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PETITIONER: THE CORPORATION OF THE CITY OFNAGPUR

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: ITS EMPLOYEES

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 10/03/1960

BENCH: SUBBARAO, K. BENCH: SUBBARAO, K. GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. GUPTA, K.C. DAS

CITATION:  1960 AIR  675            1960 SCR  (2) 942  CITATOR INFO :  R          1963 SC1681  (12)  E          1963 SC1873  (15,18)  E          1968 SC 554  (10)  RF         1969 SC 530  (2A)  R          1972 SC 763  (12)  E&R        1978 SC 548  (4,66,67,70,75,77,84,85,92,115  D          1981 SC2101  (5)  RF         1988 SC 782  (65)  R          1988 SC1182  (12)  RF         1988 SC1353  (4)  RF         1988 SC1700  (4)  RF         1990 SC2047  (7)

ACT:        Industrial Dispute-Services undertaken by City  Corporation-        If and when industry - Test-’Industry’.  Meaning  of-Central        Provinces and Berar industrial Disputes Settlement Act, 1947        (C.P.  &  Beray XXIII of 1947). S. 2 (14)  -City  of  Nagpur        Corporation Act. 1948 (Madhya Pradesh 2 of 1950).

HEADNOTE: The question for determination in these appeals was  whether and   to  what  extent  the  municipal  activities  of   the Corporation of                            943 Nagpur City fell within the term ’industry’ as defined by s. 2   (14.)   of  the  C.P.  and  Berar  Industrial   Disputes Settlement  Act, 1947.  Disputes having arisen  between  the said   Corporation  and  its   employees  in   its   various departments,   the  State  Government  referred   them   for adjudication  to the State Industrial Court under s.  39  of the  Act  and  that  Court  by  its  award  held  that   the Corporation and all its departments were covered by the said definition.   Against  that award the  Corporation  made  an application  to  the  High  Court  under  Art.  26  of   the Constitution.  The  High Court rejected its contention  that the  Corporation was not an industry within the  meaning  of the  said  section and remanded the case to  the  Industrial Court for determination as to which of its departments  fell within  the  definition  and making  an  award  accordingly. Thereafter The Industrial Court found all the departments of

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the Corporation except those dealing with (1) assessment and levy  of  house-tax (2) assessment and levy of  Octroi,  (3) removal  of  encroachment and removal and  pulling  down  of dilapidated  houses,  (4)  prevention and  control  of  food adulteration,  and (5) maintenance of cattle pounds,  to  be industries  within the meaning of the definition and  passed its  award  accordingly.  The Corporation appealed  to  this Court by special leave but there was no appeal on behalf  of the  employees  of the five departments  excluded  from  the definition. Held,  that the decision of the Industrial Court  except  so far  as  it related to the five departments  in  respect  of which the re was no appeal, must be affirmed. The  definition of the word ’industry’ in S. 2 (14)  of  the C.P.  and  Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement  Act,  1947, although in a language somewhat different from that of S.  2 (1)   of  the  Industrial  Disputes  Act,  1947,   is   very comprehensive.  It is in two parts, cl. (a) defines it  from the  standpoint  of employers and cl. (b) from that  of  the employee.   An  activity that falls within any  of  the  two clauses must be -,in industry. D.N. Banerji v. P. R. Mukherjee [1953] S.C.R. 302 and Baroda Borough  Municipality  v.  Its Workmen.  [1957]  S.C.R.  33, applied. It is not necessary that an activity of the Corporation must share  the common characteristics of an industry  before  it can come within the section.  The words Of S. 2 (14) of  the Act are clear and unambiguous and the maxim noscitur a socii can have no application.  The history of industrial disputes and  the legislation, however, recognises the basic  concept that the activity must be an organised one and not one  that pertains to private or personal employment. State  of  Bombay v. The Hospital Mazdoor  Sabha.  [1960]  2 S.C.R.  866 and Heydon’s Case (1584) 3 Rep. 7  b.,  referred to. But the definition, however wide, cannot include the  regal, primary  and  inalienable,  functions of  the  State  though statutorily delegated to a corporation and the ambit of such functions  cannot be extended so as to include  the  welfare activities  of  a  modern  state and  must  be  confined  to legislative power, administration of law and judicial power. 120 944      Richard Coomber v. The Justices of the County of Berks, Berks.(1883-84)  9  A.C. 61 and The Federated  State  School Teachers’ Association of Australia v. The State of Victoria. (1928-29) 41 C.L.R. 569,      County Council of Middlesex v. Assessment Committee of St. George’s Union. (1896) 2  Q.B.D. 143, Verisimo Vasquez Vilas v. City of  Manila,  220  U.  S. 345,   and  The  Federated  Municipal  and   Shire   Council Employees’  Union  of Australia  v.  Mclbourne  Corporation. (1918-19) 26 C.L.R. 508, referred to. The  real  test  as to whether a service  undertaken  by  a- corporation is an industry must be whether that service, if’ performed by an individual or a private person, would be  an industry.   Monetary  cosideration cannot  be  an  essential characteristic  of  industry  in a modern  State.   It  was, therefore,  incorrect  to say that only such  activities  as were  analogous to trade or business could come within S.  2 (14) of the Act. D.   N.  Banerji  v.  P.R.  Mukherjee,  [1953]  S.C.R.  302, explained.The   Federated   Municipal  and   Shire   Council Employees’  Union  of Australia  v.  Melbourne  Corporation. (19l8-19)   26  C.L.R.  508,  Federated  Engine-Drivey   and Fireme’s Association and Ors. v. The Broken Hill Proprietary

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Company  Limited  and  Ors. (1913) 16 C.L.R. 23  5  and  The Federated  State School Teachers’ Association  Australia  v. The State of Victoria, (1929) 41 C.L.R. 569, referred to. Where  a service rendered by a Corporation is  an  industry, the  employees  of  the  departments  connected  with   that service,  whether  financial, administrative  or  executive, would be entitled to the benefits of the Act. Baroda  Borough Municipality v. Its Workmen.  [1957]  S.C.R. 33, referred to. If a department of a municipality discharges many functions, some  within  and some without the  definition  of  industry given   by  the  Act,  the  predominant  functions  of   the department  shall be the criterion for the purposes  of  the Act.

JUDGMENT:        CIVIL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 143 &  144        of 1959 and 545 of 1958.        Appeals  by special leave from the Award dated December  14,        1957, of the State Industrial Court at Nagpur in  Industrial        References Nos. 18 of 1956 and I of 1957 respectively.        C.   B. Aggarwala, S. N. Andley, J. B. Dadachanji, Rameshwar        Nath  and  P.  L.  Vohra, for the  appellants  (in  all  the        appeals).        A.   V.  Viswanatha  Sastri, W.S. Barlingay,  S.  W.  Dhabe,        Shanker  Anand and A. G. Ratnaparkhi, for respondent  No.  2        (in  C.  A. No. 144/59 and respondent (in C. A. No.  143  of        1959).        H.   R. Khanna         and R. H. Dhebar, for respondent  No.        3 (in C.A. No. 144/59.)        945        A. V. Viswanatha Sastri, W. S. Barlingay, Shankar Anand  and        A.  G. Ratnaparkhi, for the respondents (in C.A. No. 545  of        1958).        1960 Feb. 10. The Judgment of the Court was   delivered by        SUBBA RAO, J.-This batch of three connected  appeals  raises        the  question whether and to what extent the  activities  of        the  Corporation  of  the  City of  Nagpur  come  under  the        definition of "industry" in s.  2(14) of the C.P. &  Berar        Industrial Disputes Settlement Act, 1947 (hereinafter called        the Act).        The  appellant  is  the Corporation of the  City  of  Nagpur        constituted  under the City of Nagpur Corporation Act,  1948        (Madhya  Pradesh Act No. 2 of 1950). Disputes arose  between        the Corporation and the  employees in various departments of        the  Corporation  in  respect  of  wage  scales,   gratuity,        provident  fund, house rent, confirmation,  allowances  etc.        The  Government of the State of Madhya Pradesh by its  order        dated October 23, 1956, referred the said disputes under  s.        39 of the Act to the State Industrial Court, Nagpur and  the        reference  was  numbered as Industrial Reference No.  18  of        1956. The appellant filed a statement before the  Industrial        Court  questioning  the jurisdiction of  that  Court,  inter        alia, on the ground that the Corporation was not an industry        as defined by the Act. On February 13, 1957, the  Industrial        Court made a preliminary order holding that the  Corporation        was  an industry and that the further question  whether  any        department of the Corporation was an industry or not,  would        be  decided  on the evidence. The appellant  challenged  the        correctness  of that order by filing a petition  under  Art.        226  of  the  Constitution in the High Court  of  Bombay  at        Nagpur,  but that petition was dismissed, as the  award  was        made  before its hearing.  On June 3, 1957,  the  Industrial

