  of  English  for only  one  year  i.e.               during the academic year 1961-62, and               (iii)   That  the  Principals  shall   satisfy               themselves   that   only  such   students   as               mentioned in (i) 125               above are permitted to avail themselves of the               concession mentioned therein. Shrikant  had not appeared at the S.S.C. Examination in  the medium of English and under the first clause of the circular he  could  not  be permitted by the  Principal  of  the  St. Xavier’s College to continue to use English as the medium of instruction in the Intermediate Arts class: if the Principal permitted Shrikant to do so the College would be exposed  to the penalties prescribed by s. 38A. The petitioner challenged the authority of the University to impose  Gujarati  or  Hindi  as  the  exclusive  medium   of instruction  under  the  powers  conferred  by  the  Gujarat University  Act,  1949, as amended by Act 4  of  1961.   The University  contended  that  authority in  that  behalf  was expressly  conferred under diverse clauses of s. 4,  and  it being  the duty of’ the Senate to exercise that power  under s. 18(XIV), Statutes 207 and 209 were lawfully  promulgated. In  any event, it was submitted that the University being  a Corporation invested with control over higher education  for the  area in which it functions such a power must be  deemed to be necessarily implied. In considering whether power to impose Gujarati or Hindi  or both  as  exclusive  medium  or  media  of  instruction   is conferred upon the University by the Gujarat University Act, 1949, clauses (1), (2), (7), (8), (10), (14), (27), and (28) of  s.  4  only need be considered.  By  cl.  (1)  power  is conferred  upon the University "to provide for  instruction, teaching  and  training  in such branches  of  learning  and courses of study‘ as it may think fit to make provision  for research and dissemination of knowledge".  We do not, having regard  to  the phraseology used by the  Legislature,  agree with  the  High Court that this power is restricted  in  its exercise  to institutions set up by the University and  does not extend to affiliated colleges.  The language used in the clause does not warrant this restriction.  But we agree with the High Court that 126 the power conferred by cl. (1) does not relate primarily  to the  medium  of instruction but to the  syllabi  in  diverse branches  of  learning  and courses of  study.   The  clause confers  authority  upon  the  University  to  direct   that instruction, teaching and training be imparted in  different branches of learning and courses of study as the  University thinks  fit,  but not to prescribe an  exclusive  medium  in which instruction in the branches of learning and courses of study  is to be imparted.  Clause (2) which  authorises  the University   "to  make  such  provision  as   would   enable

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affiliated colleges and recognised institutions to undertake specialisation  of  studies", has no direct bearing  on  the subject of an exclusive medium of instruction.  Nor does cl. (7) which enables the University "to lay down the courses of instruction   for   various  examinations"   authorise   the University to prescribe an exclusive medium, of instruction. Clause  (8)  which confers power "to guide the  teaching  in colleges  or recognised institutions" has no bearing on  the power to prescribe an exclusive medium.  Power to  designate branches   of  learning,  or  courses  of  study  in   which instruction  is  to be imparted, or power to take  steps  to facilitate  specialized  studies, or to  guide  teaching  in institutions  affiliated to or recognised by the  University undoubtedly  includes  the  power  to  indicate  the  medium through  which  instructions  were at the date  of  the  Act normally  imparted,  but  that  power  by  itself  does  not include,  in the absence of a provision express or by  clear implication,   power  to  compel  instruction   through   an exclusive medium.  Clause (10) provides that the  University shall  have  the  power "to  hold  examinations  and  confer degrees, titles, diplomas and other academic distinctions on persons who =(a) have, pursued approved courses of study  in the  University or in an affiliated college unless  exempted therefrom   in  the  manner  prescribed  by  the   Statutes, Ordinances  and Regulations and have passed the  examination prescribed  by  the  University,  or  (b)  have  carried  on research under conditions prescribed by the Ordinances 127 and Regulations".  Counsel for the University contended that by  cl. 10(a), the University had the authority  to  approve courses  of study in the manner prescribed by the  Statutes, Ordinances  and Regulations and as power was given by s.  18 (XIV)  to  the  Senate to frame  Statutes  providing  either Gujarati   or  Hindi  or  both.  as  medium  or   media   of instruction,  the  power  of the  University  to  impose  an exclusive  medium of its choice was expressly  entrusted  to the   University.   But  the  argument  proceeded  upon   an incorrect reading of the section.  The provision does not by itself  empower the University to prescribe the use  of  any exclusive  medium  of  instruction  and  examination.    The University  is  thereby  authorised to  confer  degrees  or, academic distinctions upon persons who have pursued approved courses of study and have passed the examination  prescribed by the University.  Power is also reserved to the University to confer degrees or academic distinctions upon persons  who have not pursued the courses prescribed by the University if exemption  in  that behalf is prescribed  by  the  Statutes, Ordinances  or Regulations.  The expression "in the  manner" prescribed  by the Statute, Ordinance or Regulation  has  no reference to the class of persons who have pursued  approved courses  of  study  in the University or  in  an  affiliated college,  but  qualifies  the  expression  "unless  exempted therefrom"   immediately  preceding.   By  the  clause   the University  is  authorised to confer  degrees,  diplomas  or distinctions  not  only upon persons who  have  pursued  the courses  of  instruction  prescribed  and  have  passed  the qualifying  examination but upon other persons as  well  who have not pursued the courses of instruction but have  passed the prescribed examination, if exemption in behalf is  given by  the  Statutes.  Ordinances or  Regulations.   The  power under  sub-cl.  (a) of cl. (10) does not carry with  it  the power  to  impose an exclusive medium such  as  Gujarati  or Hindi.   By cl. (14) power among others to take measures  to ensure  that proper standards of instructions,  teaching  or training are maintained in

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128 the  affiliated  colleges  and  recognised  institutions  is granted,  and cl.(15) invests the University with  power  to control   and  co-ordinate  the  activities  of,  and   give financial  aid  to affiliated colleges and  recognised  ins- titutions,  but  not the power to provide for  an  exclusive medium  as  claimed by the University.  The  Legislature  in cl.(27) has dealt with the subject of medium of instructions and  the  other clauses on which reliance is placed  do  not expressly deal with that topic.  It would be difficult  then to  hold  that the Legislature while providing   in  cl.(27) about the medium of instruction was also dealing  indirectly with  the  subject  of prescribing an  exclusive  medium  of instruction,   when   it   made   provisions   relating   to instruction,   teaching   and   training   in    educational institutions or for enabling those institutions to undertake specialized  studies-  or  giving guidance  in  teaching  in colleges,   or  for  providing  for  degrees   or   academic distinctions or for taking measures ensuring proper standard of  instructions,  teaching or training or  the  conduct  of activities. Clause  (27), before it was amended, by Act IV of 1961,  ran as follows :-               "to  promote the development of the  study  of               Gujarati and Hindi in Devnagari script and the               use  of Gujarati or Hindi in Devnagari  script               or both as a medium of instruction and  exami-               nation;               Provided  that English may continue to be  the               medium of instruction and examination in  such               subjects and for such period not exceeding ten               years  from the date on which section 3  comes               into  force  as  may  from  time  to  time  be               prescribed by the Statutes." By  the  first paragraph of cl.(27) power  is  conferred  to promote the development and use of Gujarati or Hindi or both as  a  medium  of instruction.  That clause is  not  in  its expression, grammatically accurate.  It 129 should, if it had been drafted in strict accordance with the rules  of  grammar,  have stated  that  the  University  was invested with power to promote the use of Gujarati or  Hindi or both as a medium or media of instruction and examination. The use of the expression "promote" suggests that power  was confer-red  upon  the University to encourage the  study  of Gujarati and Hindi and their use as media of instruction and examination:  it  does  not imply that power  was  given  to provide for exclusive use of Gujarati or Hindi or both as  a medium  or  media of instruction and  examination  and  that inference  is  strengthened by the indefinite  article  "’a" before  the expression "medium of instruction".  The use  of the  expression "a medium of instruction"  clearly  suggests that  Gujarati  or Hindi was to be one of several  media  of instruction,  and  steps were to be taken to  encourage  the development of Gujarati and Hindi and their use as media  of instruction and examination.  From the use of the expression "promote" read in the context of the indefinite article  "a" it  is  abundantly clear that power to  impose  Gujarati  or Hindi  as the medium of instruction and examination  to  the exclusion   of  other  media  was  not  entrusted   to   the University.   It  may  be noticed  that  if  the  expression "’promote  the  use  of Gujarati or Hindi  as  a  medium  of instruction  and  examination"  was intended  to  mean  "’to promote  the exclusive use of Hindi or Gujarati", a  similar interpretation  would  have  to be put on  the  use  of  the

