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PETITIONER: THE COLLECTOR (DISTT. MAGISTRATE) ALLAHABAD AND ANR.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: RAJA RAM JAISWAL ETC.

DATE OF JUDGMENT29/04/1985

BENCH: DESAI, D.A. BENCH: DESAI, D.A. ERADI, V. BALAKRISHNA (J)

CITATION:  1985 AIR 1622            1985 SCR  (3) 995  1985 SCC  (3)   1        1985 SCALE  (1)1044  CITATOR INFO :  D          1988 SC1459  (14)  D          1989 SC 682  (10)  RF         1991 SC 711  (13)

ACT:      Land Acquisition  Act, 1894  section 4  (1), scope  of- Acquisition of  Land For public purpose-Whether notification in the  official gazette  and causing  public notice  of the substance of  such notification  the need  of a  land for  a public purpose,  mandatory-Concept of  prejudice-Where in  a case,  objections   have  been   filed  to  the  acquisition proceedings, pursuant to an earlier notification whether non publication and  non notification  of its  substance in  the locality and  of a  corrigendum thereof  issued later  would still vitiate the proceedings. under section 4 (1)-Effect Of the  world   shall  in  section  4  (1)-When  malafides  are attributed, impleading  of the proper party effected thereby is obligatory-Malafides-Legal malafides explained.

HEADNOTE:      Raja Ram  Jaiswal along  with the members of his family purchased land  bearing plot  No. 26 with a building thereon admeasuring 2978  sq. yds.  situated at  K.P. Kakkar Road in March 1971.  The plan  for a  sound proof  air-condition  ed cinema theatre  on  the  said  plot  submitted  by  him  was sanctioned both  by the  District Magistrate  and the  local municipality in December, 1970 and thereafter he applied for a certificate  of approval under Rule 3 read with Rule 7 (2) of the  U.P. Cinematograph Rules. 1951 for construction of a Cinema theatre.      The Hindi  Sahitya Sammelan  which was initially formed as a  voluntary organisation  in 1910  and registered  as  a society under  the Societies  Registration Act on January 8, 1914 retaining  the same name had earlier acquired and taken possession  from   the  Allahabad   Municipal   Board   land admeasuring 7315  sq. yds.  and in  which a municipal school was located  for purpose  of building  "Sangrahalaya"  or  a museum-cum-library-cum-reading room.  However no  museum has come up  and the  land lies  vacant.  This  Sammelan  raised objections to the grant of a permit for the constructions of the cinema  theatre as  in its view a theatre and a research cum  study  center  can  go  ill  together.  Overruling  the

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objections, the District Magistrate, the Licensing Authority under the  U.P. Cinema  (Regulation) Act,  1955 granted  the requisite certificate  of approval, on March 24, 1972, under Rule 3  which would  in law  imply that having regard to the provisions of  the 1955  Act, and  1951 Rules,  there was no legal impediment  to the construction of a cinema theatre on plot  No.   26.  Having   failed  to  thwart  the  grant  of certificate of  approval, the  Sammelan wrote  a  letter  on October 13, 996 1971 for  acquiring land  bearing plot  No.  26  admeasuring approximately 2865 sq. yds. On the ground that it was needed for  a   public  purpose   namely  for  extension  of  Hindi Sangrahalaya  of   Hindi  Sahitya   Sammelan  Prayag.   This Notification was published in the U.P. Government Gazette on February 9,  1974.A notice  under section  4 (1) bearing the same date  was served  upon the  petitioner as also the same was published in the locality. The petitioner challenged the validity of  the notification  on diverse  grounds  in  Writ Petition No.   1932/74 and  obtained interim  stay of taking over possession.      In the  meantime, by  Notification  dated  February  6, 1975, the  earlier Notification  dated January  31, 1974 was cancelled and  a fresh  Notification was  issued to  acquire "land bearing No. 62 admeasuring 8265 sq yds." and published in the U.P.. Gazette on February lc. 1975. Consequently Writ Petition No.  1932174 was  got  dismissed  as  infructuous.A notice dated  March 6.  1975 under  section 5  of  the  Land Acquisition Act  was served upon the petitioner inviting him to  file  his  objections,  if  any.  The  petitioner  filed detailed objections  on March  8, 1975 inter alia contending that the  acquisition is for a company and the pre-requisite for acquisition  for a  company having not been carried out, the acquisition  is had  in law.  It was also contended that the petitioner  is not  the Owner of plot No. ’2 admeasuring 8265 sq.  yds Promptly on March 13, 1975, a corringendum was issued and  published in  the  Gazette  on  March  22,  1975 correcting the  notification dated  February 6, 1975 to read that instead  of plot No. 62 Plot No. 26 be read and instead of area  8265 sq. yds., 2865 sq. yds. be read. The substance of Gazette  the notifications dated 15.2.1975 March 22, 1975 were not published in the locality as required under section 4 (1).  Tn between  the issue  of the  notification and  the corrigendum, the  petitioner  filed  Writ  Petition  3174175 questioning the  validity Or the notification dated February 6, 1975  and duly  amending the  grounds after  issue of the corrigendum. The High Court negatived the challenges namely, (a) that  the Notification  was bad for non compliance first with the  provisions or  the Land  Acquisition ((Companies)) Rules, 1953;  and (b)  that the  acquisition proceedings are malafide but quashed the impugned notification on the ground of failure  to cause  public  notice  of  the  substance  of Notification under  section 4  (1) to  be published  is  the locality. Hence the State appeal (CA No. 2458/80) by special leave and  the Special  Leave Petition  No. 9019/80  by Raja Ram.      Dismissing the  State appeal  and allowing  in part the Special Leave Petition. the Court. ^      HELD:  1.  When  the  validity  of  a  Notification  is questioned  on  the  ground  of  malafides,  proper  parties affected by  such an  allegation must  be impleaded  in  the petition.  In   this  case,   Sammelan’s   application   for intervention under  Order XX  Rule 3  of the  Supreme  Court Rules 1966 must be granted though the Sammelan has not moved