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      Court  made  an award holding that the  Corporation  was  an        industry and further that all departments of the Corporation        were  covered by the said definition.  It also  revised  the        pay  scales of the employees and accepted the major  demands        made by them.  On July 15, 1957, the appellant again filed a        petition in the High Court of Bombay at Nagpur,        946             questioning  the validity and the, correctness  of  the        aid award.  A division bench of the said High Court, by  its        order  dated September 11, 1957, rejected the contention  of        the  appellant that the, Corporation was not an industry  as        defined  by  the  Act and remanded the  case  to  the  State        Industrial   Court  to  decide  the  activities   of   which        departments of the Corporation fell within the definition of        "industry" given in the Act and to re-examine the  schedules        and  categories of persons and to restrict the award to  the        persons   concerned  within  the  definition  of  the   word        "industry" in the Act.  On remand, the said Industrial Court        scrutinized the activities of each of the departments of the        Corporation  and  hold  that  all  the  departments  of  the        Corporation,  except those dealing with (i)  assessment  and        levy of house-tax, (ii) assessment and levy and pulling down        of  dilapidated houses, (iv) prevention and control of  food        adulteration    and (v) maintenance of cattle  pounds,  were        covered  by the definition of "industry" under the Act.   It        further  gave findings in regard to the disputes between  be        parties and also as to the persons entitled to the  reliefs.        It is not necessary to give the particular-. of the findings        arrived  at or the relief given by the Industrial Court,  as        nothing  turns upon them in this appeal.  The  appellant  by        special  leave filed in this Court Civil Appeal No.  143  of        1959  against  the award of the Industrial Court.   It  also        filed in this Court by special leave Civil Appeal No. 144 of        1959  against the order of the High Court holding  that  the        activities  of the Corporation came under the definition  of        "industry"  in  the  Act  and  remanding  the  case  to  the        Industrial  Court for decision on merits in respect of  each        of the activities of the Corporation.        Civil  Appeal  No.  545 of 1958, the third  appeal  in  this        batch,  arises  out  of  a  reference  made  by  the   State        Government  of  Madhya  Pradesh in regard  to  the  disputes        between  the appellant, i.e. the Corporation of the City  of        Nagpur,  and  the employees of the Corporation in  the  Fire        ]Brigade  Department,  representing  themselves  and   other        employees.   The said reference was numbered  as  Industrial        Reference No. 1              947        of 1957. As there was overlapping of the     disputes raised        in Industrial Reference No. 18 of  1956   and     Industrial        Reference  No. 1 of 1957, the Industrial    Court heard both        the  references  together and, by consent, the  evidence  in        Reference  No.  18  of 1956 was      treated  as evidence in        Reference No. 1 of 1957.  On December 14, 1957, an award was        made  in  Reference No. 1 of 1957 and it was  based  on  the        findings in the award made in Reference No. 18 of 1956.  The        Industrial Court held that the Fire Brigade ]Department  was        an  industry  within  the meaning of the Act  and,  on  that        basis, gave the necessary reliefs to the employees.        Mr.  Aggarwala, learned counsel appearing for the  appellant        in  the  first two appeals, raised before us  the  following        points: (1) No service rendered by the Corporation would  be        an industry as defined by s. 2(14) of the Act. (2)  Assuming        that   some   of  the  services  of  the   Corporation   are        comprehended  by the definition of " industry " in the  Act,        the said services, in order to satisfy the definition,  must

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      ’be  analogous to a business or trade. (3)  Even  otherwise,        the activities of the Corporation to be called industry must        partake the common characteristics of an industry. (4)  The,        finding  of  the Industrial Court holding that  the  various        departments  of  the  Corporation  are  industries  is   not        correct, as the services rendered by the said departments do        not satisfy either of the aforesaid two tests.        The  first question need not detain us, for it has now  been        finally  decided by two decisions of this Court against  the        appellant.   In D.  N. Banerji v. P. R. Mukherjee  (1),  the        chairman  of a municipality dismissed two of its  employees,        namely,  the Sanitary Inspector and the Head Clerk, and  the        Municipal  Workers’  Union questioned the propriety  of  the        dismissal and claimed that they should be reinstated and the        matter  was  referred by the Government  to  the  Industrial        Tribunal for adjudication under the Industrial Disputes Act.        In that case two questions were raised before this Court-one        was  whether the said dispute was industrial dispute  within        the        948             meaning  of s. 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act  and        the  other  was  whether the  Industrial  Disputes  Act  was        invalid  inasmuch  as it allowed the Tribunal  to  reinstate        employees and to that extent trenched on the  power   of        the  chairman to appoint and dismiss employees.  This  Court        held that the Act was not invalid, as it was in pith and        substance a law in respect of industrial and labour disputes        and   that   the  conservancy  service   rendered   by   the        municipality  was  an industry and the dispute  between  the        municipality and the employees of the conservancy department        was  an  industrial  dispute  within  the  meaning  of   the        Industrial Disputes Act.  This decision was followed by this        Court in Baroda Borough Municipality v. Its Workmen (1).  In        that case the effect of the earlier decision was  summarized        thus, at p. 38:        " It is now finally settled by the decision of this Court in        D.  N.  Banerji  v. P. R. Mukherjee  (2)  that  a  municipal        undertaking  of the nature we have under consideration  here        is  an " industry " within the meaning of the definition  of        that  word in s. 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act,  1947,        and  that the expression " industrial dispute " in that  Act        includes disputes between municipalities and their employees        in branches of work that can be regarded as analogous to the        carrying on of a trade or business."        In  that  case  the  workmen  employed  in  the  electricity        department  of the Baroda Municipality demanded bonus.   The        electricity undertaking of the Baroda Municipality was  held        to  be an industry and the dispute between the  Municipality        and its employees an industrial dispute.  Bonus was  refused        on  other grounds and we are not concerned with that  aspect        of the case here.  These two cases, therefore, have  finally        and  authoritatively held that municipal undertakings  could        be  "  industry  "  within the  meaning  of  the  Industrial        Disputes Act.        A  faint  argument  is attempted to  sustain  a  distinction        between  the definition of an "industry" in  the  Industrial        Disputes Act and the definition of the same word in the  Act        in question.  Section 2(j) of the        (1) [1957] S.C.R. 33.        (2) [1953] S.C.R. 302        949        Industrial  Disputes  Act defines " industry " to  mean  any        business,  trade,  undertaking, manufacture  or  calling  of        employers  and to include any calling  service,  employment,        handicraft, or industrial occupation or avocation of workmen

