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PETITIONER: THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX,MADHYA PRADESH AND BHOPAL

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: SODRA DEVI(with connected appeal)

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 17/05/1957

BENCH: BHAGWATI, NATWARLAL H. BENCH: BHAGWATI, NATWARLAL H. DAS, S.K. KAPUR, J.L.

CITATION:  1957 AIR  832            1958 SCR    1

ACT: Income-tax-Computation of total income-’Individual’, Meaning of-Indian  Income-tax Act, 1922 (XI Of 1922), as amended  by the Indian Income-tax (Amendment) Act, 1937 (IV Of 1937), S. 16(3).

HEADNOTE: The  common question of law for determination in  these  two appeals  was whether the word ’individual ’ in s.  16(3)  of the  ’Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, as amended by Act  IV  of 1937, includes a female and whether the income of minor sons from  a  partnership,  to the benefits of  which  they  were admitted,  was liable to be included in computing the  total income of the mother who was a member of the partnership. Held, (Per Bhagwati and Kapur jj., S. K. Das J.  dissenting) that the question must be answered in the negative. The  word ’individual’ occurring in s. 16(3) of  the  Indian Income-tax  Act, as amended by Act IV Of 1937, means only  a male and does not include a female. Shrimati  Chanda  Devi v. The  Commissioner  of  Income-tax, (1950) 18 I.T.R. 944 and Musta Quima Begum, In re, (1953) 23 I.T.R. 345, disapproved. Where the Legislature uses ambiguous language in enacting  a statute,  as  it has undoubtedly done in the  instant  case, recourse  must  necessarily be had, for a  clarification  of such  ambiguity,  to the pre-existing state of  the  law  in order  to  see  what defect or mischief  therein  was  being sought to be remedied, the remedy that was prescribed by the statute and the reason for it. Bengal  Immunity  Company  Limited v. The  State  of  Bihar, (1955)  2 S.C.R. 603, Thomson v. Lord Clanmorris,  (1900)  1 Ch.   D. 718 and Eastman Photographic Materials  Company  v. Comptroller  General  of Patents, Designs and  Trade  Marks, (1898) A.C. 571, relied on. A reference to the Income-Tax Enquiry Report, 1936, and  the Statement of objects and reasons that led to the passing  of the  Indian Income-tax (Amendment) Act IV of 1937  makes  it clear  beyond  doubt that the mischief the  Legislature  was seeking  to  remedy  was one that resulted  from  a  husband entering into a 2

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nominal partnership with his wife or a father admitting  his minor  children  to the benefits of a partnership,  and  the possibility of a mother doing so was not even thought of. Per  S. K. Das J.-There is no ambiguity in s. 16(3)  of  the Indian  Income-Tax Act, as amended by Act IV Of  1937,  and, read  in the context of the other provisions of the Act  and construed  as  a  whole,  it  clearly  indicates  that   the Legislature used the word ’individual ’ in that  sub-section in its ordinary connotation to mean both a male and a female person. Even  if, on the assumption that there is ambiguity  in  the phraseology  used in the sub-section, reference is  made  to the  Income-Tax Enquiry Report, 1936, and the  Statement  of objects  and reasons of the Amending Act IV of 1937 for  the limited  purpose for which it is permissible to do so,  they disclose  nothing  concerning  the  policy  adopted  by  the Legislature  or  the  object the, statute  was  intended  to accomplish  that  makes any other meaning  inevitable.   The recommendations  made by the Report were not fully  accepted by the Legislature and it cannot be a reliable guide and the use of the word ’parent’ in the Statement clearly shows that the mischief envisaged was not confined to the father alone.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 322 and  25 of 1955. Appeal from the judgment and order dated April 13, 1954,  of the Nagpur High Court in Miscellaneous Civil Case No. 71  of 1956 and appeal from the judgment and order dated August 26, 1952, of the Punjab High Court in Civil Reference No. 11  of 1952. C.   K.  Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India, G.  N.  Joshi and R. H. Dhebar, for the appellant in C.A. No. 322 of  1955 and respondent in C.A. No. 25 of 1955. R.   J. Kolah, J. B.  Dadachanji, S. N. Andley and Rameshwar Nath, for the respondent in C.A. No. 322 of 1955. G.   S.  Pathak and M. L. Kapur, for the appellant  in  C.A. No. 25 of 1955. 1957.  May 17.  The Judgment of Bhagwati and J.L. Kapur  JJ. was  delivered  by  Bhagwati  J. S.K.  Das  J.  delivered  a separate judgment. BHAGWATI  J.-These  two  appeals  with  certificates   under Section  66A (2) of the Indian Income-Tax  Act  (hereinafter referred  to as the Act) raise a common question of law  and will be governed by this common judgment. 3 The facts leading up to these appeals may be shortly  stated as under. Prior  to October 18, 1944, one Rai Bahadur Narsingdas  Daga (since   deceased),   his  wife  Shrimati   Sodradevi   (the assessee),  and  his  three  major  and  three  minor   sons constituted a joint and undivided Hindu family.  There was a severance  of joint status between the erstwhile members  of the  said  joint family on October 18, 1944, and  the  joint family  properties  were accordingly partitioned.   On  such partition,  the business of the Spinning and  Weaving  Mills and  agency  shop  at Hinganghat fell to the  share  of  the assessee  and  her  three major and  three  minor  sons.   A partnership  was entered into between the assessee  and  her three major sons for the purpose of carrying on the business of  the  Spinning and Weaving Mills and the agency  firm  at Hinganghat.   The  three  minor sons of  the  assessee  were admitted   to   the  benefits  of  the   partnership.    The

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genuineness  of the partnership was not disputed.  The  only question  which arose for the consideration of the  Tribunal was  whether  the income falling to the share of  the  three minor sons was liable to be included in the total income  of the  assessee.  Oil a construction of s. 16 (3) (a) (ii)  of the  Act, the Tribunal held that the income falling  to  the shares of the three minor sons of the assessee was liable to be  included  in her total income.  The  assessee  thereupon applied to the Tribunal for a reference to the High Court of Judicature  at Nagpur of the question of law arising out  of its  order  under  s. 66 (1) of the  Act  and  the  Tribunal submitted  a  statement  of  case  referring  the  following question of law for the determination of the High Court: "  Whether  on  a true construction  of  the  provisions  of section 16 (3) (a) (ii) of the Indian Income-tax Act,  1922, the income of the three minor sons of the assessee is liable to be included in her total income.  " The  High  Court  heard  the  reference  and  came  to   the conclusion that it was not the intention of the  Legislature to  include in the income of the mother, the income  of  her minor children arising from the benefits of partnership of a firm in which the mother is a 4 partner  and accordingly answered the referred  question  in the   negative.   The  High  Court,  however,  granted   the necessary  certificate  under s. 66A (2) of the Act  to  the Commissioner of Income-tax, Madhya Pradesh and Bhopal, and hence Civil Appeal No. 322 of 1955 before us. One  Ishwardas  Sahni who died on November 7,  1946,  was  a partner in the firm of Messrs.  Ishwardas Sahni & Bros.  The firm’s  accounting year ended on March 31, 1947.   The  said Ishwardas Sahni left him surviving his widow Damayanti  (the assessee) and two minor sons.  The assessee became a partner in  the said firm which also admitted her two minor sons  to the benefits of the partnership.  The Income-tax authorities included the minor sons’ shares in the reconstituted  firm’s profits  in  computing  the income of the  assessee  on  the ground that " individual " in s. 16 (3) (a) (ii) of the  Act meant  an individual person of either sex.   The  Income-tax Appellate  Tribunal held that the word "individual" must  be taken  as  referring only to a male assessee  wherever  that occurred  in  s. 16 (3) and directed the deletion  from  the assessee’s  income  of the shares of her minor sons  in  the profits of the firm.  At the instance of the Commissioner of Income-tax,  Delhi, the Tribunal referred to the High  Court of  Punjab at Simla the question of law arising out  of  its order  under s. 66 (1) of the Act together with a  statement of case.  The referred question was:- " Whether the word " individual " in Section 16(3) (a)  (ii) of  the  Income Tax Act, 1922, includes also  a  female  and whether  the  shares  of  the two  minor  sons  of  Shrimati Damayanti Sahni in the profits of the re-constituted firm of Messrs.  Ishwardas Sahni and Brothers should be included  in the  income  of Shrimati Damayanti Sahni  in  assessing  her income, profits and gains.  " The  High  Court  heard  the  reference  and  following  the decision  given by the High Court of Allahabad  in  Shrimati Chanda  Devi v. The Commissioner of Incometax (1),  answered the referred question in the affirmative. (1)  [1950] 18 I.T.R. 944. 5 The assessee obtained the requisite certificate under s. 66A (2)  of  the Act from the High Court and that is  how  Civil Appeal No. 25 of 1955 is before us. The  common  question of law which we have to  determine  in