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expression  "’to  promote the development  of  Gujarati  and Hindi",  thereby ascribing to the Legislature  an  intention that no other languages beside Gujarati and Hindi were to be developed.   Use  in  the proviso of  the  definite  article "’the"  in  relation  to English as  medium  of  instruction further  supports this view.  When the  Legislature  enacted that  English was to continue as the medium  of  instruction and  examination in certain subjects it merely provided  for continuance of an existing and accepted exclusive medium of 130 instruction.   It  is common ground, that in the  University of  Bombay the exclusive medium of instruction was  English, in  the  various affiliated colleges in the region  or  area over  which the Gujarat University acquired  authority.   By the  proviso  to  cl.(27)  of s.4  in  the  subjects  to  be prescribed  under the proviso the medium of instruction  was to  continue  to remain English.  By the operative  part  of cl.(27)  therefore  the  Legislature provided  that  use  of Gujarati  or  Hindi  or  both  as  a  medium  or  media   of instruction  was  to  be promoted  thereby  indicating  that Gujarati  or’  Hindi  or  both was or were  not  to  be  the exclusive  medium or media but to be adopted in addition  to the  accepted  medium  viz.  English,  for  instruction  and examination,  whereas  under the proviso in respect  of  the subjects  prescribed, English was to be the only medium  for the periods specified.  Clause (28) which confers  authority upon   University  "to  do  all  acts  and  things   whether incidental  to  the  powers  aforesaid  or  not  as  may  be requisite in order to further the objects of the  University and  generally  to cultivate and promote arts,  science  and other  branches of learning and culture" confers  additional powers which though not necessarily incidental to the powers already  conferred by cls.(1) and (27) were intended  to  be exercised  to further the object of the University.  But  if the object of the University as indicated by cl.(27) was not to authorise the imposition of Gujarati or Hindi or both, as an  exclusive  medium  or media it would  be  straining  the language  of  cl.(28)  to  interpret  it  as  exhibiting  an intention  to  confer  upon  the  University  by  using  the somewhat  indefinite  expression  "requisite  in  order   to further the objects" power to provide for such an  exclusive medium. Reliance  was also placed upon s.18(1)(xiv) by  counsel  for the University in support of the contention that the  Senate was bound to make provision relating to the use of  Gujarati or Hindi in Devanagri script 131 or  both as a medium of instruction and examination.  It  is true  that  s.18(1)  deals with powers  and  duties  of  the Senate.   Phraseology  used in the diverse clauses is  Prima facie  not  susceptible  of the  meaning  that  each  clause authorises  the  Senate  to  exercise  the  powers  of   the University  and  imposes also a  concomitant  duty.Assuming, however, that the power conferred upon  the   Senate    also carries with it a duty to exercise the  power,  we  do   not think  that  the exercise of power or  performance  of  duty relating to the use of Gujarati or Hindi or both as a medium or media of instruction and examination postulates a duty to make  exclusive  use of Gujarati or Hindi or both  for  that purpose.   The  use of the indefinite article "’a"  even  in this clause clearly indicates that Gujarati or Hindi or both were to be selected out of several media of instruction  and examination and not the sole medium.  No other clause of ss. 18,  20  and  22 relating to the powers and  duties  of  the Senate,  the Syndicate and the Academic Council  was  relied

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upon  and  we  are  unable to find  any  which  invests  the University or its organs, such as the Senate, the Syndicate or the Academic Council with power to   impose  Gujarati  or Hindi as an exclusive medium of instruction’. A  corporation has ordinarily an implied power to carry  out its  objects; power to indicate a medium of  instruction  in affiliated  or constituent colleges may therefore be  deemed to  be  vested in a University but the power to  indicate  a medium of instruction does not carry with it, in the absence of an express provision, power to impose upon the affiliated institutions an exclusive medium of instruction. Reliance  was  placed by counsel for the University  upon  a letter  dated  August 7, 1949, (which is reproduced  in  the University Commission’s report), addressed by the Government of India to various Universities and Provincial Governments. It was recited in the letter that the Government of India 132               were  of the opinion that in the  interest  of               national   education   it   was   hoped   that               Universities  and Provincial Governments  will               take early steps towards the implementation of               certain recommendations viz :-               "Item I.-The Government of India requests  the               University and Provincial Governments to  take               steps to :-               (a)  replace  English as the  medium  of  ins-               truction  at the University stage, by  gradual               stage during next five years and               (b)  adopt  in its place the language  of  the               State  or Province or region as the medium  of               instruction and examination. Item II.-Universities are requested to               (i)   provide  for  a compulsory test  in  the               Federal  language  during  the  first   degree               course of the University without prejudice  to               the results of the Degree Examination and               (ii)  provide  facilities for the teaching  of               the Federal language to all students who  wish               to take it up as optional subject."               Item III.-        x    x   x   x   x   x               Item IV and V-    x    x   x   x   x   x               Item VI.-          x    x   x   x   x   x               Item  VII.         x    x   x    x   x   x The  Government of India may have in the year 1948  intended that  English  should be replaced in gradual stages  as  the medium  of instruction by the language of the State  or  the Province,  or  region,  but that will not be  a  ground  for interpreting the provisions of the Act in a manner  contrary to the intention  133 of  the Legislature plainly expressed.  This  recommendation of  the Government of India has been ignored if not by  all, by  a large majority of Universities.  It is also true  that in  the  Statement  of Objects and Reasons  of  the  Gujarat University Act, it was stated................ As recommended by  the Committee, it is proposed to empower the  University to adopt Gujarati or the national language as the medium  of instruction except that for the first ten years English  may be allowed as the medium of instruction in subjects in which this   medium   is  considered  necessary".   But   if   the Legislature  has  made no provision in that  behalf  a  mere proposal  by  the Government, which is incorporated  in  the Statement of Objects and Reasons will not justify the  Court in  assuming that the proposal was carried out.   Statements of Objects and Reasons of a Statute may and do often furnish

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valuable  historical  material in ascertaining  the  reasons which  induced  the Legislature to enact a Statute,  but  in interpreting   the  Statute  they  must  be   ignored.    We accordingly  agree with the High Court that power to  impose Gujarati  or Hindi or both as an exclusive medium  or  media has  not been conferred under cl. (27) or any other  clauses of s. 4. The proviso to cl. (27) was amended by Act 4 of 1961 and the following proviso was substituted :-               "Provided that English may continue to be  the               medium-               (i)  of instruction and examination  for  such               period as may from time to time be  prescribed               by  the Statutes until the end of May 1966  in               respect  of.  such subjects.  and  courses  of               study as may be so prescribed.               (11)  of instruction and examination for  such               period as may from time to time be  prescribed               by the Statutes until 134               the  end  of  May 1968  in  respect  of  post-               graduate  instruction., teaching and  training               in   subjects   comprised  in   Faculties   of               Agriculture    and    Technology     including               Engineering  and until the end of May 1969  in               respect of post-graduate instruction, teaching               and training in the subjects comprised in  the               Faculty of Medicine, and               (iii)   of  examination  at   two   successive               examinations  in any subjects held next  after               the  period prescribed under clause (i) or  as               the  case may be, the period prescribed  under               clause (ii) in respect of those candidates who               during such period have failed to appear in or               pass  the  respective  examination  held  with               English  as the medium of examination  in  the               same subjects :               Provided  further that nothing in this  clause               shall effect the use of English as the  medium               of  instruction and examination in respect  of               English as a subject." It  is  common  ground before us that  if  power  to  impose Gujarati or Hindi as an exclusive medium is not conferred by the  operative  part of cl. (27.) there is  nothing  in  the proviso which independently conferred such a power upon  the University.   The proviso merely extends the use of  English as the medium of instruction in certain branches beyond  the period of ten years originally prescribed.  The proviso  has however some bearing on the interpretation of cl. (27) :  in the  second  proviso the distinction  between  the  definite article   "the"preceding   "’medium   of   instruction   and examination"  in so far as it relates to English is  further accentuated.   The  second proviso savs-"  Provided  further that nothing in this clause shall affect the use of  English as the medium of  135 instruction  and  examination  in respect of  English  as  a subject".  When the Legislature intended to provide  English as  the sole medium of instruction, definite .  article  the was used while in other cases indefinite article a was  used denoting  thereby  that  the  medium would  be  One  out  of several.   Therefore,  neither under the Act  as  originally framed  nor  under the Act as amended by Act 4 of  1961  was there  any  power  conferred on  the  University  to  impose Gujarati  or Hindi or both as exclusive medium or  media  of

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instruction  and  examination  and  if  no  such  power  was conferred upon the University, the Senate could not exercise such a power.  The Senate is a body acting on behalf of  the University and its powers to enact Statutes must lie  within the contour of the powers of the University conferred by the Act. On the view we have expressed, consideration of the question whether  the  State Government is competent  to  enact  laws imposing Gujarati or Hindi or both as an exclusive medium or media  of  instruction  in  the  Universities,  may   appear academic,  But we have thought it necessary to consider  the question because the High Court has declared certain  provi- sions of Act 4 of 1961 relating to medium of instruction  as ultra vires the State Legislature and on the question  which was argued at considerable length we were invited by counsel for the appellants to express our view for their guidance in any future legislation which may be undertaken. Power  of  the Bombay Provincial Legislature  to  enact  the Gujarat University Act was derived from Entry No. 17 of  the Government  of  India  Act, 1935, List  11  of  the  Seventh Schedule-"Education including Universities other than  those specified  in  paragraph 13 of List I".  In List I  item  13 were  included the Benaras Hindu University and the  Aligarh Muslim   University.   Therefore,  except  to   the   extent expressly limited by item 17 of List II read with item 13 of List I, a Provincial Legislature was invested with 136 plenary power to enact legislation in respect of all matters pertaining  to education including education  at  University level.   The expression " education’ is of wide  import  and includes all  matters relating to imparting and  controlling education; it may therefore have been open to the Provincial Legislature  to  enact  legislation  prescribing  either   a federal  or a regional language as an exclusive  medium  for subjects  selected by the University.  If by s. 4  (27)  the power  to  select  the federal or regional  language  as  an exclusive  medium of instruction had been entrusted  by  the Legislature to the University, the validity of the  impugned statutes  207,  208 and 209 could not be open  to  question. But  the  Legislature  did  not entrust  any  power  to  the University  to  select  Gujarati or Hindi  as  an  exclusive medium of instruction under s. 4 (27).  By the  Constitution a vital change has been made in the pattern of  distribution of  legislative  powers relating to  education  between  the Union Parliament and the State Legislatures.  By item No.  1 1  of List II of the Seventh Schedule to  the  Constitution, the  State Legislature has power to legislate in respect  of "’education including Universities subject to the provisions of  items 63, 64, 65 and 66 of List I and 25 of  List  III". Item No. 63 of List I replaces with modification item No. 13 of List I to the Seventh Schedule of the Government of India Act,  1935.  Power to enact legislation with respect to  the institutions  known at the commencement of the  Constitution as  the  Benaras Hindu University, the Aligarh  Muslim  Uni- versity  and  the Delhi University  and  other  institutions declared  by  Parliament  by laws to be  an  institution  of national  importance  is  thereby  granted  exclusively   to Parliament.   Item 64 invests the Parliament with  power  to legislate  in  respect of "’institutions for  scientific  or technical  education  financed by the  Government  of  India wholly or in part and declared by Parliament, by law, to  be institutions of national importance".  Item 65 vests in  the Parliament  power  to  legislate  for  "Union  agencies  and institutions  137