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this Court  against the  High Court’s  order  rejecting  the application for impleading. [1004D-E]      2.1 It  is true that ordinarily courts do not interfere at the  stage of  Sec.  4  notification  because  it  merely constitutes a  proposal which  will be meticulously examined after the  objections arc  filed under  Section  SA  by  tho person interested 997 in the  land wherein  all aspects  of the  matter  can    be threadbare  gone   into  and   examined.   However,   as   a notification under  section 4  (I) initiates the proceedings for acquisition  of land and uses the expression ’shall’ the mandate of  the legislature bcomes clear and therefore, the infirmities therein  cannot  be  wholly  overlooked  on  the specious plea  that the courts do not interdict at the stage of a more proposal. 11006-G]      2.2 A  bare perusal of section 4 (1) clearly shows that in order  to comply  with the statutory requirements therein set out,  a notification  stating ’therein the land which is needed or is likely to be needed for a public purpose has to be published in the official Gazette. The second part of the sub-section provides that ’the Collector has to cause public notice of the substance of ’such notification to be given at convenient places in the locality in which the land proposed to  be   acquired  is  situated.  Both  the  conditions  are mandatory.  Unless  both  these  conditions  are  satisfied, section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act cannot be said to have been complied  with. Nor can Court whittle down a mandate of legislation recognised  by a  long line  of decisions solely depending upon  the facts  of a  given  case;  as  is  herer Further after  the 1974  (U.P. Amendment  and Validation Act VIII of  1974), Section 4 (1) on its true interpretation may unmistakably indicate that where the enquiry under Section 5 A is  not dispensed  with  by  resorting  to  Sec.  17  (4), compliance with  the second  part  of  Section  4  would  be mandatory.                                    [1006H, 1007A-D, 1009D-E]      Khub Chand  and Ors.  v. State  of Rajasthan  and Ors., [1967] I  SCR 120 at 125; Babu Barkya Thakur v. The State of Bombay, [1961]  I SCR 128: Smt. Somavanti and Ors. v. The Sf are of  Punjab &  Ors., [1963] 2 SCR 774; State of Mysore v. Abdul Razak Sahib, [1973] I SCR 856 referred to.      Gangadharaih v.  State of  Mysore &:  Ors., (1961) Mys. L.J. 883 approved.      2.3 It  is not  correct assume  that the  sole  purpose behind publication of substance of Notification in locality, as  required   secondly  in   section  4  (1)  of  the  Land Acquisition Act  is to  make  requirement  of  section  5  A ’functionally effective. [1009G]      Where a  decision of the Government to be effective and valid has  to be  notified in  the Government  Gazette,  the decision  itself   does  not   become  effective   unless  a notification in  the Official  Gazette  follows.  Therefore, assuming that  a notification  is a  formal expression  of a decision of  the Government  to  acquire  land,  unless  the decision  is  notified  in  the  Government  Gazette  by  an appropriate notification,  the proceedings  for  acquisition cannot be said to have been initiated and the decision would remain a paper decision, Section 4 (1) further requires that ’the Collector shall cause public notice of the substance of such notification  to be  given at  convenient places in the said locality  ’ The  expression ’such  notification’ in the latter part  of Section  4(1) and sequence of events therein enumerated would clearly spell out that first the Government should reach  a decision  to acquire  land, then  publish  a

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notification under  section  4  (1)  and  simultaneously  or within a reasonable time from the date of the publication of the notification  cause a  notice to be published containing substance  of   such  notification   meaning  thereby   that notification which is pub- 998 lished. Obviously,  therefore, there cannot he a publication in the  locality prior  to the issuance of the notification. [1010B-G]      Babu Barkya Thakur v. The State of Bombay, [1961] I SCR 128; Narendra Bahadur Singh and Anr. v. State of U.P. & Ors, [1977] 2  SCR 226;  State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. v. Vishnu Prasad Sharma & Ors, [1966] 3 SCR 557 held in applicable.      Mahendra Lal Jaini v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors, [1963] Supp. I SCR 912 relied on.            3.1 Where power is conferred to achieve a purpose the power  must be  exercise reasonably and in good faith to effectuate the  purpose. And in this context ’in good faith’ means for  legitimate reasons.  Where it  is  exercised  for extraneous or  irrelevant consideration  or reasons,  it  is unquestionably a  colourable exercise  of power  or fraud on power and the exercise of power is vitiated. If the power to acquire land  is to  be exercised, it must be exercised bona fide for  the statutory purpose and for none other. If it is exercised  for  an  extraneous,  irrelevant  or  non-germane consideration, the  acquiring authority  can be charged with legal malafides. In such a situation there is no question of any personal ill-will or motive [1018C-E]      Municipal Council  of Sydney  v. Compbell,  [1925] A.C. 338 at 375 quoted with approval.             State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh & Ors, [1980] I SCR 1071 explained and followed.            3.2 Where power is conferred to achieve a certain purpose, the  power can be exercised only for achieving that purpose. Section  4(1) confers power on the Government and . the Collector  to acquire  land Deeded for a public purpose. The power  to acquire  land is  (o be exercised for carrying out a  public purpose.  If the  authorities of  the Sammelan cannot tolerate  the existence  of a  cinema theatre  in its vicinity it  cannot he  said that  such a purpose would be a public purpose.  The authority  of the Sammelan may honestly believe that  the existence of a cinema theatre may have the pernicious tendency  to vitiate the educational and cultural environment of  the institution and therefore. it would like to wish  away a  cinema theatre in its vicinity. That hardly constitutes public  purpose. The proclaimed need of land for putting up  Sangrahalya is  an easy  escape  route  whenever Sammelan wants  to take over some piece of land. Need of the land for Sangrahalya is a figment of imagination consured up to provide  an ostensible  purpose for acquisition. There is enough land  roughly admeasuring  7315 sq. yds. Lying vacant and unutilised  with the  Sammelan for  over a  quarter of a century. The Sangrahalya has not come up though this was the land which was taken from the Municipal Board for the avowed object of putting up a Sangrahalya. The Sammelan moved on to Rangamanch and  Natyashala and  then  ultimately  adopted  a position that  when the  land is made available, scheme will be devised  for  its  proper  use.  The  Sammelan  was  ever interested in acquiring the land for effectuating any of its objects. It  was neither  the plans  nor the wherewithal nor any specific object 999 for which  it needs  land and it is unable to use over years the land  already available  at its disposal. Therefore, the Sammelan  was   actuated  by   extraneous   and   irrelevant

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considerations in  seeking acquisition  of the  land and the statutory authority  having, ’known  this fact yet proceeded to exercise  statutory pwoer  and initiated  the process  of acquisition. [1017F-H, 1018A B]      3.3 The  power to  acquire land  was a exercised for an extraneous and  irrelevant purpose  and  it  was  colourable exercise of  power,  namely,  to  satisfy  the  chagrin  and anguish of the Sammelan at the coming up of a cinema theatre in the vicinity of its campus, which vowed to destroy. There fore, the  consideration  dated  6  2.1975  is  illegal  and invalid. [1019E-F]

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2458 and S.L.P. No. 9019 of 1980      From the  Judgment and  Order dated  7.12. 1979  of the Allahabad High  Court in  Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 3174 of 1975      R.N.  Trivedi,   Additional  Advocate   General,  Gopal Subramaniam and Ms. Shobha Dikshit for the Appellants.      F.S Nariman,  Raja Ram  Agarwal, Yogeshwar Prasad, Mrs. Rani Chhabra and Ms. Suman Bagga for the respondent.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      DESAI, J.  Respondent  Raja  Ram  Jaiswal  moved  Civil Miscellaneous Writ  Petition No. 3174 of 1975 under Art. 226 of the  Constitution in  the High  Court  of  Judicature  at Allahadad questioning the validity of the Notification dated February  6,  1975  issued  under  Sec.  4(1)  of  the  Land Acquistion Act  (’Act’ for  short) as  also a  notice  dated March 6,  1975  served  upon  him  pursuant  to  the  afore- mentioned  notification.   The  impugned   notification  was published in  the U.P. Government Gazette dated February 15, 1975. By  this impugned  notification, land bearing Plot No. 62 approximately  admeasuring 8265 sq. yds. was sought to be acquired as  being needed  for a  public purposse namely for extension  of   Hindi  Sangrahalaya  of  the  Hindi  Sahitya Sammelan  Prayag.A   substances  of  this  notification  was published in  the locality  where  the  land  sought  to  be acquired is  situate. On March 22, 1975, a corrigendum dated March  13,   1975  was   published  by  which  the  impugned notification dated  February 15, 1975 was to stand corrected Plot No. 26 instead of 62 and the area sought to be acquired to be read as 2865 sq. yds. 1000 instead of  8265 sq.  yds.  After  the  publication  of  the corrigendum the  petitioner sought amendment of the petition which was  granted. Validity of the amended notification was challenged on  diverse grounds.  However, at  the hearing of the petition,  the challenge  was confined  to the following four grounds  as summarised  in the  judgment  of  the  High Court. They may be extracted:      "1.  Notification dated  6.2.75 issued  under Sec. 4 of           the Land  Acquisition Act is invalid in as much as           it had  been issued  without first  complying with           the provisions  of rule  4 of the Land Acquisition           (Companies) Rules, 1963.      2.   Acquisition proceedings are mala fide.      3.   Notice under  section 4(1)  of the  Act was served           upon the  petitioner on  6th March, 1975 when only           two days time was left for filing objections under           Section 5-A  of the  Land  Acquisition  Act.  This           rendered the proceedings illegal.      4.   The notification under Section 4(1) did not relate