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      ".  Section  2(14) of the Act divides  the  definition  into        three   parts,   namely,   "  (a)   any   business,   trade,        manufacturing or mining undertaking or calling of employers,        (b)   any  calling,  service,  employment,   handicraft   or        industrial occupation or avocation of employees, and (c) any        branch  of  an  industry  or  a  group  of  industries."   A        comparative  study  of  these two sections  brings  out  the        following differences: While the definition of " industry  "        in  the  Industrial Disputes Act means  certain  things  and        includes  others, the definition of " industry " in the  Act        includes  the three categories described therein; while  the        definition  in  the  former Act places  ’undertaking’  in  a        category different from ’ manufacturing or mining ’ , in the        latter  Act it is qualified by the words  ’manufacturing  or        mining’.  In our view these differences do not justify us in        taking a different view from that accepted by this Court  in        the  foregoing  decisions.   Clause (a)  of  the  definition        defines industry with reference to the employers and cl. (b)        with  reference  to  the  employees.   Excluding  the  words        "manufacturing  or mining undertaking " from cl. (a) of  the        definition, the other words in cls. (a) and (b) thereof  are        comprehensive enough to take in all the categories which the        definition of "industry" in the Industrial Disputes Act will        take  in.   That apart, a perusal of the  decision  of  this        Court  in  D.  N. Banerji v. P. R. Mukherjee  (1)  does  not        indicate  that  this Court would have come  to  a  different        conclusion  if  the word " undertaking " in  the  Industrial        Disputes  Act was qualified by the words " manufacturing  or        mining  ".  The  decision was founded on  a  broader  basis,        having regard to the history of the legislation, the cognate        definitions  in  the  Act  and the  inclusive  part  of  the        definition  corresponding  to s. 2(14)(b) of the  Act.   We,        therefore, hold that a service rendered by a corporation, if        it complies with the conditions implicit in the  definition-        which we would consider at a later stage        (1)  [1953] S.C.R. 302        950             of  the  judgment-will  bean "  industry  "  within  th        meaning of the definition in the Act.                The  next  question  is  whether   activity   of the        Corporation is not " industry " unless it shares the common        characteristics   of  an  industry.   The   following   five        characteristics are stated to be the conditions implicit  in        the definition: (i) the activity must concern the production        or  distribution  of good or services; (ii) it  must  be  to        serve  others but not to oneself; (iii) it must involve  co-        operative  effort  between  employer  and  employer  between        capital  an  labour; (iv) it must be done  as  a  commercial        transaction  and  (v)  it must not be in  exercise  of  pure        governmental functions.        We  have  considered this aspect in State of Bombay  v.  The        Hospital Maazdoor Sabha (1) in the context of the definition        of  "  industry  "  in  the  Industrial  Disputes  Act   and        formulated  certain broad principles.  But as this  case  is        concerned  with the definition of "industry" in a  different        Act,  we shall briefly resurvey the law on the subject  with        specific reference to a corporation.        Let  us  scrutinize  the  definition  of  "  industry  "  to        ascertain whether all or some of the conditions are implicit        in the definition and whether the said conditions constitute        the necessary basis for it.  The true meaning of the section        must  be  gathered  from  the  expressed  intention  of  the        Legislature.  Maxwell in his book "On the Interpretation  of        Statutes",  10th Edn., rightly points out at p. 2 that "  If        the  words  of  the statute are in  themselves  precise  and

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      unambiguous  no  more is necessary than  to  expound  those,        words  in  their  natural  and  ordinary  sense,  the  words        themselves in such case best declaring the intention of  the        legislature  ". The words used in the section are clear  and        unambiguous  and they prima facie are of the widest  import.        We  have pointed out that the section is in two  parts:  cl.        (a) defines " industry " with reference to employers and cl.        (b)  defines  it with reference to  employees.        Clause        (c)  extends the definition to any branch of an industry  or        a  group of industries, i.e., industries Coming  within  the        definition of cls. (a) and (b).  It is said that in        (1)[1960] 2 S.C.R. 866.        951        construing  the  definition  we  must  adopt  the  rule   of        construction  noscuntur  a sociis.   Maxwell  explains  this        doctrine at p. 332 thus:        " When two or more words which are susceptible of  analogous        meaning are coupled together noscuntur  a sociis.   They are        understood to be used in their cognate sense.  They take, as        it  were,  their colour from each other, that is,  the  more        general  is  restricted  to a sense analogous  to  the  less        general."  On the basis of this doctrine, it is argued  that        the  words  following  the  words  "  any  business,  trade,        manufacturing  or  mining undertaking "  shall  partake  the        characteristics  of  any business, trade,  manufacturing  or        mining  undertaking, and the words " any  calling,  service,        employment, handicraft or industrial occupation or avocation        of  employees " shall share the qualities of  an  industrial        occupation or avocation.  In other words, the general word "        calling  " in cl. (a) is controlled by the  words  preceding        it,  and the general words " calling, service etc."  in  cl.        (b)  are  restricted by the succeeding  words  "  industrial        occupation  or avocation ". This doctrine was dealt with  by        this Court in State of Bombay v. The Hospital Mazdoor  Sabha        (1).   Therein this Court has considered the scope  of  this        doctrine and has observed thus:        " It must be borne in mind that noscuntur a sociis is merely        a rule of construction and it cannot prevail in cases  where        it is clear that the wider words have been deliberately used        in   order   to  make  the  scope  of   the   defined   word        correspondingly  wider.  It is only where the  intention  of        the  Legislature  in associating wider words with  words  of        narrower  significance is doubtful that the present rule  of        construction  can  be  usefully applied.   It  can  also  be        applied  where the meaning of the words of wider  import  is        doubtful;  but where the object of the Legislature in  using        wider  words  is clear and free of ambiguity,  the  rule  of        construction in question cannot be pressed into service.        The  said  doctrine, therefore, cannot be invoked  in  cases        where the intention of the Legislature is clear and free  of        ambiguity.  The phraseology used in the        (1)  [1960] 2 S.C.R. 866        952             section is very clear and it is not susceptible of  any        ambiguity.  The words used in the first part of cl. (b) are        unqualified; and the qualification is introduced only in the        later   part.    If   the   words   "   calling,    service,        employment, handicraft " are really intended to be qualified        by the adjective " industrial ", one should expect      the        Legislature  to  affix  the adjective to the  first  word  "        calling  " rather than to the last word " occupations."  The        inclusive  definition is a wellrecognized device to  enlarge        the meaning of the word defined, and, therefore, the word  ,        "industry " must be construed as comprehending not only such        things  as it signifies according to its natural import  but

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      also  those  things the definition declares that  it  should        include: see Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary, Vol. 2, p.  1416.        So  construed,  every  calling, service,  employment  of  an        employee  or any business, trade or calling of  an  employer        will  be  an industry.  But such a wide meaning  appears  to        overreach the objects for which the Act was passed.  It  is,        therefore,  necessary  to  limit its  scope  on  permissible        grounds , having regard to the aim, scope and the object  of        the whole Act.  To arrive at the real meaning of the  words,        Lord  Coke  in Heydon’s case, (1) says  that  the  following        matters  are to be considered: (1) What was the  law  before        the Act was passed ; (2) What was the mischief or defect for        which  the law had not provided; (3) What remedy  Parliament        hap, appointed; and (4) The reason of the, remedy.  The word        "  employers " in el. (a) and the word " employees " in  cl.        (b) indicate that the fundamental basis for the  application        of  the  definition is the existence of  that  relationship.        The cognate definitions of "industrial dispute", "employer",        " employee ", also support it.  The long title of the Act as        well  as its preamble show that the Act was passed  to  make        provision  for the promotion of industries and peaceful  and        amicable  settlement  of  disputes  between  employers   and        employees  in  an  organized activity  by  conciliation  and        arbitration and for certain other purposes.  If the preamble        is  read with the historical background for the  passing  of        the Act, it is manifest that the Act was introduced as an        (1)[1584] 3 Rep. 7 b.        953        important  step in achieving social justice.  The Act  seeks        to  ameliorate  the service conditions of  the  workers,  to        provide  a  machinery for resolving their conflicts  and  to        encourage   co-operative  effort  in  the  service  of   the        community.   The  history  of  labour  legislation  both  in        England and India also shows that        it was aimed more to ameliorate the conditions of service of        the  labour in organized activities than to  anything  else.        The  Act  was not intended to reach  the  personal  services        which do not depend upon the employment of a labour force.        Before  considering the positive aspects of the  definition,        what is not an industry may be considered.  However wide the        definition  of  " industry " may be, it cannot  include  the        regal  or sovereign functions of State.  This is the  agreed        basis  of  the  arguments at the  Bar,  though  the  learned        counsel differed on the ambit of such functions.  While  the        learned  counsel for the Corporation would like  to  enlarge        the  scope  of these functions so as to comprehend  all  the        welfare  activities of a modern State, the  learned  counsel        for  the respondents would seek to confine them to what  are        aptly  termed " the primary and inalienable functions  of  a        constitutional  government  ". It is said that in  a  modern        State  the  sovereign  power extends to  all  the  statutory        functions of the State except to the business of trading and        industrial  transactions  undertaken  by it  in  its  quasi-        private  personality.   Sustenance for  this  contention  is        sought to be drawn from Holland’s Jurisprudence, wherein the        learned  author  divides the general heading "Public  Law  "        into  four sab-heads and under the sub-head  "Administrative        Law  " he deals with a variety of topics  including  welfare        and  social  activities of a State.  The  treatment  of  the        subject " Public Law " by Holland and other authors, in  our        view,  has  no relevancy in appreciating the  scope  of  the        concept  of  regal  powers-which have  acquired  a  definite        connotation.   Lord Watson, in Coomber v. Justices of  Berks        (1),  describes  the  functions such  as  administration  of        justice,  maintenance of order and repression of  crime,  as