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for  (a)  professional, vocational  or  technical  training, including  the  training  of police  officers;  or  (b)  the promotion of special studies or research; or (c)  scientific or technical assistance in the investigation or detection of crime".   By  item 66 power is entrusted  to  Parliament  to legislate  on "co-ordination and determination of  standards in  institutions  for  higher  education  or  research   and scientific  and  technical institutions".  Item  25  of  the Concurrent List confers power upon the Union Parliament  and the State Legislatures to enact legislation with respect  to "vocational  and  technical  training  of  labour".   It  is manifest  that the extensive power vested in the  Provincial Legislature to legislate with respect to higher,  scientific and   technical  education  and  vocational  and   technical training  of  labour, under the Government of India  Act  is under the Constitution controlled by the five items in  List I and List III mentioned in item 11 of List II.  Item 63  to 66 of List I are carved out of the subject of education  and in  respect of these items the power to legislate is  vested exclusively  in  the  Parliament.   Use  of  the  expression "subject  to" in item 11 of List II of the Seventh  Schedule clearly  indicates that legislation in respect  of  excluded matters cannot be undertaken by the State Legislatures.   In Hingir-Rampur  Coal  Company v. State of  Orissa  (1),  this Court  in considering the import of the expression  "subject to" used in an entry in List II, in relation to an entry  in List  I  observed  that to the  extent  of  the  restriction imposed  by  the use of the expression ""subject to"  in  an entry  in  List II, the power is taken away from  the  State Legislature.  Power of the State to legislate in respect  of education including Universities must to the extent to which it is entrusted to the Union Parliament, whether such  power is  exercised  or  not, be deemed to be  restricted.   If  a subject of legislation is covered by items 63 to 66 even  if it  otherwise  falls within the larger field  of  "education including  Universities" power to legislate on that  subject must (1)  [1961] 2 S.C.R. 537. 138 lie with the Parliament.  The plea raised by counsel for the University  and  for the State of Gujarat  that  legislation prescribing the medium or media in which instruction  should be imparted in institutions of higher education and in other institutions  always falls within item 11 of List II has  no force.   If it be assumed from the terms of item 11 of  List II  that  power  to  legislate  in  respect  of  medium   of instruction  falls only within the competence of  the  State Legislature and never in the excluded field, even in respect of  institutions  mentioned  in items 63  to  65,  power  to legislate  on  medium  of instruction would  rest  with  the State,  whereas legislation in other respects  for  excluded subjects  would  fall  within the competence  of  the  Union Parliament.   Such  an  interpretation  would  lead  to  the somewhat  startling result that even in respect of  national institutions  or Universities of national importance,  power to legislate on the medium of instruction would vest in  the Legislature  of  the States within which they  Are  situate, even though the State Legislature would have no other  power in  respect of those institutions.  Item 11 of List  II  and item  66 of List I must be harmoniously construed.  The  two entries   undoubtedly  overlap  :  but  to  the  extent   of overlapping,  the  power conferred by item 66  List  I  must prevail  over the power of the State under item 11  of  List II.   It is manifest that the excluded heads deal  primarily with  education  in  institutions  of  national  or  special

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importance  and institutions of higher  education  including research,  sciences, technology and vocational  training  of labour.   The  power to legislate in respect of  primary  or secondary  education is exclusively vested in the States  by item No. 11 of List II, and power to legislate on medium  of instruction   in  institutions  of  primary   or   secondary education  must therefore rest with the State  Legislatures. Power  to legislate in respect of medium of instruction  is, however,  not a distinct legislative head; it  resides  with the  State Legislatures in which the power to  legislate  on education. is- vested, 139 unless  it  is  taken away by necessary  intendment  to  the contrary.   Under items 63 to 65 the power to  legislate  in respect of medium of instruction having regard to the  width of those items, must be deemed to vest in the Union.   Power to legislate in respect of medium of instruction, in so  far it has a direct bearing and impact upon the legislative head of   co-ordination  and  determination  of’   standards   in institutions of higher education or research and  scientific and  technical institutions, must also be deemed by item  66 List I to be vested in the Union. The State has the power to prescribe ;he syllabi and courses of  study  in the institutions named in Entry  66  (but  not falling within entries 63 to 65) and as an incident  thereof it has the power to indicate the medium in which instruction should  be  imparted.   But  the  Union  Parliament  has  an overriding legislative power to ensure that the syllabi  and courses  of study prescribed and the medium selected do  not impair standards of education or render the co-ordination of such  standards  either  on  an All  India  or  other  basis impossible  or even difficult.  Thus, though the  powers  of the  Union  and of the State are in the Exclusive  Lists,  a degree of overlapping is inevitable.  It is not possible  to lay down any general test which would afford a solution  for every question which might arise on this head.  On the’  one hand,  it  is  certainly within the province  of  the  State Legislature  to prescribe syllabi and courses of study  and, of  course, to indicate the medium or media of  instruction. On the other hand, it is also within the power of the  Union to  legislate  in respect of media of instruction so  as  to ensure co-ordination and determination of standards, that is to ensure maintenance or improvement of standards.  The fact that  the  Union  has  not  legislated,  or  refrained  from legislating to the full extent of its powers does not invest the State with the power to legislate in respect of a matter assigned  by  the Constitution to the Union.  It  does  not, however, 140 follow that even within the permitted relative fields  there might not be legislative provisions in enactments made  each in pursuance of separate exclusive and distinct powers which may  conflict.  Then would arise the question of  repugnancy and  paramountcy  which  may  have to  be  resolved  on  the application  of the "doctrine of pith and substance" of  the impugned  enactment.  The validity of the State  legislation on  University  education and as regards  the  education  in technical  and  scientific institutions not  falling  within Entry 64 of List I would have to be judged having regard  to whether  it  impinges on the field reserved  for  the  Union under  Entry  66.   In other words, the  validity  of  State legislation  would  depend  upon  whether  it  prejudicially affects  co-ordination and determination of  standards,  but not  upon the existence of some definite  Union  legislation directed  to  achieve  that  purpose.   If  there  be  Union

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legislation in respect of co-ordination and determination of standards, that would have paramountcy over the State law by virtue of the first part of Art. 254(1) ; even if that power be  not  exercised  by the  Union  Parliament  the  relevant legislative  entries being in the exclusive lists,  a  State law trenching upon the Union field would still be invalid. Counsel   for  the  University  submitted  that  the   power conferred by item No. 66 of List I is merely a power to  co- ordinate  and  to determine standards i. e. it  is  a  power merely to evaluate and fix standards of education,  because, the expression "co-ordination" merely means evaluation,  and "determination"  means fixation.  Parliament  has  therefore power  to legislate only for the purpose of  evaluation  and fixation  of standards in institutions referred to  in  item 66.  In the course of the argument, however, it was somewhat reluctantly admitted that steps to remove disparities  which have  actually  resulted  from the adoption  of  a  regional medium  and the falling of standards, may be undertaken  and legislation for equalising standards in  141 higher education may be enacted by the Union Parliament.  We are  unable  to  agree  with  this  contention  for  several reasons.   Item  No.  66  is  a  legislative  head  and   in interpreting  it,  unless it is expressly  or  of  necessity found  conditioned  by the words used therein, a  narrow  or restricted   interpretation  will  not  be  put  upon,   the generality  of the words.  Power to legislate on  a  subject should  normally  be  held to extend  to  all  ancillary  or subsidiary  matters which can fairly and reasonably be  said to  be comprehend in that subject.  Again there  is  nothing either  in items 66 or elsewhere in the  Constitution  which supports the submission that the expression  "co-ordination" must  mean  in  the  context in  which  it  is  used  merely evaluation,  co-ordination in its normal  connotation  means harmonising  or bringing into proper relation in  which  all the  things coordinated participate in a common  pattern  of action.  The power to co-ordinate, therefore, is not  merely power  to  evaluate, it is a power to  harmonise  or  secure relationship  for concerted action.  The power conferred  by item  66  List I is not conditioned by the  existence  of  a state  of  emergency or unequal standards  calling  for  the exercise of the power. There is nothing in the entry which indicates that the power to  legislate on co-ordination of standards in  institutions of higher education, does not include the power to legislate for   preventing  the  occurrence  of  or  for  removal   of disparities in standards.  This power is not conditioned  to be  exercised  merely upon the existence of a  condition  of disparity nor is it a power merely to evaluate standards but not  to take steps to rectify or to prevent  disparity.   By express  pronouncement of the Constitution makers, it  is  a power  to co-ordinate, and of necessity, implied therein  is the power to prevent what would make coordination impossible or difficult.  The power is absolute and unconditional,  and in  the absence of any controlling reasons it must be  given full effect according to its plain and expressed  intention. It is true 142 that  "medium  of  instruction"  is  not  an  item  in   the legislative  list.   It  falls  within  item  No.  11  as  a necessary incident of the power to legislate on education  : it  also falls within items 63 to 66.  In so far as it is  a necessary  incident  of the powers under item 66 List  I  it must  be  deemed to be included in that item  and  therefore excluded  from item 11 List II.  How far  State  legislation

