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PETITIONER: THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX,WEST BENGAL, CALCUTTA

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: RAJA BENOY KUMAR SAHAS ROY

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 23/05/1957

BENCH: BHAGWATI, NATWARLAL H. BENCH: BHAGWATI, NATWARLAL H. AIYYAR, T.L. VENKATARAMA KAPUR, J.L.

CITATION:  1957 AIR  768            1958 SCR  101

ACT: Income  Tax-Exemption-Income from sale of forest  trees,  if and  when  agricultural  income-"Agriculture",  Meaning  of- Indian Income-tax Act (XI Of 1922), SS. 2(1), 4(3)(viii).

HEADNOTE: The question for decision in this appeal by the Commissioner of  Income-tax was whether a sum of Rs. 51,978 shown by  the assessee  in his return as income from his forest  land  was agricultural  income  within the meaning of S. 2(1)  Of  the Indian  Incometax Act and was as such exempt  from  taxation under  S.  4(3)(viii)  of  the  Act.   The  forest  was   of spontaneous growth, 150 years old, and consisted of sal  and piyasal  trees.  It was in parts denuded of trees from  time to  time  by destructive elements and the  assessee  had  to plant  fresh trees in those parts.  Considerable  amount  of human labour and skill had to be applied year after year for maintaining  the ’forest, protecting the offshoots from  the stumps  of  the  trees that had been cut  and  sold  and  in reviving  its denuded parts by fresh plantation.  The  staff employed  by  the  assessee  performed  such  operations  as pruning,  weeding, felling, clearing, cutting  of  channels, guarding  the trees and sowing seeds by digging the soil  in the  denuded  areas.  The Income-tax Officer  rejected  -the assessee’s claim of exemption and added a sum of Rs.  34,430 to  the assessable income, allowing a sum of Rs.  17,548  as expenditure.   The  Assistant  Commissioner  of   Income-tax confirmed the assessment.  The Appellate Tribunal held  that the sowing of seeds were few and far between and the income, derived as it was from jungle products, was not agricultural income within the meaning of the Act.  The High Court took a contrary  view,  held  that  tillage of  the  soil  was  not essential,  and the income was agricultural income as  human labour  and skill had been expended on the land  itself  and answered the question in favour of the assessee.  No attempt was,   however,  made  by  the  Income-tax  Authorities   to ascertain the income actually derived from the trees planted by the assessee, nor were any materials placed on the record from which its exact amount could be ascertained, but having regard  to  the magnitude of the expenditure  shown  by  the assessee as against the total income this Court held that  a

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substantial  portion of it must have been derived  from  the trees planted by the assessee. Held,  that  the  income actually  derived  from  the  trees planted  by the assessee was agricultural income within  the meaning of 2(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act and no  attempt having been 102 made to ascertain its exact amount and a fresh enquiry being undesirable after such a long lapse of time, the appeal must be   dismissed. The term ’agriculture’in S. 2(1)(b)(i) of the Indian Income- tax  Act connotes the entire and integrated activity  of  an agriculturist  performed on the land in order to  raise  its produce and consists of such basic and essential operations, requiring human skill and labour on the land itself, as  the tilling  of  the  soil, sowing of the  seeds,  planting  and similar  operations  on the land and such  other  subsequent operations,  performed  after the produce sprouts  from  the land,  as  weeding, digging of the soil around  the  growth, removal  of  undesirable  under-growths,  tending,  pruning, cutting,  harvesting  and marketing.  But  these  subsequent operations, if unconnected with the basic operations, cannot by  themselves constitute agriculture.  It is only when  the land is subjected to such integrated activity, that :It  can be said to be used for ,agricultural purpose’ and its income called agricultural income within the meaning of the Act. Case-law discussed. Whatever is produced by such agriculture must be an agricul- tural product and the ambit of the term ’agriculture’ cannot be  confined merely to the production of grain and food  for men  and cattle but must extend to all products of the  land that  have some utility either for consumption or trade  and commerce.    Fruit   and  vegetable   plantations,   groves, pastures,  articles  of luxury such as betel,  coffee,  tea, spices, tobacco etc. or commercial crops like cotton,  flax, jute,  hemp,  indigo etc. as also forest  products  such  as timber, sal and Piyasal trees, Casuarina plantations,  tendu leaves, horranuts etc., can come within its ambit. Murugesa  Chetti v. Chinnathambi Goundan, (1901)  I.L.R.  24 Mad.  421 and Raja of Venkatagiri v. Ayyappa  Reddy,  (1913) I.L.R. 38 Mad. 738, disapproved. Such  an extended meaning of the term ’agriculture’ and  its processes  and products can be tenable only where  there  is cultivation, which means the basic operations, and can never be  dissociated from them.  There is, therefore, no  warrant for its further extension so as to include activities  which are in some way connected with or dependent on land, such as breeding and rearing of livestock, dairy-farming, butter and cheese making and poultry farming. Moolji Sicka & Co., In re,(1925) 10 T.C.341 and Commissioner of  Income Tax v. K. E. Sundara Mudaliar, (1950)  18  I.T.R. 259, disapproved. Although  human  labour and skill are required both  in  the performance   of  the  basic  as  well  as   the   subseqent operations,  it is only in the case of the basic  operations alone  that such skill and labour can be said to  have  been spent  on  the  land itself, and  this  distinction  becomes important where they are disjointed and do 103 not form an integrated activity, as in the case of  products of land that are of spontaneous growth where human skill and labour   are   spent  merely  in   fostering   the   growth, preservation and regeneration of such products. Judicial opinion is unanimous that products which grow  wild on the land or are of spontaneous growth and do not  involve

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any  human  skill or labour on the land, and  all  that  the assessee  has  to  perform in respect of  them  is  only  to collect them for consumption and marketing, are not products of  agriculture  and  the income derived from  them  is  not agricultural  income  within the meaning Of S. 2(1)  Of  the Act. When,  however, the assessee performs subsequent  operations on  these products of land, the nature of  those  operations will  have to be determined in the light of  the  principles enunciated above. Held  further, that there is no basis for the argument  that the  demarcation  of agriculture and  forestry  as  separate heads of legislation in Entries 14 and 19 of List 11 of  the Seventh  Schedule  to  the Constitution has  the  effect  of making them mutually exclusive.  Income from forestry coming within  the definition of agricultural income’ contained  in S.  2(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act will  be  agricultural income  under Entry 46 and thus fall within the  purview  of that Act.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 165 of 1954. Appeal  from the judgment and order dated May 27,  1953,  of the  Calcutta High Court in Income-tax Reference No.  35  of 1952. G. N. Joshi and R. H. Dhebar, for the appellant. Jyotish Chandra Pal and D. N. Mukherjee, for the respondent. 1957.  May 23.  The Judgment of the Court was delivered by BHAGWATI,  J.-This appeal with certificate of fitness  under s.  66A(2)  of  the Indian Income-tax Act (XI  of  1922)  is directed against the Judgment and order of the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta on a reference under s. 66(1) of  the Act. The  respondent owns an area of 6,000 acres of  forest  land assessed  to  land revenue and grown with  Sal  and  Piyasal trees.   The  forest was originally of  spontaneous  growth, "not grown by the aid of human skill and 104 labour"  and it has been in’ existence for about 150  years. A considerable income is derived by the assessee from  sales of  trees  from this forest.  The assessment year  in  which this  forest income was last taxed under the Indian  Income- tax Act was 1923-24 but thereafter and till 1944-45 which is the  assessment year in question, it was always left out  of account.   The  assessment for 1944-45 also was  first  made without  including  therein  any  forest  income,  but   the assessment  was  subsequently  re-opened under  s.  34.   In response to a, notice under s. 22(2) read with s. 34 of  the Act,  the  respondent submitted a return showing  the  gross receipt  of Rs. 51,978 from the said forest.  A  claim  was, however, made that the said income was not assessable  under the  Act as it was agricultural income and was exempt  under s. 4(3) (viii) of the Act.  The Income Tax Officer  rejected this  claim and added a sum of Rs. 34,430 to the  assessable income  as income derived from the forest after  allowing  a sum  of Rs. 17,548 as expenditure.  The Appellate  Assistant Commissioner  confirmed  the assessment and the  Income  Tax Appellate Tribunal also was of opinion that the said  income was not agricultural income but was income derived from  the sale of jungle produce of spontaneous growth and as such was not  covered by s. 2(1) of the Act.  At the instance of  the assessee  the Tribunal referred to the High Court  under  s.

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66(1)  of  the Act two questions of law arising out  of  its order, one of which was: "Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of this case, the  sum of Rs. 34,430 is "agricultural income" and as  such is  exempt from payment of tax under section  4(3)(viii)  of the Indian Income Tax Act?" The  Tribunal submitted a statement of case from  which  the following facts appear as admitted or established : "  (i) The area covered by the forest is about 6,000  acres, trees growing being Sal and Piyasal; (ii)It  is of spontaneous growth being about 150 years  old. It  is  not  a forest grown by the aid of  human  skill  and labour; 105 (iii)The  forest  is  occasionally  parcelled  out  for  the purposes of sale and the space from which trees sold are out away is guarded by forest guards to protect offshoots; (iv)It  has  been satisfactorily  proved  that  considerable amount of human labour and care is being applied year  after year  for keeping the forest alive as also for reviving  the portions  that  get denuded as a result  of  destruction  by cattle and other causes; (v)The  staff  is employed by the assessee  to  perform  the following specific operations: (a)  Pruning, (b)  Weeding, (c)  Felling, (d)  Clearing, (e)  Cutting of channels to help the flow of rain water, (f)  Guarding the trees against pests and other  destructive elements, (g)  Sowing  of seeds after digging of the soil  in  denuded areas." The  Tribunal found that the employment of human labour  and skill in items (a) to (f) was necessary for the  maintenance and  upkeep of any forest of spontaneous growth.   Regarding item (g), however, it found that the said operation had been performed only occasionally and over a small fraction of the area  where the original growth had been found to have  been completely denuded.  Such occasions were however few and far between,  the normal process being that whenever a tree  was cut,  a stump of about 6" height was left intact which  sent forth  off-shoots all round bringing about fresh  growth  in course of time.  This went on perpetually unless an area got otherwise completely denuded. The  reference  was heard by the High Court  and-  the  High Court  held  that  actual cultivation of the  land  was  not required  and as human labour and skill were spent  for  the growth  of  the  forest  the  income  from  the  forest  was agricultural  income.   It accordingly  answered  the  above question in the affirmative.  The 14 106 Revenue  obtained the requisite certificate of  fitness  for appeal to this Court and hence this appeal. The question that arises for consideration in this appeal is whether  income  derived from the sale of  Sal  and  Piyasal trees  in  the  forest  owned  by  the  assessee  which  was originally a forest of spontaneous growth "not grown by  the aid  of  human  skill  and labour"  but  on  which  forestry operations  described  in  the statement of  case  had  been carried on by the assessee involving considerable amount  of

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expenditure of human skill and labour is agricultural income within the meaning Of s.   2(1) and as such exempt from payment of tax under s.   4(3)(viii) of the Indian Income-tax Act. Section 2(1) of the Act defines agricultural income and  states  (so far as it is relevant for the  purposes  of this appeal): (1)  "agricultural income" means (a)  any rent or revenue derived from land which is used for agricultural  purposes,  and  is either  assessed  to  land- revenue  in  the taxable territories or subject to  a  local rate assessed and collected by officers of the Government as such : (b)  any income derived from such land by: (i)  agriculture, or (ii) the performance by a cultivator or receiver of rent-in- kind  of any process ordinarily employed by a cultivator  or receiver  of  rent-in-kind to render the produce  raised  or received by him fit to be taken to market, or (iii)     the  sale by a cultivator or receiver  of  rentin- kind of the produce raised or received by him, in respect of which no process has been performed other than a process  of the nature described in sub- clause (ii)   .............................................................. Section 4(3) of the Act provides:- "  (3)  Any  income, profits or  gains  falling  within  the following classes shall not be included in the total  income of the person receiving them;   ........................................................... (viii) Agricultural income.................. 107 Even though "agricultural income" which is exempted under s. 4 (3) (viii) of the Act is defined in s.   2(1) as above, there is no definition of "agriculture" or   "agricultural purpose" to be found in the Act and it therefore falls to be determined what is the connotation  of these terms. An  argument  based on entries 14 and 19 of List II  of  the Seventh  Schedule to the Constitution may be disposed of  at once.    It  was  urged  that  entry  No.  14  referred   to agriculture  including agricultural education  and  research protection  against pests and prevention of  plant  diseases while  entry  No.  19  referred to  forests  and  there  was therefore  a clear line of demarcation  between  agriculture and  forests  with  the result that forestry  could  not  be comprised  within  agriculture.  If forestry  was  thus  not comprised within agriculture, any income from forestry could not  be  agricultural income and the income derived  by  the assessee  from  the sale of the forest trees  could  not  be agricultural income at all, as it was not derived from  land by  agriculture  within  the meaning of  the  definition  of agricultural  income  given in the  Indian  Income-tax  Act. This  argument, however, does not take account of  the  fact that the entries in the lists of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution  are  heads  of legislation  which  are  to  be interpreted  in  a liberal manner  comprising  within  their scope all matters incidental thereto.  They are not mutually exclusive.   If the assessee plants on a vacant  site  trees with  a  view that they should grow into a  forest,  as  for example, Casuarina plantations and expends labour and  skill for  that purpose, the income from such trees would  clearly be agricultural produce.  It has to be remembered that  even though this demarcation between agriculture and forestry was available in the Lists contained in the Seventh Schedule  to the  Government  of  India Act, 1935,  no  such  demarcation