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         to  plot  No.  26  belonging  to  the  petitioner.           Proceedings to acquire the said plot are therefore           without jurisdiction."      After the  petition was  amended two additional grounds of challenge  were pressed on behalf of the respondent. They are:      "1.  The notification dated 13th March, 1975 is invalid           for  the   very  same   reason   for   which   the           notification dated  6th February,  1973 is claimed           to be invalid.      "2.  The  Land   Acquisition  proceedings  are  invalid           inasmuch as  the notification  dated  13th  March,           1975 was  neither published  nor was its substance           notified in  the  locality,  as  also  because  no           notice  thereof   had   been   served   upon   the           petitioner."      Negativing all  the challenges  except the  one that as there was failure to cause public notice of the substance of notification under  Sec. 4(1)  to be published at convenient place in the locality on 1001 this short  ground, the  impugned notification  was quashed. Hence this appeal by the Collector,   Allahabad and the Land Acquisition Officer by special leave.      Respondent who  was  the  original  petitioner  but  is respondent in  the appeal  filed by  the Collector  will  be referred to as the petitioner in this judgment.      Petitioner field  Special Leave  Petition No.  9019  of 1980 against  the same  judgment contending  that  the  High Court committed  an error  in rejecting the challenge to the validity of the impugned notification on the ground of legal mala fides as also on the ground of non-compliance with Rule 4 of the Land Acquisition (Companies) Rules, 1963.      As both  these matters  arise out of the same judgment, they were  heard together  and are  being disposed  of by  a common judgment.  It may  be mentioned  that connected Civil Appeal No. 2437 of 1981 was to be taken up for hearing after the hearing concluded in D the present appeal and therefore, the judgment  in  this  matter  was  postponed  because  the observations in  one were  likely to have some impact on the disposal on merits of the contentions in the cognate appeal. Though  very   much  delayed  by  circumstances  beyond  our control, few  days back the hearing in the cognate appeal is over and  therefore, both the appeals can now be disposed of though by separate judgments.      A brief  resume  of  the  facts  leading  to  the  writ petition field  in the High Court would be quite instructive in this  case. The  Hindi Sahitya  Sammelan (’Sammelan’  for short) for  whose benefit the land was sought to be acquired was initially formed as a voluntary organisation in 1910 and on January  8, 1914 it was registered as a society under the Societies Registration  Act retaining  the same  name.  Some where in  1950 difference  arose between  the members of the society and  the attempt  to alter  the constitution  of the society, ultimately  led to  litigation.  U.P..  Legislature enacted an Act styled as U.P. Hindi Sahitya Sammelan Act No. 36 of  1956 under  which a  statutory body was created under the name  of Hindi  Sahitya Sammelan. The statutory body was to take  over the  management and properties of the society. The Act  was however  struck  down  as  unconstitutional  in Damyanti Naranga  v. Union  of  India  &  Ors.(l)  The  pre- existing Sammelan which was a registered society (1) [1971] 3 S.C.R. 840 1002 continued to  function as such. It is for the benefit of the

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Sammelan that the land involved in the dispute was sought to be acquired.  According to  the Sammelan,  it is  in need of land  for   building  ’Sangrahalaya’   which   was   roughly translated as museum-cum-library  cum reading room.              At  the instance  of  the  Sammelan,  Allahabad Municipal Board agreed to hand over the land and building in which a  municipal school  was located,  situated  at  Kamta Prasad Kakkar  Road adjacent to the Central office and Press of the  Sammelan, on certain conditions. The Sammelan needed the land,  as it  was then  declared, to establish a museum. The land with the school building thereon was transferred to the Sammelan  in 1953.  It may  be mentioned  that even till today  the  area  of  land  admeasuring  7315  sq.  yds.  in possession of  the Sammelan  is Lying  vacant  and  for  the quarter of a century, museum has not come up. This aspect is mentioned in  some  detail  as  it  has  an  impact  on  the contention canvassed in these appeals.      Petitioner Jaiswal along with the members of his family purchased land  bearing plot  No. 26 with a building thereon admeasuring 2978  sq. yds.  situated at K. P. Kakkar Road in March 1970.  The petitioner  wanted to  build a  sound-proof air-conditioned cinema  theatre on the plot No. 26 purchased by him.  The plan  for the  proposed theatre  was sanctioned both by  the District  Magistrate and the local municipality in December  1970. It may be recalled here that the judgment of  this   Court  holding   Hindi   Sahitya   Sammelan   Act unconstitutional was  rendered on  February  23,  1971.  The Sammelan was wholly opposed to the construction of a theatre near its campus as in its view a theatre and a research-cum- study centre  can  go  ill  together.  Therefore,  when  the petitioner applied  for a certificate of approval under Rule 3 read  with rule  7(2) of the U.P. Cinematograph Rules 1951 for construction  of a  cinema theatre,  authorities of  the Sammelan raised  a  storm  of  protest,  sometimes  peaceful occasionally likely to turn violent impelling authorities to impose restrictive  orders under  Sec. 144, Code of Criminal Procedure. Sammelan also submitted a long memorandum setting out its objections with a view to persuading the authorities not to grant a certificate of approval for construction of a cinema II (1) [1971] 3 S.C.R. 840 1003 building. Overrullng the objections the District Magistrate, the  Licencing Authority under the U.P. Cinemas (Regulation) Act, 1955  granted the  requisite  certificate  of  approval under Rule  3 which would in law imply that having regard to the provisions  of the 1955 Act and 1951 Rules, there was no legal impediment  to constructing  a cinema  theatre on plot No. 26.  Thereupon, Secretary  of the  Sammelan addressed  a letter to  the Chief  Minister of  State of U.P. complaining against  the   grant  of  the  permission  by  the  District Magistrate and  requesting the  Chief Minister to cancel the permission. Ultimately, having failed to thwart the grant of certificate of  approval. the  Sammelan wrote  a  letter  on October 13,  1971 for acquiring land bearing Plot No. 26. It may  be  recalled  that  the  certificate  of  approval  for constructing a  cinema building  was granted by the District Magistrate on March 24, 1972. The Sammelan addressed various letters to  various authorities  including  the  then  Prime Minister of  India requesting them to cancel the certificate of approval granted to the petitioner. Ultimately on January 31, 1974,  a  notification  under  Sec.  4(1)  of  the  Land Acquisition Act,  1894 was  issued stating  therein that the land bearing  plot No.‘26  admeasuring approx. 2865 sq. yds. was needed  for a  public purpose  namely for  extension  of

