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PETITIONER: THE GODAVARI SUGAR MILLS LTD.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: SHRI D. K. WORLIKAR

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 14/03/1960

BENCH: GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. BENCH: GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. WANCHOO, K.N.

CITATION:  1960 AIR  842            1960 SCR  (3) 305  CITATOR INFO :  E          1966 SC 925  (9)  RF         1972 SC1589  (14)

ACT: Industrial Dispute-Notification-Construction-Head office  of Sugar  Industry,  if within  its  purview-Bombay  Industrial Relations Act, 1946 (Bom. 11 of 1947), S.  2(4)-Notification No. 1131-46 of 1952.

HEADNOTE: The respondent, a stenographer employed by the appellant  at its head office in Bombay, challenged the legality and  pro- priety  of  the  dismissal order passed against  him  by  an application  under the provisions of the  Bombay  Industrial Relations Act, 1946, and contended that the Notification No. 1131-46 issued by the Government of Bombay in 1952 under  S. 2(4)  of  the said Act brought within its purview  the  head office of the appellant which was dealing in Sugar Industry. The  appellant challenged the competency of the  application on the ground that the Act did not apply to the respondent’s case  and  the  Labour  Court had  no  jurisdiction  as  the Notification  did  not  apply  to the  head  office  of  the appellant: Held, that on a proper construction of the Notification,  it cannot  be  said that the Government of Bombay  intended  to extend the scope of the Notification to the head office of a Sugar  Industry.  The Notification did not bring within  its purview  the sugar industry as such but the  manufacture  of sugar  and its by-products, the object being to confine  its benefits  to service or employment which was connected  with the  manufacture of sugar and its by-products including  the growing  of sugar canes and all agricultural and  industrial operations connected with the growing of sugarcane.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 425 of 1958. Appeal  by special leave from the Decision dated October  9, 1956  of the Labour Appellate Tribunal of India, Bombay,  in Appeal (Bom.) No. 111 of 1956. M.   C.  Setalvad, Attorney-General of India, S. N.  Andley,

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J. B.  Dadachanji, Rameshwar Nath and P.     L.  Vohra,  for the appellants. M. S. K. Sastri, for the respondent. 1960.  March 15.  The Judgment of the Court was delivered by GAJENDRAGADKAR,  J.--This appeal by special leave  raises  a short  question about the construction of  the  notification No.  1131-46 issued by the Government of Bombay on  October, 4,  1952, under s. 2(4) of the Bombay  Industrial  Relations Act,  1946 (Bom. 11 of 1947) (hereinafter called  the  Act). The respondent, 306 who  was  a  stenographer employed  by  the  appellant,  the Godavari Sugar Mills Ltd., at its head office in Bombay  was dismissed  by the appellant on April 22, 1955.  He had  been working as a stenographer for some years past on a salary of Rs.  135 plus Rs. 27 as dearness allowance.  He was  charged with    having   committed   acts   of   disobedience    and insubordination,  and  after a proper enquiry where  he  was given an opportunity to defend himself, he was found  guilty of  the  alleged misconduct; that is why his  services  were terminated ; that is the appellant’s case. The respondent challenged the legality and propriety of  his dismissal  by  an  application before the  Labour  Court  at Bombay; he purported to make this application under s. 42(4) read  with  s.  78 (1) (a) (i) and (iii) of  the  Act.   The appellant   in  reply  challenged  the  competence  of   the application on the ground that the Act did not apply to  the respondent’s   case,  and  so  the  Labour  Court   had   no jurisdiction to entertain it.  Both the parties agreed  that the  question of jurisdiction thus raised by  the  appellant should  be tried as a preliminary issue; and so  the  Labour Court considered the said objection and upheld it.  It  held that  the notification in question on which  the  respondent relied did not apply to the head office of the appellant  at Bombay;   accordingly   the  Labour  Court   dismissed   the respondent’s  application.   The respondent  challenged  the correctness of this decision by preferring an appeal  before the Industrial Court.  His appeal, however, failed since the Industrial  Court agreed with the Labour.  Court in  holding that  the notification did not apply to the head  office  of the appellant.  The matter was then taken by the  respondent before  the  Labour  Appellate Tribunal and  this  time  the respondent  succeeded, the Labour Appellate Tribunal  having held  that the notification applied to the head  office  and that the respondent was entitled to claim the benefit of the provisions of the Act.  On this finding the Labour Appellate Tribunal set aside the order passed by the courts below  and remanded  the case to the Labour Court for disposal  on  the merits  in accordance with law.  It is this order which  has given rise to the present appeal and the only question which it  307 raises  for  our  decision is whether  the  notification  in question  applies  to the head office of  the  appellant  at Bombay. The  Act has been passed by the Bombay Legislature in  order to  regulate relations of employers and employees,  to  make provision  for  settlement of indus- trial disputes  and  to provide  for certain other purposes.  It has made  elaborate provisions  in  order  to  carry out  its  object,  and  has conferred  some  benefits on the employees  in  addition  to those  which  have  been conferred on them  by  the  Central Industrial Disputes Act, XIV of 1947.  Under s. 42(4) of the Act, for instance, an employee desiring a change in  respect of  any order passed by the employer under  standing  orders