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existed in the Devolution Rules made under the Government of India  Act, 1919, and in any event the definition  of  agri- cultural income with which we are concerned was incorporated in  the  Indian  Income-tax Acts as early as  1886,  if  not earlier: vide s. 5 of the Indian Income-tax 108 Act,  1886 (II of 1886).  It has also to be remembered  that inspite of this demarcation between agriculture and  forests in  the  Constitution, taxes on agricultural  income  are  a separate  head  under  entry 46 of List II  of  the  Seventh Schedule  and would comprise within their scope even  income from  forestry  operations  provided  it  falls  within  the definition  of  agricultural income which according  to  the definition given under Art. 366(1) means agricultural income as  defined for the purposes of the enactments  relating  to Indian Income-tax. The  terms " agriculture " and " agricultural  purpose"  not having  been defined in the Indian Income-tax Act,  we  must necessarily  fall back upon the general sense in which  they have  been understood in common parlance.  "Agriculture"  in its root sense means ager, a field and culture, cultivation, cultivation  of field which -’of course implies  expenditure of human skill and labour upon land.  The term has, however, acquired a wider significance and that is to be found in the various  dictionary  meanings  ascribed to it.   It  may  be permissible  to look the dictionary meaning of the  term  in the  absence  of  any definition  thereof  in  the  relevant statutes.   As  was  observed by Lord Coleridge,  in  R.  v. Peters (1): I  am quite aware that dictionaries are not to be  taken  as authoritative  exponents  of the meanings of words  used  in Acts of Parliament, but it is a wellknown rule of courts  of law that words should be taken to be used in their  ordinary sense,  and we are therefore sent for instruction  to  these books." Cozens-Hardy, M. R., also said in Camden (Marquis) v. I.R.C. (2): "It  is  for the Court to interpret the statute as  best  it may.  In so doing the Courts may no doubt assist  themselves in the discharge of their duty by any literary help they can find,  including  of  course the  consultation  of  standard authors   and  reference  to  wellknown  and   authoritative dictionaries.  " (1) (1886) 16 Q.B.D. 636, 641. (2) [1914] 1 K. B. 64 1, 647. 109 Turning therefore to the dictionary meaning of agriculture " we find Webster’s New International Dictionary describing it as " the art or science of cultivating the ground, including rearing  and  management of livestock,  husbandry,  farming, etc.  and  also  including  in  its  broad  sense   farming, horticulture,  forestry,  butter and ’  cheese-making  etc." Murray’s’  Oxford Dictionary describes it as "  the  science and  art  of  cultivating the  soil;  including  the  allied pursuits  of gathering in the crop and  rearing  live-stock; tillage,  husbandry,  farming  (in the  widest  sense)".  In Bouvier’s  Law Dictionary quoting the  Standard  Dictionary" agriculture  " is defined as " the cultivation of  soil  for food products or any other useful or valuable growths of the field  of  garden; tillage, husbandry; also,  by  extension, farming,  including any industry practised by cultivator  of the  soil in connection with such cultivation,  as  breeding and  rearing  of  stock, dairying, etc.   The  science  that treats of the cultivation of the soil.  " In Corpus Juris the term " agriculture " has been understood

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to  mean:  "  art  or science  of  cultivating  the  ground, especially  in  fields or large  quantities,  including  the preparation of the soil, the planting of seeds, the  raising and  harvesting  of  crops, and  the  rearing,  feeding  and management  of live- stock; tillage, husbandry and  farming. In  its  general sense the word also includes  gardening  or horticulture.  " Bhashyam  Ayyangar  J. in Murugesa  Chetti  v.  Chinnathambi Goundan(1)   gave  the  following  dictionary  meanings   of agriculture  as culled out from the Century  Dictionary  and Anderson’s Dictionary of Law: "  The primary meaning of agriculture is the cultivation  of the ground (The Century Dictionary) and in its general sense it  is  the  cultivation of the ground for  the  purpose  of procuring vegetables and fruits for the use of man and beast including  gardening  or  horticulture and  the  raising  or feeding of cattle and other stock (Anderson’s Dictionary  of Law).   Its less general and more ordinary signification  is the cultivation -with the plough and in large areas in order to raise (1)  (1901) I.L.R. 24 Mad. 421,423. 110 food for man and beast (The Century Dictionary) or, in other words,  "that  species of cultivation which is  intended  to raise  grain  and  other field crops  for  man  and  beast." (Anderson’s Dictionary of Law).  Horticulture, which denotes the  cultivation  of  garden or orchards, is  a  species  of agriculture in its primary and more general sense." Ramesam J. in Panadai Pathan v. Ramasami Chetti (1) referred to the following connotation of ’agriculture’: "Wharton’s   Law   Lexicon   adopts   the   definition    of ,,agriculture"   in  8  Edw.   VII,  c.  36,  as   including "horticulture, forestry, and the use of land for any purpose of  husbandry  etc.   In 10 Edw.  VII, c. 8 s.  41,  it  was defined  so  as to include the use of land  as  "meadow"  or pasture land or orchard or osier or woodland, or for  market gardens,  nursery grounds or allotments, etc.  In 57 and  58 Viet.  c.  30  s. 22, the term  agricultural  property’  was defined  so  as to include agricultural  land,  pasture  and woodland, etc." These  are  the  various meanings ascribed  to  the  term  " agriculture"  in various dictionaries and it is  significant to note that the term has been used both in the narrow sense of  the  cultivation  of the field and the  wider  sense  of comprising all activities in relation to the land  including horticulture,  forestry, breeding and rearing of  livestock, dairying, butter and cheesemaking, husbandry etc. It was urged on behalf of the assessee that the Court should accept  the  wider  significance of  the  term  and  include forestry operations also within its connotation even  though they  did not involve tilling of the land, sowing of  seeds, planting,  or  similar work on the land.  The  argument  was that  tilling of the land, sowing of the seeds  planting  or similar  work  on  the  land  were  no  doubt   agricultural operations and if they were part of the forestry  operations carried  on by the assessee the subsequent operations  would certainly be a, continuation of the same and would therefore acquire the characteristic of agricultural operations.   But the (1)  (1922) I.L.R. 45 Mad. 710. absence of these basic operations would not necessarily make any difference to the character of the subsequent operations and would not divest them of their character of agricultural operations,  so that if in a particular case one found  that the  forest was of spontaneous growth, even so  if  forestry

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operations  were carried on in such forests for the  purpose of  furthering the growth of forest trees, these  operations would  also enjoy the character of agricultural  operations. If  breeding and rearing of live-stock, dairying butter  and cheese-making  etc.,  could  be comprised  within  the  term "agriculture",  it was asked, why should these also  be  not classed as agricultural operations. Considerable stress was laid on the fact that s.  4(3)(viii) of the Act enacted a provision in regard to the exemption of "agricultural  income" from assessment and it was  contended that exemptions should be liberally construed.  Reliance was placed  on  the  observations of Vishwanatha  Sastri  J.  in Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras v. K. E. Sundara Mudaliar (1): "  Exemption from tax granted by a Statute should  be  given full scope and amplitude and should not be whittled down  by importing limitations not inserted by the Legislature." Mookerjee  J.  in Commissioner of  Agricultural  Income-tax, West Bengal v. Raja Jagadish Chandra Deo Dhabal Deb (2) also expressed himself similarly: "  and  the  present  day view seems to  be  that  where  an exemption  is  conferred by statute, that clause has  to  be interpreted liberally and in favour of the assessee but must always  be without any violence to the language  used.   The rule   must  be  construed  together  with   the   exempting provisions, which must be regarded as paramount." He  also  quoted a passage from The Upper India  Chamber  of Commerce v. Commissioner of Income-tax, C.P. & U.P. (3) : (1)  [1950]  18 I.T.R. 259, 271. (3) [1947] 15  I.T.R.  263; A.I.R.1948 All.70 (2)  [1949] 17 I.T.R. 426, 438. 112 " It is needless to observe that, as in the present case, we are concerned with the interpretation of an exemption clause in  a  taxing  statute,  that clause  must  be,  as  far  as possible, liberally construed and in favour of the assessee, provided no violence is done to the language used." It was also pointed out that " Taxes on agricultural  income "  formed  a  head of legislation specified in  item  46  of List.II  of  the Seventh Schedule to  the  Constitution  and should   be  liberally  construed,  with  the  result   that agriculture  should be understood in the wider  significance of  the  term  and  all  agricultural  income  derived  from agriculture  or so understood should be included within  the category.  There was authority for the proposition that  the expression  " agricultural land " mentioned in Entry  21  of List  II of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of  India Act,  1935, should be interpreted in its wider  significance as  including lands which are used or are capable  of  being used  for  raising any valuable plants or trees or  for  any other  purpose  of  husbandry.  (see  Sarojinidevi  v.  Shri Krishna  Anjanneya  Subrahmanyam (1) and Megh Raj  v.  Allah Rakhia (2). While  recognizing  the force of the  above  expressions  of opinion  we cannot press them into service in favour of  the assessee  for the simple reason that "agricultural income  " has  been defined in the Constitution itself in Art.  366(1) to  mean agricultural income as defined for the purposes  of enactments  relating  to  Indian incometax and  there  is  a definition of " agricultural income " to be found in s. 2(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act.  We have therefore got to look to the terms of the definition itself and construe the  same regardless of any other consideration, though, in so far  as the terms " agriculture " and " agricultural purposes "  are concerned, we feel free in view of the same not having  been

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defined in the Act itself, to consider the various  meanings which have been ascribed to the same in the legal and  other dictionaries. (1) I.L.R. [1945] Mad. 61.     (2) [1942] F.C.R. 53, 62.                             113 We  may also note here the dictionary meanings of the  terms "Forestry" and "Cultivation." The Shorter Oxford Dictionary, Vol.1,  page  735, gives the meaning of  "forestry"  as  the "science  and  art  of  forming  and  cultivating   forests, management of growing timber." Webster’s  New International Dictionary, Vol. 1,  page  990, gives the following meaning of forestry: "  Science  and art of farming, caring for,  or  cultivating forests; the management of growing timber." Webster’s New International Dictionary.  Vol.  1, page  643, while talking of cultivation says that "to cultivate"  means "(i)  to prepare, or to prepare and use, for the raising  of crops;  to  till; as, to cultivate the soil;  to  loosen  or break  up  the soil about (growing crop or plants)  for  the purpose   of   killing  weeds,  etc.,  especially   with   a cultivator, as to cultivate the corn; (2)to  raise,  or  foster the growth of, by  tillage  or  by labour  and  care; to produce by culture;  as  to  cultivate roses; to cultivate oysters." Whether  the  narrower  or  the  wider  sense  of  the  term agriculture" should be adopted in a particular case  depends not  only  upon the provisions of the  various  statutes  in which   the  same  occurs  but  also  upon  the  facts   and circumstances  of each case.  The definition of the term  in one  statute does not afford a guide to the construction  of the same term in another statute and the sense in which  the term  has been understood in the several statutes  does  not necessarily throw any light on the manner in which the  term should be understood generally.  The decided cases  disclose a  variety of opinions in regard to the connotation  of  the terms "agriculture" and "agricultural purposes." At one time "agriculture"  was  understood  in  its  primary  sense   of cultivation  of  field and that too for production  of  food crops   for   human  beings  and   beasts.    This   limited interpretation  could not be adhered to even though  tilling of  the land, sowing of the seeds, planting or similar  work on  the  land were the basic operations, the  scope  of  the crops  produced  was enlarged and all crops  raised  on  the land, whether they be food crops or not were included in the produce  raised by agriculture.  There was  however  another school of thought 15 114 which  extended the term "agriculture" and  included  within its  connotation  not  only  the  products  raised  by   the cultivation of the land but also allied activities which had relation to the land and operations which had the effect  of fostering  the growth, preservation and maintenance as  also the regeneration of the products of the land, thus  bringing within   its  compass  not  only  the   basic   agricultural operations but also the further operations performed on  the products  of the land even though they were not  necessarily accompanied  by  these  preliminary  basic  operations.   As against these cases which dealt with these preliminary basic operations  and  also  the  further  operations  either   by themselves or in conjunction with the former which of course necessarily  involved  the expenditure of  human  skill  and labour   in  carrying  out  those  operations,  there   were instances  of  products of land which grew wild or  were  of spontaneous  growth without the expenditure of  human  skill

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and labour and which it was agreed on all hands could not be comprised  within  "agriculture" and the income  from  which could  not  fall  within  the  definition  of  "agricultural income".  We shall briefly discuss the various cases dealing with  these  different  aspects  and  try  to  evolve   some principle  therefrom  which would serve as a  guide  in  the determination of the question before us. Kunhaven Haji v. Mavan (1) was the earliest case in which it was  held  that  a lease of a coffee garden  was  not  an  I agricultural  lease  within  the  meaning  of  Transfer   of Property  Act,  s. 117.  The case however  concerned  itself with  the situation where as far as the Court  could  gather from  the  Karar the lease was of the  coffee  plants  only. There was no further discussion of the legal position and it may  be  noted that Shephard, J., who was a  party  to  this decision  stated  in the later case of  Murugesa  Chetti  v. Chinnathambi Gounden (2) that he was wrong in the opinion he expressed -with regard to a coffee garden in this case. Murugesa  Chetti  v.  Chinnathambi  Goundan  (2)  also   was concerned with s. 117 of the Transfer of Property Act.   The lease there was a lease of land for (1) (1893) I.L.R. 17 Mad. 98. (2) (1901) I.L. R. 24 Mad. 421,423. 115 the  cultivation  of betel and the Court held  that  such  a lease  was  an  agricultural lease  falling  under  s.  117. Bhashyam  Ayyangar, J., who delivered the main  judgment  of the  Court discussed the dictionary meanings of the  term  " agriculture  " and stated that in s. 117 of the Transfer  of Property  Act  it  was used in its  more  general  sense  as comprehending  the raising of vegetables, fruits  and  other garden  products  as food for men or beast, though  some  of them may be regarded in England as products of  horticulture as  distinguished  from  agriculture.   The  learned   Judge considered  the  distinction between " agriculture "  and  " horticulture " and observed : "  The  distinction  between agriculture  when  it  is  used otherwise  than  in its primary and more general  sense  and horticulture  is  a fine one even in England and  in  India, especially,  it  will be impossible in the case  of  several products of the land to draw a line between agriculture  and horticulture   according  to  English  notions.   The   only practical distinction which I can suggest and one which will give  effect to the policy of the Legislature  in  exempting agricultural  leases  from the operations  of  section  107, etc.,  of  the  Transfer of Property Act  is  to  regard  as agriculture,  as distinguished from horticulture,  not  only all  field  cultivation  by  tillage  but  also  all  garden cultivation for the purpose chiefly of procuring  vegetables or  fruits as food for man or beast and other  products  fit for human consumption by way of luxury, if not as an article of diet." He  then discussed the policy of exemptions setting out  the observations of Cave J. in Ellis & Co. v. Hilse(l): " The very object of this exemption is the wellknown one  of favouring  agriculture-an old object of English  Legislation in favour of a very important industry ", and stated: " This observation of Mr. Justice Cave will apply with  much greater  force  in  this  country  where  the   agricultural industry is more, important than in England and is one  that is common to wet cultivation (1)  (1889) L.R. 23 Q.B.D. 24. 116 as  to  garden and dry cultivation, the object of  all  such

