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PETITIONER: THE CHIEF INSPECTOR OF MINES AND ANOTHER

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: LALA KARAM CHAND THAPAR ETC.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 10/02/1961

BENCH: GUPTA, K.C. DAS BENCH: GUPTA, K.C. DAS SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P.(CJ) DAS, S.K. AYYANGAR, N. RAJAGOPALA MUDHOLKAR, J.R.

CITATION:  1961 AIR  838            1962 SCR  (1)   9  CITATOR INFO :  F          1961 SC 849  (3)  F          1961 SC1543  (3)  RF         1972 SC2066  (10)  F          1976 SC1031  (35)  D          1980 SC1858  (19,20)  R          1982 SC1413  (18)  F          1989 SC1612  (12)

ACT: Colliery   Company-Violation  of  Coal   Mines   Regulations Prosecution of all directors of company, the managing agents and  the  manager  of  company-Legality-Mines  Act  Of  1923 repealed  and  reenacted  Regulations  made  thereunder,  if continue  in force ’Anyone of directors’ meaning  of  Indian Coal Mines Regulations, 1926-Mines Act, 1923 (4 of 1923), S. 31(4)-Mines  Act, 1952, (35 of 1952), SS.  2(1),  76-General Clauses  Act,  1897  (10 of 1897), S.  24  -constitution  of India, Art. 20(1).

HEADNOTE: The  directors  of  a  company, which was  the  owner  of  a colliery,  the  directors  of the  managing  agents  of  the company,  and  the manager and the agent  of  colliery  were prosecuted  for  offenses under ss. 73 and 74 Of  the  Mines Act, 1932, for violation 10 of  several  regulations  out  of  the  Indian  Coal   Mines Regulations,  1926.   They challenged the  validity  of  the prosecution  on the of grounds, inter alia (1) that  as  the Indian  Coal  Mines  Regulations,  1926,  framed  under  the provisions  of the Mines Act, 1923, had, under s.  31(4)  of that  Act, effect as if enacted in the Act, and as that  Act had  been  repealed  by  the  Mines  Act,  1952,  the   said Regulations  had  ceased to have any  legal  existence  long before  the date of the alleged violation, and (2) that  the Regulations of 1926 were only deemed to be regulations under the Mines Act, 1952, and hence were not laws in force on the date  of  the  alleged contravention,  and,  therefore,  the prosecution  in  the present case was a  violation  of  Art.

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20(1) Of the Constitution of India.  Two of the directors of the company also raised an objection that the prosecution of all the directors was not. permitted by the Mines Act, 1952, in view of s. 76 of the Act, which provided that any one  of the  directors  may  be prosecuted.  The  directors  of  the managing  agents  contended  that,  in  any  event,  as  the managing  agents were not the owners of the  colliery,  they could not be prosecuted. Held:     (1)  that in view Of S. 24 Of the General  Clauses Act,  1897, by which when an Act is repealed and  reenacted, rules  and regulations framed under the repealed  Act  shall continue in force and be deemed to have been made under  the provisions  so reenacted, s. 31(4) of the Mines  Act,  1923, which  had  been repealed, must be construed in such  a  way that  for  the purpose of the continuity of  existence,  the Regulations  framed  under that Act will not  be  considered part  of  the  Act.   Accordingly,  the  Indian  Coal  Mines Regulations, 1926, continued to be in force at the  relevant date  and  must be deemed to be regulations made  under  the Mines Act, 1952. Institute   of   Patent   Agents  and   others   v.   Joseph Lockwood,[1894] A. C. 347 and State v. K. B. Chandra, (r914) I.L.R. 33 Pat. 507, distinguished. (2)  that  the Indian Coal Mines Regulations,  1926,  though they became Regulations under the Mines Act, 1952, in conse- quence  of a deeming provision, nonetheless, were  "laws  in force" within the meaning of Art. 20(1) of the Constitution. Rao  Shiv Bahadur Singh and another v. The State of  Vindhya Pradesh, [1953] S.C.R. 1188, distinguished. (3)  that the expression "any one of the directors" in S.   76 of the Mines Act, 1952, means "every one of the directors". Isle  of Wight Railway Co. v. Tahourdin, (1883) 25  Ch.   D. 320, relied on. (4)  that  the managing agents or the colliery company  were neither  the owner of the mine nor the occupier  within  the meaning  Of S. 2(1) of the Mines Act, 1952, and,  therefore, the prosecution of the directors of the managing agents  was not maintainable. 11