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      among   the   primary  and  inalienable   functions   of   a        constitutional Govern-        (1)(1883-84) 9 App.  Cas, 61, 74        954        ment.   Isaacs,  J.,  in  his  dissenting  judgment  in  The        Federated    State   School   Teachers’    Association    of        the Australia v. The State of Victoria (1), concisely states        thus at p. 585 -                  Regal  functions are inescapable and  inalienable.        Such are the legislative power, the administration of  laws,        the exercise of the judicial power.  Non-regal functions may        be assumed by means of the legislative power.  But when they        are  assumed the State .acts simply as a  huge  corporation,        with  its legislation as the charter.  Its action under  the        legislation, so far as it is not regal execution of the  law        is  merely analogous to that of a private company  similarly        authorised.  "        These  words  clearly  mark  out  the  ambit  of  the  regal        functions as distinguished from the other powers of a State.        It  could not have been, therefore, in the contemplation  of        the Legislature to bring in the regal functions of the State        within   the   definition  of  industry  and   thus   confer        jurisdiction  on  Industrial Courts to  decide  disputes  in        respect thereof.  We, therefore, exclude the regal functions        of a State from the definition of industry.        This leads us to the question whether the Corporation can be        said to exercise regal functions by legislative  delegation.        The  Corporation functions under a statute and  its  powers,        duties  and  liabilities  are  regulated by  it.   It  is  a        juristic person and it can sue and be sued in its name.  The        statute  constituting  it may confer upon it  some  strictly        regal  functions and other municipal functions.   In  County        Council of Middlesex v. Assessment Committee of St. George’s        Union (2), certain premises were used for the administration        of  justice and also for municipal purposes.   The  question        raised  was whether the said premises were rateable and  the        Court  held that they were rateable in so far as  they  were        occupied for municipal purposes and not rateable in so fares        they were occupied for the administration of justice,  which        was held to be a function of the Crown.  So too, the Supreme        Court of America in Verisimo Vasquez Vilas        (1) (1929) 41 C.L.R. 569.        (2) (1896) 2 Q.B.D. 143.        955        v.  City  of Manila (1) expounded the dual  character  of  a        municipal corporation thus:        "  They  exercise powers which are governmental  and  powers        which  are of a private or business character.  In  the  one        character  a  municipal corporation is a  governmental  sub-        division,  and  for that purpose exercises by  delegation  a        part  of  the  sovereignty  of  the  State.   In  the  other        character it is a mere legal entity or juristic person.   In        the  latter  character it stands for the  community  in  the        administration of local affairs wholly beyond the sphere  of        the  public purposes for which its governmental  powers  are        conferred.  "        Isaacs  and Rich, JJ., in The Federated Municipal and  Shire        Council   Employees’   Union  of  Australia   v.   Melbourne        Corporation  (2)  in the context of the  dual  functions  of        State say much to the same effect at p. 530:        "  Here  we  have the discrimen of Crown  exemption.   If  a        municipality either (1) is legally empowered to perform  and        does perform any function whatever for the Crown., or (2) is        lawfully empowered to perform and does perform any  function        which  constitutionally is inalienably a Crown  function-as,

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      for instance, the administration of justice the municipality        is in law presumed to represent the Crown, and the exemption        applies.   Otherwise, it is outside that exemption, and,  if        impliedly  exempted  at all, some other  principle  must  be        resorted  to.  The making and maintenance of streets in  the        municipality is not within either proposition."        A corporation may, therefore, discharge a dual function : it        may  be statutorily entrusted with regal functions  strictly        so-called, such as making of laws, disposal of certain cases        judicially  etc.,  and also with other  welfare  activities.        The  former,  being  delegated  regal  functions,  must   be        excluded from the ambit of the definition of "industry".        The next head of exclusion from the definition is put by the        learned  counsel for the appellant thus : A municipality  in        the modern polity is also a trading        (1)  220 U.S. 345. 356; 55 L. Ed. 491, 495.        (2)  (1918-19),26 C.L.R. 508, 530-531.        956        and industrial corporation and in that capacity is empowered        to carry on undertakings partaking the Character         of        business and trade, and that the definition of "industry" in        the Act only takes in such undertakings   and  no   other        statutory   activities.   To  state  it   differently,   the        contention is that activities which partake the character of        trade  and  business in the hands of  a  private  individual        would  be an industry if undertaken by a corporation.   Some        observations  made by this Court in D. N. Banerji v.  P.  R.        Mukherjee (1) are relied upon in support of this contention.        Chandrasekbara  Aiyar, J., speaking for the Court  made  the        following observations at p. 317:        "Having regard to the definitions found in our Act, the  aim        or  objective  that  the Legislature had  in  view  and  the        nature,  variety  and range of disputes that  occur  between        employees  and  employees, we are forced to  the  conclusion        that  the definitions in our Act include also disputes  that        might  arise between municipalities and their  employees  in        branches  of  work that can be said to be analogous  to  the        carrying out of a trade or business."        Emphasis is laid upon the words " analogous to the  carrying        out  of a trade or business" and an argument is  built  upon        those  words  to the effect that this Court held  that  only        such  activities  of municipalities analogous  to  trade  or        business  would  be  industry  within  the  meaning  of  the        definition  of "industry" in the Act.  This argument, if  we        may  say  so, is the result of an incorrect reading  of  the        decision.   There  the  question was  whether  the  sanitary        department  of  a municipality was an  industry  within  the        meaning  of  the  Industrial Disputes Act  and  whether  the        dispute  between the municipality and its employees in  that        department was an industrial dispute thereunder.  At p. 311,        the learned Judge specifically deals with a contention based        upon  the  collocation  of  the words  in  the  section  and        observes :        "Though   the  word  "undertaking"  in  the  definition   of        "industry"  is wedged in between business and trade  on  the        one hand and manufacture on the other, and though  therefore        it might mean only a business or trade undertaking, still it        must be        (1) [1953] S.C.R. 302                                957        remembered  that if that were so, there wag no need  to  use        the  word  separately  from business or  trade.   The  wider        import  is attracted even more clearly when we look  at  the        latter part of the definition which   refers  to   "calling,        service, employment, or  industrial occupation or  avocation