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cultivation being chiefly to procure food for men and cattle and other products of the soil which are usually consumed by the people as gentle stimulants or by way of luxury.   Betel leaf is an article of daily consumption with all classes  in this country as tobacco leaf is with most classes and  betel vine  is generally grown side by side with plantations,  the products of which are among the chief articles of  vegetable food." The  lease  in that case being one for  the  cultivation  of betel  was  therefore  held to  be  agricultural  lease  and Shephard,  J.,  agreed  with this  conclusion  revising  the opinion  which he had expressed earlier in Kunhavan Haji  v. Mavan (supra). In Raja of Venkatagiri v. Ayyappa Reddy (1) the question was whether  land usually fit only for pasturing cattle and  not for  cultivation, i.e., ploughing and  raising  agricultural crops,  was  "ryoti" land, though it might  have  been  "old waste" and a tenant of such land was a "ryot" and any amount agreed  to be paid for pasturing cattle was " rent "  within the definitions of s. 3 of the Madras Estates Land Act (Mad. I of 1908).  The Court held that such land was not " ryoti " land  inasmuch as it was not fit for ploughing  and  raising agricultural crops.  The ordinary meaning of " agriculture " was taken to be " the raising of annual or periodical  grain crops  through  the operations of ploughing,  sowing,  etc." (Per Sadasiva Ayyar, J., at page 741). The Chief Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras v. Zamindar  of Singampatti   (2)  was  a  reference  arising  out  of   the assessment  for  income  tax under Act VII of  1918  of  the income  derived by the Zamindar of Singampatti from  forests and  fisheries  within  the ambit  of  his  Zamindari.   The assessee  objected to the assessment (i) on the ground  that the income was agricultural income within the meaning of  s. 4  of the Act and, therefore, not chargeable to  income-tax; (ii) that the (1) (1913) I.L.R..38 Mad. 738. (2) (1922) I.L. R. 45 Mad, 5 18 (F.B.) 117 assessment  was  illegal as contravening the  terms  of  his permanent  sanad  for the Zamindari and  the  provisions  of Regulation  XXV  of 1802.  The Court held’  that  where  the peishkush  of  a  permanently settled estate  was  fixed  in commutation not only of the rentals of the cultivated  lands but  also of all income which might be derived from  forests or fisheries, both under the terms of the sanad and s. I  of Regulation  XXV  of  1802, these incomes  were  exempt  from further taxation by the Government, and s. 3 of the  Income- tax  Act did not abrogate this exemption.  In view  of  this conclusion the Court did not think it necessary to determine whether  income  from forests or fisheries  came  under  the definition  of " agricultural income." The  Court,  however, pointed  out  that " a reference to Murray’s  and  Webster’s dictionaries  shows  that  the word  "agriculture  ",  while sometimes used in the narrow sense of the art or science  of cultivating  the ground, is also used in a much wider  sense so  as to include even " forestry ", according  to  Webster. In which sense it was used by the framers of the  Income-tax Act  would be a matter for determination and to this end  it would  not be out of place to consider the  probable  reason for  the exemption of agricultural income  from  income-tax. No  other reason is suggested than the equity  of  exempting from  further burden income which had already paid  toll  to the State in the shape of land revenue." The  question,  therefore, whether the income  from  forests would be " agricultural income " within the meaning of s.  4

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of  the Income-tax Act’ was thus left open and the  decision that  income from forests was not liable to  income-tax  was reached  under the terms of the Sanad of s. I of  Regulation No. 25 of 1802. Kaju  Mal  v. Salig Ram(1) was concerned inter alia  with  a field  in which tea was grown and the question  was  whether the  land  fell  within the definition  of  Cc  agricultural income  " or " village immoveable property " as given in  s. 3(i)  and  (ii) of the Punjab Pre-emption  Act,  1905.   The Court  held that fields planted with tea bushes were  fields used for agricultural (1)  (1919) P.R. NO. 19, P. 237. 118 purposes and this decision was affirmed by the Privy council in Kaju Mall v. Salig Ram(1).  It was held that the words  " agricultural  purposes  "  in  s.  2  (iii)  of  the  Punjab Alienation  of Land Act, 1900, included the  cultivation  of tea;  consequently, land which was not occupied as the  site of  any building in a town or  Village, and was  occupied or let  for  the cultivation of tea was  "  agricultural  land" within the meaning of s. 3(i) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1905. Emperor  v. Probhat Chandra Barua  (2) was a case under  the Indian Income-tax Act and the classes of income derived from permanently settled estates were "1. Income from  fisheries. 2. Income from land used for stacking timber. 3. Income from pasturage."  The  income  from  the  first  two  heads   was certainly  not  agricultural income or income  derived  from "land  which is used for agricultural purposes"  within  the meaning of ss. 2 and 4 of the Act.  But income derived  from pasturage was held to be agricultural income which could not lawfully be charged with income-tax.  There was a difference of  opinion between Rankin, J., and Page, J., in  regard  to the liability of income from fisheries and income from  land used  for stacking timber based on the construction  of  the Permanent  Settlement  Regulations  of 1793.   But  that  is immaterial  for our present purposes.  What is  material  is that both the learned Judges were unanimous in their opinion that  income  from pasturage was income derived  from  "land which is used for agricultural purposes" and was, therefore, within the exemption given by a. 4(3)(viii) to  agricultural income as defined by s. 2(1)(a) of the Act. In  Kesho  Prasad Singh v. Sheo Pragash Ojha (3)  the  Privy Council  held  that  a  grove  was  not  land  "  held   for agricultural  purposes " within the meaning of s. 70 of  the Agra  Tenancy Act, 1901, affirming the decision of the  High Court of Allahabad that it was impossible to hold that  that section had, any application whatever to such a property -as the grove in fact was. (1)(1923) I.L.R. 5 Lah. 50. (2)(1924) I.L.R. 51 Cal. 504. (3) (1924) I.L.R. 46 All. 831. 119 The  Commissioner  of  Income-tax, Madras  v.  T.  Manavedan Tirumalpad (1) was also a decision under the Indian  Income- tax Act (XI of 1922) and the assessee there was assessed  by the  Income Tax Officer for the year 1928-29 on  the  amount received  by the sale of timber trees cut and  removed  from the  forests.  The question was whether these  amounts  were liable as such to income-tax and the Court observed derived  from the sale of paddy which is grown on  land  and the income derived from the sale of timber cut in a  forest; but  the  profits  earned from the sale of  paddy  would  be assessable to income-tax but for the special exemption given to that income in the Incometax Act, by reason of its  being

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agricultural income.  There is such exemption in the case of income derived from the sale of timber." There  is no further discussion to be found in the  judgment which  would  throw  light  on  the  question  whether  such receipts  by  the assessee were agricultural income  and  as such exempt from income-tax. The   later   decision   of  the  Madras   High   Court   in Chandrasekhara  Bharathi  Swamigal v.  Duraisami  Naidu  (2) however   contains  an  elaborate  discussion  as   to   the connotation of the term "agriculture ". The case arose under the  Madras  Estates  Land Act (Mad.  I  of  1908)  and  the question which the Court had to consider was whether growing Casuarina  trees, i.e., trees for fuel, was an  agricultural purpose so as to make the person who held the land for  that purpose a " ryot " within the meaning of the Madras  Estates Land  Act.   The  Court  held that  land  held  for  growing Casuarina   trees  was  not  land  held  for   purposes   of agriculture and the person holding the land for that purpose was  not  a " ryot " within the meaning of the  Act.   While delivering  the judgment of the Court Reilly,  J.,  embarked upon a consideration of what the term " agriculture "  meant and  came  to the conclusion that agriculture could  not  be defined  by the nature of the product cultivated but  should be defined rather by (1) (1930) I.L.R. 54 Mad. 21 (S.B.) (2) (1931) I.L.R. 54 Mad. 900. 120 the  circumstances in which the cultivation was carried  on. He observed at page 902: "  I  agree  with the remark of Shephard,  J.,  in  Murugesa Chetti  v. Chinnathambi Goundan(l) that a man who plants  or maintains trees for firewood is not in ordinary parlance  an agriculturist.    If  we  take  the  strict  meaning  of   " agriculture  "  according to its derivation,  it  means  the cultivation of a field, the cultivation of an open space, as opposed to horticulture, the cultivation of a  comparatively small  enclosed space.  The cultivation either of the  field in  agriculture or of the garden in horticulture  cannot  be confined,  I think, to any particular product.   With  great respect,  I  do  not  agree with  the  opinion  of  Bhashyam Ayyangar, J:, in Murugesa Chetti v. Chinnathambi  Goundan(l) that agriculture implies production of things useful as food for men or beast or other products fit for human consumption by  way of luxury.  That appears to me to be too  narrow  an interpretation.   Still  less do I agree  with  the  opinion expressed  by Sadasiva Ayyar, J., in Raja of Venkatagiri  v. Ayyappa Reddi that agriculture is confined to the production of grain crops.  I can see no reason why the cultivation  in open  spaces of such useful products as cotton,  jute,  flax and  hemp  should  not  be  agriculture.   Indeed  I   think agriculture cannot be defined by the nature of the  products cultivated but should be defined rather by the circumstances in which the cultivation is carried on. In some cases it has been  suggested that agriculture is confined to tillage.   I think it can easily be shown that agriculture was carried on in this world before ploughs were invented.  In the  present day  in many places cultivation is done with spades and  not with ploughs, but the planting of timber or firewood  trees, which are to stand on the land for a considerable number  of years,  forming plantations or woods or forests, appears  to me to be opposed to the idea of agriculture, the cultivation of  an  open  space.  It is true that  for  the  purpose  of growing  trees in a plantation it may be necessary first  to prepare the land. (1) (1901) I.L.R. 24 Mad. 42I, 423.

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(2) (1913) I.L.R..38 Mad. 738. 121 Later on it may be necessary to protect and water the  young plants.   Still  later it may be necessary to thin  out  the plantation.  But, when the land is covered with trees  which had to stand on it for a number of years, sometimes as  long as a century, during most of which period the land itself is untouched,  to  describe that as agriculture appears  to  me inappropriate.   To my mind it is something  very  different from the cultivation of a field or of an open space.  It may be  noticed that in Kesho Prasad Singh v. Sheo Pragash  Ojha (1)  their  Lordships of the Privy Council approved  of  the opinion  expressed  by two learned judges of  the  Allahabad High  Court  that land let for a grove was not  let  for  an agricultural purpose.  It happened that the case then  under consideration  was one arising under the Agra  Tenancy  Act. But  in  that Act there is no definition  of  ’agriculture’. Therefore  both  the learned judges of  the  Allahabad  High Court and their Lordships of the Privy Council were, we  may take  it,  considering  what is the meaning of  the  word  I agriculture’ in its general sense.  I may mention also  that in Commissioner of Income Tax v. Manavedan Tirumalpad (2)  a Full  Bench of this Court remarked that income from  cutting timber was not agricultural income." It  may  be  noticed that the  learned  Judge  enlarged  the connotation  of the term "agriculture " by having regard  to the  circumstances in which the cultivation was  carried  on rather  than  the  nature of  the  products  cultivated  and embraced  within  the  scope  of the  term  not  merely  the production  of  things useful as food for man  or  beast  or other  products fit for human consumption by way  of  luxury but  also  such useful products as cotton,  jute,  flax  and hemp,  though  he  stopped  short  at  those  products   and hesitated to include therein growing of trees in  plantation where the land was covered with trees which have to stand on it for a number of years. The last case to be referred in this series is that of  Deen Mohammad Mian v. Hulas Narain Singh(2) (1)(1924) I.L.R. 46 All. 831. (2) (1942) 23 Pat.  L.T. 143, 152. 16 122 where  it was held that an orchard is an agricultural  land. It was observed: it The case of an orchard is quite different.  Orchard trees ordinarily are, and can be presumed to have been, planted by men after preparation of the ground which is cultivation and seasonal  crops  are  gathered.  Fruit  trees  also  require seasonal  attention such as pruning and digging of the  soil around  the roots and it cannot be said that this ceases  to be  cultivation  merely  because  the  whole  tree  is   not replanted  every  year.................. In my  opinion  the land in suit is agricultural land; it is land from which  by preparing  the soil and planting and cultivating  trees  the raiyat  expects  to enjoy periodical returns in the  way  of produce for food." This  was  a  further  extension  of  the  idea  which   had ’germinated  in  the  opinion expressed by  Reilly,  J.,  in Chandrasekhara Bharathi Swamigal v. C. P. Duraisami Naidu(1) and  even  plantation  of trees in orchards  which  did  not require  to  be  replanted every year was  included  in  the connotation of the term "agriculture". A still further extension of the term is to be found in  the following  observations  of Vishwanatha Sastri, J.,  in  The Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras v. K. E. Sundara Mudaliar