JUDGMENT: CRIMINAL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeals Nos.  98 to 106 of 1959. Appeals  by special leave from the judgment and order  dated March 3, 1958, of the Patna High Court in M. J. C. Nos. 475, 476,  479  and 480 of 1956, 180 of 1957 and 475  to  478  of 1956. N.   S.  Bindra and B. H. Dhebar, for the appellants in  Cr. As.  Nos. 98 and 101 of 1959. G.   S. Pathak, S. 0. Banerjee and P. K. Chatterjee, for the appellants  in  Cr.   As.   Nos. 102  to  106  of  1959  and respondents in Cr.  As.  Nos. 98 to 100 of 1959. B.   Ganapathy Iyer and R. H. Dhebar, for the respondents in Cr.  As.  Nos. 102 to 106 of 1959 and appellants in Cr.  As. Nos. 99 and 100 of 1959. 1961.  February 10.  The Judgment of the Court was delivered by DAs  GUPTA,  J.-On  February  5,1955,  there  was  a  tragic accident  in the Amlabad Colliery, in Manbhum  District,  in the  State  of Bihar, as a result of which 52  persons  lost their  lives  and one escaped with injuries.  The  court  of enquiry  which  was appointed to hold an  inquiry  into  the causes  of the accident and the circumstances attending  the

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accident submitted its report on September 26, 1955, holding that  the accident was due to negligence and  non-observance of  some  of  the  regulations  of  the  Indian  Coal  Mines Regulations, 1926.  This report was duly published under  s. 27  of the Mines Act, 1952.  Thereafter, on March  3,  1956, the  Government of India informed the manager and the  agent of   the  colliery  that  a  court  of  enquiry  was   being constituted  under cl. (a) of the Regulation 48 to  hold  an inquiry into their conduct.  Criminal proceedings were  also instituted against 14 persons including the manager and  the agent  of  the colliery, all the directors  of  the  company which was the owner of the colliery and the directors of the managing  agents  of that company.  The  complaints  alleged violation  by the 14 accused of several regulations  out  of the  Indian  Coal Mines Regulations, 1926.  There  were  two separate complaints in respect of the violation of different 12 regulations.   It was alleged in one of the complaints  that the accused persons had by the violation of the  regulations mentioned  therein  committed offenses under s.  73  of  the Mines  Act,  1952; the other complaint alleged that  by  the violation  of the regulations mentioned therein the  accused persons  had committed offenses under as. 73 and 74  of  the Mines   Act,  1952.   The  Sub-Divisional  Magistrate   took cognizance of the offenses, and issued processes against all the 14 persons on May 23, 1956.  Six of the accused persons, Lala  Karam  Chand Thaper, H. P. Poddar, Jagat  Ram  Sharma, Kumud   Ranjan  Dutt,  H.  V.  Varma  and  U.  Mehta   filed applications before the High Court of Patna for the issue of appropriate  writs  or  orders  for  quashing  the  criminal proceedings.   The  main  ground on  which  these  different applications  were  based was that the regulations  for  the alleged  violation of which the complaints were  lodged  had ceased  to have any legal existence long before the date  of the alleged violation by the repeal of the Mines Act,  1923, under  which they had admittedly been made.  Another  ground taken by all the applicants was that the prosecution was  in violation  of  Art.  20(1)  of  the  Constitution.   In  the application by two directors of the company owning the mine, Lala Karam Chand Thaper and H. P. Poddar a further point was taken  that  the prosecution of all the  directors  was  not permitted  by  the Mines Act, 1952.  The  directors  of  the managing agents raised in their applications the point  that the  managing  agents not being owners of the  colliery  the directors of the managing agents should not be prosecuted. The High Court rejected the applicants’ contention that  the Regulations  framed  under  a. 29 of the  Mines  Act,  1923, ceased to have legal existence after the repeal of that Act. It  however accepted the contention of the managing  agents’ directors  that  they were not liable to  prosecution.   The High Court also held on a consideration of the provision  of s. 76 of the 1952 Act that all the directors of the  company which  owned the colliery could not be prosecuted  and  only one to be chosen by the complainant out of all the directors 13 could  be  proceeded against.  On these  findings  the  High Court  dismissed  the applications of the manager,  and  the agent, and allowed the applications of the directors of  the managing  agents.   In  the  two  applications  by  the  two directors  of the colliery company (Lals Karam Chand  Thaper and  H.  P.  Poddar)  it  gave  a  direction  requiring  the respondents 2 and 3 before it, that is, the Chief  Inspector of Mines, and the Regional Inspector of Mines, Dhanbad,  "to choose  one  of  the  directors of  the  company  for  being prosecuted  against  and  to remove the name  of  the  other