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Hindi Sangrahalaya  of Hindi  Sahitya Sammelan Prayag’. This notification was published in the U.P. Government Gazette on February 9,  1974.A notice  under Sec. 4(1) bearing the same date was  served upon  the petitioner  as also  the same was published in  the locality.  The petitioner  challenged  the validity of  this notification  on diverse  grounds in  Writ Petition No. 1932174 and as a measure of interim relief, the High Court  stayed further  proceeding that  may be taken to acquire the  land. In  the meantime  by  notification  dated February 6,  1975, the  earlier notification under Sec. 4(1) dated  January   31,  1974   was  cancelled   and  a   fresh notification was issued to acquire ’land bearing plot No. 62 admeasuring 8265  sq. yds  for the  earlier mentioned public purpose’. Consequently,  the  writ  petition  in  which  the validity of  the earlier  notification  was  questioned  was disposed of  as infructuous.  The second  notification dated February 6,  1975 was  published  in  the  U.P.  Gazette  on February 15, 1975.A notice dated March 6, 1975 under Sec. 5A of the  Land Acquisition  Act was served upon the petitioner inviting him to file his objection, if there be any, against the proposed  acquisition.  The  petitioner  filed  detailed objections on  March 8,  1975 inter alia contending that the acquisition is for a 1004 company and  the pre-requisite for acquisition for a company having not  been carried out, the acquisition is bad in law. It was  also contended  that the petitioner is not the owner of plot  No. 62  admeasuring 8265 sq. yds. Promptly on March 13, 1975,  a corrigendum  was issued  and published  in  the Gazette on  March 22, 1975 correcting the notification dated February 6,  1975 to  read that instead of plot No. 62, plot No. 26  be read  and instead  of area 8265 sq. yds. 2865 sq. yds. be  read. In  between the issue of the notification and the corrigendum,  the petitioner filed Writ Petition 3174/75 questioning the  validity Or the notification dated February 6, 1975.  The High  Court struck  down the  notification  as invalid and  during the pendancy of the writ petition in the High  Court,   further  continuance  e  of  the  acquisition proceedings were stayed.      If  the  petitioner  questioned  the  validity  of  the notification on  ground of  mala fides,  he  ought  to  have joined Sammelan  as respondent.  Having failed  to implead a proper  party,   he  behaved   curiously  in   opposing  the application of  the Sammelan for being impleaded as a party. The High  Court was  in error  in rejecting the application. Therefore,  when  the  Sammelan  moved  an  application  for intervention under  Order XX  rule 3  of the  Supreme  Court Rules, 1966, we granted the same and Mr. S.N. Kacker learned counsel appeared  for the  Sammelan at  the hearing of these appeals and  addressed  his  oral  arguments  and  submitted written submissions.      The High  Court struck  down the  notification  holding that in order to be a valid notification under Sec. 4(1), it has to  be published  or notified for general information in the Official Gazette and for purposes of Sec. SA of the Act, it would be taken to have been published on the date of such publication in  the Official Gazette, and the second part of Sec. 4(1)  requires the  publication of the substance of the notification in the locality’- This having not been complied with, the  notification was bad and invalid. The correctness of this view is questioned on behalf of the appellants.      After scruitinising  the evidence placed on record, the High Court  has recorded a finding that the substance of the notification was  not published in the locality either after 15th February,  1975 when the notification dated February 6,

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1975 was  first published  in the  Official Gazette or after March 22, 1975 when the corrigendum was 1005 published in  the Official  Gazette and thus the requirement of the  second part of Sec. 4(1) has not been complied with. The finding  that there  was no  such publication  as herein indicated was not seriously questioned and in fact could not be questioned.A  few facts  will affirmatively establish it. The first  notification dated January 31, 1974 was published in the  official Gazette  dated  February  9,  1974  and  in respect of  which a  notice was published in the locality in March,  1974.A   copy  of  the  notice  was  served  on  the petitioner on  March 6,  1974. This  notification  bore  the number 78-  VIII-LAQ and  it was  in respect  of plot No. 26 admeasuring 2865  sq. yds.  This notification  was cancelled and superseded  by  another  notification  No.  552-VIII-LAQ dated February  6, 1975, which was published in the Official Gazette dated  February 15,  1975. This  latter notification clearly recites that the earlier notification dated February 9, 1974  is thereby  cancelled. In  the latter  notification dated Feb.  6, 19751  the land  proposed to  be acquired was shown to be plot No. 65 admeasuring 8265 sq. yds. Admittedly notice  of  the  substance  of  this  notification  was  not published in  the locality. The petitioner had nothing to do with land  bearing plot  No. 62 admeasuring 8265 sq. yds. As the previous  notification was  cancelled, he had nothing to worry about  the second  notification which has no relevance to the  plot belonging  to him.  The corrigendum dated March 13, 1975  was issued  and published  in the Official Gazette dated March 22, 1975 correcting the plot number and the area and the  corrected entry  was to be in reference to plot No. 26 and  area  to  be  acquired  was  to  be  2865  sq.  yds. Admittedly, there  was  no  notice  of  publication  of  the substance of the notification dated February 15, 1975 nor of the corrigendum  dated March  22, 1975  in the lacality. The High Court  was therefore,  right in holding that in respect of the  later notification  and corrigendum,  no notice  was published in  the locality  and latter part of Sec. 4(1) was not complied with.      Sec. 4(1)  in its application to the State of U.P. read as under:      "4(1):  Whenever   it  appears   to   the   appropriate      Government or  Collector that  land in  any locality is      needed or  is  likely  to  be  needed  for  any  public      purpose,  a   notification  to  that  effect  shall  be      published in  the Official  Gazette, and  the Collector      shall cause public notice of the substance of 1006      such notification  to be  given at convenient places in      the said locality."      By Land Acquisition (U.P. Amendment And Validation) Act Vlll of 1974, the section was amended to read as under:           "4(1):  Whether  it  appears  to  the  appropriate      Government and  the Collector that land in any locality      is needed  or is  likely to  be needed  for any  public      purpose,  a   notification  to  that  effect  shall  be      published in  the Official  Gazette, and  except in the      case of  any land  to which by virtue of a direction of      the State  Government under Sub-section (4) of Sec. 17,      the  provisions  of  Sec.  5-A  shall  not  apply,  the      Collector shall cause public notice of the substance of      such notification  to be  given at convenient places in      the said locality."      Though this  amendment of  1974 is  subsequent  to  the impugned notification,  yet some reference was made to it to