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(2) at p. 273: "  It is a matter of ordinary experience, at least  in  this part of the country, that mango, cocoanut, palmyra,  orange, jack, arecanut, tamarind and other trees are planted usually in an -enclosed land, and that these trees do not yield  any fruit  or  crop in the early years of  their  growth.   They remain on the land for a long number of years yielding fruit only  after  their  maturity.There  is  no  reason  why  the planting, rearing,  watering, fencing and protection of such trees and the  gathering  of their fruits during the  annual seasons   should not be held to be "agriculture".  There  is some kind  of  cultivation or prodding of the  soil  at  the inception when the planting is done and subsequently also at intervals.   In  the. case of coffee grown on  hill  slopes, there is no ploughing or tillage as in the (1) (1931) I.L.R. 54 Mad. 900. (2) [1950] 18 I.T.R. 259, 271. 123 case  of  wet and dry -fields; but it cannot  be  maintained that  growing  coffee  is  not  an  agricultural  operation. Coffee and tea plants stand on the soil for many years,  and their  produce  is gathered periodically.   In  the  padugai lands or lands lying between the sandy bed and flood bank of rivers,  plantains  are  grown in  many  places  in  deltaic tracts.  Young plants are often brought and planted in  pits dug  for the purpose in a row with  sufficient  interspaces. Trenches  are dug by the side of a row of plantain trees  in order  to catch and detain water.  The plantain  trees  last for about two years, and from each tree off-shoots spring up and  grow  in  place of the parent tree.  There  is  thus  a natural replenishment of the plantain garden.  It cannot  be said  that the raising of plantains is not  an  agricultural purpose.   Similarly  in the case of  sugarcane  the  plants stand on the land for two years or a little more, and  there are  usually  two cuttings.  Castor plants  stand  for  some years  on the soil and the seeds are  periodically  gathered in.   Bamboo is often planted in enclosed lands  by  digging pits,  filling them with sand and manure and  then  planting the young stalks in a bunch at suitable distances.  Watering is  done for the first 2 or 3 years.  Every year,  the  land surrounding  each  bamboo cluster is dug with  a  spade  and small  earthen ridges are put up so as to catch  and  retain rain  water.  Bamboo plants attain maturity in about 3 or  4 years,  and the thorny branches which grow on the main  stem are   then  fit  to  be  cut  off  and  used   for   fencing purposes..............................  I am unable  to  see why these operations are not agricultural operations." The  cases  above  noted  all of  them  interpret  the  term "agriculture"  in  its  narrower sense, though  there  is  a marked  progress from the extremely narrow construction  put upon  it  by  Bhashyam Ayyangar J.  in  Murugesa  Chetti  v. Chinnathambi  Goundan(1) to the somewhat  wider  connotation thereof  adopted  by Reilly J.  in  Chandrasekhara  Bharathi Swamigal  v.  C.P. Duraisami Naidu (2) and  by  Vishwanatha, Sastri J. in The Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras v. K. E. Sundara (1) (1901) I.L.R. 24 Mad. 421, 423. (2) (1931) I.L.R. 54 Mad. 900. 124 Mudaliar(1)  It is interesting- to note that all  throughout these  cases runs the central idea of either tillage of  the land  or sowing of seeds or planting or similar work on  the land which invests the operation with the characteristic  of agricultural  operations and whenever that central  idea  is fulfilled  there  is  the  user  of  land  for  agricultural

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purposes   and   the  income   derived   therefrom   becomes agricultural income. There  were, on the other hand, decisions which  interpreted the  term "agriculture" in the wider sense as including  all activities in relation to the land, even though they did not comprise these basic agricultural operations.  King  Emperor v.  Alexander  Allen(2) involved the interpretation  of  the expression  "land used solely for agricultural purposes"  in sub-s.  (3) of s. 63 of the Madras  District  Municipalities Act  (Mad.   IV of 1884) as amended by the  Madras  District Municipalities  Amendment  Act (Mad.  III of 1897)  and  the Court  held  that  the  lands  on  which  potatoes,   grain, vegetables, etc., were grown, as well as pasture land,  were used  solely for agricultural purposes " within the  meaning of  the  sub-section.  The Court adopted the  definition  of agricultural  land given in the Agricultural Rates  Act  (59 and 60 Vict., Chap. 16) s. 9: "  The expression " agricultural land " means any land  used as  arable, meadow, or pasture ground only, cottage  gardens exceeding  one-quarter of an acre, market  gardens,  nursery grounds, orchards, or allotments, but does not include  land occupied together with a house as a park, gardens other than as aforesaid, pleasure grounds or any land kept or preserved mainly or exclusively for purposes of sport or recreation or land used as a race course." and  also  the  meaning ascribed to it  in  Murray’s  Oxford English Dictionary quoted above and observed: "  We  also  note  that it is there  pointed  out  that  the restriction  of the word agriculture to tillage, as  in  the following quotation, is rare.  The lands were not fields for agriculture  but  pastures for cattle.  We believe  that  we cannot do better than follow these definitions in (1)  [1950] 18 I.T.R. 259, 271.  (2) (1901) I.L.R.  25  Mad. 627, 629,630. 125 attempting  to decide what, for the purposes  of  subsection (3) of section 63 of the Municipalities Act, are or are  not lands used solely for agricultural purposes ..... We do  not consider that any distinction can be    drawn between  large and small plots of lands on which  roots   of   grain    are cultivated.   All  such land must be held to  be  land  used solely for agricultural purposes   Counsel has urged  before us that these so-called  waste  lands are pasture lands  and as such should be   held   to  be  lands  used  solely   for agricultural purposes  If, therefore, it could be shown that these so-called waste lands were in reality pasture  grounds or  lands used for "rearing livestock", we should  certainly decide  that  they were lands used solely  for  agricultural purposes." The  learned Judges there were influenced by the  dictionary meaning  of  the term agriculture as given in  Murray’s  New Oxford Dictionary and understood the term agriculture in the widen sense as including the user of-land for rearing  live- stock also. In Panadai Pathan v. Ramaswami Chetti(1) a lease of land was given  for  growing  casuarina trees and  the  question  was whether  such a lease was a lease for agricultural  purposes within  the  meaning of s. 117 of the Transfer  of  Property Act.   The Court held that it was a lease  for  agricultural purposes   and  therefore  did  not  require  a   registered instrument for its creation.  Spence J. in the course of his judgment differed from the opinion of Bhashyam Ayyangar, J., in Murugesa Chetti v. Chinnathambi Goundan (2) that the word agriculture  in  its  more  general  sense  comprehends  the raising  of vegetables, fruits and other garden products  as

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food for man or beast, if the learned Judge intended thereby to  limit  it to the raising of food products.   For  to  so restrict  the  word  would be  to  exclude  flower,  indigo, cotton, jute, flax, tobacco and other such cultivation.   He also  differed from the opinion expressed by Sadasiva  Ayyar J. in Seshayya v. Rajah of (1)  (1922) I.L.R. 45 Mad. 710. (2)  (1901) I.L.R. 24 Mad. 42I, 423. 126 Pittapur  (1) and Rajah of Venkatagiri v. Ayyappa Reddi  (2) that  agriculture meant the raising of annual or  periodical grain  crops  through the operation  of  ploughing,  sowing, etc.,  as such definition would exclude sugar cane,  indigo, tea,   flower,   tobacco,   and   betel   cultivation   from agriculture.  He then referred to the dictionary meaning  of the term "agriculture" as given in the Oxford Dictionary and the Bouvier’s Law Dictionary set out above and observed: "  In my opinion agriculture connotes the raising of  useful or  valuable products which derive nutriment from  the  soil with  the  aid of human skill and labour; and thus  it  will include horticulture, arboriculture and silviculture, in all cases  where growth of trees is effected by the  expenditure of  human care and attention in such operations as those  of ploughing,  sowing, planting, pruning,  manuring,  watering, protecting etc.  " Ramesam, J., who delivered a concurring judgment referred to the  definition  of  agriculture adopted  in  Wharton’s  Law Lexicon and was of opinion that it would include the use  of land as " meadow or pasture or orchard or osier or woodland, or  for market gardens, nursery grounds or allotments  etc." but would exclude all cultivation of fibrous plants such  as cotton,  jute  and  linen and all  plants  used  for  dyeing purposes,  such  as indigo etc., and all  timber  trees  and flowering  plants etc.  According to him, the rearing  of  a Casuarina plantation requires some preparation of the ground and  subsequent  care  by watering the  plants  and  he  was therefore of Opinion that rearing of Casuarina trees was  an agricultural  purpose  within the meaning of s. 117  of  the Transfer of Property Act. It  may  be  observed however that  according  to  both  the learned  Judges  some  preparation of  the  ground  or  some expenditure  of human care and attention in such  operations as those of ploughing, sowing, planting etc., was considered essential  for  constituting these  operations  agricultural operations. In  Commissioner  of  Income-tax,  Burma  v.  Kokine  Dairy, Rangoon(3) the question was whether income (1)  (1916)  31  M.L.J. 284; 1916 M.W.N. 396. (3)  [1938]  6 I.T.R. 502, 509. (2)  (1913) I.L.R. 38 Mad. 738. 127 from  a  dairy farm and the milk derived from  the  farm  is agricultural  income  and  exempt as  such  from  incometax. Roberts  C.J.  who  delivered  the  opinion’  of  the  Court observed: "Where cattle are wholly stall-fed and not pastured upon the land  at  all,  doubtless it is trade  and  no  agricultural operation  is  being  carried on;  where  cattle  are  being exclusively  or  mainly pastured and are none the  less  fed with  small amounts of oil-cake or the like, it may well  be that  the  income  derived from the sale of  their  milk  is agricultural  income.   But between the two  extremes  there must  be  a number of varying degrees, and the task  of  the Income-tax  Officer  is  to  apply  his  mind  to  the   two distinctions  and to decide in any particular case on  which

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side of the fence, if I may use the term, the matter falls." He  then referred to the case of Lean and Dickinson v.  Ball (1)  where  Lord Cullen had said that he  proceeded  on  the footing  that the case, which was one dealing with  poultry- farming,  was one in which poultry derived sustenance  to  a material extent from the produce of the ground. This method of approach was on a par with the one adopted by Lord  Wright  in Lord Glanely v. Wightman(2)  where  it  was observed: " If authority were needed, the provisions just quoted do at least  show that profits of occupation’ include  gains  from the   animal   produce   as  well   as   the   agricultural, horticultural,    or   arboricultural   produce    of    the soil;......................  equally it is obvious that  the rearing of animals, regarded as they must be as products  of the  soil-since  it is from the soil that  they  draw  their sustenance  and  on the soil that they liveis  a  source  of profit  from the occupation of land, whether  these  animals are  for  consumption  as food (such as  bullocks,  pigs  or chickens), or for the provision of food (such as cows, goats or  fowls),  or  for recreation (such  as  hunters  or  race horses),  or  for use (such as draught or  -plough  horses). All  these  animals  are appurtenant to  the  soil,  in  the relevant  sense  for this purpose, as much as  trees,  wheat crops,  flowers  or  roots though no doubt  they  differ  in obvious respects.  Nor (1)  (1925) 10 Tax Cas. 341. 128 is it now material towards determining what are products  of occupation  that  farming  has  developed  in  its  use   of mechanical appliances and power, not only in such matters as ploughing,  reaping, threshing, and so forth, but  in  such’ ancient  methods of preparing its products as making  cream, butter  or  cheese.  The farmer is still  dealing  with  the products of the soil, and Schedule B covers the income." The  House  of  Lords  were  dealing  with  the  profits  of occupation of land not with income derived from user of land for  agricultural purposes and therefore not  restricted  in their  interpretation  of the term " occupation  "  and  all these activities which were described therein might as  well have been comprised within the scope of the taxing statutes. What  we have, however, to see is whether  these  activities fall within the connotation of the terms " agriculture " and "  agricultural  purpose " which are the only  terms  to  be considered for bringing the income derived therefrom  within the definition of agricultural income in s. 2 (1) (a) of the Indian Income-tax Act. In  Moolji Sicka & Co., In re(1) Derbyshire C.J.  understood the  term  ,agriculture"  in  a  wider  sense  as  including operations  not  only on the land itself but on  the  shrubs which  grew on the soil and were according to him a part  of the soil.  The assessees were manufacturers of biri, a  kind of cigarette consisting of tobacco wrapped in tendu  leaves. The  tendu plant was of entirely wild growth and  propagated itself without human agency in jungle and waste lands.   The assessees  had  taken  several villages on  "  lease  "  for plucking the leaves of such plants and the work done by  the assessees  consisted  in pruning the trees and  burning  the dead  branches  and dried leaves lying on the  ground.   The Court held that the profits accruing to the assessees by the sale  of tendu leaves was not exempt as agricultural  income but  to  the  extent to which pruning  of  the  tendu  shrub occurred,  there  was  in  a technical  and  legal  sense  a cultivation of the soil (1)  [1939] 7 I.T.R. 493.

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129 in which the shrub grew and therefore so much of the  income as was shown by the. assessee to be profit derived from  the collection  and  preparation, so as to make them fit  to  be taken to the market, of tendu leaves produced by the pruning of the tendu shrubs was exempt as agricultural income  under s.  2 (1) and s. 4 (3) (viii) of the Indian Income-tax  Act. The learned Chief Justice observed: " Cutting back or pruning the wild tendu clearly contributes to the growth of the leaves in that shrub and I am  prepared to  hold that the pruning of the shrub is a  cultivation  of the  shrub and as the shrub grows in the soil and as a  part of it, is a cultivation of the soil in a legal and technical sense." The  word  cultivation was here understood  by  the  learned Chief  Justice not only in the sense of cultivation  of  the soil  but  in the sense of cultivation of the  tendu  shrubs which grew on the soil and were therefore a part of it.  The operations which were performed on the shrubs were certainly not operations performed on the soil itself and the  opinion expressed  by the learned Chief Justice has certainly  given an  extended meaning to the term cultivation and  used  with reference to the soil.  It is significant however to observe that  cultivation  of the soil was considered  an  essential ingredient which rendered the income derived from the  tendu leaves  agricultural  income  within  the  meaning  of   its definition in s. 2(1)(a) of the Act. Commissioner of Income-Tax, Madras v. K. E. Sundara Mudaliar (1)  contains  a  further  extension  of  this  idea   where Vishwanatha Sastri J. observed at p. 274: " Pasture land used for the feeding and rearing of livestock is land used for agricultural purposes: Emperor v. Alexander Allen  (2) . Rearing of livestock such as  cows,  buffaloes, sheep and poultry is included in "husbandry".  These animals are  considered  to be the products of the soil,  just  like crops,  roots, flowers and trees, for they live on the  land and  derive their sustenance from the soil and its  produce: Glanely  v. Wightman(3) ; Commissioner of Income-tax,  Burma v. (1) [1950] 18 I.T.R. 259, 27I.  (3) [1933] 1 A.C. 618 (H.L.) 638. (2)  [1901] I.L.R. 25 Mad. 627, 629, 630. 17 130 Kokine  Dairy Co. (1) It is therefore not legitimate, in  my opinion,   to   confine  the  word  "agriculture"   to   the cultivation of an open field with annual or periodical crops like   wheat,  rice,  ragi,  cotton,  tobacco,  jute,   etc. Casuarina  is usually raised on dry lands of  poor  quality, and  it  is usual to find the same land  used  alternatively "for  the cultivation of ordinary cereal crops  like  ground nut,  gingelly, cholam, kambu, etc., and for the raising  of Casuarina  plantations.  The land bears the  dry  assessment whatever be the nature of the crop raised." This enlarged connotation of the term "agriculture" has been tinged by the dictionary meanings ascribed to it in Murray’s Oxford Dictionary and the Webster’s Dictionary quoted  above which  understood the term as including the allied  pursuits of  rearing, feeding and management of live-stock  and  also including  husbandry,  farming horticulture,  etc.,  in  the widest  sense, as also butter, cheese-making etc.  We  shall have to consider at the appropriate stage as to how far such enlargement  is  warranted,  by the definition  of  "  agri- cultural  income  " as given in s. 2 (1) (a) of  the  Indian Income-tax Act.