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      of workmen."   "Undertaking"  in  the  first  part  of   the        definition  and "industrial occupation. or avocation" in the        second part obviously mean much more than what is ordinarily        understood   by  trade  or  business.  The  definition   was        apparently-intended  to include within its scope what  might        Dot strictly be called a trade     or business venture."        This  passage  leaves  no room for  doubt  that  this  Court        construed the terms of the definition of "industry" in a way        which takes in activities which are not strictly      called        trade or business. Therefore the words "not  strictly     be        called a trade or business venture" and the words "analogous        to the carrying out, of a trade or business" emphasize  more        the nature of the organised activity implicit in a trade  or        business  than to equate the other activities with trade  or        business. This is made more clear by the learned Judge  when        be  expressly  reserves  the  Court’s  opinion  on  a  wider        question   in  the  following  words  at  p.  318:        "It is  unnecessary to decide whether disputes    arising in        relation to purely administrative work  fall  within   their        ambit."        We  cannot,  therefore, agree with the contention  that  the        said decision, when it expressly accepted the  comprehensive        meaning  which  the  words of the  section  naturally  bear,        intended to circumscribe the wide  sweep  of the section  to        business  or trade and activities in the nature of trade  or        business. Nor a fair reading  of the section bears out  such        a construction. We have  already  indicated our view on  the        construction  of  the section, having regard  to  the  clear        phraseology  used  therein,  that  the  section  cannot   be        confined  to  trade or business or activities  analogous  to        trade or business.        A more workable and reasonable test is laid down  in      an        Australian decision cited at the Bar, and that test has also        been  accepted  and  applied by  this  Court.  In  Federated        Engine-Drivers and Firemen’s Association        958             of   Australia,  and  Others  v.  The   Broken.    Hill        Proprietory Company Limited and Others (1) a distinction was        drawn  between trading and non-trading operations,  but  the        question as to how far non-trading operations attracted  the        definition of "industry" was left undecided.  That  question        fell  to  be decided in The   Municipal  and  Shire  Council        Employees’  Union of Australia v. Melboure Corporation (2  )        and  that  decision, if we may say so, is  illuminating  and        throws  considerable light on the question to be decided  in        the  present  appeal.   It was held by  the  High  Court  of        Australia  that the Commonwealth Court of  Conciliation  and        Arbitration  had authority to determine by award  a  dispute        between   an   organization  of  employees   registered   in        connection  with  "municipal and shire  councils,  municipal        trusts  and similar industries", and municipal  corporations        constituted  under State laws. The dispute there related  to        those  operations of municipal corporations which  consisted        of  the making, maintenance, control and lighting of  public        streets. The learned Judges discussed at length the  meaning        of  the  word  "industrial dispute" in s.  51  (XXXV)  ofthe        Constitution  of  Australia.   It  is  manifest  from   this        decision that even activities of a municipality which cannot        be described as trading activities can be the subject-matter        of  an  industrial dispute.  Isaacs,  J.,in  his  dissenting        judgment in The Federated State School Teachers’ Association        of  Australia  v. The State of Victoria (3),  has  concisely        expressed this idea at p. 587 thus:        "The material question is: What is the nature of the  actual        function  assumed is it a service that the State could  have

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      left to private enterprise, and, if so fulfilled, could such        a  depute be "industrial" ?" This test steers clear  of  the        argument  that  to be an industry the activity  shall  be  a        trading  activity.  If a service performed by an  individual        is  an industry, it will continue to be  so  notwithstanding        the fact that it is undertaken by a corporation.        Another  test  suggested  by  the  learned  counsel  may  be        scrutinized.  It is said that unless there is a        (1) (1913) 16 C.L.R. 245.  (2) (1918-19) 26 C.L.R. 508, 530-        531        (3) (1929) 41 C.L.R. 569             959        quid pro quo for the service, it cannot be an industry. This        is  the same argument, namely, that the service must  be  in        -the nature of trade in a different garb.  This Court  in D.        N. Banerji v. P. B. Mukherjee (1) has held that neither  the        investment  of  capital or the   existence  of profitearning        motive seems to beta sine     qua  non or necessary  element        in  the modern conception of industry. The  conception  that        unless  the public who are benefited by the services pay  in        cash  for  the services rendered to them,  the  services  so        rendered cannot be industry is based upon an exploded  theory.        As observed by  Chandrasekhara Aiyar, J.,    "the  conflicts        between  capital and labour have now to be  determined  more        from  the standpoint of status than of contract". Isaac  and        Rich, JJ., in The Fede   rated  Municipal and Shire  Council        Employees’ Union    of  Australia v.  Melbourne  Corporation        (2) formulated the  modern  concept  of industry at  p.  554        thus:        " Industrial disputes occur when, in relation to  operations        in which capital and labour are contributed in  co-operation        for  the  satisfaction  of human  wants  or  desires,  those        engaged in co-operation  dispute  as  to  the  basis  to  be        observed, by the    parties  engaged,  respecting  either  a        share  of the product or any other terms and  conditions  of        their     cooperation.        The learned Judges proceeded to state at p. 564:        " The question of profit-making maybe important   from    an        income  tax  point of view, as in many  municipal  cases  in        England; but, from an industrial   dispute point of view, it        cannot matter whether the     expenditure  is met  by  fares        from passengers or  from    rates.   In   each   case    the        ’municipality is performing a function; and in the one  case        it performs it with a variation in contrast with the  other.        Isaac,  J., elaborated the theme in his dissenting  judgment        in The Federated State School Teachers’ Association       of        Australia v. The State of Victoria (3) at    p. 577 thus:             " The contention sounds like an echo from the dark ages        of  industry  and  political  economy...............    Such        disputes  are not simply a claim to share        (1) [1953] S.C.R. 302  (2) [1918-19] 26 C.L.R. 508, 539-531.        122               (3) [1929] 41 C.L.R. 569.        960          the  material  wealth  jointly  produced  and  capable  of        registration  in statistics.  At heart they are a  struggle,        constantly becoming more intense on the part of the employed        group engaged in co-operation      with the employing  group        in  rendering  services  to the community  essential  for  a        higher general      human welfare, to share in that  welfare        in a greater degree.  All industrial enterprises  contribute        more  or less to the general welfare of the  community,  and        this  is  a  most material consideration  when  we  come  to        determine  the  present question apart from  the  particular        contention raised at the Bar.        Monetary  considerations for service is, therefore,  not  an

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      essential characteristic of industry in a modern State.        The learned counsel then sought to demarcate the  activities        of  a  municipality into three categories, namely,  (i)  the        activities  of the department which performs  the  services;        (ii)  those  of  the department  which  only  impose  taxes,        collect  them  and administer them; and (iii) those  of  the        departments  which  are purely in administrative  charge  of        other departments.  We do not see any justification for this        artificial  division of municipal activities.   Barring  the        regal functions of a municipality, if such other  activities        of  it, if undertaken by an individual, would  be  industry;        then  they  would  equally be industry in  the  hands  of  a        municipality.   It  would  be unrealistic  to  draw  a  line        between  a  department  doing a  service  and  a  department        controlling   or   feeding  it.   Supervision   and   actual        ,performance  of  service  are integral  part  of  the  same        activity.  In other words, whether these three functions are        carried  out  by  one department or  divided  between  three        departments, the entire organizational activity would be  an        industry.   This  aspect of the  question  was  incidentally        touched upon by this Court in Baroda Borough Municipality v.        Its Workmen and the following passage at p. 49 reads thus:        " We have already pointed out that under the Municipal Act a        municipality may perform various functions, some  obligatory        and some discretional.  The activities may be of a composite        nature,: some        (1)  [1957] S.C.R. 33                                   961        of  the  departments may be mostly earning  departments  and        some   mostly   spending  departments.  For   example,   the        department which collects municipal taxes or other municipal        revenue,  is essentially an earning department  whereas  the        sanitary   department   or  other  service   department   is        essentially  a  spending  department. There  may  indeed  be        departments  where  the earning and  spending  may    almost        balance  each  other."         We   have   extracted  this  passage   only   because   the        observations are apposite to the discussion on hand but  not        to express our concurrence with the conclusion drawn in that        case.  The question of bonus does not fall to be  considered        in the present appeal. These  observations  and  support  to        our view that integrated activities of a municipality cannot        be  separated  to  take in some under the  definition  of  "        industry " and      exclude others from it.        We  can  also visualize different situations.  A  particular        activity of a municipality may be covered by the  definition        of   "industry".   If  the  financial   and   administrative        departments are solely in charge of that activity, there can        be no difficulty in treating  those two departments also  as        part of the industry. But there may be cases where the  said        two  departments may not only be in charge of  a  particular        activity or service covered by the definition of  "industry"        but  also in charge of other activity or activities  falling        outside the definition of "industry".In such cases a working        rule may be evolved to   advance  social justice  consistent        with the principles of equity. In such cases the solution to        the problem depends upon the answer to the question  whether        such a department is primarily and predominantly  concerned        with   industrial   activity   or   incidentally   connected        therewith.        The result of the discussion may be summarized thus: (1) The        definition of " industry " in the Act is very comprehensive,        It is in two parts: one part  defines it from the standpoint        of  the  employer and the other from the standpoint  of  the        employee. If   an  activity falls under either part  of  the