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buttress  the  sub  mission  that  the  only  purpose  of  a notification under  Sec. 4(1)  and the  public notice in the locality is to make functionally effective the provisions of Sec. 5A so that the persons interested in the land sought to be acquired  can canvass his objections against the proposed acquisition. We shall presently deal with it.      Mr. S.N.  Kacker for the intervener and Mr. Dikshit for the State  of U.P.  urged  that  ordinarily  courts  do  not interfere at  the ,. stage of Sec. 4 notification because it merely constitutes  a proposal  which will  be  meticulously examined after the objections are filed under Sec. 5A by the person interested  in the  land wherein  all aspects  of the matter can  be threadbare  gone into  and examined.  Broadly stated,  one   cannot  take   serious  exception   to   this submission. However,  as a  notification under  Sec.  4  (1) initiates the  proceedings for  acquisition of land aud uses the  expression  ’shall’  the  mandate  of  the  legislature becomes clear  and therefore, the infirmities therein cannot be wholly overlooked on the specious plea that the courts do not interdict at the stage of a mere proposal.      bare perusal  of Sec. 4 (1) clearly shows that in order to comply with the statutory requirements therein set out, a notification 1007 stating therein  the land which is needed or is likely to be needed for  a public  purpose’ has  to be  published in  the official  Gazette.   The  second  part  of  the  sub-section provides that  ’the Collector  has to cause public notice of the substance of such notification to be given at convenient places in  the locality  in which  the land  proposed to  be acquired is  situated. Both  the conditions  are held  by  a catena of  decisions to  be  mandatory  Whether  the  second condition is  mandatory or directory is no more res integra. In Khub  Chand and  Ors. v.  State of Rajasthan and Ors.(1), Subba Rao,  CJ speaking  for the  court observed  that  ’the statutory intention  is, therefore,  clear, namely, that the giving  of   public  notice   is  mandatory.   If  so,   the notification issued  under s.  4 without  complying with the said  mandatory   direction  would  be  void  and  the  land acquisition proceedings  taken  pursuant  thereto  would  be equally void.’  While reaching  this conclusion,  the  Court distinguished the  decision in  Babu Barkya  Thakur  v.  The State of  Bombay(2) wherein  it was held that ’any defect in the notification  under Sec.  4 is not fatal to the validity of the proceedings, particularly when the acquisition is for a company and the purpose has to be investigated under s. 5A or s.  40 necessarily  after the  issue of  the notification under s.  4 of  the Act’.  The Court  pointed out  that  the defect with  which the  notification in Bahu Barkya Thakur’s case sufferred  was of a formal nature and did not go to the root  of  the  matter.  However,  the  decision  is  not  an authority for the proposition that if a public notice of the notification was  not given as prescribed by s. 4, it can be ignored. The pertinent observation of the court is that such an approach  would constitute  rewriting  The  section.  The court also  referred to Smt. Somavanti and Ors. v. The State of Punjab  & Ors.(3)  and quoted with approval the statement therein made  that a  valid notification under sub-s. (I) of Sec. 4  is  a  condition  precedent  t-)  the  making  of  a declaration under  sub-s. (1)  of Sec. 6. This view has been consistently followed and was approved in State of Mysore v. Abdul Razak  Sahib(4), wherein  it was  observed that in the case of  a notification under Sec. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act,  the  law  has  prescribed  that  in  addition  to  the publication of the notification in the Official Gazette, the

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Collector must  also give  publicity of the substance of the notification in  the concerned  locality. Unless  both these conditions are satisfied, s. 4 (1) [1967] 1 S.C.R. 120 at 125. (2) [1961] 1 S.C.R. 128. (3) [1963] 2 S.C.R. 774. (4) [1973] 1 S.C.R. 856. 1008 of the  Land Acquisition  Act cannot  be said  to have  been complied with.  The publication  of a notice in the locality is a  mandatory requirement.  Mr. Kacker  however, drew  our attention to a few more observations in the judgment wherein it was  said that  there  is  an  important  purpose  behind publication of  the substance  of the  notification  in  the locality because  in the  absence of  such publication,  the interested persons  may not be able to file their objections challenging the proposed acquisition and they will be denied an opportunity  afforded by  s.  5A  which  confers  a  very valuable right. Relying on this observation Mr. Kacker urged that if  the underlying  purpose  behind  publication  of  a notice in  the locality  is to  give an  opportunity to  the person interested  in the land to object to the acquisition, where in  a case the purpose is achieved as in this case the petitioner having  filed  his  objections,  the  failure  to publish the  substance of  the notification  in the locality need  not   be  treated  fatal  and  cannot  invalidate  the proceedings. The  submission as presented is very persuasive and but  for binding  precedents,  we  would  have  accorded considerable attention  to it. But we would not whittle down a mandate  of legislation  recognised  by  a  long  line  of decisions solely  depending upon  the facts of a given case. Further the submission is predicated upon an assumption that the  sole   purpose  behind   publication  of  substance  of notification in  locality is to make requirements of Sec. 5A functionally effective.  The assumption  as would be pointed out is  not well  founded. In  fact, the  court in  the last mentioned case  went so far as approving the decision of the Mysore High  Court in  Gangadharaih v.  State  of  Mysore  & Ors.(l) wherein it was ruled that ’when a notification under s. 4  (1) is  published in  the official  Gazette and  it is accompanied by or immediately followed by the public notice, that a  person interested  in the  property pro  posed to be acquired can  be regarded to have had notice of the proposed acquisition.’ This  is a  mandatory  requirement  for  legal compliance with  requirements of  Sec. 4  (1).  In  Narendra Bahadur Singh  and Anr. v. State of U.P. & Ors(2) this Court reiterated that  a publication of the notice in the locality as required  by the second part of s. 4 (1) is mandatory and unless  that   notice  is   given  in  accordance  with  the provisions  contained   therein,  the   entire   acquisition proceedings are vitiated. Repelling the contention, that (1) [1961] Mys. L.J, 883 (2) [1977] 2 S.C.R. 226. 1009 the only  purpose behind  publication of  a  notice  in  the locality is  to give opportunity to the person interested in the land  to prefer objections under Sec. 5A which confers a valuable right, it was held that even though in the facts of that case,  the inquiry  under s. 5A was dispensed with by a direction under  Sec. 17  (4) of  the Act,  the  failure  to comply with  the second condition in Sec. 4 (1) is fatal. It was pertinently observed that provisions of Sec. 4(1) cannot be held  to be  mandatory in  one situation and directory in another and  therefore, it  cannot be  said  that  the  only purpose behind  making the  publication  of  notice  in  the

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locality mandatory  is to give an opportunity to the persons interested in  the land to file objections under Sec. 5A. Of course, what other object it seeks to subserve has been left unsaid. But  the answer is not far to seek. At least we have no doubt  that the  only visible  and  demonstralle  purpose behind publication  of the  substance  of  the  notification under Sec.  4 (1) in the locality where the land proposed to be acquired  is situated,  is to give the persons interested in the  land due  opportunity  to  submit  their  considered objections against the proposed notification.      Incidentally, it may be pointed out that after the 1974 amendment,  Sec.  4  (1)  on  its  true  interpretation  may unmistakably indicate  that where  the enquiry under Sec. 5A is  not   dispensed  with  by  resorting  to  Sec.  17  (4), compliance  with   the  second  part  of  Sec.  4  would  be mandatory. We  however do not propose to go into this aspect because the amendment is subsequent to the notification.      Mr. Kacker  however on  behalf of the interveners while conceding that  there cannot be a valid acquisition unless a notification is  published in  the Official  Gazette  and  a substance of  the notification is published in the locality, urged that  publication in  locality  need  not  necessarily follow the  publication of  the notification in the Official Gazette but  it may even precede the same because what is of importance is  the decision to acquire, the notification and publication of the notice are mere formal expressions of the decision of  the Govt.  to  start  acquisition  proceedings. Proceeding along  it was said that the second requirement of Sec. 4 (1) v z. publication of the notice in the locality is only to  make effective  the provisions  of Sec. 5A and that such minor  defect cannot invalidate notification under Sec. 4. To substantiate this submission, reliance was placed upon the decisions in Babu Barkya Thakur’s case, State of Madhya 1010 Pradesh &  Ors.  v.  Vishnu  Prasad  Sharma  &  Ors.(l)  and Narendra Bahadur  Singh’s case.  All these  decisions do not bear out  or substantiate  the submission  of Mr. Kacker for the reasons already mentioned.      Assuming that a notification in the Official Gazette is a formal   expression of the decision of the Government, the decision of  the Government  is hardly  relevant, unless  it takes the  concrete shape  and form  by publication  in  the Official Gazette.  Where a  decision of the Government to be effective and  valid has  to be  notified in  the Government Gazette, the  decision  itself  does  not  become  effective unless a  notification in  the Official  Gazette follows. In Mahendra Lal  Jaini v.  The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.(2) it was  held that a notification under Sec. 4A of the Indian Forest Act,  1927 is required to be published in the Gazette and  unless  it  is  so  published,  it  is  of  no  effect. Logically, the same view must be adopted  for a notification under Sec.  4. Therefore  assuming that  a notification is a formal expression of a decision of the Government to acquire land, unless  the decision  is notified  in  the  Government Gazette by  an appropriate notification, the proceedings for acquisition cannot  be said  to have  been initiated and the decision would  remain a  paper decision. Sec. 4 (1) further requires that  ’the   Collector shall cause public notice of the substance of such notification to be given at convenient places  in   the  said   locality.’  The   expression  ’such notification.’ in the latter part of Sec. 4 (1) and sequence of events  therein enumerated  would clearly  spell out that first the  Government should  reach a  decision  to  acquire land, then  publish  a  notification  under  Sec.4  (1)  and simultaneously or within  a reasonable time from the date of