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these  appeals is whether the word " individual " in  s.  16 (3)  (a)  (ii)  of the Act includes also a  female  and  the income  of the minor sons derived from a partnership to  the benefits  of which they have been admitted is liable  to  be included in the income of the mother who is a member of that partnership. Section 16(3) of the Act provides: " In computing the total income of any individual for  the purpose of assessment, there shall be included- (a)  so much of the income of a wife or minor child of  such individual as arises directly or indirectly: (i)from  the membership of the wife in a firm of  which  her husband is a partner; (ii)from  the admission of the minor to the benefits of  the partnership in a firm of which such individual is a partner; (iii)from  assets transferred directly or indirectly to  the wife   by   the   husband  otherwise   than   for   adequate consideration  or  in connection with an agreement  to  live apart; or (iv)from  assets transferred directly or indirectly  to  the minor   child,  not  being  a  married  daughter,  by   such individual otherwise than for adequate consideration; and (b)so  much  of the income of any person or  association  of persons as arises from assets transferred otherwise than for adequate consideration to the person or association by  such individual  for the benefit of his wife or a minor child  or both." Section 3 of the Act may also be referred to in this context and it runs as follows: Section 3. Charge of Income Tax: "  Where  any Central Act enacts that  income-tax  shall  be charged for any year at any rate or rates, tax at that  rate or those rates shall be charged for that year in  accordance with,  and subject to the provisions of this Act in  respect of  the  total  income  of  the  previous  year-  of   every individual, Hindu undivided 6 family, company and local authority, and of every firm  and- other association of persons or the partners of the firm  or the members of the association individually." The same description of the assessee is also to be found  in s.   4A,   which  deals  with  residence  in   the   taxable territories,  s.  48 dealing with refund and s.  58  dealing with the charge of super-tax. The  word  assessee  is wide enough to  cover  not  only  an "individual" but also a Hindu undivided family, company  and local  authority  and every firm and  other  association  of persons  or the partners of the firm or the members  of  the association  individually.  Whereas the word " individual  " is  narrower in its connotation being one of the  units  for the  purposes  of taxation than the word " assessee  ",  the word  "  individual " has not been defined in  the  Act  and there  is  authority  for the proposition that  the  word  " individual  " does not mean only a human being but  is  wide enough to include a group of persons forming a unit.  It has been  held that the word " individual " includes a  Corpora- tion  created  by  a statute, e.g., a University  or  a  Bar Council,  or the trustees of a baronetcy trust  incorporated by  a  Baronetcy Act.  It would also include a  minor  or  a person  of unsound mind.  If this is the connotation of  the word  " individual " it follows that when s. 16(3) talks  of an  "individual" it is only in a restricted sense  that  the word has been used.  The section only talks of "  individual "  capable  of  having a wife or minor child  or  both.   It therefore  necessarily excludes from its purview a group  of

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persons forming a unit or a corporation created by a statute and  is  confined only to human beings who  in  the  context would be -comprised within that category. The Revenue urges before us that the word " individual "  as used  qua  human beings is capable of including  within  its connotation  a male as well as a female of the  species  and having regard to the context in which the word has been used in s. 16(3), it should be construed as meaning a male of the species  when used in Juxtaposition with " a wife "  and  as meaning both a male and a female when used in  juxtaposition with "minor child" so that when s. 16(3) talks of 7 such  individual"  in  sub-cls. (ii) and  (iv)  of  cl.  (a) thereof it refers to both a male and a female of the species so as to include within its compass not only a father of the minor child but also a mother. The  assessees, on the other hand, contend that the  word  " individual  "  used in s. 16(3) is not used in  its  generic sense  but  is used in a restricted and  narrower  sense  as connoting  only  human being and if it  is  thus  restricted there  is  ample  justification  for  restricting  it  still further  to  the male of the species when  regarded  in  the context of s. 16(3).  Sub-clauses (i) to (iv) of cl. (a) are specific  cases where the income of a wife or a minor  child of ,such individual" arising directly or indirectly from the several  sources  therein  indicated is to  be  included  in computing  the  total  income of the  "individual"  for  the purpose of assessment and the word could not have been ’Used in  a different sense for the purposes of sub-cls.  (i)  and (iii)  and  sub cls. (ii) and (iv) of cl. (a).  The  word  " such individual " as used in sub-cl. (a) can only have  been used  in  one sense and one sense only and if  that  is  the sense  in which it could have been used " such individual  " should be one who is capable of having a wife or minor child or  both  and  that individual can only be  a  male  of  the species and not a female. The question for our determination is a very narrow one  and it  turns on the construction of s. 16(3) of the  Act.   The High  Court  of  Madhya  Pradesh  plunged  headlong  into  a discussion  of the reasons which motivated  the  Legislature into  enacting  s. 16 (3) by Act IV of 1937, and  took  into consideration  the  recommendations made in the  Income  Tax Enquiry  Report, 1936 and also the statement of objects  and reasons  for the enactment of the same, without  considering in the first instance whether there was any ambiguity in the word individual " as used therein.  It is clear that  unless there  is  any such ambiguity it would not be  open  to  the court  to depart from the normal rule of construction  which is that the intention of the Legislature should be primarily gathered from the words which are used.  It is only when the words  used  are  ambiguous  that they  would  stand  to  be examined and 8 construed  in  the light of  surrounding  circumstances  and constitutional principle and practice (Per Lord Ashbourne in Nairn v. University of St. Andrews(1).  In the latter  event the following observations of Lord Lindley M. R. in  Thomson v. Lord Clanmorris(2) would be apposite: " In construing any statutory enactment, regard must be  had not  only to the words used, but to the history of  the  Act and  the  reasons which led to its being passed.   You  must look at the mischief which had to be cured as well as at the cure  provided" (See also the observations of Goddard C.  J. in B. v. Paddington and St. Marylebone Rent Tribunal (3). The position in law has been thus enunciated in the judgment

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of Das, Actg.  C.J. (as he then was) in the Bengal  Immunity Company Limited v. The State of Bihar (4) : "  It  is a sound rule of construction of a  statute  firmly established  in  England as far back as 1584  when  Heydon’s Case (5) was decided that-   "............ for the sure and true interpretation of  all statutes   in   general  (be  they  penal   or   beneficial, restrictive or enlarging of the common law) four things  are to be discerned and considered: 1st.  What was the common law before the making of the Act., 2nd.  What was the mischief and defect for which the  common law did not provide., 3rd.  What remedy the Parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the Commonwealth., and 4th.  The true reason of the remedy; and then the office  of all  judges  is always to make such  construction  as  shall suppress  the  mischief,  and advance  the  remedy,  and  to suppress  subtle inventions and evasions for continuance  of the mischief, and pro privato commodo, and to add force  and life to the cure and remedy, according to the true intent of the makers of the Act, pro bono publico.  " (1)  (1909) A.C. 147. (2)  (1900) 1 Ch.  D. 718, 725 (3)  (1949) 65 T.L.R. 200, 203. (4)  (1955) 2 S.C.R. 603, 632. (5) (1584) 3 Co. Rep. 7a; 76 E.R. 637, 9 In In re Mayfair Property Company (1) Lindley M. R. in  1898 found  the rule " as necessary now as it was when Lord  Coke reported Heydon’s case ". In Eastman Photographic  Materials Company v. Comptroller General of Patents, Designs and Trade Marks (2) Earl of Halsbury re-affirmed the rule as follows: "  My Lords, it appears to me that to construe  the  statute now  in  question,  it is not  only  legitimate  but  highly convenient  to  refer  both to the former  Act  and  to  the ascertained  evils to which the former Act had  given  rise, and to the later Act which provided the remedy.  These three things being compared, I cannot doubt the conclusion." The  High Court of Punjab based its conclusion primarily  on the  use  of the word "or" between the word "wife"  and  the words "minor child" in s. 16(3)(a) of the Act and it was  of opinion  that  these words were used disjunctively  and  the "individual" referred to in s. 16(3) (a) of the Act may have a  wife and minor child or may not have a wife but have a  " minor child ". If the individual assessed to income tax is a female that individual will have no wife but she may have  a minor child and therefore s. 16 (3) (a) of the Act does  not imply that the individual must necessarily be a male. The  argument  based  on the disjunctive user  of  the  word "wife"  and  the  words "minor child" is  capable  of  being summarily disposed of.  Even if the words "such  individual" in s. 16 (3)(a) of the Act meant only a male of the  species the word "wife" and the words "minor child" could only  have been  used  with the word "or" in between.  A  male  of  the species  may. not necessarily have both a wife and  a  minor child.   He  may have a wife but no "minor child".   He  may have  a  minor child but may have no wife  at  the  relevant period.   If  therefore  provision had to be  made  for  the inclusion of the income of a wife or minor child or both  in the total income of a male of the species the word "or"  was absolutely  necessary  to  be interposed  between  the  word "wife"  and the words ’minor child".  To construe  the  word "or" as disjunctive between the word "wife" and (1) L.R. (1898) 2 Ch. 28, 35. (2) (1898) A.C. 571, 576.