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can  make an application to the Labour Court in that  behalf subject  to the proviso which it is unnecessary to set  out. Section  78(1)(a)(iii) requires the Labour Court  to  decide whether  any  change made by an employer or  desired  by  an employee should be made.  An order of dismissal passed by an employer  can,  therefore,  be challenged  by  the  employee directly by an application before the Labour Court under the Act,  whereas  under  the Central Act  a  complaint  against wrongful dismissal can become an industrial dispute only  if it is sponsored by the relevant union or taken up by a group of employees and is referred to the industrial tribunal  for adjudication  under s. 10 of the Act  Since  the  respondent claims a special benefit under the Act he contends that  his case falls under the notification.  It is common ground that if  the notification applies to the case of  the  respondent the  application  made by him to the Labour Court  would  be competent and would have to be considered on the merits;  on the other hand, if the said notification does not apply then the  application  is incompetent and must  be  dismissed  in limine on that ground. Let us now read the notification.  It has been issued by the Government of Bombay in exercise of the powers conferred  on it  by s. 2, sub-s. (4), of the Act, and in supersession  of an  earlier  notification,  and  it  provides  that  "   the Government  of  Bombay  is pleased to direct  that  all  the provisions of the said Act shall 308 apply  to the following industry, viz., the  manufacture  of sugar  and  its  by-products Including (1)  the  growing  of sugarcane  on  farms belonging to or  attached  to  concerns engaged  in the said manufacture, and (2)  all  agricultural and  industrial  operations connected with  the  growing  of sugarcane or the said manufacture, engaged in such concerns. Note:  For the purposes of this notification all service  or employment connected with the conduct of the above  industry shall  be deemed to be part of the industry when engaged  in or by an employer engaged in that industry ". It is significant that the notification applies not to sugar industry as such but to the manufacture of sugar and its by- products.   If  the expression " sugar industry "  had  been used it would have been possible to construe that expression in  a broader sense having regard to the wide definition  of the word " industry " prescribed in s. 2(19) of the Act; but the  notification  has  deliberately  adopted  a   different phraseology and has brought within its purview not the sugar industry  as such but the manufacture of sugar and  its  by- products.  Unfortunately the Labour Appellate  Tribunal  has read  the  notification as though it referred to  the  sugar industry  as  such.   That is a  serious  infirmity  in  the decision of the Labour Appellate Tribunal. Besides,  the inclusion of the two items specified  in  cls. (1) and (2) is also significant.  Section 2(19)(b)(i)  shows that  "  industry " includes  agriculture  and  agricultural operations.   Now, if the manufacture of sugar and  its  by- products  had  the  same meaning  as  the  expression  sugar industry, then the two items added by cls. (1) and (2) would have  been included in the said expression by virtue of  the definition  of " industry " itself and the addition  of  the two clauses would have been superfluous.  The fact that  the two items have been included specifically clearly  indicates that  the  first  part of the notification  would  not  have applied  to them, and it is with a view to extend the  scope of the said clause that the inclusive words introducing  the two items have been used.  This fact also shows the  limited interpretation  which  must  be  put  on  the  words  "  the