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relating to medium of instruction in institutions has impact upon co-ordination of higher education is a matter which  is not susceptible, in the absence of any concrete challenge to a specific statute, of a categorical answer.  Manifestly, in imparting instructions in certain subjects, medium may  have subordinate  importance and little bearing on  standards  of education  while  in certain others its importance  will  be vital.   Normally,  in  imparting  scientific  or  technical instructions  or  in  training  students  for   professional courses  like  law,  engineering,  medicine  and  the   like existence  of  adequate  text books at  a  given  time,  the existence of journals and other literature, availability  of competent instructors and the capacity of students to under- stand  instructions imparted through the medium in which  it is  imparted are matters which have an important bearing  on the  effectiveness  of instruction and  resultant  standards achieved thereby.  If adequate text-books are not  available or  competent  instructors  in  the  medium,  through  which instruction is directed to be imparted, are not available or the students are not able to receive or imbibe  instructions through the medium in which it is imparted, standard is must of  necessity  fall, and legislation  for  co-ordination  of standards in such matters would include legislation relating to medium of instruction. If legislation relating to imposition of an exclusive medium of  instruction in a regional language or in  Hindi,  having regard  to the absence of textbooks and journals,  competent teachers  and incapacity of the students to  understand  the subjects, is likely to  143 result in the lowering of standards, that legislation Would, in  our judgment, necessarily fall within item 66 of List  I and  would be deemed to be excluded to that extent from  the amplitude of the power conferred by item No. 11 of list II It must be observed, that these observations have been  made by  us  on certain abstract considerations which  have  been placed before us.  We have no specific statute the  validity of  which,  apart  from  the one  which  we  will  presently mention, is challenged. Counsel  for  the  State and the University  invited  us  to express  our  opinion on the  question  whether  legislation which  the  State may undertake with a view to  rectify  the deficiency  pointed  out by us in interpreting  s.  4  (27), would  be  within the competence of the  State  Legislature. What  shape  such legislation may take is for the  State  to decide.   We  have, however, proceeded somewhat  broadly  to deal with what we conceive is the true effect of item 66  in List  I in its relation to item 11 in List II in so  far  as the two items deal with the power of the Parliament and  the State  Legislature  to enact laws in respect  of  medium  of instruction. We  are unable, however, to agree with the High  Court  that Act  4  of 1961 in so far as it amended the  proviso  to  s. 4(27) is invalid, because it is beyond the competence of the State Legislature.  By the amendment of the proviso to s.  4 (27),  the  Legislature  purported to continue  the  use  of English as the medium of instruction in subjects selected by the  Senate beyond a period of ten years prescribed  by  the Gujarat University Act, 1949.  Before the date on which  the parent  Act was enacted, English was the traditional  medium of instruction in respect of all subjects at the  University level.  By enacting the proviso as it originally stood,  the University was authorised to continue the use of English  as an  exclusive  medium of instruction in respect  of  certain subjects to be selected by the Senate.  By the amendment

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144 it  is common ground that no power to provide  an  exclusive medium  other  than  the  pre-existing  medium  is  granted. Manifestly,  imparting instruction through a common  medium, which was before the Act the only medium of instruction  all over  the  Country,  cannot by  itself  result  in  lowering standards  and coordination and determination  of  standards cannot  be  affected thereby.  By extending  the  provisions relating  to  imparting of instruction for a  period  longer than  ten  years  through  the medium  of  English  in  the, subjects selected by the University, no attempt was made  to encroach upon the powers of the Union under item No. 66 List I. If the University have no power to prescribe an exclusive medium,  the enactment of s. 38A which prescribes  penalties for failing to carry out directions relating to the media of instruction will doubtless be not invalid. The  order of the High Court relating to the  invalidity  of the Statutes 207 and 209 of the University in so far as they purport  to impose "Gujarati or Hindi or both  as  exclusive medium or media" of instruction, and the circulars enforcing those statutes must therefore be confirmed. We do not express any opinion on the alleged infringement of fundamental  rights  of the petitioner  under  Arts.  29(1), 30(1)  of the Constitution.  We set aside the order  of  the High  Court in so far as it declares s. 4 cl.  (27)  proviso and  s. 38A invalid.  This will be, however, subject to  the interpretation  placed by us upon the  relevant  provisions, and the power of the State Legislature to impose Gujarati or Hindi or both as exclusive medium or media for  instructions in the affiliated and constituent colleges. The appellants will pay the costs of the respondents in  the two appeals.  One hearing fee. SUBBA  RAO, J.-.With the greatest respect,, I cannot  agree. The  facts  have  been fully stated in the  judgment  of  my learned brother:, Shah, J., and I  145 need   not   restate   them.   Two   questions   arise   for consideration, namely, (1) whether the State Legislature has the  constitutional competence to make a law prescribing  an exclusive medium of instruction in the affiliated  colleges, and (2) whether under the Gujarat University Act, as amended by  Act  IV of 1961. the said University has  the  power  to prescribe an exclusive medium of instruction. The  first  question  maybe elaborated thus:  Is  the  State Legislature  competent to make a law under entry 11 of  List II  of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution  prescribing an  exclusive  medium  of  instruction  in  the   affiliated colleges of the University?  To put it in other words, can a State law enable a University to prohibit, expressly or  ’by necessary  implication, any media of instruction other  than those prescribed by it?  Learned counsel., appearing for the University of Gujarat and for the State of Gujarat,  contend that  the State Legislature has such a power under entry  11 of  List  II of the Seventh Schedule  to  the  Constitution, whereas learned counsel for the respondents, while conceding that  a  State  Legislature  has  the  power  to  empower  a university  to  prescribe a medium of  instruction,  broadly contend that a State law which prohibits the use of a medium of instruction, such as English, which is traditionally  the exclusive current medium of instruction in the  universities of this country, and directs the use of a regional  language as   the  sole  medium  or  as  an  additional   medium   of instruction,  along  with other Indian  languages,  impinges directly  on entry 66 of List I of the Seventh  Schedule  to the  Constitution,  since,  it  is  said,  the  fixation  of

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standards  and co-ordination on all-India basis is  rendered difficult, if not made impossible, by such a State law. Before I consider the impact of entry 66 of List I on  entry II of List II., it would be convenient to notice briefly the relevant  principles of construction.  Learned  counsel  for the respondents contend 146 that the principle of pith and substance has no relevance to a case where one entry is made subject to another entry;  if out  of  the scope of one entry, the  argument  proceeds,  a field of legislation covered by another entry is carved out, there  is no scope for overlapping and, therefore, there  is no occasion for invoking the principle of pith and substance in the matter of interpreting the said entries; to meet such a  situation,  his  further argument  is,  the  courts  have evolved  another  principle of "direct impact", i.e.,  if  a State  law  has a "direct impact" on an entry in  the  Union List,  the  said law falls outside the scope  of  the  State entry.   Let  us see whether there is any  such  independent doctrine  of construction in decided cases or in  principle. The  judicial  Committee,  in  Prafulla  Kumar  v.  Bank  of Commerce, Khulna(1), had invoked the principle of "pith  and substance" to ascertain whether the Bengal Money-lenders Act (X  of  1940) was ultra vires  the  Provincial  Legislature. There, the conflict was between items 28 and 38 of List I of the  Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act,  1935, namely, promissory notes and banking, and item 27 of List II thereof, namely, moneylending.  The judicial Committee  held that the pith and substance of the Act being  money-lending, it  came  under  item 27 of List II  and  was  not  rendered invalid  because  it  incidentally  trenched  upon   matters reserved  to  the Federal  Legislature,  namely,  promissory notes  and  banking.  At p.65 of the  report  the  following instructive passage appears:               "But the overlapping of subject-matter is  not               avoided by substituting three lists for two or               even  by arranging for a hierarchy  of  juris-               diction%.               Subjects must still overlap and where they  do               the  question must be asked what in  pith  and               substance  is the effect of  the  enactment-of               which  complaint is made and in what  list  is               its true nature and character to be found." (1)  A. I. R. 1947 P. C. 60, 65. 147 Then their Lordships proceeded to state :               "Thirdly,  the extent of the invasion  by  the               Provinces  into  subjects  enumerated  in  the               Federal  List has to be considered.  No  doubt               it  is  an  important matter,  not,  as  their               Lordships  think, because the validity  of  an               Act   can  be  determined  by   discriminating               between  degrees  of  invasion,  but  for  the               purpose  of determining what is the  pith  and               substance of the impugned Act.  Its provisions               may  advance so far into Federal territory  as               to show that its true nature is not  concerned               with  Provincial matters; but the question  is               not,  has it trespassed more or less,  but  is               the trespass, whatever it be, such as to  show               that  the pith and substance of  the  impugned               Act is not money-lending out promissory  notes               or banking It  is  clear  from  the said passage  that  the  degree  of invasion  of  a law made by virtue of an entry in  one  List

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into  the field of an entry in another List is not  governed by  a separate doctrine but is only a circumstance  relevant for ascertaining the pith and substance of an impugned  Act. This Court, in The State of Bombay v. F. N. Balsara (1), has accepted that principle.  There, the constitutional validity of  the Bombay Prohibition Act (XXV of 1949) was  in  issue. The  question  was whether that Act fell under entry  31  of list  II of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of  India Act,  1935, namely, "intoxicating liquors, that is  to  say, the production, manufacture, possession, transport, purchase and sale of intoxicating liquors", or under entry 19 of List I, namely, import and export across customs frontier,  which is  a dominion subject.  This Court held that the  pith  and substance  of  the Act fell under the former entry  and  not under  the  latter, though the Act  incidentally  encroached upon  the  Dominion field of legislation.   It  was  argued, inter   alia,  that  the  Prohibition  of   purchase,   use, transports and sale of liquor, (1)  [1951] S. C. R, 682. 148 would  affect  the import.  The argument was advanced  as  a part of the doctrine of pith and substance and was  rejected on the ground that the said encroachment did not affect  the true  nature and character of the legislation.   This  Court again  had to deal with the vires of the provisions  of  the Madras  Prohibition  Act in A. S. Krishna v.  The  State  of Madras(1).  There, the argument was that the said provisions were repugnant to the provisions of the existing Indian laws with respect to the same matter, to wit, Indian Evidence Act I of 1872 and Criminal Procedure Code Act No. V of 1898.  In that  context the argument based upon impact of  the  former legislation   on  the  latter  was  advanced.   This   Court rejecting the contention observed:               "That  is  to say, if a statute  is  found  in                             substance  to  relate  to a  topic  within  th e               competence  of the legislature, it  should  be               held  to be intra vires, even though it  might               incidentally  trench on topics not within  its               legislative  competence.   The extent  of  the               encroachment on matters beyond its  competence               may  be an element in determining whether  the               legislation is colourable, that is, whether in               the  guise of making a law on a matter  within               its competence, the legislature is, in  truth,               making   a  law  on  a  subject   beyond   its               competence.    But  where  that  is  not   the               position,  then the fact of encroachment  does               not  affect  the  vires of  the  law  even  as               regards the area of encroachment." But  it is said that the separate existence of the  doctrine of "direct impact was conceded in Union Colliery Company  of British  Columbia, Ltd. v. Bryden(2) . There,  the  question was   whether  s.4  of  the  British  Columbia  Coal   Mines Regulation Act, 1890, which prohibited Chinamen of full  age from  employment in underground coal workings, was  in  that respect ultra vires of the provincial legislature nasmuch as the subject of "naturalization and aliens" (1) [1957] S. C. R. 399, 406. (2) [1899] A. C. 580, 587.  149 was   within  the  exclusive  authority  of   the   Dominion Parliament  conferred  under s.91, sub-s.25 of  the  British North America Act, 1867.  On a consideration of the material factors  and on a construction of the  relevant  provisions,