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10 the  words  "minor child" does not necessarily lead  to  the conclusion  that the words "such individual" were  used  for both a male and a female of the species and were necessarily inconsistent  with the user of those words for the  male  of the   species  if  the  context  otherwise  lead   to   that conclusion.  The reasoning adopted by the learned Judges  of the  High  Court  of Punjab therefore does  not  clinch  the matter. We have therefore got to examine whether the use of the word "individual"  in  s. 16(3) (a) of the Act is in  any  manner ambiguous.   The  opening  words of s. 16(3)  talk  of  "any individual"  whose total income has got to be  computed  for the  purpose of assessment and the words  "such  individual" used  in  section  16(3) (a) have  reference  only  to  that individual.   That individual must be an assessee and it  is in  the computation of his total income for the  purpose  of assessment that the income of the persons mentioned in  cls. (a) and (b) have got to be included.  Sub-clause (a)  refers to two distinct sets of persons bearing a relationship  with "such  individual",  the assessee.  One is a  wife  and  the other is a minor child.  The case of the wife is dealt  with in  sub-cls. (i) and (iii) and the case of a minor child  is dealt in sub-cls. (ii) and (iv).  Sub-clauses (i) and  (iii) use the word "her husband" or "the husband" in place of  the words "such individual" with reference to the income derived by the wife in the circumstances therein mentioned,  though, it  may  be  observed  that the  user  of  the  words  "such individual" would not have made the slightest difference  to the  position.  Subclauses (ii) and (iv) which deal  with  a "minor child" use the words "such individual" in relation to the minor child whose income under the circumstances therein mentioned  has to be included in computing the total  income of "such individual" for the purpose of assessment.  Whereas the  words used in sub-cls. (i) and (iii) are  specific  and refer  only  to  "her husband" and "the  husband"  as  "such individual", the words used in sub-cls. (ii) and (iv)  leave it  indefinite  as  to which is meant  by  the  words  "such individual"  whether a male and/or a female of the  species. If the words used in all these four sub-clauses were to be 11 harmoniously  read and the two cases which are mentioned  in sub-cls.  (i) and (iii) are not to be read differently  from the  cases mentioned in sub-cls. (ii) and (iv) the only  way in  which  the words "such individual" as used  in  sub-cls. (ii)  and (iv) could be understood would be to read them  as confined  to  a male of the species and  not  including  the female.   If these words "such individual" as used  in  sub- cls. (ii) and (iv) are thus read restricted to a male of the species, all these sub-clauses would have reference only  to the  male of the species irrespective of the fact  that  the words "her husband" and "the husband" have been used in sub- cls.  (i) and (iii) instead of the words "such  individual". If the words "such individual" had been used in sub-cls. (i) and  (iii) as they have been used in sub-cls. (ii) and  (iv) the  position would have been just the same because in  that event also we would have had to determine whether there  was any  justification for reading the words  "such  individual" used  with  reference  to  sub-cls. (i)  and  (iii)  in  any different  sense  from the same words "such  individual"  as used  in sub-cls. (ii) and (iv).  The crux of the  question, therefore,  is whether the words "such individual"  used  in the opening part of s. 16 (3) (a) are used to mean a male of the  species  when they are read in juxtaposition  with  the words "a wife" and are used to mean both a male as well as a

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female  of  the species, as the case may be,  when  used  in juxtaposition with the words "minor child". If  that  was  the intention of the  Legislature  there  was nothing  to prevent it from dividing cl. (a) into  two  sub- clauses  whether they were numbered (a) and (ai) or (a)  and (b)  respectively.   The  Legislature  could  as  well  have enacted the provisions in the manner following: (a):so  much of the income of a wife of such  individual  as arises directly or indirectly; (i)from  the membership of the wife in a firm of  which  her husband (or such individual) is a partner; or (ii)from  assets transferred directly or indirectly  to  the wife by the husband (or such individual) 12 otherwise  than for adequate consideration or in  connection with an agreement to live apart; (ai) or (b): so much of the income of a minor child of  such individual as arises directly or indirectly ; (i)from  the admission of the minor to the benefits  of  the partnership in a firm of which such individual is a partner; or (ii)from  assets transferred directly or indirectly  to  the minor   child,  not  being  a  married  daughter,  by   such individual otherwise than for adequate consideration. If these provisions had been enacted in the manner aforesaid it  would  have  been possible to urge, as  has  been  urged before  us by the Revenue, that cl. (a) referred only  to  a male of the species who only could have a wife and cl.  (ai) or (b) referred to a male and/or a female of the species. The  Legislature however chose to adopt a peculiar  mode  of enactment  either  for the purpose of economy  of  words  or structural beauty and mixed up both these sets of provisions into  the enactment of cl. (a) of s. 16(3) of the Act as  it stands  at present.  It rolled in both these sets  of  cases and  used  the  words "a wife" or  "minor  child"  of  "such individual" raising thus the question of construction  which has  got  to be determined by us.  "Such individual"  as  is talked of in s. 16(3) (a) may have a wife, may have a  minor child or may have both a wife and a minor child.  When "such individual" is thought of in connection with a wife, it  can only be a male of the species, but when "such individual" is thought of in connection with a minor child it can be both a male as well as a female of the species, though, of  course, when  "such  individual" is thought of  in  connection  with "both" then again it would have to be a male of the  species and  certainly not a female.  Such an  interpretation  would lead   to  the  interpretation  of  the  same  words   "such individual" as meaning two different things in two different contexts.   They would mean one thing when used in  relation to  "a  wife"  and would mean another  thing  when  used  in relation to a "     minor child".  They would be capable’ of being understood in a narrower sense when used in connection with "a wife" and would be capable of being 13 understood  in a wider sense when used in connection with  a "minor child".  One may as well question the elegance or the propriety of such user of the words "such individual"  where the  words  "as  the  case may be"  are  necessarily  to  be imported  in  order to understand the true import  of  these words,  when again they are used not in different  parts  of the same section but at one place only. If  one  turns to s. 16 (3) (b) the words used  therein  are "transferred............   by  "such  individual"  for   the benefit of his wife or a minor child or both".  There is the indefinite article "a" used before the words "minor  child".

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If  that  indefinite  article "a" had  not  been  used,  the expression  would have run "for the benefit of his  wife  or minor  child or both" thus leaving no doubt at all  that  in cl.  (b) at least the words "such individual" meant  only  a male  of the species.  It is urged however that the  use  of the  indefinite article "a" shows that the words "his  wife" and  "minor child" mid "both" have been  used  disjunctively and  should be read in the same manner as in s. 16(3)(a)  of the Act.  The words " his wife " would appropriately go with a  male of the species but the words "a minor  child"  would appropriately  go  with a male as well as a  female  of  the species, though the word "both" could only be appropriate in relation  to a male of the species and not a female who  can have  a minor child but not both a wife and a  minor  child. The same want of elegance or propriety can be predicated  of this expression also and the use of such expressions both in s.   16  (3)(a)  and  s.  16  (3)(b)  raise   questions   of construction  whether what was meant by the Legislature  was only a male of the species in both these contexts or a  male and/or  female of the species, as the case may be,  applying one  or  the  other in  accordance  with  the  circumstances attendant, upon the computation of the total income of " any individual " for the purpose of assessment. We are of opinion that the very manner in which all the four sub-clauses have been grouped together in s. 16 (3) (a)  and the  manner in which the expression "for the benefit of  his wife,  a  minor  child or both" is used in  s.  16  (3)  (b) renders the words "any individual"                              14 or " such individual " ambiguous.  There is no knowing  with certainty as to whether the Legislature meant to enact these provisions  with  reference only to a male  of  the  species using  the words "any individual" or " such individual "  in the  narrower sense of the term indicated above or  intended to  include  within  the  connotation  of  the  words   "any individual"  or  " such individual " also a  female  of  the species, wherever appropriate which would of course only  be possible in the cases contemplated in sub-cls. (ii) and (iv) of s.     16   (3)(a)  and  in  one  of  the   three   cases contemplated in     s. 16 (3)(b).  The Legislature certainly was guilty of  using,  an ambiguous term in enacting  s.  16 (3)  of  the  Act  as it did.   In  order  to  resolve  this ambiguity therefore we must of necessity have resort to  the state of the law before the enactment of the provisions; the mischief  and defect for which the law did not provide;  the remedy which the legislature resolved and appointed to  cure the  defect  and; the true reason of the remedy  within  the meaning of the authorities referred to above. Before  the enactment of s. 16 (3) of the Act by the  Indian Income-tax (Amendment) Act, 1937 (IV of 1937), there was  no provision  at all for the inclusion of the income of a  wife or a minor child in the computation of the total income of " any  individual " for the purpose of  assessment.   Whatever may have been the income of a wife from her membership in  a firm  of  which  her husband was a partner  or  from  assets transferred  directly  or indirectly to her by  her  husband otherwise  than for adequate consideration or in  connection with an agreement to live apart, her income was not included in  the income of her husband in computing the total  income of  the husband for the purpose of assessment.  Similar  was the position in the case of income derived by a minor  child from  the  admission  of  the  minor  to  the  benefits   of partnership  in  a  firm of which "such  individual"  was  a partner or from assets transferred directly or indirectly to the  minor  child, not being a married  daughter,  by  "such