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the publication  of the  notification cause  a notice  to be published containing  substance of such notification meaning thereby that  notification which  is  published.  Obviously, therefore, there  cannot be  a publication  in the  locality prior to the issuance of the notification. The submission of Mr. Kacker does not commend to us.      In this context, it was next contended that at any rate the petitioner has not suffered any prejudice by the failure of the  Government to  publish  a  notice  in  the  locality because the petitioner has filed detailed objections against the proposed acquisition. If the (1) [1965] 3 S.C.R. 557. (2) [1963] Supp, 1 S.C.R. 912. 1011 only purpose  behind publishing  the notice  in the locality was to  give an opportunity to the persons interested in the laid to  file their  objections, the  submission would  have merited consideration,  but  the  same  has  been  expressly negatived and  therefore, it  is futile to examine the same. To be  brutally frank  if  this  was  the  only  ground  for invalidating the  notification, in  the backdrop of facts we would  have   our  serious  reservations  in  upholding  the decision, though  as the  law stands,  the  High  Court  was perfectly  justified   in  reaching   this  conclusion.  Our reservations have  nothing to  do with  the perfectly  legal view taken  by the  High Court.  They stem from the facts of this case  and  our  understanding  of  the  purpose  behind publication of  notice as  set out  by us earlier. In such a situation, we  would have developed the concept of prejudice and  the   absence  of   it  resulting   in  negativing  the contention. But there are other formidable challenges to the validity of  the impugned notification, which of course have not found  favour with the High Court but we are inclined to take a  different view  of the  matter. Therefore we let the decision of the High Court on this point stand.      Turning to  the petition for special leave filed by the petitioner, we  grant special leave to appeal and proceed to examine  the   two  challenges   to  the   validity  of  the notification under  Sec. 4(1)  which have  been negatived by the High  Court. The  petitioner questioned  the validity of the  notification   inter  alia   on  the  ground  that  the acquisition was  malafide and that the acquisition being for a Company,  it would  be invalid  for failure to comply with the provisions of rule 4 of the Land Acquisition (Companies) Rules, 1963.  The High  Court negatived both the challanges. Mr. Nariman,  learned counsel  for the petitioner invited us to examine them.      The relevant averments on the question of mala fides as set out  in the writ petition filed in the High Court may be briefly summarised.  As the  objections by  the Sammelan for not granting  a certificate  of approval  for constructing a cinema building  on Plot  No. 26  were not  accepted by  the Licensing  authority  and  a  certificate  of  approval  was subsequently granted  to the  petitioner, the  Sammelan   in order to  achieve the  same object,  namely, not to permit a theatre  to   be  constructed   at  the   place,  moved  the authorities for  acquiring the  land. It is averred that the genesis of the proceeding for acquisition is not in the need of the  Sammelan but  its failure to stop the cinema theatre coming up and thus the purported need is non- 1012 existent and  the initiation  of the acquisition proceedings was mala fide. Its sole purpose is to deprive the petitioner of the  cinema business  which he  would legally  carry  on. Frankly, the averments are not very specific, clear, precise

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and  to   the  point.  But  the  comulative  effect  of  the allegations is  that Sammelan being actuated by the ulterior motive to  thwart the  petitioners’ project  to construct  a cinema building  resorted to  the dubious  method of seeking acquisition of  the land  even though it had no need present or in  near future  of the  land in  question. Obviously, if such be  the allegation,  the Sammelan  ought to  have  been impleaded as  a party  to the  writ petition  Not  only  the Sammelan was  not impleaded  as  the  party,  but  when  the Sammelan moved  an application for intervention or for being joined as  a party, the petitioner was ill-advised to object to the  same and  unfortunately the objection prevailed with the High  Court.  We  are  unable  to  appreciate  both  the objections and  the view taken by the High Court. Therefore, when    Nariman  pressed his  petition for  special leave to appeal against  the rejection of the challenge on the afore- mentioned two  grounds, we  made it abundantly clear that we would be least interested in examining the challenge founded on the  ground of mala fides in the absence of the Sammelan. The Sammelan had moved a petition for intervention which, it must be  stated in fairness to Mr. Nariman, was not objected in this  Court and  we made  it abundantly  clear  that  the request for  being impleaded  as a  party in  the High Court ought not  to have  been objected. Accordingly, the petition for intervention  was granted  and the Sammelan was given an opportunity to  file its  affidavit as  well as any material that it  chooses to place on record. According to the rules, the interveners are not entitled to address oral submissions to the  court but  in the  background of  the facts  of this case, we gave full opportunity to Mr. Kacker to address oral submissions. It  is in  the backdrop  of these facts that we propose to  examine the  challenge founded  on the ground of mala fides.      A few  facts will  have to  be recapitulated. After the petitioner purchased  the  Plot  No.  26  and  submitted  an application on  July 6,  1971 to the licensing authority for grant of  a certificate  of approval  as envisaged by rule 3 read with  rule 7  of U.P.  Cinematograph Rules, 1951 (’1951 Rules’ for short) for constructing a cinema building on Plot No. 26,  the Sammelan  promptly objected  to  the  grant  of certificate of  approval on  the ground  that existence of a cinema theatre  within the  vicinity of  the campus  of  the institute of culture learning 1013 and research  like the  Sammelan would be destructive of the environment  and   the  atmosphere  of  the  institute,  and existence of  a cinema  theatre at  such a place would be an incongruity. May  be, it  might be  the honest  and  genuine belief  of  the  office-bearers  of  the  Sammelan  that  an institute of  learning and  research cannot  co-exist with a cinema theatre  in its  vicinity, and  that the  latter  may pollute  the   educational  and   cultural  environment  The District  Magistrate   as  the   licensing  authority  after corresponding  with  the  State  authorities    granted  the certificate of approval on February 24, 1974. On October 13, 1971, the  Sammelan sent  a communication  addressed to  the Chief Minister  of U.P. in which it was stated that a cinema building should  not be  permitted to  be constructed in the vicinity of  the campus  of the  Sammelan. The  letter  also refers to  an earlier  application addressed  to  the  Chief Minister requesting  him to  intervene so  that the proposed cinema house may not be permitted to be constructed near the campus of  the Sammelan,  because  it  is  likely  to  cause nuisance and  interfere with the activities and the academic environment of the Sammelan. Further request was made in the