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      definition, it will be an industry within the meaning of the        Act.        962             (2) The history of industrial disputes and the legisla-        tion recognizes the basic concept that the activity    shall        be  an organized one and not that which pertains to  private        or personal employment. (3) The regal   functions  described        as  primary  and  inalienable  functions  of  State   though        statutorily delegated to      corporation  are   necessarily        excluded  from  the purview of the definition.   Such  regal        functions   shall   be  confined   to   legislative   power,        administration  of law and judicial power. (4) If a  service        rendered  by an individual or a private person would  be  an        industry, it would equally be an industry in the hands of  a        corporation.  (5) If a service rendered by a corporation  is        an industry, the employees in the departments connected with        that service, whether financial administrative or executive,        would  be  entitled  to the benefits of the Act.  (6)  If  a        department of a municipality discharges many functions, some        pertaining to industry as defined in the Act and other  non-        industrial  activities,  the predominant  functions  of  the        department  shall be the criterion for the purposes  of  the        Act.        The following are the various departments of the Nagpur City        Corporation:  (1)  General  Administration  Department;  (2)        Octroi Department; (3) Tax Department; (4) Public Conveyance        Department;  (5)  Fire  Brigade  Department;  (6)   Lighting        Department;  (7) Water Works Department; (8)  City  Engineer        Department; (9) Enforcement (encroachment) Department:  (10)        Sewage   Pumping  Station  Department;  (11)   Sewage   Farm        Department; (12) Health Department; (13) Market  Department;        (14)  Cattle Pound Department; (15) Public  Gardens  Depart-        ment;   (16)  Public  Works  Department;   (17)   Assessment        Department;   (18)   Estate   Department;   (19)   Education        Department;  (20) Printing Press Department;  (21)  Workshop        Department;  and  (22) Building Department.   Out  of  these        departments,  the State Industrial Court has held  that  all        the  departments except those pertaining to  (i)  assessment        and  levy of house-tax, (ii) assessment and levy of  octroi,        (iii)   removal   of  encroachment  and  pulling   down   of        dilapidated houses, (iv) maintenance of cattle pounds,                                     963        and  (v)  prevention and control of food  adulteration,  are        industries.  Even  in regard to the departments    which the        State Industrial Tribunal held to be    industries it denied        relief to persons who are not covered by the definition of "        employees " in the Act.  As the employees have not preferred        any  appeal against the award in so far as it  went  against        them,     nothing  further  need be said in  regard  to  the        aforesaid five departments.        Before we consider whether all or any of the departments  of        the  Corporation fall within the definition of " industry  "        in  the Act, it will be convenient to notice the  scheme  of        the City of Nagpur Corporation Act, 1948 (Madhya Pradesh Act        No. 2 of 1950).     Section  7 makes the Corporation a  body        corporate  with  perpetual  succession and  a  common  seal.        Section   6 describes the municipal authorities charged with        the execution of the Act and they are: (a) the  Corporation;        (b) the Standing Committee; and (c) the      Chief Executive        Officer. Chapter II of Part II     contains  the   aforesaid        sections and it further provides   for  the constitution  of        the Corporation and the mode  of election to the said  body.        Chapter III of the said  Part  prescribes the procedure  for        the  conduct  of business of the  Corporation.   Chapter  IV        thereof  provides for the appointment of municipal  officers

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      and servants and for their punishment and removal.   Chapter        V  deals with powers, duties and functions of the  municipal        authorities;  it  gives  the  obligatory  and  discretionary        duties  of  the Corporation.  Under s. 57,  the  Corporation        shall  make  adequate provision, by any  means  or  measures        which  it  may lawfully use or take, such  as  for  lighting        public  streets,  cleaning  of  public  streets,disposal  of        nightsoil and rubbish, maintenance of firebrigade and  other        welfare  activities in the interest of the public.   Section        58  confers  a  discretionary power on  the  Corporation  to        provide for other amenities not covered by s. 57, and  which        are comparatively not absolutely essential but are necessary        for the happiness of the people of the State.  Provisions of        Ch.   VI  enable  the  municipality  to  hold  and   acquire        properties, to manage public institutions maintained out  of        municipal funds.  Section 79 enjoins on the        964             municipality  to  apply the fund available with  it  to        discharge   its  statutory  duties  and  pay  salaries   and        allowances of its various servants.  Chapter IX enables  the        municipality   to  raise  loans  on  the  security  of   its        properties for discharging debts and for meeting the capital        expenditure.   Part IV empowers the municipality  to  impose        taxes  for the purposes of this Act and also  describes  the        procedure for collecting the same. Part V confers powers and        imposes  duties  on  the Corporation  and  its  officers  in        respect of public health, safety and convenience.  This Part        deals   with   public  convenience,  drains   and   privies,        conservancy, sanitary provisions, water supply and drainage,        regulation  of factories and trades, markets  and  slaughter        places, food, drink, drug and dangerous articles, prevention        of  infectious diseases and disposal of the dead.   Part  VI        empowers the Corporation to draw up townplanning schemes, to        regulate  erection  and re-erection of buildings,  to  close        public  streets,  to  remove  obstruction  in  streets,   to        regulate laying of new streets, to dispose of mad and  stray        dogs,  to control public begging, to prohibit brothels  etc.        Part  VIII lays down the general provisions for carrying  on        the   municipal   administration  and  also   enabling   the        Corporation to make by-laws for carrying out the  provisions        and intentions of the Act.  Shortly stated, the Act  creates        the  Corporation  a juristic person capable of  holding  and        disposing  of  property, confers power on it to  impose  and        collect  taxes and licence fees, to borrow money, to  decide        disputes   in  the  first  instance  in   respect   thereof,        constitutes  the  amounts so collected as the  fund  of  the        municipality  from and out of which the liabilities  of  the        Corporation  are met and the salaries of its  employees  are        paid,  imposed  on it duties to carry  out  various  welfare        activities  in  the interest of the public,  confers  on  it        powers  for,  implementing their duties  satisfactorily  and        also  powers  to  make by-laws for  regulating  its  various        functions.   In short, a corporation is analogous to  a  big        public company carrying out most of the duties which such  a        company can undertake to do with the difference that certain        statutory powers have been conferred on the corporation  for        carrying out its functions more satisfactorily.                                965        With this background let us take each of the departments  of        the  Corporation held by the State   Industrial  Court to be        governed by the Act.        (i)  Tax  Department: The main functions of this  department        are the imposition and collection of conservancy, water  and        property taxes.  No separate staff has been employed for the        assessment  and levy of property taxes: the same staff  does