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the judicial Committee observed :               "But  the  leading feature of  the  enactments               consists in this-that they have, and can have,               no  application  except to  Chinamen  who  are               aliens or naturalized subjects, and that  they               establish  no rule or regulation  except  that               these aliens or naturalized subjects shall not               work,  or be allowed to work,  in  underground               coal  mines  within-the  Province  of  British               Columbia." After arriving at that finding, their Lordships proceeded to say :               "Their Lordships see no reason to doubt  that,               by virtue of s. 91, sub-s. 25, the legislature               of  the  Dominion is invested  with  exclusive               authority   in  all  matters  which   directly               concern    the   rights,    privileges,    and               disabilities of the class of Chinamen who  are               resident in the provinces of Canada.  They are               also  of  opinion  that  the  whole  pith  and               substance  of  the enactments of s. 4  of  the               Coal  Mines  Regulation  Act,  in  so  far  as               objected to by the appellant company  consists               in establishing a statutory prohibition  which               affects  aliens or naturalised  subjects,  and               therefore trench upon the exclusive  authority                             of the Parliament of Canada." This  passage  indicates that the judicial  Committee  found that’, in pith and substance., the impugned law affected the rights  and privileges of Chinamen which subject was  within the  exclusive authority of the Parliament of Canada.   This judgment   only  reiterates  the  principle  of   pith   and substance;  and  it does not in any way  countenance  a  new principle ,of "’direct impact" outside the scope of the said 150 doctrine.   In Bank of Toronto v. Lambe (1) the  Qyebec  Act was  attacked  on two grounds, first that the  tax  was  not "taxation  within the Province", and secondly, that the  tax was  not a "direct tax".  The judicial Committee  held  that the  Act  was  within  the  legislative  competence  of  the Province.  It was observed therein :               "If  (the judges) find that on the  due  cons-               truction of the Act a legislative power  falls               within s. 92, it would be quite wrong of  them               to   deny  its  existence  because   by   some               possibility it may be abused, or may limit the               range  which  otherwise would be open  to  the               Dominion Parliament." The  argument  of anticipatory  encroachment  was  rejected. This  case  was considered and  distinguished  in  Attorney- General  for  Alberta v. Attorney-General  for  Canada  (2). There,  the  Province of Alberta passed  an  Act  respecting ""the  taxation of Banks", imposing on every corporation  or joint  stock  company,  other  than  the  Bank  of   Canada, incorporated  for  the purpose of doing banking  or  savings bank business in the Province, an annual tax, in addition to any  tax payable under any other Act., of (a) 1/2 per  cent. on  the paid-up capital, and (b) 1 per cent. on the  reserve fund  and  undivided  profits.   The  Board  held  that  the proposed  taxation was not in any true sense  taxation  "’in order  to the raising of a revenue for Provincial  purposes" so  as to be within the exclusive legislative competence  of the  Provincial Legislature under s. 92 (2) of  the  British North America Act, but was merely part of a legislative plan to  prevent  the  operation within  the  Province  of  those

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banking  institutions which had been called  into  existence and  given  the  necessary powers  there  to  conduct  their business by the only proper authority’ the Parliament of the Dominion, under s. 91 of the British North America Act.  The Board  in effect, therefore, held that the  Provincial  Act, though (1) [1882] 12 A. C. 575, 587. (2) [1939] A. C. 117, 130, 133,  151 couched  as a taxation measure, was a colourable attempt  to prevent  the  functioning of the banking  institutions,  the regulation  whereof was the Dominion subject.  The pith  and substance of the statute was not direct taxation or taxation within  the  Province  within the meaning of s.  92  of  the British  North America Act, but was one that fell under  the Dominion   subject  of  "banking".   The  reason  for   this conclusion is found at p. 133 and it is as follows :               "Their   Lordships  agree  with  the   opinion               expressed  by  Kerwin,  J.  (concurred  in  by               Crocket,J.)  that there is no escape from  the               conclusion that, instead of being in any  true               sense  taxation in order to the raising  of  a               revenue for Provincial purposes, the Bill  No.               1  is  merely "part of a legislative  plan  to               prevent  the operation within the Province  of               those  banking  institutions which  have  been               called into existence and given the  necessary               powers  to conduct their business by the  only               proper authority, the Parliament of Canada." That is to say, the constitutional validity of the Bill  was sustained  on the ground that it was a colourable  piece  of legislation  in respect of a subject which in substance  was within the Dominion field.  The judicial Committee in coming to  the  conclusion  laid down the  rules  of  guidance  for ascertaining  the  true  nature  of  a  legislation.   Their Lordships  premised  their  discussion  with  the  following statement :               "........... it is well established that if  a               given subject-matter falls within any class of               subjects  enumerated  in s. 91, it  cannot  be               treated  as covered by any of those within  s.               92." And  to ascertain whether a particular subject-matter  falls in  one  class  or  other, their  Lordships  laid  down  the following rules of guidance :               (1)   "It  is therefore necessary  to  compare               the two complete lists of categories with a 152               view  to ascertaining whether the  legislation               in  question, fairly considered,  falls  prima               facie within s. 91 rather than within s. 92."               (2)  "The  next step in a case  of  difficulty               will be to examine               the effect of the legislation."               (3)   "The  object  or purpose of the  Act  in               question.  " It will, therefore, be seen that the judicial Committee  did not lay down any new principle of "direct impact" dehors the doctrine  of  pith  and substance.   The  heavy  impact  and crippling  effect of an impugned legislation on  a  Dominion subject  was  taken  as  an  important  indication  of   its colourable  nature.   The  foregoing  discussion  does   not countenance  the suggestion that apart from the doctrine  of pith   and   substance,  the  courts  have   recognized   an independent principle of "direct impact".

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Nor  can I agree with the argument of learned  counsel  that the  doctrine of pith and substance has no application in  a case where one entry in a list is expressly made subject  to another  entry in a different list.  In such a case it  only means  that out of the scope of the former entry a field  of legislation has been carved out and put in the latter entry. That in itself has no bearing on the applicability or other- wise  of the doctrine.  The position is exactly the same  as in the matter of construing two entries in different  lists. Whether  two entries are carved out of one subject  or  deal with  two different subjects, the principle of  construction must  be the same : in either case the Court is called  upon to  ascertain under what entry the impugned law falls.   The doctrine  of  pith and substance only means that  if  on  an examination of a statute it is found that the legislation is in  substance one on a matter assigned to  the  Legislature, then  it  must  be held to be valid in  its  entirety,  even though it may trench upon matters which are beyond its  153 comprehension:see  The State of Bombay v. F. N. Balsara  (1) and  A.  S. Krishna v. The State of Madrass (2).   The  true character  of  the  legislation is  the  criterion  and  its incidental encroachment on other items is not material.   If that be so, once we come to the conclusion that the impugned legislation squarely falls within one entry, its  incidental encroachment  on  another entry whether carved  out  of  the former entry or has an independent existence althrough, will not  make it any the less one made within the limits of  the former entry. To  summarize:  When a question arises under what  entry  an impugned  legislation falls, the court directs its  mind  to ascertain  the scope and effect of the legislation  and  its pith  and substance.  Decided cases afford many criteria  to ascertain  its  scope,  namely,  comparison  of  conflicting entries, effect of the impugned legislation, its object  and purpose, its legislative history, its colourable nature  and similar others all or some of them would be useful guides to get  at the core of the legislation.  But no  authority  has gone  so far as to hold that even if the pith and  substance of  an Act falls squarely within the ambit of  a  particular entry,  it  should  be struck down on  the  speculative  and anticipatory  ground that it may come into conflict  with  a law  made by a co-ordinate Legislature by virtue of  another entry.  If the impact of a State law on a Central subject is so  heavy  and  devastating as to wipe  out  or  appreciably abridge  the  Central  field, then it may be  a  ground  for holding that the State law is a colourable exercise of power and that in pith and substance it falls not under the  State entry  but under the Union entry.  The case-law,  therefore, does  not  warrant the acceptance of a new  doctrine  dehors that of pith and substance. In this context it will be useful to notice some of the well settled  rules  of interpretation laid down by  the  Federal Court and accepted by this Court in the matter of construing the entries.  In Calcutta Gas (1) [1951] S. C. R. 682.  (2) (1957) S. C. R. 399,406. 154 Company v. The State of West Bengal (1), it is observed               "The power to legislate is given to the appro-               priate   Legislatures  by  Art.  246  of   the               constitution.  The entries in the three  Lists               are  only  legislative  heads  or  fields   of               legislation:  they  demarcate  the  area  over               which   the   appropriate   Legislatures   can               operate.  It is also well settled that  widest