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letter that  administrative  sanction  may  be  granted  for acquisition of land on which the cinema building is proposed to be constructed offering that the Sammelan is ready to pay whatever  compensation   that  may   have  to  be  paid  for acquisition of  the  land  and  the  building  thereon.  The Ditrict Magistrate  by his  letter dated  November  8,  1971 addressed to  the Pradhan Mantri of the Sammelan pointed out that the  Revenue Board  had directed  that  no  institution should be given land more than that required for its purpose and that  where the land is to be acquired by a body, such a body itself  must make  an attempt  to directly purchase the land. Then comes a sentence which may be extracted:           "It is  also evident by your above referred letter      that you  stood in  need of  acquiring land because the      owner of  the land  wants to  construct a  cinema house      over it and the institution does not want that a cinema      should be constructed over the same.           It is  clear by  the above  circumstances that the      land is  not so much required by the institution as for      the construction  of the  cinema  house.  Therefore,  I      would request  you to  consider the  matter and if your      aim is that the cinema house is not constructed you may      resort to other means."                                           (underlining ours) 1014              In  the meantime  on December  16, 1971,  Joint Secretary to  the Government  of U.P.  wrote to the District Magistrate  enquiring   as  to   ’whether  in  granting  the certificate of  approval, Rule  7 (2)  of the 1951 Rules was violated; What  is the  sphere  of  the  activities  of  the Sammelan;  does   it  undertake   teaching  or   other  such activities by  virtue of  which it  may  be  placed  in  the category of  Educational Institutions;  if  for  some  other reasons, construction  of cinema  house on  proposed site is against public  interest, seek Government’s approval in this respect  specifying  the  reasons  thereon;  obtain  written objections from  the Sammelan; if required take Government’s approval making recommendations; and intimate whether cinema building will  be  sound-proof.’  On  March  24,  1972,  the District  Magistrate  as  the  licensing  authority  sent  a detailed reply  inter. alia stating that the Sammelan is not an educational institution nor a residential institution and it has  no regular programme of class teaching and it cannot be styled  as an  educational institution within the meaning of the  expression in  rule 7.  He also  opined that  having regard to  all  relevant  factors  and  other  circumstances construction of  a cinema  building on  the proposed site is not against  the public  interest. He  also opined  that the approved plans  of  the  building  show  an  air-conditioned sound-proof  cinema   theatre  which   would   enhance   the beautification of  the locality and would enrich the coffers of the  State. It  was lastly  pointed out that the distance between the  proposed cinema  building and the campus of the Sammelan was about 95 feet as crow-fly measure. He concluded by saying  that having  regard to  all the circumstances, he was of  the opinion  that public interest in no way would be damaged if the permission is granted for construction of the cinema house  in question  on the proposed site, and that he was proceeding to grant permission to the applicant which is being forwarded  to the Government. After the receipt of the permission, the  old existing  building on  Plot No.  26 was demolished by  the petitioner  and construction  of a modern cinema theatre  fully air-conditioned  and  sound-proof  was commenced On  August 7,  1983, the  Sammelan moved  a formal application   requesting    for    initiating    acquisition

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proceedings of land included in Plot No. 26 as it was needed by the  Sammelan for  the  purpose  of  extension  of  Hindi Sangrahalya (Museum’. Skipping over some of the intermediate steps including a request to the then 1015 Prime Minister  to intervene  and thwart the cinema project, when the  first notification under Sec. 4 (1) was published, the purpose  for which the land was to be acquired was shown to be  ’extension of  Hindi  Sangrahalya  at  Hindi  Sahitya Sammelan Prayag’.      Way back  on July 22, 1949, the Sammelan with a view to establishing a  museum in connection with a Hindi University approached the  Allahabad  Municipal  Board  to  transfer  a middle school  building along  with the Gymnacia attached to it. The  Municipal Board unanimously sanctioned the proposal to handover the building of the school with appurtenant land situated at  Kanta Prasad  Kakkar Road  (that is the road on which the  irritating cinema  theatre has  come up)   to the Sammelan subject  to the  condition that  the Sammelan would construct a school building at South Malaka at a cost of Rs. 30,000. The  Sammelan accepted  the condition  and  complied with it. The Government accorded sanction to the proposal on September 9,  1953 and  since then  the school building with the land  over which  it is  standing and  the Gymnacia were transferred to the Sammelan. It is an admitted position that an area  of 7315  sq. yds. Of land in the Sammelan campus is lying vacant,  open and  unutilised till  today, that is for thirty two  years. This  will have  a direct  impact on  the alleged need  of the  Sammelan of  the land  propsed  to  be acquired. At  the time  of taking  over the school building, the Sammelan  had contemplated  putting up  a  museum.  That again is  the purpose  for- which  the land involved in this appeal is  sought to  be acquired  at the  instance  of  the Sammelan. When  this rather  disturbing position  emerged on analysis and  evaluation of  uncontroverted  facts,  it  was suggested that  the Sammelan  wanted to construct a building for Natyashala  and Rangmanch  for which plans have not been prepared. All  these inconvenient  facts found reflection in the order  sheet of the Collector dated September 3, 1973 in which it  is stated  that  "since  the  authorities  of  the Sammelan have  capacity to approach the highest authority of the democratic  Government as  is evident  from the  letters received from  their office,  the office  is not  capable to offer any comments whatever might be the proposal whether it is according  to the  rules or against the rules or the same should be  allowed to  remain as  it is  etc." Later  on the Sammelan stated that after the land is acquired, it would be utilised for implementation of some new schemes. Thus though the Sammelan  indisputably had  and has  open  land  in  its possession from  1953 till  1973, it  did not  construct the museum for which it had obtained land from the 1016 Allahabad Municipal  Board. That  apart it  again moved  the Government for  acquiring the  land of  the petitioner under the pretext  that it  is needed  for constructing  a museum. When the facts counter-indicated the purported need, it came out  with   a  suggestion  that  it  proposed  to  construct Natyashala  and   Rangmanch.  One  may  in  passing,  a  bit humourously note  that Natyashala  is a place where dramatic performances are  staged and  Rangmanch  is  a  place  where dances are  performed. The  Sammelan would put up with them. That  would   show  that  such  performances  would  not  be destructive of  educational and  cultural environment of the campus of  the Sammelan  but a modern air-conditioned sound- proof cinema  building would. We leave this without comment.