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      the  work connected with assessment and collection of  water        rates as well as scavenging taxes.  It is not disputed  that        the work of assessment and levy of water rate and scavenging        rate  for  private latrines is far heavier  than  the  other        works  entrusted  to this department.  No attempt  has  been        made  to  allocate  specific proportion  of  the  staff  for        different functions.  We, therefore, must accept the finding        of  the  State  Industrial  Court that  the  staff  of  this        department doing clerical or manual work predominantly  does        the work connected with scavening taxes and water rate.  The        said  rates  are  really intended as fees  for  the  service        rendered.   The services, namely, scavenging and  supply  of        water,  can  equally be undertaken by a private firm  or  an        individual  for remuneration and the fact that  the  munici-        pality  does the same duty does not make it any the  less  a        service  coming  under  the definition  of  "industry".   We        would,  however, prefer to sustain the finding on a  broader        basis.   There cannot be a distinction between property  tax        and  other  taxes  collected by  the  municipality  for  the        purpose of designating the tax department as an industry  or        otherwise.  The scheme of the Corporation Act is that  taxes        and  fees are collected in order to enable the  municipality        to  discharge its statutory functions.  If the functions  so        discharged  are  wholly  or  predominantly  covered  by  the        definition of " industry ", it would be illogical to exclude        the  tax department from the definition.  While in the  case        of private individuals or firms services are paid in cash or        otherwise,  in  the  case of  public  institutions,  as  the        services  are  rendered to the public, the  taxes  collected        from  them constitute a fund for performing those  services.        As  most of the services rendered by the  municipality  come        under the definition of industry ", we should hold that  the        employees of the        966             tax department are also entitled to the benefits  under        the Act.        (ii) Public Conveyance Department: This is a tax which is  a        wheel-cum-road  tax.   Conveyance  department  is  meant  to        regulate the using of cycles, rickshaws, bullock-carts  etc.        This  department recovers registration fees  for  rickshaws,        licence  fee  from  rickshaw  drivers  and  wheel  tax  from        bullock-carts.   It also recovers cycle tax on  every  cycle        used in Corporation limits. (See the evidence of Witness  No        1  for Party No. 1).  These taxes are therefore really  fees        collected  by the Corporation for the services  rendered  to        the  owners  of  cycles  and other  conveyances  by  way  of        maintenance  and construction of roads.  These services  can        equally  be performed by a private individual or a firm  for        remuneration.  It satisfies the tests laid down by us.  This        department, therefore, is ’an industry within the meaning of        the definition in the Act.        (iii)  Fire  Brigade  Department: Ex.  N. A.  22  gives  the        duties   of  the  driver-cum-fitter  of  the  Fire   Brigade        Department.   This  exhibit indicates that the  function  of        this  department is to attend to fire calls.  Witness No.  3        for Party No. 1 says that it is the duty of the  firebrigade        to  supply  water  at marriage functions  and  other  public        functions.  The firebrigade employees are not paid any extra        amount  for supplying water at public or private  functions.        Though the department renders some extra services, the  main        function  of the department is to attend to "  fire  calls".        Private bodies also can undertake this service.  It is  said        that  under  s. 333 of the City of  Nagpur  Corporation  Act        powers  are  conferred on specified officers  to  remove  or        order  the  removal  of any person who  interferes  with  or

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      impedes  the operation for extinguishing the fire, to  close        any street or passage in or near which any fire is  burning,        to  break into or pull down or use for the passage of  hoses        or  other  appliances,  any  premises  for  the  purpose  of        extinguishing  the fire and generally to take such  measures        as  may  appear necessary for the preservation  of  life  or        property, and that the services of the firebrigade cannot be        satisfactorily  rendered  without such powers  and  that  no        private individual        967        can  perform  the  same.  Here ’the  argument  tends  to  be        fallacious as it ignores the distinction between he services        and   the  statutory  powers  conferred  to   satisfactorily        discharge the said services.  A private person or a firm can        equally  do  the  same services  and  nothing  prevents  the        legislature from conferring similar powers on an  individual        or  a firm.  These services also satisfy all the tests  laid        down  by  us and therefore we hold that this  department  is        also an industry.        (iv) Lighting  Department: Lighting Department  looks  after        the arrangements for lighting the streets in the Corporation        area.   There are two systems of lighting  streets,  namely,        (1) by electricity, and (2) by kerosene oil lamps.  Electric        street  lighting  is given on contract to Nagpur  Light  and        Power Co., Nagpur, by the Corporation.  Kerosene oil  street        lighting is done departmentally by the lighting  department.        Electric  Light  and  Power  Co.,  is  responsible  to   the        Corporation  for street lighting.  The said Company  has  to        fix  electric lights according to the programme given to  it        by the Corporation.  The burning hours are also fixed by the        Corporation.  The Corporation does not charge the public for        street  lighting.  (See the evidence of Witness  No.  5  for        Party No. 1).  We have already indicated that quid pro  coin        the  shape  of  payment of  money  for  particular  services        rendered is not a necessary condition for the application of        the definition of "industry ". The services rendered by  the        department  satisfy the terms of the definition.  They  also        satisfy  both the positive and negative tests laid  down  by        us.   We, therefore, hold that this department is an  indus-        try.        (v)  Water Works Department: This department maintains three        head-works,  Kanhan,  Gorewara,  and  Ambazeri.   There  are        pumping  stations  at Kanhan and Gorewara.  At  the  pumping        stations  the  water  is filtered and  pumped  into  service        reservoir  at Nagpur.  The Corporation has a separate  staff        at  each pumping station.  It has also a separate staff  for        distribution.   In  addition  it  maintains  an  assessment.        department  to  assess water cess for  the  distribution  of        water. (See the evidence of Witness No. 9 for Party No.  1).        These three branches of the department have an        123        968         administrative   and  an  executive  staff.   Whether   the        services  rendered  by  the department  are  concerned  With        manufacturing process or not, they are certainly covered  by        the wide definition of " industry" in the    Act.  They also        satisfy  both the positive and negative tests laid  down  by        us.  None of them comprises        delegated regal functions        of  State  and they are such that a private  individual  can        equally  undertake to do. We, therefore hold that  the  said        department comes under the definition of "industry".        (vi) City   Engineers  Department:  The  function  of   this        department   is  to  exercise  supervisory  an           ad-        ministrative control over, its subordinate departments.  The        City  Engineer  is  the head of this  department.  (See  the

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      evidence  of Witness No. 5 for Party No. 1).  As we  are  of        the view that the departments subordinate to this department        come  under the definition of "industry",  this  department,        which  has  administrative control  Over  those  subordinate        departments, must be considered a part of those departments.        If so, it follows that this department is also an  industry.        (vii) Enforcement (encroachment) Department: The function of        this  department is to remove encroachment and  unauthorised        constructions and dilapidated houses.  This department is  a        section  of  the  Estate Department. (See  the  evidence  of        Witness  No. 5 for Party No. 1).  It is contended  that  the        functions  of this department are all statutory and that  no        private  individual can perform them.  Statutory powers  are        conferred  on  the Corporation to  remove  encroachment  and        unauthorised  construction  and dilapidated  houses.   These        powers  are  necessary for the Corporation  to  protect  its        properties and to prevent encroachment thereon and to remove        dilapidated houses in the interest of the public.  But if  a        distinction is made between the powers and the nature of the        services  rendered,  it would be obvious that  the  services        rendered are not peculiar to a corporation.  A private  firm        may  undertake to manage the properties of others.  It  will        have to. appoint persons to detect encroachment and to  take        steps  to recover possession of lands encroached upon.   The        only  difference between a firm and a municipal  corporation        is that the corporation        969        can,  in  exercise  of  its  statutory  powers,  remove  the        encroachment,  but it does not prevent the  aggrieved  party        from  going to a civil court to establish his title  to  the        property : but in the case of a firm, it cannot take the law        into  its own hands: it has to get the encroachment  removed        through a court of law.  So far as the nature of the service        is  concerned,  namely,  protecting its  properties  in  the        interest  of  the public from encroachment  and  to  recover        possession  of  the  lands  encroached  upon,  there  is  no        essential  distinction  between  the  said  service  of  the        Corporation  and  a similar service performed by  a  private        firm.   The  service  satisfies not only the  terms  of  the        definition, but also the tests laid down by us.        Even so, it is contended that, the said reasoning cannot  be        invoked   in  the  case  of  the-service  rendered  by   the        municipality  in removing dilapidated houses and it is  said        that  the  said  service  is  rendered  in  exercise  of   a        governmental  function  which a  private  individual  cannot        himself  discharge.   Here  again the  incidental  power  is        confused  with  the  service.  To  illustrate,  a  firm  may        undertake  to remove dilapidated houses and render the  said        service  to those who engage it.  It may not have the  power        to remove dilapidated houses of persons other than those who        employed  its services.  The difference does not in any  way        affect  the’ character of the service.  We, therefore,  hold        that this department is also an industry.        (viii)    Sewage  Department; The sewage pumping station  is        meant  for pumping sewage at the outfall of the  underground        sewers.   The  sewage  is  utilised on  the  land  on  broad        irrigation  system,  and some crops are also  grown  on  the        farm.  (See the evidence of Witness No. 8 for Party No.  1).        In the cross-examination of the said witness it was elicited        that  whatever  sewage  is left after  irrigating  the  farm        maintained   by  the  Corporation  will  be  sold   to   the        neighbouring  farms.  For the said reasons, it must be  held        that this department is also an industry.        (ix) Health   Department:   This  department   looks   after        scavenging, sanitation, control of epidemics control of food