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directors from the category of the accused persons".  In the two criminal cases the two directors of the company obtained special  leave  to appeal against this direction  and  have, pursuant thereto, filed the two appeals which are now before us  as  Criminal  Appeals Nos. 103 and  104  of  1959.   The manager  and the agent have also filed appeals  against  the order  rejecting  their applications after  having  obtained special  leave from this Court.  These two appeals  are  now numbered  as  Cr.  Appeals Nos. 105 and 106  of  1959.   The Chief Inspector of Mines and others who are made respondents in the application under Art. 226 have also filed appeals on special leave granted by this Court against the High Court’s order  in the applications of the directors of the  managing agents  allowing the same and also against the High  Court’s orders  in  the  application of the  two  directors  of  the company asking the Chief Inspector of Mines and the Regional Inspector  of Mines to choose one only of the directors  for prosecution;  their  appeals  in  the  application  of   the directors  of  the  managing  agents  before  us  have  been numbered  as  Criminal  Appeals Nos.  100  and  101.   Their appeals in the applications of the directors of the colliery company are numbered 98 and 99 of 1957. It  will be convenient to refer to the appellants  in  these four appeals as government-appellants. At about the same time these several applications were  made before  the  High Court, the agent and the  manager  of  the colliery company also made applications to the High Court of Patna for the issue of 14 appropriate writs or orders restraining the Commissioner  of Chotanagpur  who  had been appointed to   hold  the  inquiry under  Regulation 48, from holding that inquiry.   The  High Court  held  that no inquiry could be  ordered  against  the agents.   The  manager’s application was  however  rejected. Against  that  order  the manager Shri  Kumud  Ranjan  Dutt. obtained  special  leave  from  this  Court  to  appeal  and pursuant thereto has filed the appeal which is now before us as Appeal No. 102 of 1959. The  Appeals Nos. 100 and 101 need not detain us long.   For whatever  be the controversy on other questions  as  regards the  Regulations of 1926 being in force after the repeal  of the  Mines Act of 1923 and as regards the alleged  violation of  Art.  20(1) of the Constitution, there is no  manner  of doubt  that  the  High Court is right in  holding  that  the managing  agents  of the colliery company  are  neither  the "owner"  of  the coal mines nor the  "manager"  nor  "agent" thereof.   It  was  not even suggested before  us  that  the managing agents are either managers or agents.  "Agent"  has been defined in the Act, as the representative of the  owner in  respect of the management, control and direction of  the mines  and managing agent of the company in no  sense  falls within this definition.  "Manager" is not defined, but s. 17 of  the  Act  provides that every mine 3hall  be  under  one manager  who  shall have the prescribed  qualifications  and shall   be   responsible  for   the   control,   management, supervision  and directions of the mines, and the owner  and agent  of  every mine shall appoint himself  or  some  other person  having such qualifications to be such  manager.   In the  Amlabad Colliery Mr. Kumud Ranjan Dutt  was  admittedly appointed  the  manager  and  it  was  on  that  basis  that proceedings were commenced against him.  The managing  agent of  the company was not and could not be the manager of  the Amlabad  Colliery.  It was urged however that  the  managing agents  of  the colliery company are in  occupation  of  the mines  and  thus  fall within the  definition  of  the  word

