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PETITIONER: THE DELHI CLOTH AND GENERAL MILLS LTD.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: KUSHAL BHAN

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 10/03/1959

BENCH: WANCHOO, K.N. BENCH: WANCHOO, K.N. GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B.

CITATION:  1960 AIR  806            1960 SCR  (3) 227  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1961 SC 860  (15)  RF         1965 SC 155  (9)  R          1969 SC  30  (6)  R          1988 SC2118  (5)

ACT: Industrial   Dispute-Dismissal  of  employees   by   enquiry committee   pending  trial  in   Criminal   Court-Subsequent acquittal  of  the, employee--Jurisdiction  of  Tribunal  to refuse  approval of dismissal-Industrial Disputes  Act  1947 (XIV Of 1947), s. 33(2), proviso.

HEADNOTE: The  appellant  company served a charge-sheet  on  the  res- pondent  who was one of its employees alleging that  he  had stolen  the cycle of the company’s Head Clerk.   A  criminal case relating 228 to the theft was pending against him then.  He was asked  to show  cause why he should not be dismissed  for  misconduct, and as his explanation was unsatisfactory a certain date was fixed  for  enquiry.   The respondent  appeared  before  the enquiry committee but refused to participate in the  enquiry by  answering  questions put to him as he did  not  want  to produce  any  defence  till the matter was  decided  by  the Court.   The  company,however,after completing  the  enquiry directed the dismissal of the respondent on the ground  that misconduct  had  been  proved  against  him.   The   company thereafter  made  an  application  under  s.  33(2)  Of  the Industrial  Disputes  Act  to the  Industrial  Tribunal  for approval  of  the  disciplinary  action  taken  against  the respondent.  In the meantime the respondent was acquitted by the Criminal Court.  ’The judgment of the Criminal Court was produced  before the tribunal which refused to  approve  the order  of  dismissal of the respondent.  On  appeal  by  the company by special leave : Held, that the principles of natural justice do not  require that an employer must wait for the decision of the  Criminal Trial  Court  before taking disciplinary action  against  an employee. Shri  Bimal Kanta Mukherjee v. Messrs.   Newsman’s  Printing Works, (1956) L.A.C. 188, approved.

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If  a case is of a grave nature involving questions of  fact and  law which are not simple it would be advisable for  the employer  to await the decision of the Criminal Trial  Court but in a simple case like the present the tribunal erred  in not  granting  approval  under S. 33(2)  of  the  Industrial Disputes Act.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 88 of 1959. Appeal  by special leave from the judgment and  order  dated May 6, 1958, of the Industrial Tribunal, Delhi, in 0. P. No. 54 of 1958. M.C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, S. N.  Andley, J. B. Dadachanji, Rameshwar Nath and P.   L.  Vohra, for the appellant. Janardan Sharma, for  the respondent. 1960.  March 10.  The Judgment of the Court was delivered by WANCHOO,  J.-This  is  an  appeal by  special  leave  in  an industrial  matter.  The appellant is a company carrying  on the manufacture of textiles.  The respondent Kushal Bhan was in the employ of the company as a peon.  It appears that the cycle  of Ram Chandra, Head Clerk of the Folding  Department was  stolen on August 24, 1957.  The matter was reported  to the  police.  Sometime later, the cycle was  recovered  from the  railway  station cycle -stand at the  instance  of  the respondent who took the police there and picked out 229 the  stolen  cycle from among 50/60 cycles  standing  there. This  matter  was apparently brought to the  notice  of  the company  in  October 1957 and thereupon a  charge-sheet  was served  on the respondent to the effect that he  had  stolen the  cycle  of  Ram Chandra, Head Clerk, that  it  had  been recovered  at  his  instance and that a  criminal  case  was pending  against him with the police.  He was asked to  show cause  why he should not be dismissed for  misconduct.   The respondent  submitted his explanation on October  13,  1957. As  his explanation was unsatisfactory, November  14,  1957, was  fixed for enquiry.  The respondent appeared before  the enquiry  committee but stated that as the case  was  pending against him, he did not want to produce any defence till the matter was decided by the court.  He further stated that  he did  not  want  to  take part in the  enquiry  and  was  not prepared to give any answers to questions put to him.   When questions  were  put  to him at the enquiry  he  refused  to answer them and eventually he left the place.  The  company, however, completed the enquiry and directed the dismissal of the  respondent on the ground that the misconduct  had  been proved  against  him.  Thereafter an  application  was  made under  s.  33(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, No.  14  of 1947,  by  the company to the tribunal for approval  of  the action taken against the respondent.  The matter came before the  tribunal  on  May  6,  1958.   In  the  meantime,   the respondent had been acquitted by the criminal court on April 8,  1958,  on the ground that the case against him  was  not free  from doubt.  The copy of the judgment of the  criminal court  was  produced before the tribunal and it  refused  to approve  the  order  of dismissal.   The  company  thereupon applied  for  special leave to this Court resulting  in  the present appeal. The  main contention on behalf of the appellant  company  is that the company was not bound to wait for the result of the trial in the criminal court and that it could, and did, hold a fair enquiry against the respondent, and if the respondent

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refused  to participate in it and left the place  where  the enquiry was being held, the company could do no more than to complete it and come to such conclusion as was 230 possible on the evidence before it.  Learned counsel for the respondent,  on  the other hand, urges  that  principles  of natural  justice  require that an employer  should  wait  at least  for the decision of the criminal trial  court  before taking  disciplinary  action,  and  that  inasmuch  as   the employer  did  not  do  so in this  case  the  employee  was justified in not taking part in the disciplinary proceedings which dealt with the very same matter which was the subject- matter of trial in the criminal court. It is true that very often employers stay enquiries  pending the decision of the criminal trial court& and that is  fair; but we cannot say that principles of natural justice require that an employer must wait for the decision at least of  the criminal  trial  court  before  taking  action  against   an employee.    In  Shri  Bimal  Kanta  Mukherjee  v.   Messrs. Newsman’s Printing Works (1), this was the view taken by the Labour Appellate Tribunal.  We may, however, add that if the case  is of a grave nature or involves questions of fact  or law,  which  are not simple, it would be advisable  for  the employer  to await the decision of the trial court, so  that the defence of the employee in the criminal case may not  be prejudiced.   The  present,  however, is a case  of  a  very simple  nature and so the employer cannot be blamed for  the course  adopted by him.  In the circumstances, there was  in our  opinion no failure of natural justice in this case  and if  the  respondent  did  not choose to  take  part  in  the enquiry, no fault can be found with that enquiry.  We are of opinion that this was a case in which the tribunal  patently erred  in  not  granting  approval under  s.  33(2)  of  the Industrial  Disputes  Act.  Besides it is apparent  that  in making  the order under appeal, the tribunal has  completely lost sight of the limits of its jurisdiction under s. 33(2). We therefore allow the appeal and setting aside the order of the  tribunal grant approval to the order of  the  appellant dismissing the respondent.  In the circumstances we pass  no order as to costs. Appeal allowed. (1)  (1956) L.A.C. 188. 231