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      adulteration  and running of public  dispensaries.   Private        institutions can also render        970        these  services.   It  is  said that  the  control  of  food        the  adulteration  and  the control of epidemics  cannot  be        done by private individuals and institutions.  We do     not        see why.  There can be private medical units to help in  the        control of food adulteration and in the control of epidemics        for remuneration.  Individuals     may get the food articles        purchased  by  them examined by the medical  unit  and  take        necessary action against guilty merchants.  So too, they can        take advantage of such a unit to prevent epidemics by having        necessary  inoculations  and advice.  This  department  also        satisfies  the  other  tests  laid down by  us,  and  is  an        industry within the meaning of the definition of  "industry"        in the Act.        (x)  Market   Department:   The  function  of   the   Market        Department  is  to issue licences, collect  ground-rent  and        registration  fee and to detect short weights and  measures.        Rents  are  collected for permitting persons  to  enter  the        Corporation  land and transact business thereon.   Detection        of short weights and measures is a service to the people  to        prevent  their  being cheated in the  market.   The  setting        apart of market places, supervision of weights and  measures        are  services rendered to the public and the fees  collected        are  remuneration  for  the services  so  rendered.   ’These        services  can  equally be done by  any  private  individual.        This  department; also satisfies the tests laid down by  us.        We,  therefore,  hold that this department  is  an  industry        within the meaning of the Act.        (xi) Public  Gardens  Department:  The  functions  of   this        department are the maintenance of public parks and  -gardens        and  laying of new gardens and parks; and planting of  trees        on road sides. (See the evidence of Witness No. 5 for  Party        No.  1).   This service is covered by the  definition  of  "        industry"  Any private individual can certainly perform  the        functions  stated above and the fact that  the  municipality        has  undertaken those duties does not affect the  nature  of        the service.  This also satisfies the tests laid down by us.        We, therefore, hold that this Department is an industry.        (Xii)     Public  Works Department : This department  is  in        charge of construction and maintenance of public                                 971        works  such  as roads, drains,  buildings,  markets,  public        latrines  etc.  For  the  convenience  of  the  public  this        department  is  divided into zones and every zone  has   its        office.  The  outdoor  staff  in  the  P.W.D.  consists   of        assistant engineer, overseers, sub-overseers, time- keepers,        mates, carpenters, masons, blacksmiths and   coolies.    The        other staff, consisting of clerks and   peons       performs        indoor duties. (See the evidence of Witness No. 5 for  Party        No. 1). This department  performs  both  administrative  and        executive functions.The services rendered are such that they        can  equally  be done by private individuals and  they  come        under  the  definition of "industry)’, satisfying  both  the        positive  and  negative  tests  laid  down  by  us  in  this        regard.We,  therefore,  hold  that  this  department  is  an        industry.        (xiii) Assessment Department: This department deals with the        assessment of taxes, fees and rates. The same staff does the        assessment  work connected not only with taxes  strictly  so        called  but  also  other fees and  rates.  As  the  services        rendered, namely, scavenging and supply of water can be done        by private individuals, the State Industrial Court held that        they  come under the definition of "industry" and  therefore

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      the department assessing fees and rates is also part of that        industry.  There  is no reason why a distinction  should  be        made in regard to the assessment of taxes so-called and that        of fees and rates. The taxes are collected only for enabling        the Corporation to render service to the public and, as most        of  the  services come under the definition  of  "industry",        this department also, in our view, is an industry within the        meaning  of the Act. That apart, the State Industrial  Court        has held that the same staff does the work of assessment  of        house-tax as well as other fees and rates    and the work of        this department is predominantly   connected    with     the        assessment of scavenging tax and   water rate. Applying  the        test of "paramount and   predominant duty ", this department        falls within the    definition of " industry " in the Act.        (xiv)  Estate  Department : This  department  maintains  the        record of property acquired, vested or  transferred  to  the        Corporation and all buildings and  roads constructed by  the        P.W.D. This department        972        lets  out lands and houses belonging to the  Corporation  by        public auction and gets income therefrom, which no doubt  is        credited to the common fund.  A    department  like this  is        equally necessary in a private     company which carries out        functions  similar  to  the  Corporation.   Maintenance   of        records  of  the properties acquired,  buildings  and  roads        constructed   and   properties  leased,   is   a   necessary        administrative  function  correlated  to  the  corresponding        services.  If the service such as construction of buildings,        roads etc., is an industry, its administrative wing is  also        an  industry.   The  department as a whole,  both  with  its        administrative  and executive wings, for reasons  stated  in        connection with the other departments, is an industry.        (xv)  Education Department: This department looks after  the        primary  education,  i.e.,  compulsory  primary   education.        within  the limits of the Corporation. (See the evidence  of        Witness No. 1 for Party No. 1).  This service can equally be        done  by  private persons.  This  department  satisfies  the        other tests.  The employees of this department coming  under        the  definition  of  "  employees  "  under  the  Act  would        certainly be entitled to the benefits of the Act.        (xvi)  Printing  Press  Department: The  printing  press  is        maintained  by the Corporation for printing passes.   It  is        also  used  for  printing  of  by-laws  and  the  rules  and        proceedings  and  forms, and the by-laws and  the  rules  so        printed  are  sold to the public.  For  the  reasons  stated        supra  in  the  case of the  Water  Works  Department’  this        department is also an industry.        (xvii)  Building Department: This department is really  a  "        building  permission  department  ". The  function  of  this        department  is  to  regulate construction  of  buildings  by        private  individuals  and to take action against  those  who        violate  the by-laws and the provisions of  the  Corporation        Act  pertaining  to this department.  It is  said  that  the        functions  of this department are statutory and  no  private        individual  can  discharge those statutory  functions.   The        question  is not whether the discharge of certain  functions        by the Corporation have statutory backing,        973        but  whether  those functions can equally  be  performed  by        private individuals.  The provisions of the Corporation  Act        and   the  by-laws  prescribe  certain  specifications   for        submission of plans and for the sanction of the  authorities        concerned before the building is put up.  The same thing can        be  done by a co-operative society or a private  individual.        Cooperative  societies  and private  individuals  can  allot

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      lands for building houses in accordance with the  conditions        prescribed  by  law in this regard.  The  services  of  this        department  are  therefore analogous to those of  a  private        individual  with the difference that one has  the  statutory        sanction  behind  it and the other is governed by  terms  of        contracts.  This department functions in the interest of the        public and the services rendered by this department  satisfy        both  the positive and negative tests laid down by us.   We,        therefore,  hold  that  this department is  covered  by  the        definition of "industry ".        (xviii)   General   Administration    Department   :    This        department  co-ordinates  the  functions of  all  the  other        departments.   The  State  Industrial  Court  describes  the        functions  of  this  department  thus:  "  This   department        consists  of treasury, accounts section, records section  in        which are kept records of all the different departments  and        public  relations section.  It also consists of a  committee        section the duty of which is to look after the convening  of        meetings,  to draw up agenda, minutes of proceedings and  to        draft  by-laws.  In the record section are kept  records  of        most  of the departments including health and  engineering."        Every  big  company  with different  sections  will  have  a        general   administration   department.    If   the   various        departments  collated with this department  are  industries,        this  department  would  also be a  part  of  the  industry.        Indeed  the  efficient rendering of all the  services  would        depend  upon  the proper working of  this  department,  for,        otherwise  there  would be confusion and chaos.   The  state        Industrial, Court in this case has held that all except five        of  the  departments  of  the  Corporation  come  under  the        definition  of  "industry" and if so, it follows  that  this        department, dealing predominantly        974        with industrial departments, is also an industry. Hence  the        employees of this department, are also       entitled to the        benefits of this Act.        The   State  Industrial  Court  held   that  five   of   the        departments of the Corporation did not fall within the terms        of the definition of "industry " in the Act. The   employees        of  these -departments did not file any appeal  against  the        finding of the State Industrial Court and we do not  propose        to  express  our  final opinion on the  correctness  of  the        decision  of  the  Industrial  Court  in  regard  to   these        activities.        In the result the appeals fail and are dismissed with costs.                                            Appeal dismissed.