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manufacture of sugar and its by-products 309 It is true that the note added to the notification  purports to  include within the scope of the notification some  cases of   service  and  employment  by  the,   deeming   process. Unfortunately  the  last  clause in the  note  is  unhappily worded and it is difficult to understand what exactly it was intended to mean.  Even so, though by the first part of  the note  some’ kinds of service or employment are deemed to  be part of the industry in question by virtue of the fact  that they  are connected with the conduct of the  said  industry, the  latter part of the note requires that the said  service or  employment  must  be engaged in that  industry.   It  is possible that the workers engaged in manuring or a clerk  in the  manure depot which is required to issue manure  to  the agricultural farm which grows sugarcane may for instance  be included  within the scope of the notification by virtue  of the note; but it is difficult to see how the respondent, who is  an employee in the head office at Bombay, can claim  the benefit  of  this note.  The addition made  by  the  deeming clause on the strength of the connection of certain services and  employments  with the conduct of the industry  is  also controlled  by  the requirement that the  said  services  or employments  must  be  engaged  in  that  industry  so  that connection   with  the  industry  has  nevertheless  to   be established   before  the  note  can  be  applied   to   the respondent. It  has  been  urged  before  us  by  Mr.  Sastri,  for  the respondent,  that  at  the head  office  there  is  accounts department,  the  establishment  section,  stores   purchase section  and legal department, and he pointed out  that  the machinery  which is purchased for the industry is landed  at Bombay, received by the head office and is then sent to  the factories.   In fact the factories and the offices  attached to   them  are  situated  at  Lakshmiwadi   and   Sakharwadi respectively and are separated by hundreds of miles from the head office at Bombay.  The fact that the machinery required at  the factories is received at the head office and has  to be  forwarded  to the respective factories cannot,  in,  our opinion,  assist the respondent in contending that the  head office  itself  and  all the employees engaged  in  it  fall within the note to the notification.  The object of the 40 310 notification appears to be to confine its benefit to service or  employment  which is connected with the  manufacture  of sugar and its by-products including the two items  specified in cl. (1) and cl. (2)  Subsidiary services such as those we have indicated are also included by virtue of the note;  but in  our opinion it is difficult to extend the scope  of  the notification  to the head office of the appellant.  We  must accordingly hold that the Labour-Appellate Tribunal erred in law in holding that the case of the respondent was  governed by the notification. Incidentally  we  would  like  to  add  that  the  registrar appointed under s. 11 of the Act has consistently refused to recognise  the staff of the head office as coming under  the notification,  and it is common ground that  the  consistent practice in the matter so far is against the plea raised  by the respondent.  It is perfectly true that in construing the notification the prevailing practice can have no  relevance; but if after construing the notification we come to the con- clusion  that the head office is outside the purview of  the notification  it  would not be irrelevant to  refer  to  the prevailing practice which happens to be consistent with  the

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construction we have placed on the notification.  It appears that  in  the courts below reference was made to  a  similar notification issued in respect of textile industry under  s. 2,  sub-s.  (3)  of  the  Act  and  the  relevant  decisions construing  the  said notification were cited.   We  do  not think  any useful purpose will be served by considering  the said notification and the decisions thereunder. In the result the appeal is allowed, the order passed by the Labour Appellate Tribunal is set aside and the  respondent’s application  is  dismissed.  There will be no  order  as  to costs.                                            Appeal allowed. 311