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             amplitude  should be given to the language  of               the  entries.  But some of the entries in  the               different  Lists  or  in  the  same  List  may               overlap and sometimes may also appear to be in               direct  conflict with each other.  It is  then               the  duty  of  this  Court  to  reconcile  the               entries   and  bring  about  harmony   between               them.......  It may, therefore, be taken as  a               well  settled rule of construction that  every               attempt  should  be  made  to  harmonize   the               apparently  conflicting  entries not  only  of               different Lists but also of the same List  and               to reject that construction which will rob one               of the entries of its entire content and  make               it nugatory." With this background let me look at the two entries, namely, entry 11 of List II and entry 66 of List I. The said entries read:               Entry  11  of List  II.   Education  including               universities,  subject  to the  provisions  of               entries 63, 64, 65 and 66 of List I and  entry               25 of List III.               Entry  66 of List I. Go-ordination and  deter-               mination  of  Standards  in  institutions  for               higher  education or research  and  scientific               and technological institutions. We  are  not  concerned  with  the  question  of  medium  of instruction in regard to that part which has been  specially carved out and included in entries 63, 64 and 65 of List  I. The entire field of education, (1)  [1962] SUPP. 3 S. C. R. 1. 155 including universities, subject to the exceptions  mentioned in  entry  11  of  List  II,  is  entrusted  to  the   State Legislature.   There  cannot be education except  through  a medium  or media of instruction.  Education can be  imparted only  through a medium.  To separate them is to destroy  the concept.   It is inconceivable that any reasonable  body  of constitution  makers would entrust the subject of medium  of instruction  to Parliament and education dehors medium to  a State:  it  is  like cutting away the hand  that  feeds  the mouth.   That  no such separation was made in  the  case  of elementary  and secondary education is conceded.  It  cannot also be doubted that medium of instruction is also  included in   entry   63  of  List  I  relating  to   the   specified universities.   If so much is conceded, what is  the  reason for  excluding it from the university education in entry  11 of List II ?  There is none.  Conversely, the express  terms of  entry  66  of List I does not prima facie  take  in  the subject of medium of instruction.  The phraseology is rather wide,  but  none  the less clear.  Let me look  at  the  two crucial  expressions "co-ordination" and  "determination  of standards".   The  contention  of learned  counsel  for  the appellant that the composite term means fixing of  standards for  the  purpose of correlation and equating them  if  they vary, appears to be plausible, but is rather too restrictive and,  if  accepted makes the role of Parliament  that  of  a disinterested  spectator.   It must be  more  purposive  and effective.   The interpretation sought to be put upon it  by learned  counsel  for the respondents,  namely,  that  under certain   circumstances  the  Parliament  can  make  a   law displacing the medium of instruction prescribed by the State law by another of its choice, cuts so deeply into the  State entry  that  it cannot be countenanced unless the  entry  in List  I  is clear and unambiguous.  "To  determine"  is  "to

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settle, or decide or fix".  The expression "coordination" is given   the  following  meanings,  among  others,   in   the dictionary: "to place in the same order, rank or division to place in proper 156 position relatively to each other and to the system of which they form parts; to act in combined order for the production of  a particular result".  That entry enables Parliament  to make  a  law for fixing the standards  in  institutions  for higher education for the purpose of harmonious co-ordination of the said institutions for the achievement of the  desired result,namely, the  improvement  of higher  education.   The expression     co-ordination    and    determination.     of standards"  is  a  composite  term; and  the  fixing  up  of standards   for  the  purpose  of  co-ordination  does   not necessarily involve a particular medium of instruction.   To illustrate: education cannot be imparted effectively without books, professors, students, equipment, buildings,  finance, proper  medium  of instruction, etc.  All the  said  matters admittedly  are  comprehended by the word  "education",  for they are the necessary concomitants of education.  It  would be unreasonable to hold that all the said matters fall under the heading "co-ordination and determination of  standards", for,  if  it was so held, the entry "education’.’  would  be robbed of its entire content.  In such a case the  principle of   harmonious  construction  should  be  invoked   and   a demarcating line drawn; the clue for drawing such a line  is found  in  the word "  co-ordination".   So  understood, the State  can  make  a  law for  imparting  education  and  for maintaining  its standards; whereas Parliament can  step  in only  to improve the said standards for the purpose  of  co- ordination.   The  standards of some universities  may  fall because  of the deficiency in any of the  aforesaid  things. Parliament  may  make  a law  providing  for  facilities  in respect  of  any or all the aforesaid matters  so  that  the backward  universities may pick up and come to the level  of other  advanced  universities.  It may also make a  law  for raising the general standards of all the universities.   The law  made by Parliament may determine the general  standards in  respect of the said and similar matters and provide  the necessary   financial   and  other  help   to   enable   the universities to  157 reach  the level prescribed.  It may also be that  the  said law  may  provide  for a machinery to  enrich  the  language adopted   as  a  medium  of  instruction  by  a   particular university so that it may become a useful vehicle for higher education and for technological and scientific studies.   If the  pith  and substance of the law is  "’co-ordination  and determination  of standards" its incidental encroachment  on the  medium of instruction for the purpose of  enriching  it may probably be sustained.  But in the name of co-ordination it  cannot displace the medium of instruction, for, in  that event,  the encroachment on the subject of education is  not incidental  but direct.  For the said entry does not  permit the making of any law which allows direct interference by an outside body with the course of education in any university, but  enables  it generally to prescribe standards  and  give adventitious  aids  for  reaching the  said  standards.   In short,  the  role  of  a  guardian  angel  is  allotted   to Parliament  so that it can make a law providing a  machinery to watch, advise, give financial and other help, so that the universities   may  perform  their  allotted   role.    ’The University  Commission Act was passed in the  implementation of such a role.  So understood, there cannot be any possible

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dichotomy between the two entries. The  scheme of the Constitution also negatives the  idea  of legislation   by   Parliament  in  respect  of   medium   of instruction.   When the Constitution was passed, there  were many  fairly well developed languages in different parts  of our  country and they were mentioned in the Eighth  Schedule to  the Constitution.  At that time, English was the  medium of  instruction  at  all levels and was  also  the  official language  of  the administration.  It was  accepted  on  all hands that English should be replaced at all levels, but the process  should be phased.  Article 343 of the  Constitution declares  that the official language of the Union  shall  be Hindi in Devnagari script and it 158 permits  the use of English for all official purposes for  a specified period.  But in the case of education no such  go- slow process was indicated, presumably, because it was  left to   the   wisdom  of  the  Legislatures   of   States   and educationists   to  work  out  the  programme   for   smooth transition.   But  the  insistence  on  the  replacement  of English by Hindi for all official purposes, the  recognition of regional languages, the omission of English in the Eighth Schedule, the direction under Art. 351 that Hindi should  be enriched  by  a process of assimilation from  the  languages specified  in the Eighth Schedule and from  Hindustani,  all indicate that the makers of the Constitution were  confident that  the  regional  languages  were rich  or  at  any  rate resilient  enough to be or to become convenient vehicles  of instruction  at  all levels of education.  That  is  why  no express  reservation  was  made  for  replacing  English  by regional languages by convenient stages.  It may, therefore, be accepted that the makers of the Constitution thought that the specified regional languages would be suitable  vehicles of instruction, though it may equally be conceded that  they require  to  be  enriched  to meet  the  demands  of  higher education.   In  this  context entry 66 of List  I  must  be construed  on  the assumption that  the  regional  languages would  be the media of instruction in all the  universities, and  if  so construed the law fixing the standards  for  co- ordination cannot displace the medium of instruction. Let  me  now  look  at it from a  different  angle.   It  is contended   that  English  is  the  established  medium   of instruction  throughout  the  country,  that  following  the example  of the Gujarat University other universities  might follow  suit, that consequently there would be a steep  fall in  the  standards  of higher education,  and  that  if  the argument of the appellant was accepted, Parliament would  be a helpless spectator witnessing the debacle.  In effect,  on the appellant’s construction, the major part of the field of  159 co-ordination  would be wiped out.  This in effect  was  the argument  of  learned  counsel for  the  respondents  though couched  in different phraseology.  This is another  way  of saying that the pith and substance of such legislation  made by  a State prohibiting the use of English falls not  tinder the  subject  of  "education"  but  under  the  entry   "co- ordination".  This argument though appears to be attractive, is  without  legal  or  factual  basis.   If  the  pith  and substance  of  the  Impugned law is  covered  by  the  entry "education",  the question of effacing the Union entry  does not arise at all.  It is an argument of policy rather than a legal   construction.   The  simple  answer  is   that   the Constituent-Assembly  did  not  think  fit  to  entrust  the subject  of medium of instruction to Parliament, but  relied upon the wisdom of the Legislatures to rise to the occasion,

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and  enact  suitable  legislation.   Factually,  except   in Gujarat,   where the Legislature introduced Gujarati as  the exclusive  medium of instruction by an accelerated  process, all other States are adopting a go-slow policy.  Though that circumstance, in my view, has no relevance in construing the relevant   provisions  of  the  Constitution  there  is   no immediate danger of all the other States abolishing  English as  an additional medium of instruction.  I would prefer  to accept the natural meaning of the word "’education" than  to stretch  the expression "’co-ordination" to meet a  possible emergency when all the States, following a policy adopted by a State, might set their face against English.  That  apart, the picture drawn by learned counsel is rather  extravagant. It  presupposes that, but for the continuance of English  as one of the media of instruction, education is bound to  fall in  standards and co-ordination may become impossible.   But our  Constitution-makers did not think so, and they did  not provide for the continuance of English in the  universities. Further, the standards can be maintained, perhaps with  some trouble  and expense’ by imparting education  through  other media of’ instruction, provided the languages are suitably 160 enriched.    The  State  Legislatures,  and  more   so   the universities,  can be relied upon to make  every  reasonable attempt  to  maintain the standards.  It cannot  be  assumed that the State Legislatures would function against the  best interests  of  university education,  while  Parliament  can safely  be relied upon to act always in its  interest.   All the legislative bodies under our Constitution are elected on adult  franchise and this Court rightly presumes  that  they act  with  wisdom and in the interests of  the  people  they represent.   If  the  Legislature  of a  State  could  in  a particular  instance act precipitately by replacing  English by a regional language, Parliament also in its wisdom, if it has  power to do so., may cut the Gordian knot by  replacing English by Hindi in all the universities.  It is after all a constitutional   choice  of  institutions  to  implement   a particular  purpose and it is, therefore, the duty  of  this Court  to  interpret  the  provisions  of  the  Constitution uninfluenced  by ephemeral local conditions and  situations. I  would, therefore, hold that entry 11 of List IL takes  in the medium of instruction and that it is not comprehended by the  phraseology  of  entry  66 of List  I  of  the  Seventh Schedule  to  the Constitution.  It follows that  the  State Legislature  can  make a law empowering the  ’University  to prescribe  a  regional language as the exclusive  medium  of instruction. The  next  question is whether under the provisions  of  the Gujarat  University Act, 1949, hereinafter called  the  Act, the University has the power to prescribe a language as. the exclusive   medium   of.  instruction;  or   to   state   it differently,  whether the University has power to  prohibit, expressly  or  by  necessary implication,  the  use  of  any language  other  than  that  prescribed  as  the  medium  of instruction. At  the outset it would be convenient to notice briefly  the scheme  of  the Act so that the relevant provisions  may  be constructed  in  their propel setting.  Under the  Act,  the Chancellor and the  161 Vice-Chancellor  of the University, and the members  of  the Senate,  the  Syndicate  and the  Academic  Council  of  the University constitute a body corporate by the name of  "’The Gujarat  University".   It  is a  teaching  and  affiliating University.   It  has,  inter alia, powers  to  provide  for