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individual" otherwise than for adequate consideration.   The income derived by such minor child could not be added to the 15 income  of  the father for the purpose of  assessment.   The income  derived  by the wife or minor child  could  only  be included  in  computing  his or its  total  income  for  the purposes  of  assessment  and neither the  husband  nor  the father  could  be made liable for income-tax in  respect  of such income, whatever may be the reason which actuated  them in providing such income for the wife or the minor child. The position was pregnant with difficulties for the Revenue. There were no doubt genuine cases where a wife or the  minor child  as the case may be, was provided with such income  on bona  fide severance of joint status between  the  erstwhile members  of  a joint and undivided Hindu  family  and  where after such partition the adult member of the family  entered into  a bona fide -partnership admitting the minors  to  the benefits of the partnership.  There were, on the other hand, innumerable  cases where such severance of joint status  was resorted  to mainly with a view to evade a higher  incidence of  income  tax.  There were also cases where  husbands  and fathers  provided shares for their wives and minor sons  and thus evaded payment of income tax in regard to their  shares in  the  profits  of such partnerships.  This  evil  was  so rampant that the Income Tax Enquiry Report, 1936, recognised the   same  and  made  the  following  recommendations   for remedying the situation (vide pp. 19 & 20 of the Report).  CHAPTER III-Assessees   Section I-Individuals. (a)  Wife’s  Income.   Our attention has been drawn  to  the extent to which taxation is avoided by nominal  partnerships between husband and wife and minor children.  In some  parts of  the  country, avoidance of taxation by  this  means  has attained  very serious dimensions.  The obvious  remedy  for this  state  of  affairs  so far as  husband  and  wife  are concerned  is  the  aggregation  for  assessment  of   their incomes,  but such a course would involve aggregation  in  a quite different class of cases i.e., where the wife’s income arises from sources unconnected with the husband.........  ....................................................                              . 16 We  recommend, therefore, that the incomes of a wife  should be deemed to be, for income tax purposes, the income of  her husband,  but that where the income of the wife  is  derived from  her  personal exertions and is  unconnected  with  any business  of  her  husband, her  income  from  her  personal exertions  upto a certain limit, say Rs. 500, should not  be so included . (b)  Income of Minor Children.  There is also a growing  and serious tendency to avoid taxation by the admission of minor children  to  the benefits of partnership  in  the  father’s business.   Moreover,  the admission is, as a  rule,  merely nominal, but being supported by entries in the firm’s books, the Income-Tax Officer is rarely in a position to prove that the alleged participation in the benefits of partnership  is unreal. ............................... We suggest that the income of a minor should be deemed to be the income of the father (i) if it arises from the  benefits of  partnership  in  a business in which  the  father  is  a partner or (ii) if, being the income of a minor other than a married  daughter,  it is derived  from  assets  transferred directly or indirectly to the minor by his or her father  or mother,  (iii) if it is derived from assets  apportioned  to him in the partition of a Hindu Undivided Family.

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It  may  be noted that the recommendations  of  the  Enquiry Committee  even in the cases hereinbefore mentioned went  to the length of including the income of the wife or the  minor child as the case may be in the income of the husband or the father  in  the  computation of his  total  income  for  the purpose  of  assessment.   The mischief  which  the  Enquiry Report sought to remedy by its recommendations was one which was  the result of husbands entering into  nominal  partner- ships  between  themselves  and  their  wives  and   fathers admitting  their  minor  children to the  benefits  of  such partnerships.   The  mischief, if any,  resulting  from  the mothers  admitting their minor children to the  benefits  of partnerships  in which they were members was  farthest  from the thoughts of the Enquiry Committee and was nowhere sought to be remedied.  Having 17 regard to the circumstances which prevailed at the time when the  Enquiry  Committee made its report, the  only  mischief which they sought to remedy by their recommendations was the one  resulting  from the male assessees  indulging  in  such tactics  for the evasion of income tax by  creating  nominal partnerships  between themselves and their wives on the  one hand and their minor children on the other. These recommendations were duly considered by the Government and  as  a  result  thereof  Act  IV  of  1937  was  enacted introducing  a. 16(3) in the Act.  What was intended  to  be done  by the Legislature in enacting this amendment  may  be gleaned  to a certain extent from the statement  of  objects and reasons appended to the Bill which eventually became the amending  Act.  Though it is not legitimate to refer to  the statement   of  objects  and  reasons  as  an  aid  to   the construction   or  for  ascertaining  the  meaning  of   any particular word used in the Act or Statute (See Aswani Kumar Ghose v. Arabinda Bose (1), nevertheless, this Court in  The State of West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal Bose(2) referred to the same "for the limited purpose of ascertaining the conditions prevailing  at  the time which actuated the sponsor  of  the Bill  to  introduce the same and the extent and  urgency  of evil which he sought to remedy." The  statement  of  objects and reasons  which  led  to  the passing of Act IV of 1937 ran as follows: "  Reference is made in sections I and 4 of Chapter  III  of the  Income  Tax Enquiry Report, 1936, to  the  practice  of avoiding  taxation by means of nominal partnerships  between husband and wife or parent and minor child or by the nominal transfer  of  assets to a wife or minor child (or  to  an  " Association " consisting of husband and wife) when there  is no  substantial separation of the interests of the  assessee and the wife or child.  These practices are reported to have become very widespread already, with considerable  detriment to  the revenue, and there is little doubt that if they  are not  checked there will be progressive  deterioration.   The proposals in the Report regarding the aggregation (1) (1953) S.C.R. 1.        (2) (1954) S.C.R. 587, 628. 3 18 of  the incomes of husband and wife go beyond the  immediate necessities  of the case and to that extent  their  adoption would  involve  the admission of a new principle  which  the Government of India do not desire to establish in advance of the  general public discussion of the Report which has  been arranged;  and  the present Bill has been so drafted  as  to deal only with the abuses to which I have referred." It is clear from the above extracts that the evil which  was sought  to  be  remedied  was the  one  resulting  from  the

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widespread  practice  of  husbands  entering  into   nominal partnerships  with their wives and fathers  admitting  their minor children to the benefits of the partnerships of  which they  were members.  This evil was sought to be remedied  by the enactment of s. 16(3) in the Act.  If this background of the enactment of s. 16(3) is borne in mind, there is no room for any doubt that howsoever that mischief was sought to  be remedied  by  the amending Act, the only  intention  of  the Legislature in doing so was to include the income derived by the  wife or a minor child, in the computation of the  total income  of the male assessee, the husband or the father,  as the case may be, for the purpose of assessment.  If that was the  position, howsoever wide the words "any individual"  or "such  individual" as used in s. 16(3) and s.  16(3)(a)  may appear be so as to include within their connotation the male as  well  as  the  female  of  the  species  taken  by   the themselves, these words in the context could only have  been meant as restricted to the male and not including the female of  the species.  If these words are used as referring  only to the male of the species the whole of the s. 16(3)(a)  can be  read  harmoniously  in the  manner  above  comprehending within  its scope all the four cases specified  in  sub-cls. (i) to (iv) thereof and so also s. 16(3)(b).We          are, therefore,  of opinion that the words" any  individual"  and "such individual" occurring in s.  16(3) and s. 16(3)(a)  of the Act are restricted in their connotation to mean only the male  of the species, and do not include the female  of  the species,  even  though  by  a  disjunctive  reading  of  the expression   "the  wife"  or  "a  minor  child"   of   "such individual" in s. 16(3)(a) 19 and  the expression "by such individual" for the benefit  of his wife or a minor child or both" in s. 16(3)(b), it may be possible  in the particular instances of the  mothers  being connected with the minor children in the manner suggested by the   Revenue  to  include  the  mothers  also  within   the connotation  of these words.  Such inclusion which  involves different  interpretations of the words "any individual"  or "such individual" in the different contexts could never have been  intended  by the Legislature and would  in  any  event involve the addition of the words "as the case may be" which addition  is not normally permissible in the  interpretation of a statute. We  shall  now refer to the decisions of  the  several  High Courts  in India bearing on the construction of s. 16(3)  of the Act.  The earliest decision is that of the High Court of Allahabad in Shrimati Chanda Devi v. Commissioner of Income- tax,  U.P. (1).  That decision emphasised that  the  sub-cl. (i)  of  cl. (a) of sub-s. (3) of s. 16 made it  clear  that where  the husband was a partner the income of the wife,  by reason of her being a member of the firm, was to be computed in  the  income of the husband, and if the  Legislature  had intended  that the word "individual" in sub-cl. (ii)  should mean only the father and not the mother there was no  reason why they should not have used similar language as in sub-cl. (i)  and  said  "from  the admission of  the  minor  to  the benefits  of partnership in a firm in which his father is  a partner."  Why the Legislature used a particular  expression and why it did not use any expression which would have  been clearer  and  better expressive of its intention  is  really difficult  to  fathom.   We  may  as  well  wonder  why  the Legislature did not use the words "such individual" in  sub- cls.  (i)  and (iii), of s. 16(3)(a) in place of  the  words "her  husband"  or "the husband" when the intention  of  the Legislature  would have been equally carried out by the  use