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"owner" in s. 2(1) of the Act.  The relevant portion of  the definition of owner in s. 2(1) runs thus: " "Owner" when 15 used  in  relation to a mine, means any person  who  is  the immediate proprietor or lessee or occupier of the(,, mine or of  any  part thereof".  The argument is that  the  managing agents exercise, by reason of their being managing agents of the  colliery  company,  possession over the  mine;  and  so "occupy"  the  mine.   Though the  word  "occupier"  is  not defined in the Act it is patently absurd to suppose that any and every person exercising possession over the mine, is  an "occupier" and thus an owner of the mine, for the purpose of the  Mines  Act.   From the very collocation  of  the  words "immediate  proprietor, or lessee or occupier of the  mine", it  is abundantly clear that only a person whose  occupation is  of  the  same  character,  that  is,  occupation  by   a proprietor  or a lessee-by way of possession on  his  behalf and  not  on behalf of somebody else is meant  by  the  word "occupier"  in  the  definition.   Thus,  a  trespasser   in wrongful  possession to the exclusion of the rightful  owner would  be an occupier of the mine, and so be an "owner"  for the purposes of the Act.  When however a servant or agent of the  proprietor  or lessee of a mine is in possession  of  a mine,  he  is in possession on behalf of his master  or  his principal,  and  not  on  his  own  behalf.   It  would   be unreasonable  to  think that the legislature  intended  such servants or agents liable and responsible as "owner" of  the mine. possession on behalf of another was sufficient to make a  person  "occupier" within the meaning of s.  2(1),  every manager  would  be  an  occupier  and  thus  have  all   the responsibilities  of  an  "owner".   Many  "agents"  of  the proprietors  or  lessee  of  the  mine  would  similarly  be "occupier"  and  therefore "owner".  If that  had  been  the intention of the legislature it would have been  unnecessary and  indeed meaningless to mention "agent" and "manager"  in addition  to the word "owner" in s. 18 of the  Act,.,in  the important  provision as to who will be responsible  for  the proper  carrying on of operations in the mine in  regard  to the  provisions of the Act and Regulations and bye-laws  and orders made thereunder. It would have been similarly unnecessary to mention  "agent" and "manager" in addition to the word 16 ’Inspector power to give special directions for the  removal of certain defects or in s. 61 providing for the framing  of bye-laws.   The  very fact that in ss. 18,22 and  61  owner, agent  and  manager have been  separately  made  responsible clearly shows that the legislature did not think that  agent or manager would come within the definition of "owner" in s. 2(1).  That must be because possession on behalf of somebody else was not in the contemplation of the legislature such  " occupation"   as  to  make  the  person  in  possession   an "occupier"   within  the  meaning  of  s.  2(1).    Whatever possession,  the  managing  agents  of  a  colliery  company exercise  in and over a mine is exercised on behalf  of  the colliery  company  and not on their own behalf and  so  such managing  agents  are not occupier of the  mine  within  the meaning of s. 2(k). The  managing  agent  company, not  being  either  agent  or manager, or owner of the mine, no question of  contravention by  that company or any of its directors of the  Coal  Mines Regulations can arise.  The High Court has therefore rightly quashed  the criminal proceedings against the  directors  of the  managing agent company.  Appeals Nos. 100 and  101  are accordingly dismissed.