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The  cases above noted all of them involve some  expenditure of human skill and labour either on the land or the  produce of the land, for without such expenditure there would be  no question  of  the  income  derived  from  such  land   being agricultural  income.  Where, however, the products  of  the land  are  of  wild,  or  spontaneous  growth  involving  no expenditure of human labour and skill there is unanimity  of opinion that no agricultural operations were at all involved and  there  is no agricultural income.  In  such  cases,  it would be the absence of any such operations rather than  the performance thereof which would be the prime cause of growth of such products. The  cases  bearing on this aspect of the  question  may  be noted. Kaju  Mal  & others v. Salig Ram (2) is  the  earliest  case where a stretch of natural forest came in for consideration. It was a forest land and it was held to (1) [1938] 6 I.T.R. 502, 509. (2) (1919) P.R. No. 19 P. 237. 131 be  agricultural land or land used for purposes  subservient to  agriculture  or for pasture, and therefore  exempt  from pre-emption under s. 4 of the Punjab Premption Act, 1905. There  was  no discussion of any legal  principles  in  that decision  but when we come to the next case of  Province  of Bihar  v. Maharaja Pratap Udai Nath Sahi Deo(l) which was  a case under the Bihar Agricultural Income Tax Act (Bihar  VII of 1938), we find the ratio of these decisions laid down  in clear terms.  The assessees there derived their income  from "  Bankar  " and " Palkar ". " Bankar " was  income  derived from  the  sale of wood from virgin jungles or  jungles  not actually  cultivated; and "Phalkar" was income derived  from the  fruits of wild jungle trees and bushes.   The  question was  whether this income was agricultural income within  the meaning of the term as defined in the Act.  Harries C.J. who delivered the judgment of the Court observed: "Bankar"  : It appears that this head of income was  derived from virgin jungles or jungle land not actually  cultivated. A few forest guards appear to have been employed to  protect the  property,  but it cannot be said that  the  trees  have grown  as  the result of cultivation.  They appear  to  have grown  naturally in the jungles without the intervention  of the  human agency, and in my view the growth of these  trees cannot  be said to result from the cultivation of the  soil. In  fact, it was the absence of cultivation  that  permitted the area to develop into a jungle...................... " " Phalkar ": This is income derived from wild jungle fruits, and it cannot be said that the fruit gathered is the  result of  the cultivation, but, on the contrary, it is the  result of  the absence of cultivation.  Trees and  bushes  yielding these fruits grow not on cultivated soil but on the land not under cultivation and frequently the more neglected and wild the  land  is the thicker grow these wild bushes  and  trees yielding  such crop.  Practically in all cases the  crop  is the  result  of want of cultivation and not  the  result  of cultivation. (1)  [194I] 9 I.T.R. 313, 328. 132 In  my  judgment  it  is not  established  that  the  income described  as phalkar in these cases is income derived  from land  used  for  agriculture or  from  agriculture  and  is, therefore, not assessable to agricultural income-tax." In  Raja Mustafa Ali Khan v. Commissioner of Income Tax,  U. P. & C. P. (1) which went up to the Privy Council, the  Oudh Chief  Court held that income from the sale of forest  trees

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growing  on land naturally and without the  intervention  of human agency, even if the land was assessed to land revenue, was not agricultural income within the meaning of s. 2(1)(a) of  the  Income-tax  Act.  The  Court  followed  an  earlier decision  given by it in the case of Maharaja of  Kapurthala v. Commissioner of Income Tax C. P. & U. P. (2) in which the court  had discussed the meaning to be ascribed to the  term "agriculture" and observed at page 93: "A  fiscal  statute should no doubt be  construed  strictly, and,  if  there  be any doubt about  its  construction,  the subject  must be given the benefit.  But we do not feel  any doubt  that  the  expression  "land  used  for  agricultural purposes"  in the Income-tax Act does not extend to  forests of spontaneous growth, where nothing is done to prepare  the soil  for trees to be planted therein, and where the  growth of  the trees is not fostered by tillage.  We should not  be justified  in  giving  the  taxpayer  the  benefit  of   the dictionary  definition  when  it is not  disputed  that  the meaning of the term  " agricultural" cannot be  extended for the  purpose  of  the Income-tax Act to  all  the  secondary implications  therein suggested.  We therefore construe  the term in its primary sense.  We accordingly hold that  income from the sale of forest trees of spontaneous growth  growing on   land  which  is  assessed  to  land  revenue   is   not agricultural income within the meaning of section 2(1)(a) of the Income Tax Act." Yuvarajah  of Pithapuram & Anr. V.  Commissioner  of  Income Tax, Madras(3)was also a case where the (1) [1945] 13 I.T.R, 98. (2)[1945] 13 I.T.R. 74,93. (3)[1946] 14 I.T.R. 92,99. 133 assessee  derived income from forests of spontaneous  growth by the sale of wood, bark, leaves, other usufruct of  trees, minor  forest produce and licence fees and from  trees  that had  grown  wild  in non-forest  areas.   The  Zamindari  of Pithapuram  was  a  permanently  settled  estate  under  the Permanent Settlement Regulation (Regulation XXV of 1802) and it  was  contended  that the  imposition  of  income-tax  in respect  of  income other than agricultural  income  derived from  a permanently settled estate would not be a breach  of Regulation  XXV  of 1802 relating to  permanent  settlement. Reliance  was  placed  in support of this  position  on  the decision in Chief Commissioner of Income Tax v. Zamindar  of Singampatti  (1).  It was, however, held that the  case  was impliedly overruled by the decision of the Privy Council  in Probat  Chandra  Barua  v. King Emperor (2)  and  the  Court proceeded to consider whether income derived from forests of spontaneous growth by the sale of wood, bark, leaves,  other usufruct of trees, minor forest produce and licence fees and from  trees  which have grown wild in  nonforest  areas  was agricultural  income  within the meaning of s. 2(1)  of  the Indian Income-tax Act.  The Court observed : "There  is ample authority for holding that  income  derived from trees which have grown wild is not agricultural  income but  without  the  aid  of  authority,  we  should  have  no hesitation  in  saying  that to describe it  as  such  would involve   a   distortion  of  the  meaning   of   the   word agriculture’. and such income was accordingly held to be not  agricultural income within the meaning of s. 2 (1) of the Act. (It may be noted  that the appellant preferred an appeal to  the  Privy Council  against  this decision but the same  was  dismissed vide Yuvarajah of Pithapuram & Anr. v. Commr. of Income Tax, Madras (3)

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Benoy  Ratan  Banerji v. Commissioner of Income  Tax,  U.P., C.P.  &  Berar (4) was another case in  which  the  assessee derived income from the sale of timber from (1)  (1922)  I.L.R. 45 Mad. 518 (F.B.). (2)  (1930) L.R. 57 I.A. 228. (3)  [1949] 17 I.T.R. 445. (4)  [1947] 15 I.T.R. 98. 134 the  Zamindari  on which there had been for  many  years,  a number of forest trees, khar and wild plants.  There was  no evidence on the record to show that the growth of the  trees in  question was the result of any actual culivation by  the assessee  at all.  The various trees which he sold  were  of spontaneous  growth, not having grown as a result of  actual cultivation.   The Court held that in order to  come  within the  definition of " agricultural income ", the  income  had not  only  to  be  derived from  land  which  was  used  for "agricultural  purposes"  but  such income had  also  to  be derived  by  the  process  of "  agriculture  ".  The  Court observed that being trees of spontaneous growth, to the pro- duction  of which the assessee had made no  contribution  by way  of cultivation, no question could arise either  of  the land  on  which  they  grew  being  "used  for  agricultural purposes"  or  of the trees themselves and the  income  they produced  being  the  result  of  "agriculture."  The  Court accordingly  held  that the income from the sale  of  forest trees  of spontaneous growth, growing on land naturally  and without   the   intervention  of  human  agency,   was   not agricultural income within the meaning of s. 2(1)(a) of  the Income Tax Act even if such land was subject to a local rate assessed and collected by officers of the Crown as such  and such  income  was not exempt from income-tax under  s.  4(3) (viii) of the Act. A decision of the Nagpur High Court in Beohar Singh Raghubir Singh  v. Commissioner of Income Tax, U.P., C.P., and  Berar (1)  (delivered on September 4, 1946, but reported in  1948) may  be noted here.  There also the income in  question  was derived by the assessee from the sale of forest produce such as  timber,  tendu leaves, mohua  flowers,  harranuts  etc., derived from a forest which was not a cultivated one but was of spontaneous growth.  The question was whether such income was  agricultural  income and as such exempt  from  taxation under s. 4(3)(viii) of the Indian Incometax Act.  The  Court considered the dictionary meanings of the term "agriculture" which included forestry within its compass but observed that the essence of (1)  [1948] 16 I. T.R. 433. 135 agriculture even when it was extended to include "forestry", was the application of human skill and labour; without  that it  could  neither  be an art nor a  science  and  that  was according  to them the determining factor in such  class  of cases.   The  Court then referred to the  various  decisions referred  to  above and cited with  approval  the  following passage from the Judgment of the Federal Court in Meghraj v. Allah Rakhia (1). "Their  Lordships confirmed a decision of the  Punjab  Chief Court to the effect that land used as a tea garden was  used for  "agricultural purposes." In the judgment of  the  Chief Court  (which was generally approved by their Lordships)  it was  observed that the term "agricultural land" is  used  in the Act of 1905 in its widest sense to denote all land which is  tilled............. The, Chief Court had held that  land covered  by a natural forest was not agricultural land,  and this  view  also would seem to have been  confirmed  by  the

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Judicial Committee," and they further proceeded to observe "  We  have  underlined the word "tilled"  because,  in  our opinion,  that  brings  out the distinction  which  we  have sought   to  draw  between  an  agricultural  and   a   non- agricultural  purpose.  The decisions referred to  are  Kaju Mal v. Saligram and Kajumal v. Saligram (2)". The Court came to the conclusion that it was essential  that the  income  should  be derived  from  some  activity  which necessitated  the employment of human skill and  labour  and which was not merely a product of man’s neglect or  inaction except  for the gathering in of the spoils.  Not  only  must the  assessee labour to reap the harvest, but he  must  also labour  to  produce it and they accordingly  held  that  the income  in question was not agricultural income and was  not exempt  from  taxation  under s. 4(3)(viii)  of  the  Indian Income-tax Act. We  now  come to the decision of the Privy Council  in  Raja Mustafa Ali Khan v. Commissioner of (1)  [1942] F.C.R. 53,62. (2)  [1919] P. R. No. 19 P. 237 and (1923) I.L.R. 5 Lah. 50. 136 Income-tax,  U. P. Ajmer and Ajmer Merwara (1).  It will  be recalled  that the Oudh Chief Court had in Raja Mustafa  Ali Khan  v.  Commissioner  of Income Tax, U.  P. &  C.  P.  (2) decided that income from the sale of forest trees growing on land naturally and without the intervention of human  agency even  if  the  land was "assessed to land  revenue  was  not agricultural income within the meaning of section 2(1)(a) of the Indian Income-tax Act.  The appellant took an appeal  to the  Privy  Council  against  this  decision  and  the  main question  for  consideration  before  their  Lordships   was whether the land was ’used for agricultural purposes and the income  derived  therefrom was agricultural  income.   Their Lordships  of the Privy Council observed that the income  in question- "  was  derived from the sale of trees described  as  forest trees growing on land naturally and the case has  throughout proceeded  upon the footing that there was nothing  to  show that the assessee was carrying on any regular operations  in forestry  and that the jungle from which trees had been  cut and  sold  was a spontaneous growth.  Upon those  facts  the question  is whether such income is (within section  2(1)(a) of    the    Act)    rent    or    revenue............    or alternatively.........  whether  such  income  was,   within section   2(1)(b),   income  derived  from  such   land   by agriculture. It  appears  to their Lordships that, whether  exemption  is sought under section 2(1)(a) or section 2(1)(b), the primary condition  must  be satisfied that the land in  question  is used for agricultural purposes; the expression " such  land" in  (b). refers back to the land mentioned in (a)  and  must have the same quality.  It is not then necessary to consider any  other  difficulty  which may stand in the  way  of  the assessee.  His case fails if he does not prove that the land is  "used for agricultural purposes." Upon this point  their Lordships concur in the views which have been expressed  not only  in  the Chief Court of Oudh but in the High  Court  of Madras (see Yuvarajah of Pithapuram v. (1) [1948] 16 I.T.R. 330. (2) [1945] 13 I.T.R. 98. 137 Commissioner  of Income Tax, Madras (1), and the High  Court of  Allahabad  (see Benoy Ratan Banerji v.  Commissioner  of Income  Tax, U.P., C.P. & Berar(2) and elsewhere  in  India.