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of those words.  It may be that the draftsman considered the use of the words "her husband" or "the husband" when he used the  same  in  juxtaposition  with the  words  "a  wife"  as appropriate  or  more  elegant  and  therefore  ignored  the obvious user of the words "such (1)  [1950] 18 I.T.R. 944. 20 individual"  which  would have been equally  appropriate  in that  context.  It would have been better expressive of  the intention  of  the Legislature, as we have  already  divined above  (viz.,  to use the words "any individual"  and  "such individual"  in  s. 16(3) and 16(3)(a) respectively  in  the restricted meaning of the male of the species), to have used the  words  "the  father"  in  place  of  the  words   "such individual" in sub-cls. (ii) and (iv) of s. 16(3)(a).  It is however  difficult to fathom the mind of the draftsman  when he used one particular expression in preference to the other and  not much help can be derived from the ratio adopted  by the  learned  Judges of the High Court of Allahabad  in  the decision  just  referred  to.  It  is  also  significant  to observe that the learned Judges considered that the language of  the  -section does not create any  real  difficulty  and therefore did not think it worth their while to refer to the Income  Tax Enquiry Report, 1936, and the passage  therefrom which  we have quoted above.  Suffice it to say that  we  do not concur with the reasoning adopted by the learned  Judges of  the High Court of Allahabad and are of the opinion  that the  decision  just referred to in so far  as  it  militates against the reasoning adopted by us herein is incorrect. The later case of Musta Quima Begum, In re(1) decided by the same  High  Court merely follows the  judgment  in  Shrimati Chanda Devi’s case (2) and is subject to the same  criticism as above. The  decision  of  the  High Court  of  Punjab  in  Shrimati Damayanti  Sahni v. Commissioner of Incometax, Delhi (3)  is the  one  under appeal before us in Civil Appeal No.  25  of 1955.  The learned Judges there followed the decision of the High  Court of Allahabad in Shrimati Chanda Devi’s case  (2) and  answered the referred question in the affirmative.   It follows  from what we have said above that that decision  is also incorrect and the referred question ought to have  been answered by them in the negative. The  latest  decision in this context is that  of  the  High Court of Madhya Pradesh in commissioner of (1)  [1953] 23 I.T.R. 345. (2)  [1950] 18 I.T.R. 944. (3)  [1953] 23 I.T.R. 41. 21 Income tax,Madhya Pradesh and Bhopal v. Smt.  Sodra Devi (1) which is the subject-matter of Civil Appeal No. 322 of  1955 before  us.   The High Court there observed  that  the  word "individual"  as used in s. 16(3) of the Act  was  ambiguous and  referred to the above quoted passage from the  -Inquiry Committee’s  Report, 1936, as also the statement of  objects and  reasons  and  came  to the  conclusion  that  the  word "individual"  was restricted to the male of the species  and it  was  not  the intention of  the  Legislature  to  impose additional  tax  on a mother assessee by  including  in  her income  the  income of her minor children arising  from  the benefits  of partnership of a firm in which the  mother  and the  minors  were  partners.  We are  of  opinion  that  the decision reached by the learned judges of the High Court  of Madhya  Pradesh  in that case was correct and  the  referred question was rightly answered by them in the negative. The  result therefore is that Civil Appeal No. 322  of  1955

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will  be  dismissed with costs, and Civil Appeal No.  25  of 1955 will be allowed with costs, the referred question being answered in the negative. S.   K.  DAS  J.-The substantial question  which  falls  for decision in these two appeals is if the word "individual" in sub-s.   (3)  of  s.  16  of  the  Indian  Income-tax   Act, hereinafter referred to as the Act, includes also a  female, and  therefore  the income of the minor  sons  which  arises directly or indirectly from their admission to the  benefits of  partnership in a firm of which their mother is a  member is  to  be  included in computing the total  income  of  the mother  within the meaning of sub-s. (3), cl.  (a),  sub-cl. (ii),  of  s.  16.   The question  is  really  one  of  pure construction,  that is, construction of sub-s. (3) of s.  16 of  the Act.  Nothing turns upon the facts of the case,  and as  the  material  facts have been clearly set  out  in  the judgment  just read by my learned brother Bhagwati J.  I  do not  think  that  any  useful  purpose  will  be  served  by restating them. Therefore,  I proceed at once to a consideration  of  sub-s. (3) of s. 16 of the Act and state at the very (1)  [1955] 27 I.T.R. 9. 22 outset that, to my great regret, I have come to a conclusion different  from  that  of  my  learned  brethren.   I  shall presently read the sub-section; but before I do so, it  will help  the  exposition which follows if I explain  in  a  few words  the  standpoint  from which  I  have  approached  the question.  Speaking generally, the expression "construction" includes  two things: first, the meaning of the words;  and, secondly,  their legal effect or the effect which is  to  be given  to them by the courts.  As in the case of  documents, so in the case of statutes also, they should be construed in a manner which carries out the intention of the Legislature. It  may  be  reasonably asked-how is the  intention  of  the Legislature  to  be  discovered?  The  answer  is  that  the intention  must  first  be gathered from the  words  of  the statute itself.  If the words are unambiguous or plain, they will  indicate  the  intention with which  the  statute  was passed and the object to be attained by it; in other  words, the intention is best declared by the words themselves,  and the  words  of a statute are to be  interpreted  as  bearing their ordinary, natural meaning unless the context  requires a  different meaning to be given to them.  If, however,  the words  are ambiguous, the policy of the legislation and  the scope  and  object  of  the  statute,  where  these  can  be discovered,  will show the intention, which may  further  be brought to light by applying the various well settled  rules and presumptions of construction.  One such rule is that the statute must be read as a whole and the construction made of all the parts together.  I am emphasising this aspect of the question  to  guard against any possible suggestion  that  I have  started  with  some a priori idea of  the  meaning  or intention  behind  subs. (3) of s. 16 of the  Act  and  have tried  by construction to work that idea into the  words  of the  sub-section.  I have been conscious all through of  the warning   given   by  Lord  Halsbury,   in   the   following observations in Leader v. Duffey (1): "  All  these  refinements and nice  distinctions  of  words appear to me to be inconsistent with the modern view,  which is I think in accordance with reason and (i)  (1888) 13 App.  Cas. 294, 301. 23 common sense, that, whatever the instrument, it must receive a  construction according to the plain meaning of the  words