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The  main controversy common to the other seven  appeals  is whether  the  Mines Regulations, 1926, framed as  they  were under  a. 29 of the Mines Act, 1923, survived the repeal  of the  Mines Act, 1923, by the Mines Act, 1952.  For a  proper appreciation  of  the question involved it is  necessary  to have  regard on the one hand to the provisions of s.  31  of the  Mines Act, 1923, and on the other to the provisions  of a. 24 of the General Clauses Act, 1897.  The first  sub-sec- tion  of a. 31 provides that the power to  make  regulations and rules conferred by ss. 29, 30 and 30A is subject to  the condition  of  the  regulation and rules  being  made  after previous  publication.   The  fourth  sub-section  of   that section  lays  down  that regulations  and  rules  shall  be published  in the official gazette and on  such  publication shall  have  effect  "as  if  enacted  in  this  Act".   The regulations, which are alleged to have 17 been contravened were all made under s. 29 of the 1923  Act, and  admittedly  they were duly published  in  the  official gazette.  As a result of such publication, these regulations from  the date of the publication, commenced having  "effect as if enacted" in the Mines Act, 1923.  The question we have to  answer is: Did the regulations stand repealed, when  the Mines Act, 1923, was repealed?  Before endeavoring to answer the  question, we have to take note of s. 24 of the  General Clauses  Act.   The relevant portion of this  clause  is  in these words:-               "When  any Central Act is after the  commence-               ment  of this Act repealed and reenacted  with               or  without modification, then, unless  it  is               otherwise expressly provided, any rule made or               issued under the repealed Act shall so far  as               it is not inconsistent with the provisions re-               enacted,  continue in force, and be deemed  to               have been made or issued under the  provisions               so reenacted unless and until it is superseded               by   any  rule  made  or  issued   under   the               provisions so reenacted". It is convenient at this stage to state that a regulation is indisputably a rule within the meaning of these provisions. The  present  is  a case, where the  Mines  Act,  1923,  was repealed, and was reenacted with modifications as the  Mines Act, 1952: Section 29 of the 1923 Act empowering the Central Government  to make regulations consistent with the Act  for specified  purposes was reenacted in the 1952 Act as s.  57: regulations  were made in 1926 under s. 29 of the 1923  Act, but  at the relevant date, in 1955, no regulations had  been made under S. 57 of the 1952 Act, so that in 1955 the  Mines Regulations,   1926,   had  not  been  superseded   by   any regulations made under there enacted provisions of s. 57  of the 1952 Act: Therefore if s. 24 of the General Clauses  Act is  operative the Mines Regulations, 1926, were in force  at the relevant date in-1955, and shall be deemed to have  been made  under s. 57 of the 1952 Act, as there is no  provision express or otherwise, in the later Act to the contrary,  and the  regulations  are not inconsistent  with  the  reenacted provisions. 18 For  the management-appellant, Mr. Pathak  contends  however that s. 24 of the General Clauses Act can have no  operation in  respect  of these regulations, as  they  stood  repealed along with the repeal of the Mines Act, 1923.  His  argument is  simple.   Section  31(4) of the  1923  Act  says,  these regulations  shall  have effect as if enacted in  that  Act. The  consequence of this provision is that  the  regulations

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became part of the Act: the entire Act was repealed by s. 88 of  the  1952 Act: the 1926 Regulations as part of  the  Act thus stood repealed.  So, on the very day the 1952 Act  came into  force,  the Regulations of 1926 ceased to  have  legal existence.  So, a. 24 of the General Clauses Act had nothing to operate upon. The whole foundation of the argument is the assumption  that the  necessary  consequence of s. 31(4) of the 1923  Act  is that  the regulations, on publication, shall have effect  as if  enacted in the Act is that the Regulations  became  part and parcel of the Act.  Is that assumption justified? In attempting to answer this question, it will be profitable to  remember that the purpose of the General Clauses Act  is to  place  in  one single statute  different  provisions  as regards interpretations of words and legal principles  which would  otherwise  have  to be specified  separately  a  many different  acts  and  regulations.   Whatever  the   General Clauses  Act says, whether as regards the meanings of  words or  as regards legal principles, has to be read  into  every statute  to which it applies.  The Mines Act, 1923, being  a Central Act, s. 24 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, applies to  it, so that we have to read in the Mines Act,  1923,  an additional  provision  embodying the words of s. 24  of  the General  Clauses  Act.  The result is that we have  in  this Mines  Act  of 1923 on the one hand the provision  that  the regulations made under s. 29 of the Act will have effect  as if  enacted  in  the  Act and  on  the  other,  the  further provision, that regulations made under s. 29 shall  continue to  remain in force when this Act is repealed and  reenacted and  be  deemed to have been made under the  reenacted  pro- visions, it is otherwise expressly provided, unless and 19 until  superseded  by regulations made under  the  reenacted provisions. If  the  words of s. 31(4) are construed to mean  that’  the regulations  became part of the Act to the extent that  when the Act is repealed, the regulations also stand repealed,  a conflict at once arises between s. 31 (4) and the provisions of  s. 24 of the General Clauses Act.  In other  words,  the Mines Act, 1923, while saying in s. 31(4) that the repeal of the  Act will result in the repeal of the regulations,  will be saying, in the provisions of s. 24 of the General Clauses Act as read into it, that on the repeal of the Act, when the Act  is  repealed and reenacted, the  regulations  will  not stand repeated but will continue in force till superseded by regulations  made  under the reenacted Act.  To  solve  this conflict  the  courts  must apply  the  rule  of  harmonious construction.   According  to  Mr. Pathak  we  have  perfect harmony  if it is held that the provisions of s. 24  of  the General Clauses Act will have effect only if the regulations are such as survive the repeal of the parent Act and at  the same  time, construe s. 31(4) to mean that  the  regulations became  for  all purposes part and parcel of  the  Act.   To harmonise is not however to destroy.  The so-called  harmony on the learned counsel’s argument is achieved by making  the provisions of a. 24 of the General Clauses Act nugatory  and in  effect  destroying them in relation to  the  Mines  Act, 1923.   We  have  to  seek therefore  some  other  means  of harmonising  the  two  provisions.  The  reasonable  way  of harmonising that obviously suggests itself is to construe s. 31(4) to mean that the regulations on publication shall have for some purposes, say, for example, the purpose of deciding the validity of the regulations, the same effect as if  they were part of the Act, but for the purpose of the  continuity of  existence, they will not be considered part of the  Act,