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The question seems not yet to have been decided whether land can be said to be used for agricultural purposes within  the section, if it has been planted with trees and cultivated in the regular course of arboriculture, and upon this  question their  Lordships express no opinion.  It is  sufficient  for the  purpose of the present appeal to say (1) that in  their opinion no assistance is to be got from the meaning ascribed to  the word "agriculture" in other statutes and  (2)  that, though  it must always be difficult to draw the  line,  yet, unless  there  is some measure of cultivation of  the  land, some  expenditure of skill and labour upon it, it cannot  be said to be used for agricultural purposes within the meaning of  the  Indian Income-tax Act.  In the present  case  their Lordships  agree with the High Court in thinking that  there is no evidence which would justify the conclusion that  this condition is satisfied." It  may be noted that the Privy Council also proceeded  upon the footing that there was nothing to show that the assessee was carrying on any regular operations in forestry and these observations  are  patient of argument that if  any  regular operations  in  forestry had been carried on the  land  they might have made a difference to the result.  Their Lordships also  did  not express any opinion on the  question  whether land can be said to be used for agricultural purposes within the section if it has been planted with trees and cultivated in the regular course of arboriculture.  They were, however, definite in their opinion that unless there is some  measure of  cultivation of the land, some expenditure of  skill  and labour  upon  it,  the land cannot be said to  be  used  for agricultural  purposes  within  the  meaning  of  the   Act. Agricultural  operations  are  thus defined by  them  to  be operations  where there was some measure of  cultivation  of the land, some expenditure of skill and labour upon it.   If these conditions were satisfied in regard to any  particular land, then (1) [1946] 14 I.T. R. 92, 99. (2) [1946] 15 I.T.R. 98, 18 138 such  land can be said to be used for agricultural  purposes and  the  income derived therefrom  constitute  agricultural income  within  the meaning of s. 2(1)(a) of the  Act.   The term "agriculture" for the purposes of the Indian Income Tax Act  was thus in effect defined by their Lordships  to  mean some measure of cultivation of the land and some expenditure of  skill  and  labour upon it and  unless  the  operations, whether   they  be  agricultural  operations   or   forestry operations conformed with those definitions, they could  not be  styled agricultural operations so as to constitute  land on  which  they were performed land  used  for  agricultural purposes. One  should  have thought that this decision  of  the  Privy Council would put an end to all controversies with regard to the   connotation  of  the  term  "  agriculture  "  and   " agricultural purposes ". That was, however, not to be.   The words used by their Lordships in their judgment were cryptic and  the  controversy  arose immediately  thereafter  as  to whether " some measure of cultivation of the land" and "some expenditure  of skill and labour upon it" were used by  them as cumulative or in the alternative.  Considerable ingenuity was exercised in determining what were regular operations in forestry   and   whether  they  could  be   assimilated   to agricultural  operations  which  could have  the  effect  of constituting  the land upon which they were  performed  land used  for  agricultural purposes within the meaning  of  the

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Indian Income-tax Act so that income derived therefrom could fall within the definition of agricultural income" contained therein. The  first  case which came up for consideration  after  the above  decision  of  the  Privy  Council  was  the  case  of Commissioner of Agricultural Income Tax, West Bengal v. Raja Jagadish Chandra Deo Dhabal Deb (1) before the Calcutta High Court.   The assessee was the Zamindar of Chilkigarh in  the district  of Midnapore the western part of  which  contained jungle  mahal.  The income in question was derived from  the sale of Sal trees which grew in the forest.  The forest  was not an uncared for virgin forest.  The assessee maintained a staff of one forester, 6 guards and 24 Chaukas to look after the (1)  [1949] 17 I.T.R. 426, 438. 139 forest and for the proper cultivation of the same.  The  Sal trees were generally sold off in blocks when about 15  years old.   Annually  blocks of about 1,000 acres were  sold  up. All  the  trees in the blocks sold up were cut down  by  the purchasers  for  sale as fuel and house posts.   During  the rainy  season  from the stumps of the trees  cut  down,  new shoots come out which grew into mature trees in 15 years, to be cut down again.  In order to prevent damage to the  young shoots  in  the early stages of their growth the  areas  cut down  were  closely guarded for one year at least  from  the time when the block in question had been completely  denuded of trees, in order to keep cattle and men off from the lands so  that they may not damage the young growing  shoots.   In order  to promote the growth of shoots, the ground was  also kept free from undergrowth jungle.  This was not cleared  at the  assessee’s  expense but the villagers were  allowed  to clear the grounds of the undergrowth and take the same  away free of cost.  The existing Sal trees in the forests and the Sal  trees  which had been sold off in 1350  B.S.  had  been grown in the same manner as described above.  From the above facts  it  was  clear that human care  and  skill  had  been utilised  for  promoting the growth of the  Sal  trees  from which the income was derived in 1350 B.S. The  Court  discussed the dictionary meaning of the  term  " agriculture  "  and  following the  decision  of  the  Privy Council  in Raja Mustafa Ali Khan v. Commissioner of  Income Tax  U.P., Ajmer & Ajmer Merwara(l) came to  the  conclusion that  income from a virgin forest or forests of  spontaneous growth  was  not  agricultural income.  The  view  that  the tilling  of  the soil was the sine qua non  for  bringing  a pursuit  within the term agriculture was also held  to  have been exploded and it was observed at p. 440: "  Whether a particular forest is one of spontaneous  growth or  not has to be decided on one important consideration  as indicated  by the Judicial Committee in that decision  i.e., whether  there  has  been I some expenditure  of  skill  and labour upon it’." (1)  [1948] 16 1.L.R. 330. 140 Reliance  was  placed upon the further observations  of  the Privy  Council  that,  whether  there  were  "  any  regular operations  in  forestry  " would be  a  material  fact  for consideration and it was observed: "  To  put  it in another form, the  introduction  of  human agency  and  the application of human efforts would  be  the criteria for consideration" and after discussing several cases on the subject the  Court observed at p. 441 : " On a careful analysis of the reasons given by the  learned

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Judges in the various decisions referred to above it will be apparent  that  the facts of each particular  case  must  be considered for determining whether there has or has not been sufficient  application  of human efforts before it  can  be determined  whether the income from a particular  forest  is agricultural or otherwise." On the findings of fact recorded by the Tribunal in the case before  them  the Court was of opinion that  the  forest  in question was not either a virgin forest or containing  trees which  grew  spontaneously and naturally without  any  human intervention  whatever.   The circumstance  that  there  was felling  of the trees, the new shoots appearing  during  the rainy season without any human intervention, guarding of the new  shoots from either being trampled under foot  or  being browsed by animals and the removal of undergrowth of  fallen leaves were considered regular operations in forestry in the forests in question which required the application of  human efforts   sufficient   to  include  them  under   the   head agricultural income.  It was further observed : " If the view of the Judicial Committee were to exclude  all kinds  of  income from the category of  agricultural  income unless  there was actual cultivation of the soil,  reference to   "regular  operations  of  forestry"  would  have   been unnecessary.   Not that there must always be " some  measure of cultivation of the land " and " some expenditure of skill and  labour upon it " but that the proof of either would  be sufficient to bring the case within either clause (a) or (b) of section 2(1) of 141 the  Act.   " Regular operations in forestry  "  do  require expenditure  of skill and labour upon the land on which  the forest grows.  " The  Court,  therefore, came to the conclusion that  in  the special  circumstances as disclosed in the case, there  were regular operations in forestry and the income, derived  from forests  in  question  was agricultural  income  within  the meaning  of s. 2 (1) (a) of the Bengal Agricultural  Income- tax Act, 1944. Jyotirindra  Narayan Sinha Choudhury v. The State  of  Assam (1) arose under the Assam Agricultural Income-tax Act,  1939 and  the  question for the consideration of  the  Court  was whether  the amounts realised by the assessee from the  sale of Sal tree,-, growing in the forest was agricultural income within  the  meaning of s. 2 (1) of the Act.  There  was  no evidence  to show that these Sal trees were  of  spontaneous growth.    Even  though  the  possibility  of  the   forests originally having been of spontaneous growth was recognised, it was an admitted fact that forest trees were protected and fostered  in growth by the application of human  labour  and skill.   In these forests, operations’ in forestry  such  as clearing jungles, creepers and climbers, thinning by removal of  less healthy trees from thickly grown areas, removal  of unsound,  crooked and diseased trees, burning of  leaves  to fertilise  the ground, cutting of trees at special  heights, reservation of blocks by turns and their operation in cyclic order, preservation of mother trees for the spread of  seed, protection  of  forests  from  fire,  etc.,  were  regularly carried on and regular operations were thus being undertaken for their growth, preservation and regeneration.  The  Court held that as extensive operations in forestry were  employed in the forest of Sal trees, the income from the sale of such trees  would be agricultural income as defined in the  Assam Agricultural   Income-tax   Act.   In   arriving   at   this conclusion,  the  Court relying on  the  various  dictionary meanings of the term "agriculture " observed at p. 390:

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(1)  [1950] 19 I.T.R. 379. 142 "  in spite of the diversity as to the scope and purpose  of agriculture as revealed by the different definitions,  there is one feature which is essentially common to all of  these. This  is the application of human skill and  labour  without which there can be no agriculture." The Court then referred to the decision of the Privy Council in  Raja Mustafa Ali Khan v. Commissioner of  Income  Tax(1) and  after  quoting  the passage  from  the  judgment  above referred to proceeded to observe : "  Their Lordships have not laid down that some  measure  of cultivation  is absolutely necessary before it can  be  said that land is used for agricultural purposes.  In fact " some measure  of  cultivation " is placed on a par  with  "  some expenditure  of  skill and labour ". If either  of  the  two conditions exists, the land could be said as being used  for agricultural purposes.  Tillage or actual cultivation  would not  in  their  view  be an  essential  pre-requisite  of  " agriculture " in its wider implication." After referring to a decision of the Calcutta High Court  in Hedayat  Ali  v.  Kamalanand Singh(2)  and  Commissioner  of Agricultural  Income Tax v. Jagadish Chandra Deo Dhabal  Deb (3) the Court observed: "  The review of the authorities considered above  leads  to the conclusion that purpose within the meaning of the  Assam Act  can  be agricultural even if its achievement  does  not involve  actual  cultivation of the soil.  In the  words  of their Lordships of the Privy Council in the case of receipts from  the  sale  of  forest  trees,  the  income  would   be agricultural  if  there  is some expenditure  of  skill  and labour upon it.  Regular operations in forestry  necessarily involve expenditure of skill and labour.  Where,  therefore, such  operations  take place, the income from  the  sale  of trees   in  the  forest  would  be  within  the   ambit   of agricultural income as defined in the Assam Act." In  Pratap  Singh Balbeer Singh v.  Commissioner  of  Income Tax, U. P., C. P. & Berar (4), however, the (1)[1948] 16 I.T.R. 330. (2)[1913] 17 C.L.J. 411. (3)[1949] 7 I.T.R. 426, 438. (4)[1952] 22 I.T.R 1. 143 High  Court  of  Allahabad struck  a  different  note.   The assessee  there derived the income from the sale  of  forest trees  growing on land naturally and  spontaneously  without the intervention of any human agency but carried on forestry operations  working  the forest for at least  some  time  on scientific  lines  in  accordance with a  scheme  of  making profits.  There was a regular working plan and the  assessee was  deriving  regular income from the forest  and  spending money  to  increase the profit.  The Court held that  the  " agriculture  " and " agricultural purposes " with  reference to land clearly implied that some operations must be carried on on the land itself; human skill and labour should be used for the purpose of ploughing the land, manuring it, planting the  trees  or some similar process, and that  mere  weeding care   and   preservation  of  forest   trees   which   grew spontaneously  were  not operations on the land  which  were necessary   to   constitute  the  process   a   process   of agriculture.   In  the  course of the  judgment,  the  Court interpreted  the above passage  from the judgment  of  their Lordships  of the Privy Council in Raja Mustafa Ali Khan  v. Commissioner of Income Tax (1) a.-, under: "  It is quite clear that their Lordships were of  the  view

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that,  for income to be agricultural income,  the  essential element  that  must  exist is that  there  should  be  "some measure of cultivation of the land" or " some expenditure of skill  and  labour  upon it".  The language  used  by  their Lordships of the Privy Council shows that the expenditure of skill  and labour must be upon the land and not  merely  oil the  trees  which are already growing on it as a  result  of spontaneous growth." Mere  regeneration  and preservation of trees could  not  be said  to be expenditure of human skill and labour  upon  the land  itself and the land could not under the  circumstances be held to be used for agricultural purposes nor could it be held  that any process of agriculture was being carried  on. The Court observed that planned and scientific  exploitation of a forest of spontaneous growth, though it might yield (1)  [1948] 16 I.T.R. 330. 144 regular  income, would not be income from agriculture as  no operations  were carried out and no human skill  and  labour was expended in such a case, on the land itself. Raja  Benoy Kumar Sahas Roy v. Commissioner of  Income  Tax, West  Bengal  (1) the judgment under appeal before  us  here struck  a middle path.  The Tribunal had found  that  except the  sowing  of seeds, the operations  carried  out,  though equally  necessary  for the maintenance and  upkeep  of  any forest   of  spontaneous  growth,  did  not   involve   such expenditure of human labour and skill as to constitute  them operations  in agriculture.  The sowing of seeds were "  few and far between " and the normal process by which the forest grew again, after a part of it had been cut down, was by the growing out off-shoots from the stumps left, the  operations were  therefore  in  the  main only  operations  for  the  " maintenance,  preservation,  nursing and rearing ",  of  the forest.  It was urged before the High Court on behalf of the assessee  that  the exemption from  agricultural  income-tax determined in Commissioner of Agricultural Income Tax,  West Bengal  v. Raja Jagadish Chandra Deo Dhabal  Deb(2)  covered the case and it was submitted that the facts here were if at all far stronger in favour of the assessee.  The decision of the  Privy Council in Raja Mustafa Ali Khan v.  Commissioner of  Income  Tax,  U.P.,  Ajmer  and  Ajmer-Merwara  (3)  was considered and the Court observed at p. 87: " I do not think that when the Privy Council said that there must  be  ’some  measure of Cultivation on  the  land,  some expenditure  of skill and labour upon it ", their  Lordships intended  to  say that the expenditure of skill  and  labour must  always be in the form of cultivation.  The  word  "or" introduced  by  the  Allahabad High Court  between  the  two phrases  does not occur in the original, but I think  it  is implied.  The idea, it seems to me, is that if the land  has been left to the forces of nature to grow what products such forces could, there is no agriculture and there can be (1)  [1953] 24 I.T.R. 70, 87. (2)  [1049] 17 I.T.R. 426, 438. (3)   [1948] 16 I.T.R. 330. 145 SUPREME COURT REPORTS agriculture only if the labour and skill of man has operated on the land to cause or aid the growth of certain  products. All  that is necessary is that the land should  be  actively exploited with a view to procuring growth or better  growths from the soil but it does not seem to be also necessary that the exploitation should be by tillage." The  Court  accordingly  came to the  conclusion  that  even though  tillage  was thus not essential,  human  labour  and