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and sentences therein contained.  But I agree that you  must look at the whole instrument, and, inasmuch as there may  be inaccuracy   and  inconsistency,  you  must,  if  you   can, ascertain  what is the meaning of the instrument taken as  a whole  in order to give effect, if it be possible to do  so, to the intention of the framer of it.  But it appears to  me to  be arguing in a vicious circle to begin by  assuming  an intention apart from the language of the instrument  itself, and  having  made  that fallacious assumption  to  bend  the language in favour of the presumption so made." Keeping  that warning in mind, I shall first take the  words of  sub-s.  (3)  of  s. 16 and see  if  they  are  plain  or unambiguous.   Alternatively,  I  shall  also  consider  the proper construction of sub-s. (3) of s. 16 on the assumption that  the  word  "individual" used  in  the  sub-section  is ambiguous  and should therefore be interpreted  consistently with the principles laid down in the locus classicus on  the subject,  namely, the celebrated Heydon’s case (1)  reported by  Lord Coke and decided by the Barons of the Exchequer  in the sixteenth century. I shall now read sub-s. (3) of s. 16 of the Act: "  16. (3) In computing the total income of  any  individual for the purpose of assessment, there shall be included- (a)  so much of the income of a wife or minor child of  such individual as arises directly or indirectly- (i)  from the membership of the wife in a firm of which  her husband is a partner; (ii)from  the  admission  of the minor to  the  benefits  of partnership in a firm of which such individual is a partner; (iii)from  assets transferred directly or indirectly to  the wife   by   the   husband  otherwise   than   for   adequate consideration  or  in connection with an agreement  to  live apart; or (1)  (1584) 3 Co. Rep. 7a, 24 (iv)from  assets transferred directly or indirectly  to  the minor   child,  not  being  a  married  daughter,  by   such individual otherwise than for adequate consideration ; and (b)  so  much of the income of any person or association  of persons  as arises from asset,,; transferred otherwise  than for  adequate consideration to the person or association  by such individual for the benefit of his wife or a minor child or both." I have already stated that the sub-section must be read  as a whole and in the context of the other  provisions of the Act, particularly s. 16 of which it is a part; it  is only  then  that  we shall arrive  at  its  correct  meaning consistent  with the other provisions of the Act.  The  word "individual"  used in sub-s. (3) of s. 16 occurs in  several other provisions of the Act, e.g., s. 3, s. 4A, s. 48 and s. 55.  It is necessary to quote s. 3 in extensor That  section is in these terms: "  Where  any Central Act enacts that  income-tax  shall  be charged for any year at any rate or rates, tax at that  rate or those rates shall be charged for that year in  accordance with,  and subject to the provisions of this Act in  respect of   the  total  income  of  the  previous  year  of   every individual,  Hindu  undivided  family,  company  and   local authority,  and  of  every firm  and  other  association  of persons  or the partners of the firm or the members  of  the association individually." It  is  not disputed before us that the word  "individual  " occurring  in ss. 3, 4A, 48 and 55 means either a male or  a female;  nor has it been disputed before us that,  according to  the  ordinary accepted meaning of the word, it  means  a single  human being as opposed to "society," "family"  etc.,

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and that a single human being may be of either sex.  Learned counsel appearing for the assessees in the two appeals  have pointed out, however, that the word "individual" has not the same  width of meaning in sub-s. (3) of s. 16 as it  has  in the  other  provisions;  for  example, in  s.  3,  the  word "individual" has been held to include a Corporation  created by a statute, e.g., a University or a Bar 25 Council or the trustees of a baronetcy trust incorporated by a  Baronetcy Act etc; whereas sub-s. (3) of s. 16  makes  it quite  clear  that the word " individual "  there  does  not include  a Corporation created by a statute. This indeed  is correct.   But  the question before us is  whether,  in  its context,  sub-s. (3) of s. 16 imposes a further  restriction on the word "individual", confining it to a male  individual only.   The  critical question before us is whether  such  a further  restriction  is imposed on  the  word  "individual" either  by the express words used in the sub-section  or  by necessary  implication  from  the  clauses  and  sub-clauses thereof. It is said to be a presumption in construction that the  same  words are used in the same meaning  in  the  same statute and particularly in the same section or sub-section. The presumption is, however, of the slightest, and there are many  instances  where  the  application  of  this  rule  or presumption is impossible.  The same words may often receive a  different interpretation in different parts of  the  same Act,   for  words  used  with  reference  to  one   set   of circumstances "may convey an intention quite different  from what  the  selfsame  set of words  used  with  reference  to another set of circumstances would or might have  produced." (Edinburgh  Street  Tramways Co. v. Torbain  (1),  per  Lord Blackburn).   The classic example of the same word having  a somewhat  different meaning in the same section is  provided by  Offences  against the Person Act, 1861, s. 57  of  which deals  with  bigamy and enacts: "Whosoever,  being  married, shall  marry any other person during the life of the  former husband or wife... ......... Shall be guilty of felony."  It is  obvious that the word "marry" is used in  two  different senses  in  the  same section.   There  is  another  classic example in Art. 31 of our Constitution where the word  "law" in  el. (3) of the said Article has been used  in  different senses.  This is referred to in a decision of this Court  in The State of Bihar v. Maharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh of Darbhanga (2). (1)  (1877) 3 App.  Cas. 58, 68.  (2) 1952 S.C.R. 889,  908, 909. 26 The  word  "individual" is not defined in the Act,  but  the meaning  of the word in ss. 3, 4A, 48 and 55  is  reasonably clear.  The word "assessee" is defined in cl. (2) of s. 2 of the Act, as meaning a person by whom income-tax or any other sum  of  money (which would include  super-tax,  penalty  or interest) is payable under the Act.  It also includes  every person  in respect of whom any proceeding under the  Act  is taken for the assessment (a) of his income, (b) of his  loss or  (c)  of  the  amount of refund due  to  him.   Thus  the definition covers two categories: first, persons by whom any tax,  penalty or interest is payable under the Act,  whether any proceeding under the Act has been actually taken against them  or not; and secondly, persons against whom any of  the proceedings specified in this clause has been taken, whether he is or is not liable to pay any tax, penalty or  interest. ’A  person’,  under  s. 3(42) of the  General  Clauses  Act, includes any company or association or. body of individuals, whether  incorporated  or  not; and under  cl.  (9)  of  the

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section  ’a person’ also includes a Hindu  undivided  family and  a  local authority.  Thus, we have  six  categories  of assessees  referred to in s. 3-(a) the individual,  (b)  the Hindu  undivided  family, (c) the local authority,  (d)  the company, (e) the firm and (f) other association of  persons. Read  in  the  context  of  s.  3  of  the  Act,  the   word "individual"  means, in the other sections, one of  the  six categories  of  assessees  referred to in  s.  3.  The  same category is also referred to in sub-s. (3) of s. 16, subject only  to  this restriction that in the context of  the  sub- section,   the   word  "individual"  does  not   include   a Corporation etc. We  now turn to the critical question before us-is  there  a further  restriction in the sub-section confining  the  word "individual"  to a male individual only?  My answer is  that there  is  nothing in the context of s. 16 or  of  the  sub- section  which  confines  the word "individual"  to  a  male individual  only.  Section 16 deals with the computation  of total  income and provides what sums are to be  included  or excluded  in  determining the total income.  The  effect  of including exempted income in the assessee’s total income is 27 mainly  two-fold: first, the tax payable by the assessee  is determined with reference to the total income and  therefore exempted income which is included in the total income  would affect the rate of tax applicable to the chargeable  portion of the total income; secondly, in several cases reliefs  are given  or  calculations  made with reference  to  the  total income.   Sub-section  (3) of s. 16 appears ex facie  to  be directed towards preventing an individual’s attempt to avoid or reduce the incidence of tax by transferring the assets to his wife or a minor child or admitting the wife as a partner or admitting a minor child to the benefits of partnership in a firm in which such individual is a partner.  I agree  that the  sub-section  creates,  to some  extent,  an  artificial liability to tax by including the income of A in the  income of B, and must therefore be strictly construed; that  merely means  that the words of the subsection must be given  their strictly natural meaning, and there should be no attempt  at artificial stretching one way or the other. What then is the proper construction of the subsection ?  It naturally falls into three interconnected parts.  The  first part controls both cl. (a) and cl. (b), and states that  "in computing the total income of any individual for the purpose of assessment, there shall be included so much of the income etc." as is specified in cls. (a) and (b).  The second  part is  cl.  (’a) itself which starts with an  opening  sentence that "so much of the income of a wife or minor child of such individual  as  arises  directly or  indirectly"  from  four specific cases shall be included in the total income of  the individual,  and then the cases are enumerated in four  sub- clauses numbered (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv).  Then, comes the third  part  which deals with cl. (b).  I have  divided  the sub-section into its three natural parts, but I must make it clear that all the three parts must be construed together as they  are interconnected and interdependent.  In  the  first part,  there is no difficulty whatsoever, in my opinion,  in giving  the word "individual" its natural meaning, that  is, that the word means either a male or a female.  The  opening sentence of cl. (a) contains the expression "so much of  the income of a 28 wife  or minor child of such individual".  Does the  use  of the  word  "individual" in the opening sentence of  cl.  (a) give  rise to any ambiguity or difficulty?  I do  not  think