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so  that  even though the Act is repealed,  the  regulations will continue to exist, in accordance with the provisions of s.  24 of the General Clauses Act.  This  construction  will give  reasonable effect to S. 31(4) of the Mines; Act,  1923 and at the same time not frustrate the very salutary  object of 20 Fs.  24 of the General Clauses Act.  One may pause here  to- remember  that  regulations framed under an Act are  of  the very  greatest importance.  Such regulations are framed  for the  successful  operation  of  the  Act.   Without   proper regulations,  a  statute will often be worse  than  useless. When  an  Act  is  repealed, but  reenacted,  it  is  almost inevitable that there will be some time lag between the  re- enacted  statute  coming into force, and  regulations  being framed  under the reenacted statute.  However efficient  the rule making authority may be it is impossible to avoid  some hiatus  between  the  coming into  force  of  the  reenacted statute  and the simultaneous repeal of the old Act and  the making  of  regulations.   Often,  the  time  lag  would  be considerable.   Is it conceivable that any  legislature,  in providing that regulations made under its statute will  have effect  as  if enacted in the Act, could  have  intended  by those words to say that if ever the Act is repealed and  re- enacted, (as is more than likely to happen sooner or later), the  regulations will have no existence for the  purpose  of the  reenacted statute, and thus the reenacted statute,  for some time at least, will be in many respects, a dead letter. The answer must be in the negative.  Whatever the purpose be which induced the, draftsmen to adopt this legislative  form as  regards  the rules and regulations that they  will  have effect  "case  if enacted in the Act", it  will  be  strange indeed if the result of the language used, be that by becom- ing part of the Act, they would stand repealed, when the Act is  repealed.  One can be certain that  could not have  been the  intention of the legislature.  It is satisfactory  that the words used do not produce that result,, For, if we apply the rule of harmonious construction, as has been pointed out above,, s. 31(4) does not stand in the way of the  operation of s. 24 of the General Clauses Act. The  proper  construction  of  a  legislative  provision  as regards rules or regulations made under an Act having effect as  if enacted in the Act, fell to be considered in  several English  and  Indian  decisions and from  one  of  these-the earliest.. case in which the 21 question appears to have been considered Mr.  Pathak  sought assistance.  That is the case of Institute of Patent  Agents and others v. Joseph Lockwood (1).  There, a declaration was sought  against  Lockwood that he was not  registered  as  a patent  agent in pursuance of the Patents, Design and  Trade Marks Act, 1888 and was not entitled to describe himself  as a  patent  agent; and consequential relief  was  asked  for. While  the  first  section  of  the  Act  required  such   a registration, the Act itself did not provide "for the manner in  which  the register is to be formed, who is  to  be  the Registrar,  the formalities requisite for the  registration, or any particulars in relation to it".  The Act left to  the Board  of Trade to make such general rules as were  required for  giving  effect to the first section.  Among  the  rules made by the Board, was one requiring certain fee to be  paid on  first registration, and also an annual fee, non  payment of  which shall be a ground for canceling the  registration. The question arose whether the rules with reference to  fees were  intra vires or ultra vires.  The House of  Lords  held