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instruction, teaching and training in different branches  of learning  and  courses of study; to  hold  examinations  and confer degrees; to control and co-ordinate the activities of various  institutions connected with the University; and  to do  all acts and things incidental to the said powers.   The said  purposes  are carried out  through  three  instrument- alities,,  namely,  the Senate, the  legislative  body,  the Syndicate, the executive, and the Academic Council, which is responsible   for  the  maintenance  of  standards  in   the examinations of the University.  The Chancellor is the  head of   the  University.   The  Senate  passes  statutes;   the Syndicate,   ordinances;  and  the  Academic  Council,   the regulations-all providing for the subjects entrusted to them respectively.  The Chancellor and the State Government  have the  power of inspection over the affairs of the  University and  of giving necessary instructions.  Briefly stated,  the University  is  a  corporate body with  a  large  degree  of autonomy,  forming  an  institution  for  the  promotion  of education in the higher branches of learning.  It has  power to  confer  degrees and other privileges on  the  successful alumni of the institutions under its control. With this background let me look at the relevant  provisions of  the Act.  Clause (1) of s. 4 empowers the University  to provide  for  instruction,  teaching and  training  in  such branches  of learning and courses of study as it  may  think fit and to make provisions for research and dissemination of knowledge;  cl.  (7)  thereof, to Jay down  the  courses  of instruction for various examinations; cl. (8), to guide  the teaching  in colleges or recognized institutions; cl.  (10), to hold examinations and confer degrees, 162 titles, diplomas and other academic distinctions; cl.  (14), to inspect colleges and recognized institutions and to  take measures  to ensure that proper standards  of  instructions, teaching  or training are maintained in them; cl.  (15),  to control  and  co-ordinate  the activities of,  and  to  give financial   aid  to  affiliated  colleges   and   recognized institutions;  and cl. (28), to do all such acts and  things whether incidental to the power,% aforesaid or not as may be requisite in order to further the objects of the  University and  generally  to cultivate and promote arts,  science  and other  branches  of learning and culture.   Apart  from  the incidental  powers  expressly conferred by cl. (28),  it  is well  settled  that a corporation can also  exercise  powers incidental   to  or  consequential  upon   those   expressly conferred on it.  The legal position has been neatly brought out by Viscount Cave L. C. in Deuchar   v.  Light  and  Coke Company (1), by placing  two  passages of earlier  decisions in juxtaposition    thus :               "Whenever  a corporation is created by Act  of               Parliament, with reference to the purposes  of               the  Act, and solely with a view  to  carrying               these purposes into execution, I am of opinion               not   only   that  the   objects   which   the               corporation  may legitimately pursue must  be,               ascertained from the Act itself, but that  the               powers which the corporation may lawfully  use               in furtherance of these objects must either be               expressly  conferred or derived by  reasonable               implication from its provisions."               "’I must stop there.  To that statement I  may               add  a  sentence  from  the  speech  of   Lord               Selborne  in the case of  Attorney-General  v.               Great Eastern Py.  Co. (2) where he said  this               :  "I agree with Lord justice james that  this

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             doctrine  ought  to  be  reasonably,  and  not               unreasonably, understood and applied, and that               whatever may fairly be regarded as  incidental               to, or (1) [1925] A.C. 691, 695. (2) [1880] 5 A.C. 473, 478. 163               consequential  upon, those things  which’  the               Legislature has authorized, ought not (unless.               expressly prohibited) to be held, by  judicial               construction, to be ultra vires." When  an Act confers a power on a corporation, it  impliedly also   grants  tee  power  of  doing  all  acts  which   are essentially necessary for exercising the same. Bearing  the  aforesaid principles in mind, I must  ask  the question  whether,  on,  a fair  reading  of  the  aforesaid Provisions,  it  can  be said that the  University  has  the implied   power   to  prescribe  an  exclusive   medium   of instruction.   If once I reach the conclusion, namely,  that such  a  power is necessary for carrying  out  the  purposes expressly  authorized by the statute, I must hold  that  the said  power is not beyond the competence of the  University. The University has to provide for instruction, teaching  and training  in different branches of learning and  courses  of study,  to lay down the courses of instructions for  various examinations  and  to  guide the  teaching  in  colleges  or recognized institutions.  The power to prescribe a medium of instruction  is  implicit  in  the  power  to  provide   for instruction  and the power to guide the teaching.   One  can only  instruct  through  a  medium.   It  is  impossible  to conceive of instruction without a medium.  Indeed, they  are parts  of  the  same process.  A university  cannot  make  a provision  for instruction or teaching without at  the  same time  prescribing a medium or media for teaching it.  If  it can fix two media, it can equally prescribe a sole medium if it  thinks  that  for the proper  instruction  a  particular language  is  the most suitable medium.  A  perusal  or  the earlier  Bombay  statutes  and  similar  statutes  of  other universities  of  this  country  indicates  that  the   said universities prescribed the English medium only in  exercise of  similar powers conferred on them.  If  this  fundamental power to prescribe the medium is 164 denied to the universities, the substratum of their autonomy and  utility  under the Act will largely be  jeopardized  or affected.    To  illustrate,  there  may  be   20   colleges affiliated  to  a  university;  if  the  university   cannot prescribe   a  sole  medium  of  instruction  for  all   the affiliated colleges, each one of them may adopt a  different language  as its medium, with the result that there will  be chaos  in the sphere of higher education.  If such  a  power does not exist, how is it possible for a university to  hold examinations  in a particular medium?  It will be forced  to hold  examinations in all the different languages chosen  by the  affiliated  colleges  . Though the  statute  confers  a plenary  power  on the University to hold  examinations  and confer degrees, it will not have the power, if the construc- tion  suggested  by learned counsel for the  respondents  be adopted, to hold examinations in the language chosen by  it. But it is suggested that though it has such a power, it must exercise  it  reasonably so as to satisfy the needs  of  the different  colleges affiliated to it. I do not see  how,  if the  University  has the power to hold examinations  in  one language,   the   exercise  of  that  power   could   become unreasonable  if affiliated colleges chose to ply their  own

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course in utter disregard of the opinion of the  University. Be that as it may, I have no hesitation in holding that  the University  has the implied power to prescribe for the  pur- poses of higher education a number of media of  instructions or  even  a sole medium of instruction to the  exclusion  of others. It  is then said that cl. (27) confers an express  power  on the  University  to prescribe a medium of  instruction  and, therefore, whatever implied power it may have in its absence it can no longer be exercised under the Act.  As much of the argument  turned  upon the construction of this  clause,  it would be convenient to read it:               Clause  (27): (The University shall  have  the               power) to promote the development of the 165               study  of  Gujarati  and  Hindi  in  Devnagari               script  and  the use of Gujarati or  Hindi  in               Devnagari  script  or  both  as  a  medium  of               instruction and examination:               Provided  that English may continue to be  the               medium-               (i)  of instruction and examination  for  such               period as may from time to time be prescribed.               by  the Statutes until the en of May  1966  in               respect of such subjects and courses of  study               as may be so prescribed,               x        x       x       x      x It is said that this being the express power conferred  upon the  University in regard to the prescribing of a medium  of instruction, it can only exercise the said power within  the four corners of the said clause, and that under that  clause the  University  can only provide for Gujarati or  Hindi  or both  of  them  in  addition to other  medium  or  media  of instructions.   To  put it in other words, the  argument  is that the University has no power to provide for an exclusive medium  of instruction, but it can only prescribe  the  said languages  as additional media.  This argument is sought  to be reinforced by a comparison of the indefinite article used in  the  substantive  part of the clause  and  the  definite article used in the proviso thereto.  While the  substantive part of the clause says that the University has the power to promote  the development of the study of Gujarati and  Hindi in  Devnagari  script and the use of Gujarati  or  Hindi  in Devnagari  script  or both as a medium  of  instruction  and examination,  the proviso says that English may continue  to be  the medium of instruction and examination.  The  use  of the  indefinite article "  all  in the substantive  part  of the  clause  in contradistinction to  the  definite  article "’the" used in the proviso, the argument proceeds, is 166 decisive of the question that the University has no power to prescribe  Gujarati  or  Hindi  as the  medium  i.  e.,  the exclusive  medium, of instruction in the University.   I  do not find any merits in this argument.  Clause (27) does  not exhaust the power of the University to provide for a medium: that power is implicit in cl. (1) of s. 4 and other  clauses thereof   already   mentioned.   Clause  (27)   confers   an additional   power   on  the  University  to   promote   the development  of the study of Gujarati or Hindi in  Devnagari script  and  the use of them as medium  of  instruction  and examination.   This  is a composite power.  It  enables  the University  not  only  to  develop the  study  of  the  said languages  but  also to use them as  media  of  instruction. There  is  an essential distinction between  the  expression "providing" and "promoting".  To promote the development  of