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skill must be expended on the land itself and not merely  on the  growth from the land.  When income is derived from  the natural  growths from the land, it is derived from land  but not derived from land by the process of agriculture.  It  is derived  from  land  by agriculture only when  the  land  is subjected  to  the labour and skill of man, whether  in  the form of cultivation or otherwise, in order to produce or the improvement of the produce which yields the income.  On  the facts before them the learned Judges were of opinion that if forest  of natural growth was taken over and then  the  land was  regularly weeded and cleared, if it was  supplied  with moisture, necessary for the nourishment of the trees, by the cutting  of  channels across it and by the  distribution  of rain-water  through them and if the land was dug,  and  sown with seeds whenever bare patches appeared and while all this was  done,  if elaborate subsidiary arrangements  were  also maintained  for the protection of the trees and the  tending of  new  shoots springing from the stumps of old  trees  cut down till they themselves grew into new trees, it might well be  said that operations in forestry involving  agricultural operations  were  carried  on on the forest  land  and  that income derived from the land was derived from agriculture. Sir  Kameshwar Singh v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Bihar  & Orissa (1) which is the subject-matter of C.A. Nos. 11 2  to II  7  of 1956 before us also was a case  under  the  Indian Income-tax Act (XI of 1922).  It was found by the  Appellate Tribunal  that  the Sal and ebony trees which  grew  in  the forest were conserved by allowing each a circle of 15  feet, that there was cutting down (1)  [1954] 26 I.T.R. 121, 19 146 of  the  trees  and jungles which fell  within  that  circle leaving   sufficient  space  for  growth  and  that   forest conservancy  staff was maintained to look after the  forest. The Court construed the observations of the Privy Council in Raja Mustafa Ali Khan’s case (1) to mean that " in order  to show  that  an  income is  agricultural  income  within  the meaning  of the definition, it must be found that  the  land itself was cultivated and that there was some expenditure of skill  and  labour  upon  it."  The  Court  held  that  even conceding  that  the two conditions laid down by  the  Privy Council  in Raja Mustafa Ali Khan’s case were to be read  as alternative  conditions, there was no material on  which  to hold that there was any expenditure of skill and labour upon the  land and therefore the income from the sale  of  forest trees was not agricultural income. In  Jyotikana  Chowdhurani v. Commissioner  of  Income  Tax, Assam  (3)  which is also under appeal before  us  in  Civil Appeals  Nos.  57 to 62, a Special Bench of the  Assam  High Court  considered whether income, derived by  the  assessees from the sale of trees of spontaneous growth where there was no planting or sowing or employment of any human agency  for the  purpose of tilling the land but operations in  forestry were  carried  on  by the  assessee  involving  considerable expenditure  of  human  skill and  labour  was  agricultural income  within  the meaning of s. 2 (1) (a)  of  the  Indian Income  Tax  Act.  The majority of the Court  consisting  of Sarjoo  Prasad C.J. and Ram Labhaya J. (Deka J.  dissenting) held  that even though there was no tilling of the  land  or planting  of  seed  or  saplings  and  the  trees  were   of spontaneous  germination, the operations carried on  by  the assessees  were conducive to the growth and  development  of the  trees and in essence involved the expenditure of  human skill and labour on the land itself.  Those operations  were

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"agricultural  operations" and the land on which  the  trees stood  was  being  used  for  "agricultural  purposes"  and, therefore,  the  income  from  the sale  of  the  trees  was "agricultural income" and was exempt from taxation under  s. 4(3)(viii) of the Income-tax Act. (1)  [1948] 16 I.T.R. 330.  (2) [1953] 26 I.T.R.  424,  439, 461. 147 Sarjoo  Prasad  C.J. explained the test laid  down  in  Raja Mustafa  Ali  Khan v. Commissioner of  Incometax(1)  in  the manner following: " The contention of Mr. Iyengar is that the expression "some expenditure  of skill and labour upon it" is used merely  in further clarification of the expression "cultivation of  the land"  and,  therefore, all’ that their Lordships  held  was that  cultivation  of  the land was  necessary.   I  do  not concede   that   the  word  "cultivation"   is   necessarily synonymous with ploughing or tillage.  But even if it  were, I  am  unable to accept the argument for the  simple  reason that   if  precision  is  the  hallmark  of  Privy   Council decisions, as I think it is, then their Lordships would have stopped  short with the phrase "some measure of  cultivation of the land".  This, in itself, was quite expressive and  no further  expressions  were  needed to  clarify  the  matter. Therefore,  when they proceeded to add after a  ’comma,  the phrase "some expenditure of skill and labour upon it",  they evidently  intended  to  signify something  more  than  mere cultivation.   There  is, of course, no  conjunctive  phrase between the two expressions, but in the context the  meaning seems to be plain." Ram  Labhaya J. expressed himself in the test laid  down  by the Privy Council in these words: " A test however was laid down for finding out when land may be  said  to be used for agricultural  purposes.   The  test requires  that there must be some measure of cultivation  of the land; some expenditure of skill and labour upon it.   It has  however to be borne in mind that their  Lordships  when stating the facts did point out that the case had  proceeded on  the  footing  that there was nothing to  show  that  the assessee was carrying on any regular operations in forestry. This  statement  has  an important  bearing  on  the  inter- pretation  of  the test.  Such operations  in  forestry  are carried on in forests.  They involve the use of human labour and  skill on the soil.  They aim at stimulating growth  and could easily satisfy the requirements of the (1)  [1948] 16 I.T.R. 330. 148 test evolved by their Lordships.  Due importance, therefore, has to be given to the absence of operations in forestry  in Raja Mustafa Ali Khan’s Case (1) when interpreting the  test laid down therein."  Vikram  Deo Varma v. Commissioner of Income-tax,  ’Bihar  & Orissa  (2) is the last case of this series.   The  assessee derived income from extensive forest areas in the impartible estate of which he was proprietor.  Over several decades the whole  of the forest area had been subjected by hill  tribes to  a  process of "podu" cultivation-setting  fire  to’  the trees  and  cultivating the forest lands and  raising  crops thereon-so that it was impossible to say that there was  any virgin  forest  left.  Through a huge  forest  establishment considerable amount of human labour and skill was spent  (i) in  fostering the growth of trees and preserving  them  from destruction  by men and cattle; (ii) in cultivation  of  the soil  by felling and burning trees from time to time;  (iii) in  planned exploitation of trees by marking out  the  areas

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into  blocks:  (iv) in systematic cutting down of  trees  of Particular  girth and at particular heights (v) in  planting new trees where patches occur; and (vi) watering,   pruning, dibbling  and digging.  The Tribunal had held that as  there was no forest cultivation or tilling as such the income  was not due to agricultural operations and therefore not  exempt under  s. 4(3)(viii) of the Indian Income Tax Act.   In  the course  of the judgment the learned Judges referred  to  the observations of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Raja Mustafa  Ali  Khan’s  Case  (1)  but  observed  that   their Lordships  did  not  lay  down  what  the  measure  of  that cultivation should be or what the nature of skill and labour expended should be, in order to bring the operations  within the  meaning of the expression " agricultural purposes "  as used  in  the  definition  section.   The  question  to   be determined  in each case should, therefore, be  whether  the land  out of which the rent or revenue was derived was  used for " agricultural purposes." Unless the land was subject to some measure of cultivation or there was some expenditure of human skill and labour on it in order to (1) [1948] 16 I.T.R. 330. (2) [1951] 29 I.T.R. 76. 149 derive  the  rent  or  revenue, the  purpose  would  not  be agricultural.  It was observed that the cultivation was  not mere tilling but the science and art of cultivating the soil may  depend upon the nature of the soil the  atmosphere  and various  other  factors.  It was therefore idle  to  regard" tilling " as the sole or indispensable test of  agriculture. On  the facts before it, the Court held that the  operations carried on by the assessee through the forest  establishment showed  that there had been both cultivation of the soil  as well  as the application of human skill and labour upon  the land as well as on the trees themselves, and that  therefore the income derived from the forest was exempt from  taxation under s. 4(3) (viii) of the Indian Income-tax Act. Before  parting with these cases it may be apposite here  to note the following observations of Vishwanatha Sastri J.  in Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras v. K.E. Sundara  Mudaliar (1) at page 277: " In Commissioner of Agricultural Income Tax v. Raja Jagdish Chandra  Deo Dhabal Deb (2) it was held by a Division  Bench of the Calcutta High Court that income derived from the sale of sal trees growing spontaneously in forest and not planted by man was "   agricultural  " income within the meaning  of s.  2(1) of the Bengal Agricultural Income Tax  Act.   There was  no  digging or ploughing of the land  nor  planting  of trees  but  there were " operations in forestry  "  such  as guarding  the forest trees to keep away cattle and  allowing leaves  and  undergrowth  to be removed  by  people  of  the locality.   There was no breaking up of the soil, no  sowing or planting or watering or fencing.  Whether the decision is correct  or not can only be authoritatively declared by  the Supreme  Court  of  India.  It seems to  rest  on  an  undue extension  of  the  principle  laid  down  by  the  Judicial Committee  in Raja Mustafa Ali Khan’s Case(3) and goes  much further than our decision in the present case." It  appears  from  the above survey that there  has  been  a divergence of opinion amongst the various (1)  [1950]  18 I.T.R. 259,271.  (2) [1949] 17  I.T.R.  426, 438. (3) [1948] 16 I.T.R. 330. 150 Courts  not only in regard to the connotation of  the  terms "agriculture’ and "agricultural purposes" but also in regard

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to the nature of forestry operations performed in the forest which  can  be  styled  agricultural  operations  so  as  to constitute the "land used for agricultural purposes"  within the  definition of agricultural income as given both in  the Indian Income-tax Act and in the several Agricultural Income Tax Acts passed by the various States. It  may  be  noted  at the outset  that  the  definition  of "agricultural income" given in s. 2(1) of the Indian Income- tax  Act is in identical terms with the definitions of  that term  as given in the various Agricultural  Income-tax  Acts passed by the several States.  It will be idle therefore  to treat  "Taxes on Agricultural Income" which fall within  the legislative competence of the State Legislature as having no relation  at  all  to the corresponding  provisions  of  the Indian  Income-tax  Act.   Once it is  determined  that  the income   in   question  is  derived  from  land   used   for agricultural   purposes   by-  agriculture,  it   would   be agricultural  income  and as such exempt from tax  under  s. 4(3)(viii)  of  the  Indian Income-tax Act  and  would  fall within the purview of the relevant provisions of the several Agricultural  Income-tax Acts passed by the various  States. The result of this determination would be that the  assessee would  not be liable to assessment under the Indian  Income- tax Act but he would have to pay the Agricultural Income-tax which   would  be  levied  upon  him  under   the   relative Agricultural Income-tax Acts.  The only enquiry which  would therefore  be relevant is whether the income in question  is agricultural  income  within  the terms  of  the  definition thereof and that would have to be determined in each case by the  Court having regard to the facts and  circumstances  of the particular case before it. In order that an income derived by the assessee should  fall within the definition of agricultural income two  conditions are  necessary  to be satisfied and they are: (i)  that  the land   from  which  it  is  derived  should  be   used   for agricultural  purposes  and  is  either  assessed  for  land revenue in the taxable territories or is subject 151 to  local  rates assessed and collected by the  officers  of /the Government as such; and (ii) that the income should  be derived from such land by agriculture or by one or the other of  the operations described in cls. (ii) and (iii) of s.  2 (1) (b) of the Indian Income-tax Act. It  was at one time thought that the assessment of the  land to  land revenue in the taxable territories was intended  to exempt the income derived from that land from liability  for payment  of income-tax altogether and that theory was  based on  the  assumption  that an assessee  who  was  subject  to payment  of land revenue should not further be subjected  to the payment of income-tax, because if he was so subjected he would be liable to pay double taxation. It  is interesting to note at this stage the genesis of  the provision  exempting  agricultural income derived  from  the lands assessed to land revenue as understood by the  Courts. Vishwanatha  Sastri  J.  in this  context  observed  in  the Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras v.K.E.Sundara Mudaliar(l) at page 270: "I  shall  briefly advert to the genesis  of  the  provision exempting agricultural income derived from lands assessed to land  revenue,  as I consider that the subject  matter  with which the Legislature was dealing, and the facts existing at the time with respect to which the legislation was made, are legitimate  topics  for consideration  in  ascertaining  the object and scope of the exemption from income-tax  conferred on  agricultural  income.   This  exemption,  it  would   be

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noticed,  has  been a persistent feature of  the  Income-tax legislation  of this country from 1867 onwards, and  nothing like it is found in the English Income Tax Acts.  Even at  a time  when  there was no provision like Section 100  of  the Government  of India Act, 1935, with Federal and  Provincial Lists  and  there  was no incompetency on the  part  of  the Central  Legislature to levy a tax on  agricultural  income, the Income Tax Acts passed from time to time by the  Central Legislature  including  the existing Act of  1922,  exempted from income-tax the agricultural income of land assessed  to public revenue. (1)  [1950] 18 I.T.R. 259, 271. 152 This  exemption  was granted for no other  reason  than  the justice  and equity of exempting from further burden  income which had already paid its toll to the State in the shape of land  revenue either as a permanently fixed peishkush  under Regulation No. XXV of 1802 or as an assessment  periodically fixed  under  the ryotwari settlement.  Under  what  may  be called the common law in India, the State had the immemorial prerogative  right to collect a share of the produce of  the land  from  its owner, the latter having the full  right  to enjoyment  of the land and its produce, subject only to  the aforesaid  contribution  to  the  State.   Land  revenue  is collected  annually from the proprietor of the land  and  is presumably  exigible  from  the income of  the  land.   Cash payment  in lieu of a share of the produce due to the  State was  substituted  long  ago  to  facilitate  collection   of revenue.  Income derived from the produce of the land having been subjected to the payment of the annual land revenue, it was thought inequitable to subject the same income again  to annual income-tax.  Hence the exemption of the  agricultural income  of  assessed lands or lands whose revenue  had  been remitted  either in whole or in part, as in the case of  the inams.   Mines, minerals, and quarries having been  reserved by  the  State, at any rate in respect of lands  other  than those  comprised  in a permanently  settled  estate,  income derived from such sources was not exempted from  income-tax. The revenue assessment was based on the quality of the  soil and  the income derived from the produce of the  lands,  and therefore  the  exemption  from income-tax  was  limited  to agricultural  income derived from assessed lands.   Such  is the  reason  for exemption from income-tax  of  agricultural income." Whatever  may  have  been the genesis of  the  exemption  of agricultural  income from income-tax, the liability  to  pay land revenue or fixed peishkush under Regulation XXV of 1902 was  not considered by Rankin J. as a deterrent against  the levy  of  incometax in appropriate cases,  even  on  certain classes  of  income  derived from  the  permanently  settled estates, if that was the clear intention of the legislature. The 153 learned  Judge observed in Emperor v. Probhat Chandra  Barua (1): ,,Some reference was made at the bar to the practice of  the Revenue  Authorities  since  1886 as  regards  fisheries  in permanently settled estates but there is no agreement as  to what  that  practice-if  there  be  any  practice-has  been. Assuming  that it would have been open to us to  place  some degree  of  reliance  upon  an  interpretation  settled   by practice  as contemporanea expositio we are in fact  without any such assistance. "  Some reference was also made to what has been  called  a" presumption  against double taxation ". In Manindra  Chandra