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that  the  rules  were intra vires; but dealt  also  with  a contention  raised on behalf of the appellants that in  view of the provisions in the Act that the rules "shall be of the same  effect  as  if they were contained in  this  Act"  the question  whether the rules were intra vires or ultra  vires could not at all be canvassed in the courts.  Speaking about the  effect of the above provisions, Lord Herschell, L.  C., said:-"I own I feel very great difficulty in giving to  this provision  that  they ’shall have of the same effect  as  if they were contained in the Act’ any other meaning than this, that  you  shall  for  all  purposes  of  construction,   or obligation or otherwise, treat them, as if. they were in the Act".  Mr. Pathak fastens on the phrase "for all purposes of construction,  or obligation or otherwise" and submits  that this is a good authority for holding that for the purpose of deciding  whether the rules were part of the Act, so  as  to attract the consequence of repeal, along with the repeal  of the Act, the rules should be treated "as if they were in the Act" and so stood (1)  [1894] A-C- 347. 22 repealed.  We are bound however to take notice of the  .fact that  the question whether the rules were to be  treated  as part  of  the  Act to ascertain the effect on  them  of  the repeal of the Act was not even remotely. before the House of Lords.   The  sole question before them was how far,  if  at all,  the courts could consider the question of validity  of ’the rules, in view of the above provisions as regards their having  "the  same effect as if they were contained  in  the Act".   That the Lord Chancellor was not concerning  himself with  the  effect  of this provision  in  other  aspects  is further  clear  from  what he  said  immediately  after  the observations quoted above:               "No doubt", said he, "there might be some con-               flict  between a rule and a  provision-of  the               Act.   Well  there  is  a  conflict  sometimes               between  two sections to be found in the  same               Act.   You have to try and reconcile  them  as               best  as you may.  If you cannot, you have  to               determine  which is the leading provision  and               which is the subordinate provision, and  which                             must  give way to the other.  That would be  s o               with  regard to enactments and with regard  to               rules which are to be treated as if within the               enactment.    In   that  case   probably   the               enactment  itself  would  be  treated  as  the               governing consideration and the rule               as subordinate to it". Not only was the question now before us not for decision  in Lockwood’s Case (1), but it is quite clear that the  learned Lord  Chancellor had no intention of dealing with  questions like  this, when he used the words on which Mr.  Pathak  has tried to rely. In  our  opinion,  Lockwood’8 Case (1) is  no  authority  in favour of the construction urged by the learned counsel  for acceptance. In  a later case of Ministry of Health v. The King (on  the, prosecution of Yaffe,) (2) the House of Lords considered the question how far the principle laid down in Lockwood’s  Case went.   But  there  also, the question was  as  regards  the soundness of a plea that the validity of a scheme which,  on confirmation, had effect as if it was contained in the  Act, could not be (1) [1894] A.C. 347.