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the  said languages means to further their growth.  It  also implies some action anterior to the existence or  occurrence of the thing promoted.  The power of promotion confers  upon the University the power to prescribe adventitious- aids for the purpose of promotion.  To illustrate, Gujarati or  Hindi is not the medium of instruction in the University; the said languages  have  not got sufficient  vocabulary  to  express scientific   and  technological  concepts;  there   are   no professors  who  are trained to teach the said  subjects  in those languages- there are no books in the said languages of a  standard  appropriate to the needs of  higher  education. The University can certainly help, financially or otherwise, to  enrich  the said languages so as to make  them  suitable vehicles  for conveying scientific and technological  ideas. It may provide for intensive training of the professors  and lecturers  in  those  languages  to  enable  them  to   have sufficient knowledge for communicating their ideas in  those languages.   It  may  give concessions  in  fees  etc.,  for students  who  take  those  languages  as  their  media   of instruction  instead of English or any other  language.   It may  start a pilot college where the medium is only  any  of those two languages.  It  167 may  in extreme cases prohibit the use of any  medium  other than  the said two languages.  There are many other ways  of subsidizing and helping the promotion of the said languages. That  apart, cl. (27) does not deal only with  ’instruction, but also with examination.  Should it be held that the power of  the University to prescribe a medium of  instruction  is derived  only from cl. (27) it should also be held that  the power  to prescribe a medium of instruction for  examination is  also  derived therefrom.  If so, it would  lead  to  the anomalous position of the University not being in a position to hold examinations in any language other than the said two languages, while in the case of instruction, the  affiliated colleges,  if  the  argument  of  learned  counsel  for  the respondents  be correct., will be able to instruct in  media other  than the said two languages: the University  will  be absolutely  powerless to examine the students of  a  college through the medium chosen by it.  It is, therefore,  obvious that  cl. (27) does not in any way replace or  even  curtail the undoubted power of the University to prescribe a  medium of instruction of its choice, but only confers an additional power and a correlative duty to promote these two languages. If  so  understood, the proviso also squarely  fits  in  the scheme.  What the proviso says is that English may  continue to  be  the medium of instruction and  examination  in  such subjects and for such period until the end of May 1966.   It is  enacted  as  a proviso to cl. (27),  as,  but  for  that proviso, English may continue to be a medium of instruction, but  it  cannot  be  the  medium  or  the  sole  medium   of instruction,  for there is a duty cast on the University  to introduce  one  or other of the aforesaid two  languages  as medium  of instruction.  The proviso enables the  University to  postpone the introduction of the aforesaid languages  as media  of  instruction  for a prescribed  period.   In  this context,  the argument based upon the use of the  indefinite article  in  the substantive part of the clause and  of  the definite article in the proviso may be 168 considered.  The use of the indefinite article, it is  said, shows that the power of the University is only to  prescribe an  additional medium, for otherwise the  Legislature  would have  used  the  words "the medium" as it has  done  in  the proviso.  Grammatically the definite article "the" could not

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have  been  used  in the substantive  part  :  the  definite article is used only to mark the object as before  mentioned or  already known or contextually particularized.   That  is why in the proviso the definite article is used in the  con- text  of the English language which is already in the  field as  the  exclusive  medium  of  instruction.   But  in   the substantive  part of cl. (27) the Legislature was  providing for  an additional power to promote one or other of the  two languages  mentioned  therein  or both  of  them.   In  that context when different languages, which can alternatively be prescribed, are mentioned, the appropriate article can  only be  the  indefinite  article.  If the  argument  of  learned counsel  for the respondents be accepted, it may lead  to  a more  serious  anomaly, namely, that  after  the  prescribed period  in the proviso the University becomes  powerless  to introduce  any  language  other than Gujarati  or  Hindi  as medium  of instruction and examination.  This difficulty  is sought  to  be  met  by the contention  that  the  power  to continue English as a medium of instruction after the period prescribed  in  the proviso, is necessarily implied  in  the proviso.   The doctrine of necessary implication as  applied to  the law of statutory construction means  an  implication that  is  absolutely  necessary and unavoidable  It  is  not implication  by conjecture.  I would be attributing  to  the Legislature an ineptitude in drafting if I should hold  that such   an  important  power  of  prescribing  a  medium   of instruction is left to be implied by construction.  It would also be against the natural meaning of the phraseology  used in the proviso.  The Legislature in enacting cl. (27) of  s. 4  must be deemed to have had knowledge that the  University has  prescribed  English as the medium in  exercise  of  the powers vested in it  169 and  with that knowledge the Legislature proceeded to  enact in the proviso that the University could continue English as the  sole  medium  for a prescribed  period.   The  proviso, therefore,  was  enacted on the assumption  of  an  existing power:  it was not conferring the power for the first  time. Should  it be held that the proviso conferred the  power  on the  University  to prescribe English as a  medium  for  the first time, it should also be held that the University could not  prescribe  any medium other than.   English,  Hindi  or Gujarati  after the period prescribed in the proviso.   But, on the other hand, if cl. (27) is construed in the manner  I have  done,  i.e.,  it  is only a  power  conferred  on  the University in addition to its existing power to prescribe  a medium or media of instruction, the relevant provisions fall into  a  piece.  The University will then  have  powers,  to prescribe  any  medium  or  media,  to  promote  Hindi   and Gujarati,  to  introduce the use of Hindi and  Gujarati,  to continue  English as the sole medium of instruction for  the prescribed  period and after the said period has run out  to prescribe  English  or any other language as the  medium  of instruction  in  addition  to Hindi  or  Gujarati.   If  the artificial  construction  suggested by  the  respondents  be accepted,  the Legislature should be held to  have  deprived the University not only of its power to discontinue  English as  the medium of instruction but also to have prevented  it from  introducing  any medium other than English,  Hindi  or Gujarati.   For  the  aforesaid reasons I  would  hold  that cl.(27)  of s. 4 of the Act gives only an  additional  power and it does not derogate from the implied power derived from other provisions of the Act. Some argument is advanced on the basis of s. 18(1)(XIV)   of the Act, which reads:

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18.  (1) Subject to such conditions as may be prescribed  by or  under  the  provisions of this  Act,  the  Senate  shall exercise the following 170               powers  and  perform  the  following   duties,               namely :-               x          x          x          x               (XIV) to make provision relating to the use of               Gujarati or Hindi in Devnagari script or  both               as a medium of instruction and examination. Learned  counsel for the appellant contends that  while  cl. (27) of s. 4 confers a power on the University, cl. (XIV) of s.  18(1) confers both a power and a duty on the  Senate  to provide for the use of Gujarati or Hindi in Devnagari script as  medium of instruction and examination.  Learned  counsel for  the  respondents again emphasize upon the  use  of  the indefinite article in the said clause.  I cannot agree  with either of the two contentions.  When a power is conferred on the  University to promote the said two languages as  medium of  instruction,  presumably  for public good,  there  is  a correlative  duty on the University to exercise  that  power The fact that under s. 4 only powers are conferred,  whereas under  s. 18 both powers and duties are mentioned, does  not make  much difference in a case where a power  is  conferred for  public  good.   The  statute  uses  three  expressions, namely,  "provide",  " promote", and  "’make  a  provision". Under  the statute the powers of the University can only  be exercised through the instrumentalities of the University in the manner prescribed.  In s. 18 the words used are  neither "’provide"   nor   "’promote"  but  "’to   make   provision" indicating thereby that specific provisions have to be  made presumably  through  statutes.  As the  University  has  got power  to  provide  for the exclusive  medium  and  also  to promote  the  use  of the said two  languages  as  media  of instruction,  the  Senate  is authorized  to  make  statutes providing  for the former in exercise of its power under  s. 18 (1) (i) and for the latter under s. 18 (1) (xiv).  As  to the.  promotion of the development of the study of  Gujarati and  171 Hindi in Devnagri  script, the Senate, the Syndicate and the Academic Council may make the requisite laws in exercise  of the  appropriate powers confer-red on them.  The use of  the indefinite  article "a" in cl. (xiv) of s. 18 (1) is not  of much  relevance, for, as I have already pointed out,  it  is the appropriate article in the context. Another contention accepted by the High  Court, namely, that s.  4  (1) and other clauses of the section  apply  only  to residential  colleges,  was  faintly  advanced  by   learned counsel  for the respondents.  There is absolutely no  force in  it, as the phraseology of the said clauses is  wide  and comprehensive and does not    admit of any such limitation. The   argument  that  this  construction  will  enable   the University to    abolish English altogether as a  medium  of instructions  it  is  done  in  the  present  case,  has  no relevance,  for it can certainly do so, if it has  power  in that  regard.   The  Constitution depended  upon  the  State Legislatures and the universities for imparting education at the university level.  The Legislature in its turn,  rightly in   my  view,  conferred  the  necessary  powers   on   the university, in the interest of higher education.  No one  is better   qualified   than   the   representatives   of   the intelligentsia   of   the   State  who   man   the   various instrumentalities of the University to decide on the  medium of  instruction to be introduced in the colleges  affiliated

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to  the University.  It may be that a particular  university may  have  accelerated  the pace of the  introduction  of  a regional  language  as  the medium  of  instruction  at  the university  level,  but other universities are  following  a more  cautious policy.  It is for the university  to  decide its own course.  If the statute has conferred the power,  as I have said it has, these considerations are of no avail. it  is not disputed that if the University has the power  to prescribe an exclusive medium of instruction 172 under a statute, s. 38A of the Act which is a  consequential provision would be valid. For  the  aforesaid reasons I hold that the  University  was well within its rights in prescribing, by statutes, the said two languages as media of instruction to replace English  by stages. In  the result the order of the High Court is set aside  and the  appeals are allowed with costs of the  appellants  here and in the High Court. By COURT: In accordance with the view of the majority,  both the  appeals stand dismissed in the manner indicated in  the majority  judgment,  with costs.  There will be one  set  of hearing fee.                                    Appeals dismissed.