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Nandi v. Secretary of State (2), royalties from a coal  mine were held liable both to cess under the Cess Act, 1880,  and to  income tax under the Act of 1886, but it was  said  that "it may be considered that courts always look with disfavour upon  double  taxation, and Statute will  be  construed,  if possible,  to  avoid double taxes." Reference  was  made  to certain dicta of American Courts and to the English case  of Carr v. Fowle (3)-But the only observation in this case  was to  the  effect that the statute presumably did  not  intend that  a vicar should in effect pay the same tax  (land  tax) twice on the same hereditament.  This is plain enough.  Thus the  income-tax  is one tax, and income assessed  under  one schedule  cannot be assessed all over again  under  another. That  there is any legal presumption of a general  character against  "  double  taxation  " in  any  wider  sense  is  a proposition to which I respectfully demur as a principle for the  construction of a modern statute.  In Manindra  Chandra Nandi v. Secretary of State (2) it did not avail to cut down clear’ though absolutely general language." This  view of Rankin J. was upheld by the Privy  Council  in Prabhat Chandra Barua v. King Emperor(4).  In the later case of  Yuvarajah of Pittapuram v. Commissioner -of Income  Tax, Madras  (5)  the Privy Council held that the  imposition  of Income-tax in respect of income derived from the permanently settled estate (1)  (1924) I.L.R. 51 Cal. 504. (2)  (1907) I.L.R. 34 Cal. 257, 287. (3)  (1893) 1 Q.B. 251. (4)  (1930) L.R. 57 I.A. 228. (5)  [1949] 17 I.T.R. 445. 20 154 would  not  be a breach of the Madras  Permanent  Settlement Regulations No. XXV of 1802.  The assessment of land to land revenue  or  its being subject to local rates  assessed  and collected  by  the  officers of the Government  as  such  is merely  an indication that the land is an agricultural  land as   distinguished   from  land  which  can  be   used   for agricultural purposes but carries the matter no further. We have, therefore, to consider when it can be said that the land  is  used  for agricultural  purposes  or  agricultural operations  are performed on it.  Agriculture is  the  basic idea underlying the expressions "agricultural purposes"  and "agricultural  operations" and it is pertinent therefore  to enquire  what is the connotation of the term  "agriculture". As we have noted above, the primary sense in which the  term agriculture   is  understood  is  agar-field   and   cultra- cultivation,  i.e., the cultivation of the field and if  the term is understood only in that sense, agriculture would  be restricted  only  to cultivation of the land in  the  strict sense  of  the term meaning thereby, tilling  of  the  land, sowing of the seeds, planting and similar operations on  the land.  They would be the basic operations and would  require the  expenditure  of human skill and labour  upon  the  land itself.   There are however other operations which have  got to  be  resorted  to  by the  agriculturist  and  which  are absolutely necessary for the purpose of effectively  raising the  produce  from  the land.  They  are  operations  to  be performed  after  the produce sprouts from the  land,  e.g., weeding,  digging  the soil around the  growth,  removal  of undesirable  under-growths and all operations  which  foster the  growth and preserve the same not only from insects  and pests  but  also  from depredation  from  outside,  tending, pruning, cutting, harvesting, and rendering the produce  fit for  the  market.   The latter  would  all  be  agricultural

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operations   when  taken  in  conjunction  with  the   basic operations  above described, and it would be futile to  urge that they are not agricultural operations at all.  But  even though  these  subsequent operations may be  assimilated  to agricultural  operations, when they are in conjunction  with these basic operations, could it be said that even 155 though  they are divorced from these basic  operations  they would nevertheless enjoy the characteristic of  agricultural operations  ?  Can  one  eliminate  these  basic  operations altogether  and say that even if these basic operations  are not performed in a given case the mere performance of  these subsequent operations would be tantamount to the performance of  agricultural operations on the land so as to  constitute the  income derived by the assessee  therefrom  agricultural income within the definition on that term ? We  are  of  opinion  that the  mere  performance  of  these subsequent  operations  on the products of the  land,  where such  products  have  not been raised on  the  land  by  the performance of the basic operations which we have  described above   would  not  be  enough  to  characterise   them   as agricultural  operations.  In order to invest them with  the character  of  agricultural  operations,  these   subsequent operations  must  necessarily be in conjunction with  and  a continuation of the basic operations which are the effective cause  of  the products being raised from the land.   It  is only  if  the  products  are raised from  the  land  by  the performance  of these basic operations that  the  subsequent operations attach themselves to the products of the land and acquire the characteristic of agricultural operations.   The cultivation of the land does not comprise merely of  raising the  products of the land in the narrower sense of the  term like tilling of the land, sowing of the seeds, planting, and similar  work  done  on  the  land  but  also  includes  the subsequent operations set out above all of which operations, basic as well as subsequent, form one integrated activity of the  agriculturist and the term "agriculture" has got to  be understood  as  connoting this integrated  activity  of  the agriculturist.   One cannot dissociate the basic  operations from the subsequent operations, and say that the  subsequent operations,  even  though they are divorced from  the  basic operations   can  constitute  agricultural   operations   by themselves.   If this integrated activity which  constitutes agriculture  is  undertaken and performed in regard  to  any land  that  land  can  be  said to  have  been  used  for  " agricultural purposes " and the income 156 derived  therefrom can be said to be " agricultural  income" derived from the land by agriculture. In considering the connotation of the term " agriculture" we have  so  far thought of cultivation of land  in  the  wider sense  as comprising within its scope the basic as  well  as the subsequent operations described above, regardless of the nature  of the products raised on the land.  These  products may be grain or vegetables or fruits which are necessary for the  sustenance  of human beings including  plantations  and groves,  or  grass or pasture for consumption of  beasts  or articles  of  luxury such as, betel,  coffee,  tea,  spices, tobacco etc., or commercial crops like, cotton, flax,  jute, hemp,  indigo etc.  All these are products raised  from  the land and the term "agriculture" cannot be confined merely to the  production of grain and food products for human  beings and beasts as was sought to be done by Bhashyam Ayyangar  J. in Murugesa Chetti v. Chinnathambi Goundun (1) or  Sadashiva Ayyar  J. in Rajah of Venkatagiri v. Ayyappa Reddi  (2)  but

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must be understood as comprising all the products of the  I- and  which have some utility either for consumption  or  for trade  and commerce and would also include  forest  products such   as   timber,  sal  and   piyasal   trees,   casuarina plantations, tendu leaves, horranuts etc. The question still remains whether there is any warrant  for the  further  extension of the term " agriculture "  to  all activities in relation to the land or having connection with the land including breeding and rearing of livestock, dairy- farming,  butter  and cheese making,  poultry-farming,  etc. This  extension is based on the dictionary meanings  of  the term  and  the  definitions of  agriculture  "  collated  in Wharton’s Law Lexicon, as also the dicta of Lord Cullen  and Lord  Wright  in  Lean  & Dickinson v.  Ball  (3)  and  Lord Glaneley v. Wightman (4) quoted above. Derbyshire  C.J.  in Moolji Sicka & Co.,  In  re(5)  treated tendu  plants  growing on the soil as part of the  soil  and therefore considered the pruning of the shrub (1)  (1901) I.L.R. 24 Mad. 421, 423. (2)  (1913) I.L.R. 38 Mad. 738. (3)  (1925) 10 Tax Cas. 341. (4)  [1933] A.C. 618 (H.L.) 638. (5)  [1939] 7 I.T.R. 493. 157 as  cultivation of the soil in a legal and  technical  sense and  this  extension  of the  term  "agriculture"  was  also approved by Vishwanatha Sastri J. in Commissioner of  Income Tax  v.  K.  E. Sundara Mudaliar (1).   We  are  however  of opinion  that  the  mere  fact that  an  activity  has  some connection  with or is in some way dependent on land is  not sufficient to bring it within the scope of the term and such extension  of  the term "agriculture" is  unwarranted.   The term  "agriculture" cannot be dissociated from  the  primary significance  thereof  which is that of cultivation  of  the land  and  even though it can be extended in the  manner  we have  stated  before  both  in  regard  to  the  process  of agriculture and the products which are raised upon the land, there  is  no  warrant  at  all  for  extending  it  to  all activities which have relation to the land or are in any way connected with the land.  The use of the word agriculture in regard to such activities would certainly be a distortion of the term. A  critical examination of the definition  of  "agricultural income" as given in s. 2(1) of the Indian Income tax Act and the relevant provisions of the several Agricultural  Income- tax  Acts of the various States also lends support  to  this position.   In the first instance, it is defined as rent  or revenue  derived  from land which is used  for  agricultural purposes; and it is next defined as income derived from such land by agriculture or by the activities described in cls. 2 and  3  of  s. 2(1)(b) of the  Act.   These  activities  are postulated to be performed by the cultivator or receiver  of rent-in-kind  of such land in regard to the products  raised or  received  by  him which necessarily  means  the  produce raised  on  the  land either by himself  or  by  the  actual cultivator  of the land who pays such rent-in-kind  to  him. If produce raised or received by the cultivator or  receiver of rent-in-kind is thus made the subject-matter of cls. (ii) and (iii) in s. 2 (1)(b) of the Act, the term  "agriculture" used  in  cl.  (i)  of s. 2(1)(b)  must  also  be  similarly restricted to the performance of the basic operations on the land and there is no scope for reading the term  agriculture " in the still wider sense indicated above. (1)  [1950] 18 I.T.R. 259, 271. 158

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If the term " agriculture " is thus understood as comprising within its scope the basic as well as subsequent  operations in the process of agriculture and the raising on the land of products  which have some utility either for consumption  or for  trade  and commerce, it will be seen that  the  term  " agriculture " receives a wider interpretation both in regard to  its  operations  as well as the results  of  the  same’. Nevertheless there is present all throughout the basic  idea that  there must be at the bottom of it cultivation of  land in  the sense of tilling of the land, sowing of  the  seeds, planting,  and  similar work done on the  land  itself  This basic  conception  is  the essential sine  qua  non  of  any operation  performed on the land  constituting  agricultural operation.   If the basic operations are there, the rest  of the operations found themselves upon the same.  But if these basic  operations are wanting the subsequent  operations  do not acquire the characteristic of agricultural operations. All  these  operations no doubt require the  expenditure  of human labour and skill but the human labour and skill  spent in the performance of the basic operations only can be  said to  have  been spent upon the land.  The  human  labour  and skill  spent  in the performance  of  subsequent  operations cannot be said to have been spent on the land itself, though it  may  have  the  effect  of  preserving,  fostering   and regenerating the products of the land. This  distinction  is not so important in  cases  where  the agriculturist  performs  these operations as a part  of  his integrated  activity  in cultivation of  the  land.   Where, however, the products of the land are of spontaneous growth, unassisted  by human skill and labour, and human  skill  and labour   are   spent  merely  in   fostering   the   growth, preservation and regeneration of such products of land,  the question  falls  to be considered whether  these  subsequent operations  performed by the agriculturist are  agricultural operations  and  enjoy the  characteristic  of  agricultural operations. It  is agreed on all hands that products which grow wild  on the  land  or are of spontaneous growth  not  involving  any human labour or skill upon the land are 159 not products of agriculture and the income derived therefrom is  not  agricultural  income.   There  is  no  process   of agriculture  involved in the raising of these products  from the land.  There are no agricultural operations performed by the assessee in respect of the same, and the only work which the assessee performs here is that of collecting the produce and  consuming  and  marketing the  same.   No  agricultural operations  have been performed and there is no question  at all  of  the  income derived  therefrom  being  agricultural income within the definition given in s. 2(1) of the  Indian Income-tax  Act.   Where,  however,  the  assessee  performs subsequent operations on these products of land which are of wild  or spontaneous growth, the nature of those  operations would  have to be determined in the light of the  principles enunciated above. Applying these principles to the facts of the present  case, we  no  doubt  start with the finding  that  the  forest  in question was of spontaneous growth.  If there were no  other facts  found,  that  would entail the  conclusion  that  the income  is not agricultural income.  But, then, it has  also been found by the Tribunal that the forest is more than  150 years  old, though portions of the forest have from time  to time  been  denuded, that is to say, trees  have  completely fallen and the proprietors have planted fresh trees in those areas, and they have performed operations for the purpose of

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nursing the trees planted by them.  It cannot be denied that so  far  as those trees are concerned,  the  income  derived therefrom would be agricultural income.  In view of the fact that the forest is more than 150 years old, the areas  which had  thus become denuded and replanted cannot be  considered to be negligible.  The position therefore is that the  whole of  the income derived from the forest cannot be treated  as non-agricultural  income.  If the enquiry had been  directed on proper lines, it would have been possible for the Income- tax  authorities  to  ascertain how much of  the  income  is attributable to forest of spontaneous growth and how much to trees  planted by the proprietors.  But no such enquiry  had been directed, and in view of the long lapse of time, we  do not consider it desirable to direct any such 160 enquiry now.  The expenditure shown by the assessee for  the maintenance  of the forest is about Rs. 17,000 as against  a total  income  of about Rs. 51,000.  Having  regard  to  the magnitude  of  this  figure, we  think  that  a  substantial portion  of  the income must have been  derived  from  trees planted  by the proprietors themselves.  As no  attempt  has been  made by the Department to establish which  portion  of the income is attributable to forest of spontaneous  growth, there  are  no  materials on which we  could  say  that  the judgment of the court below is wrong. The appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed. 161