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that it does.  It is quite obvious that a female  individual cannot have a wife, but she can have a minor child whereas a male  individual can have a wife, minor child or  both.   It has been argued that el. (a) must be interpreted noscitur  a sociis,  and  as the expression "a wife or minor  child"  is capable of meaning only when used in connection with a  male individual, the whole sub-section must be confined to a male individual.   I am unable to accede to this  argument.   The collocation  or  association of the words "a wife  or  minor child" in connection with the words "such individual" in the opening  sentence of cl. (a) does not necessarily mean  that the  individual contemplated is a male individual  only.   I agree  that the -word "or" in between the words  "wife"  and "minor child" must be there, even when the individual talked of  is  a  male only; in other words, the use  of  the  dis- junctive  word "or" does not necessarily clinch  the  issue. But I do not see any real difficulty in reading the  opening sentence  of  el. (a) distributively so as to  mean  a  male individual  when  the wife is being talked of and  either  a male or a female individual when a minor child is talked  of I do not think that such a construction does any violence to the  words  used; on the contrary, in my opinion,  it  gives effect to the plain meaning of the word "individual". Turning  now to the sub-clauses numbered (i) to (iv),  there can be no doubt from the phraseology used that sub-cls.  (i) and (iii) refer only to a male individual, because a  female individual  cannot  have  a wife.  It  is  worthy  of  note, however-and  this is very important -that sub-cls. (ii)  and (iv) make it equally clear that they are not confined to the male individual only in the manner in which sub-cls. (i) and (iii)  are so confined.  In sub-cls. (i) and (iii) the  word "individual"  is  not  used, and the  words  used  are  "her husband"  and "the husband".  In sub-cls. (ii) and (iv)  the words  used are "such individual".  Why did the  Legislature make  this difference in phraseology?  If the intention  was to 29 confine  the entire sub-section to a male  individual  only, nothing  could  have been easier than to  qualify  the  word "individual"  by the adjective "male" in the first  part  of the  sub-section  which controls both clauses (a)  and  (b); alternatively, in sub-cls. (ii) and (iv) it would have  been easy to use the word "father" instead of "such  individual". It  is  true  that  a change of  language  is  some,  though possibly slight, indication of a change of intention.  I  am unable,  however, to accept the argument advanced before  us that  the  phraseology employed in sub-cls.  (i)  and  (iii) different  as it is from that employed in sub-cls. (ii)  and (iv)  can  be  accounted for on the ground  of  elegance  or felicity  of  expression.   It  seems  to  me  that  if  the intention  was  to confine the word "individual" to  a  male individual only, elegance and clarity both required that the word  "individual"  should  be qualified  by  the  adjective "male", and the word "father" should have been used in  sub- cls. (ii) and (iv).  I am aware that a draftsman often  uses different words merely to avoid repetition.  I am also aware that  it  is  dangerous  to  suppose  that  the  Legislature foresees  every  possible  result that may  ensue  from  the "unguarded  use of a single word, or that the language  used in  statutes  is  so precisely accurate that  you  can  pick out......  this and that expression and  skilfully,  piecing them  together,  lay  a  safe  foundation  for  some  remote inference."  (as  per  Lord  Loreburn,  L.C.,  in  Nairn  v. University  of  St.  Andrews and Others (1).   But  what  is noteworthy  in  the present case is that the  difference  in

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phraseology  between sub-cls. (i) and (iii) on the one  side and sub-cls. (ii) and (iv) on the other, is so striking that the  conclusion appears to me to be reasonably plain; it  is not  really a case of the unguarded use of a single word  or picking  out  an  expression here  or  picking  out  another expression   there  in  order  to  piece  out  some   remote inference.  The striking difference in phraseology hits,  as it  were,  one  in the face when one  reads  the  four  sub- clauses.   It seems to me that the meaning, is  very  clear. In  the  opening part of el. (a), the word  "individual"  is used  to  mean a male or a female; two of  the  sub-clauses, however, are confined (1)  [1909] A.C. 147, 161. 30 to the male only and therefore the word "husband" is used in juxtaposition  to  the word "wife".  In the other  two  sub- clauses, however, the word "individual " is used in order to make  it  clear  that they refer either to a male  or  to  a female  individual.   I  do  not  see  any  incongruity   or disharmony  in the enumeration of the four sub-clauses,  nor do I appreciate the argument urged before us that the word " individual  ",  on  the construction adopted by  me,  has  a different meaning in two of the four sub-clauses of cl. (a). The  word  "individual" has and retains  the  same  meaning, namely  a male or a female, all throughout  the  subsection. All  that  happens is that in two of the subclauses  of  cl. (a),  when  the  Legislature intends  that  they  should  be confined  to a male individual only, the word  "husband"  is used  to make the intention clear.  On the  same  reasoning, when  the Legislature intends in two other sub-clauses  that they  should apply to either a male or a female, the word  " individual " is used to include either of them.  I am unable to accept the contention that such an interpretation offends against the rule of harmonious construction.  So far as  el. (b) of the sub-section is concerned, the word " individual " is again used and that again relates to a male or a  female. The  last part of the clause reads "by such  individual  for the  benefit  of his wife or a minor child  or  both."  Here again  the sentence has to be read  distributively-that  is, when  the  wife is talked of, the individual can only  be  a male; when a minor child is talked of, the individual can be a  male  or  a female; when both wife and  minor  child  are talked  of, the individual can again be a male only.   There was  some argument before us with regard to the use  of  the indefinite article "a" before the words "minor child" and it was  submitted by the learned Solicitor-General that if  the Legislature intended to confine cl. (b) to a male individual only,  it could have easily dropped the  indefinite  article and  used  the word "his" before the  words  "minor  child". Personally, I do not attach much significance to the use  of the indefinite article "a".  It is to be noted that no  such indefinite article is used before the words "minor child" in the opening 31 sentence of cl. (a); but I do not see any compelling reasons why  the natural meaning of the word " individual  "  should not  be  given  to it in el. (a) and cl.  (b)  of  the  sub- section.   Such  meaning  can be easily given  to  both  the clauses  if they are read distributively, and  such  reading does  not,  in my opinion, do any violence to  the  language used. On  a plain reading of the sub-section, I have come  to  the conclusion  that there really is no ambiguity and  the  word "individual"  has  been  used  in  the  sub-section  in  its ordinary  accepted connotation, that is, either a male or  a

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female individual; two of the sub-clauses of cl. (a) are  no doubt  confined to a male individual and that has been  made clear  by  the  use of the words  "   wife"  and  "husband", instead of the words "such individual ". Assuming, however, that there is some ambiguity in the  sub- section by reason of (1) the use of the phraseology in  sub- cls.  (i)  and  (iii) of cl. (a), and  (2)  of  the  opening sentence of cl. (a) which controls all the four  sub-clauses of  that  clause,  what then is the  position  ?   The  four principles  laid  down  in  Heydon’s  case  have  been  thus summarised: " That for the sure and true interpretation of all  statutes in  general  (be they penal or  beneficial,  restrictive  or enlarging of the common law) four things are to be discerned and  considered:  (1)  what was the common  law  before  the passing of the Act; (2) what was the mischief and defect for which  the common law did not provide; (3) what  remedy  the Parliament  hath resolved and appointed to cure the  disease of the commonwealth; (4) the true reason of the remedy.  And then  the  office  all the Judges is  always  to  make  such construction as shall suppress the mischief and advance  the remedy,  and to suppress subtle inventions and evasions  for the continuance of the mischief and pro privato commedo, and to  add force and life to the cure and remedy  according  to the true intent of the makers of the Act pro bono publico." Let  me  now apply these principles in the  construction  of sub-s. (3) of S. 16 of the Act, 32 The  subjection  was  introduced in  1937,  and  before  the enactment of the sub-section, there was no provision for the inclusion  of the income of a wife or a, minor child in  the computation  of  the  total income of  an  individual.   The Income Tax Enquiry Report, 1936, referred to the  widespread evil  of  the evasion of tax by the severance of  the  joint status  amongst  members  of a  joint  and  undivided  Hindu family.  The Report said : "  Our  attention  has been drawn to  the  extent  to  which taxation is avoided by nominal partnerships between  husband and wife and minor children.  In some parts of the  country, avoidance  of  taxation  by this  means  has  attained  very serious  dimensions.  The obvious remedy for this  state  of affairs  so  far as husband and wife are  concerned  is  the aggregation  for  assessment of their incomes,  but  such  a course would involve aggregation in a quite different  class of  case, i.e., where the wife’s income arises from  sources quite unconnected with the husband We  recommend, therefore, that the incomes of a wife  should be deemed to be, for Income-tax purposes, the income of  her husband,  but that where the income of the wife  is  derived from  her  personal exertions and is  unconnected  with  any business  of  her  husband, her  income  from  her  personal exertions up to a certain limit, say Rs. 500, should not  be so included................................ (b)Income  of  minor children.-There is also a  growing  and serious tendency to avoid taxation by the admission of minor children  to  the benefits of partnership  in  the  father’s business.   Moreover,  the admission is, as a  rule,  merely nominal, but being supported by entries in the firm’s books, the Income-tax Officer is rarely in a position to prove that the alleged participation in the benefits of partnership  is unreal. ........................................ We suggest that the income of a minor should be deemed to be the income of the father (i) if it arises                              33 from the benefits of partnership in a business in which  the