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But as  these proposals  failed  to  carry  conviction,  its latest stand  is that  let the  land come, they would devise schemes for  its proper  utilisation as and when the land is made available.  This demonstrates  the  hollowness  of  the alleged need  and removes  the veil  thereby disclosing  the real purpose for acquiring the land.      Mr. Kacker  urged that  quitting the  quibbling so  far resorted to,  the Court  may examine  a forthright submisson that the Sammelan’s interest in getting the land acquired is not merely to construct Sangrahalya but it is equally if not more interested  in not having a cinema theatre at the place where it  is being constructed.  Shorn of embellishment, the Sammelan would  not tolerate  the theatre and therefore when it failed to thwart the grant of certificate of approval and cinema theatre  came up,  it took the second step to achieve the first  mentioned object viz. seek acquisition of land to satisfy an  imaginary or non-existent need. The challenge on the ground  of legal  mala fides  to  the  validity  of  the notification under   Sec.  4 (1),  a preliminary step in the process of  acquisition has  to be  examined, evaluated  and answered in the backdrop of these facts.      It can  be stated  without fear  of contradiction  that need of the land for Sangrahalya is a figment of imagination conjured  up   to  provide   an   ostensible   purpose   for acquisition. There  is enough  land roughly admeasuring 7315 sq. yds.  Lying vacant  and unutilised with the Sammelan for over a quarter of a century. The Sangrahalya has not come up though this  was the land which was taken from the Municipal Board for the avowed object of putting up a Sangrahalya. The Sammelan moved  on to  Rangamanch and  Natyashala  and  then ultimately adopted  a position  that when  the land  is made available, 1017 schemes will be devised for its proper use. Could it be said with   confidence that  the Sammelan  was ever interested in acquiring the  land for  effectuating any of its objects. It has neither  the plans nor the wherewithals nor any specific object for  which it needs land and it is unable to use over years the land already available at its disposal. Therefore, Mr. Kacker  took bold  and to  some  extent  an  imaginative stand. He  said that in seeking acquisition of the land, the Sammelan is  actuated by  a desire  not to  have the  cinema theatre in its vicinity or if it has come into existence, to do away with the same. When these facts stare into the face, can it  be said  with confidence  that the Government or the Collector in  whom the  power to  acquire  land  is  vested, exercised the  power for  the purpose for which it is vested or are they guilty of legal mala fides.      The High  Court disposed  of the contention by an over- simplification of  this tangled  web of facts without making the least  attempt at  unearthing the  real motives  of  the Sammelan- The  tell tale  facts disclose motives and unravel hidden objects-  The High  Court by  passed them  by  simply observing that  there is  nothing on record to indicate that the Collector  or the  State Government  are inclined to act against the  petitioner for  any improper  motives. The High Court unfortunately missed the real contention of legal mala fides, as  also an  important piece  of  evidence  that  the Collector on  whom the  statute confers  power  to  initiate proceeding  for   acquisition  himself  was  satisfied  that Sammellan sought  acquisition not  because it  requires  the land but  it wants  to stop  or  do  away  with  the  cinema theatre.  This  becomes  evident  from  the  letter  of  the District Magistrate dated November 8, 1971.      It is  well-settled that  where power  is conferred  to

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achieve a  certain purpose,  the power can be exercised only for achieving  that purpose. Sec. 4 (1) confers power on the Government and  the Collector  to acquire  land needed for a public purpose. The power to acquire land is to be exercised for carrying out a public purpose. If the authorities of the Sammelan cannot  tolerate the  existence of a cinema theatre in its vicinity, can it be said that such a purpose would be a public  purpose ? May be the authority of the Sammelan may honestly believe  that the existence of a cinema theatre may have the  pernicious tendency to vitiate the equcational and cultural environment  of the  institution and  therefore, it would like to wish 1018      away a  cinema theatre  in its  vicinity.  That  hardly constitutes public  purpose. We  have already said about its proclaimed need of land for putting up Sangrahalya. It is an easy escape  route whenever Sammelan wants to take over some piece of  land. Therefore,  it can  be fairly concluded that the Sammelan  was  actuated  by  extraneous  and  irrelevant considerations  in  seeking  acquisition  of  the  land  the statutory authority  having known this fact yet proceeded to exercise  statutory  power  and  initiated  the  process  of acquisition. Does this constitute legal mala fides      Where power  is conferred  to achieve  a purpose it has been repeatedly  reiterated that the power must be exercised reasonably and  in good faith to effectuate the purpose. And in this  context  ’in  good  faith’  means  ’for  legitimate reasons’.  Where   power  is  exercised  for  extraneous  or irrelevant considerations or reasons, it is unquestionably a colourableq exercise  of power  or fraud  on power  and  the exercise of  power is vitiated. If the power to acquire land is to  be exercised,  it must be exercised bona fide for the statutory purpose and for none other. If it is exercised for an extraneous,  irrelevant or non-germane consideration, the acquiring authority  can be charged with legal mala fides In such a  situation there  is no question of any personal ill- will  or   motive.  In   Municipal  Council   of  Sydney  v. Compbell(1) it  was observed  that irrelevant considerations on which  power to  acquire land is exercised, would vitiate compulsory purchase  orders or  scheme depending on them. In State of  Punjab v.  Gurdial Singh  & Ors (2) acquisition of land for  constructing a  grain market was challenged on the ground of legal malafides Upholding the challenge this Court speaking through  Krishna Iyer,  J. explained the concept of legal malafides in his hitherto inimitable language, diction and style and observed as under:           "Pithily put,  bad  faith  which  invalidates  the      exercise of  power-sometimes called colourable exercise      or fraud  on power  and  oftentimes  overlaps  motives,      passions and  satisfactions-is the  attainment of  ends      beyond the  sanctioned purposes  of power by simulation      or pretension  of gaining a legitimate goal. If the use      of the power is for the fulfilment of a legimate object      the actuation or cataly- (1) [1925] A.C. 338 at 375. (2) [1980] 1 S.C.R. 1071. 1019      sation by  malice is  not legicidal.  The action is bad      where the true object is to reach an end different from      the one  for which  the power  is entrusted,  goaded by      extraneous considerations,  good or bad, but irrelevant      to the  entrustment. When  the  custdian  of  power  is      influenced in  its exercise  by considerations  outside      those for  promotion of  which the  power is vested the      court calls  it a colourable exercise and is undeceived

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    by  illusion.  In  a  broad,  blurred  sense,  Benjamin      Disraeli was  not off  the mark  even in  Law  when  he      stated: "I repeat-that all power is a trust-that we are      accountable for its exercise-that, from the people, and      for the people. all springs, and all must exist."      After analysing  the factual  matrix, it  was concluded that the  land was  not needed  for a  Mandi which  was  the ostensible purpose  for which  the land  was  sought  to  be acquired but  in truth  and  reality,  the  Mandi  need  was hijacked to  reach the  private destination  of depriving an enemy of his land through back-seat driving of the statutory engine. The  notification was declared invalid on the ground that it suffers from legal mala fides. The case before us is much stronger,  far  more  disturbing  and  unparalelled  in influencing official  decision by  sheer weight  of personal clout. The  District Magistrate was chagrined to swallow the bitter pill  that he  was forced to acquire land even though he  was  personally  convinced  there  was  no  need  but  a pretence- Therefore, disagreeing with the High Court, we are of the  opinion that the power to acquire land was exercised for  an   extraneous  and  irrelevent  purpose  and  it  was colourable exercise of power, namely, to satisfy the chagrin and anguish  of the  Sammelan at  the coming  up of a cinema theatre in  the vicinity  of its  campus, which  it vowed to destroy. Therefore,  the impugned  notification  has  to  be declared illegal and invalid for this additional ground.      The validity  of the  impugned  notification  was  also challenged on the ground that even though the acquisition is for the  Sammelan, a  company, the  notification was  issued without first complying with the provisions of rule 4 of the Land Acquisition (Companies) Rules, 1963. The High Court has negatived this  challenge. We  must frankly confess that the contention canvassed  by Mr.  Nariman in  this behalf  would necessitate  an   indepth  examination  of  the  contention. However,  we   consider  it  unnecessary  in  this  case  to undertake this exer- 1020 cise because  the judgment of the High Court is being upheld for the  additional reason that the acquisition in this case was mala  fide. Therefore,  we do not propose to examine the contention under this head.      For the  reasons which  appealed to  the High Court and for  the   additional  reasons  herein  stated,  the  appeal preferred by  the Collector  and the District Magistrate and another fails and is dismissed while the appeal on the grant of special  leave to the petitioner is hereby partly allowed to the  extent herein  indicated. Substantially,  the  Civil Appeal No.  2458 of  1975 fails  and is  dismissed  with  no orders as to costs. S.R.                  Appeal dismissed and Petition allowed. 1021