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father is a partner or (ii) if, being the income of a  minor other  than  a married daughter, it is derived  from  assets transferred  directly or indirectly to the minor by  his  or her  father  or mother, (iii) if it is derived  from  assets apportioned  to  him in the partition of a  Hindu  Undivided Family." It is clear, however, that the report is of very little help in   the  construction  of  the  sub-section,  because   the Legislature did not accept in full the recommendations  made in  the Report.  Two of the rules in Heydon’s case lay  down (1)  that we must find what was the mischief or  defect  for which  the earlier law did not provide and (2)  what  remedy the  Parliament  has  resolved and  appointed  to  cure  the mischief  or defect.  In the case under  our  consideration, the interpretation which has been put by me on sub-s. (3) of s.  16 does not militate against any of the aforesaid  rules of Heydon’s case.  The interpretation put by me  undoubtedly remedies  the mischief or defect for which the  earlier  law did not provide.  The only serious criticism made by learned counsel  for  the assessees against that  interpretation  Is that the remedy not merely cures the mischief for which  the earlier  law did not provide, but it goes a  little  further and  attacks the evil even when the evil is committed  by  a female  individual,  though the Income  Tax  Enquiry  Report (except in one part) did not in specific terms refer to such an evil committed by a female individual.  I can see nothing in  the  rules laid down in’ Heydon’s case  which  militates against the view taken by me.  There is no presumption that, while  remedying an evil, the Legislature may not  cast  its net  very wide so as to remedy the evil in all its  aspects. Let  me again refer to sub-cls. (i) and (ii) of cl.  (a)  of sub-s.  (3) of s. 16 of the Act.  Those two sub-clauses  are absolute  and  unqualified in terms and not subject  to  any exception.  If the wife owns and manages a business and  she takes her husband into partnership with her in the business, the  result  of  the partnership would be  that  the  wife’s income  from the business would be no longer taxable in  her hands but would be included in the total income of her 5 34 husband  under the sub-section, even though the husband  may be   a  dormant  partner.   This  clearly  shows  that   the Legislature was not confining itself to the  recommendations made  in  the  Income Tax Enquiry Report.   What  is  to  be included in the total income of an individual under cl.  (a) is  the income of a wife or minor child arising directly  or indirectly "from the membership of the wife" in the firm  or "from  the  admission  of  the  minor  to  the  benefits  of partnership"  in  the  firm of which  the  individual  is  a partner.  The clause covers the share of the profits of  the firm  received by the wife in her capacity- as a partner  or by the minor child in his or her capacity as one admitted to the  benefits of partnership.  But the income received  from the  firm  by the wife or the minor child  under  any  other contract  with the firm or in any other capacity,  does  not fall within the clause and is not included in the  husband’s or parent’s total income. From what is stated above, it is clear that the  Legislature did   not   confine  itself  strictly  or  solely   to   the recommendations made by the Income Tax Enquiry Committee but provided for all such aspects of the evil or mischief as  it thought  fit to remedy by the Indian Income-tax  (Amendment) Act,  1937 (Act IV of 1937).  In these circumstances,  I  do not  think that the recommendations made by  the  Income-tax Enquiry Committee can be relied upon to restrict the meaning

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of the word "individual" used in sub-s. (3) of s. 16 of  the Act. , As to the Statement of Objects and Reasons which  led to the passing of Act IV of 1-937 and which has been set out in  the judgment of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh,  I  do not think that the Statement can be referred to as an aid to construction  for  ascertaining  the  meaning  of  the  word "individual"  used  in  the  sub-section.   Even  if  it  is referred  to  "for the limited purpose of  ascertaining  the conditions prevailing at the time which actuated the sponsor of the Bill to introduce the same and the extent and urgency of the evil which he sought to remedy", the use of the  word "Parent" in the Statement of Objects and Reasons shows  that the  evil was not confined to the male individual only,  and the sponsor of the Bill was aware of                              35 it.  The Statement reads: "Sec. 16(3) was thus  designed  to bring  within  the ambit of taxation incomes  of  wives  and minor  children  as  income  of  husband  or  parent,  which otherwise  would  escape the whole burden  of  taxation."  I emphasise the use of the word "parent" which would show that the evil contemplated was an evil which was not confined  to the "father" only but included the mother as well. My  conclusion  therefore is that there is  nothing  in  the policy  of the legislation and the scope and object  of  the statute which compels one to cut down the natural meaning of the word "individual" used in sub-s. (3) of s. 16 of the Act so as to confine it to a male individual alone. I now turn to such authorities as have been cited before us. There  has been a difference of opinion in the  High  Courts with regard to the interpretation of sub-s. (3) of s. 16  of the Act.  In Shrimati Chanda Devi v. Commissioner of Income- tax  (1), the Allahabad High Court has taken the  view  that the minor’s income which arises directly or indirectly  from the admission of the minor to the benefits of partnership in a firm of which the, mother is a partner, can be included in the mother’s assessable income under s. 16(3)(a)(ii) of  the Act.  The Allahabad High Court proceeded on the footing that the  language  of the sub-section. did not create  any  real difficulty and it was not open to it to take the help of the Income-tax Enquiry Report.  I have considered this case from both  the  points  of view, and have  arrived  at  the  same conclusion at which the Allahabad High Court arrived.  It is not  necessary  to mention the other reasons  given  by  the Allahabad High Court, because they have already been  stated by me in an earlier part of this judgment.  This decision of the  Allahabad  High Court was followed by the  Punjab  High Court  in  Commissioner  of Income-tax,  Delhi  v.  Shrimati Damayanti  Sahni(2), which has given rise to one of the  two appeals before us.  The Punjab High Court gave no additional reason  except to state that in cl. (a) of sub-s. (3) of  s. 16, the word "wife" and the (1) (1950) 10 I.T.R. 944.                   (2) (1953) 23 I.T.R. 41. 36 words "minor child" were used disjunctively.  I have already stated that the use of the disjunctive "or" is not decisive; but  there is no real difficulty in reading clauses (a)  and (b)  distributively.  The Madhya Pradesh High Court  took  a different  view  in Sahodradevi N. Daga v.  Commissioner  of Income-tax  (1),  which has given rise to the  other  appeal before us.  In my view, the learned Judges in that case  did not  attach sufficient importance to sub-cls. (ii) and  (iv) of  cl.  (a).   If I may say so  with  great  respect,  they confined their attention primarily to sub-cls. (i) and (iii) of  el. (a) and to cl. (b), and from those  provisions  they

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inferred  that  the  intention  was  to  confine  the   word "individual" to a male individual.  I venture to think  that all  the three parts of the sub-section, including the  four sub-clauses  of cl. (a), must be read together in  order  to understand  the true meaning and effect of the  sub-section. The  learned Judges further seemed to think that the use  of the  words "such individual" in sub-cl. (ii) of el. (a)  was due to inadvertence.  I am unable to agree.  I have  already pointed  out that the phraseology in sub-cls. (i) and  (iii) of  cl. (a) is so strikingly different from the  phraseology used  in  sub-cls.  (ii)  and (iv) that  only  one  and  one reasonable  conclusion can be drawn, namely, that  the  word "individual" has been used in its accepted connotation,  and when  the Legislature wanted to confine the operation  of  a sub-clause  to  the male individual only, it used  the  word "wife" and "husband"; where, however, the Legislature wanted to  refer  to either a male or a female, it  used  the  word "individual"  which,  in  its  ordinary  connotation,  means either a male or a female. For the reasons given above, I agree with the view expressed by  the  Allahabad  and the Punjab High Courts  and  do  not accept  the interpretation given by the Madhya Pradesh  High Court.   In my opinion, the question should be  answered  in the  way the Allahabad and the Punjab High  Courts  answered it;  therefore,  Civil  Appeal No. 322  of  1955  should  be allowed with costs and Civil Appeal No. 25 of 1955 should be dismissed with costs. (1)  (1955) 27 I.T.R. 9. 37 By  COURT: In accordance with the Judgment of  the  majority Civil  Appeal  No. 322 of 1955 is dismissed with  costs  and Civil  Appeal  No.  25 of 1955 is allowed  with  costs,  the referred question being answered in the negative.