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(2) [1931] A.C. 494. 23 questioned in the courts and the question now before us  did not even remotely come up for consideration. The question which was considered by the Patna High Court in State  v. K.B. Chandra(1) was also entirely  different  from the  question now before us.  The contention there was  that the  Mines Creche Rules and Coal Mines Pithead  Bath  Rules, 1946-which  the  respondent  Chandra  had  been  accused  of violating  should be deemed as part of the Mines Act,  1923, and any question as to their validity could not be canvassed in the courts.  The contention was rejected, and it was held that whether the rules were consistent with the Act can be a matter   of   judicial   consideration.    In   that    case contravention of the rules took place before the Act of 1952 had come into force, and so the Court was not called upon to consider  the  question of the continued  existence  of  the rules after the 1923 Act was repealed. None  of  the  cases cited at the bar is  therefore  of  any assistance for the decision of our present question. The  true  position  appears  to  be  that  the  Rules   and regulations  do  not  lose  their  character  as  rules  and regulations,  even though they are to be of the same  effect as  if  contained  in the Act.  They continue  to  be  rules subordinate  to  the Act, and though for  certain  purposes, including  the  purpose  of construction,  they  are  to  be treated  as  if contained in the Act, their true  nature  as subordinate rule is not lost.  Therefore, with regard to the effect  of a repeal of the Act, they continue to be  subject to the operation of s. 24 of the General Clauses Act. For  the  reasons  given above, we  have  no  hesitation  in holding that the provisions of s. 31, sub-s. 4, of the Mines Act, 1923, do not stand in the way of the full operation  of s.  24  of  the  General Clauses  Act,  1897,  and  that  in consequence of these provisions the Coal Mines  Regulations, 1926, continued to be in force at the relevant date and have to  be deemed to be regulations; made under the  Mines  Act, 1952. Mention has to be made here of an argument rather (1)  (1954) I.L.R. 33 Patna ’507. 24 faintly made by Mr. Pathak that even if the regulations  are deemed  to be regulations made under the Mines Act of  1952, s.  73  or s. 74 of that Act can have  no  application.   He pointed  out that what these sections made punishable  is  a contravention   of  a  provision  of  the  Act  or  of   any regulations,  rules  or  bye laws or any  other  order  made thereunder.   They  do  not, he  contends,  make  punishable contravention  of  regulations deemed to be made  under  the 1952 Act; and so assuming that his clients have  contravened the Mines Regulations, 1926, as alleged no offence under  s. 73  or s. 74 has been committed.  Learned Counsel has  drawn our  attention  in  this connection  to  the  definition  of "regulations" in a. 2(o) of the 1952 Act according to  which regulations  mean "regulations made under this Act".  If  it was intended, the argument is, that any contravention of the regulations  deemed to be made under the Act should also  be punishable,  the legislature would have defined  regulations to  include  not  only regulations made under  the  Act  but regulations  deemed to have been made under the  Act.   This argument  is  not even plausible.  The effect of  a  deeming provision,  it need hardly be pointed out, is to attract  to what is deemed to be something all the legal consequences of that  something.  In other words, when A is deemed to be  B, compliance with A is in law compliance with B, contravention

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of  A is in law contravention of B. As soon as we reach  the conclusion  that  in  consequence of s. 24  of  the  General Clauses  Act, the Coal Mines Regulations, 1926, had  at  the alleged   date  of  contravention,  to  be  deemed   to   be regulations  made under the Mines Act, 1952, the  conclusion is  inevitable that contravention of the Mines  Regulations, 1926, amounted to con. travention of regulations made  under the  1952  Act,  so that the contravener was  guilty  of  an offence under s.73, or 74, as the case might be. Equally  untenable is Mr. Pathak’s next contention that  the contravention  of the Indian Coal Mines  Regulations,  1926, which  were  at  the date of contravention  "deemed"  to  be regulations under the 1952 Act, was not a violation of a law in force on such date, so that 25, Art.  20(1) is a bar to the conviction of his clients.   The relevant  portion  of Art. 20(1) lays down  that  no  person shall be convicted of any offence except for violation of  a law  in  force  at the-time of the  commission  of  the  act charged as an offence.  The result of this is that if at the date  of the commission of an act, such commission  was  not prohibited  by  a law then in force, no  future  legislation prohibiting that act with retrospective effect will  justify a conviction for such commission.  In other words, if an act is  not an offence at the date of commission, no future  law can make it an offence.  But how, on the facts of this  case the accused can claim benefit of this principle embodied  in Art.  20(1) it is difficult to see.  They are being  charged under  s.  73  and s. 74 of the Mines  Act,  1952,  for  the contravention  of some regulations.  Were these  regulations in  force on the alleged date of contravention?   Certainly, they  were in consequence of the provisions of S. 24 of  the General  Clauses Act.  The fact that these regulations  were deemed to be regulations made under the 1952 Act does not in any way affect the position that they were laws in force  on the  alleged  date of contravention.  The argument  that  as they were "regulations" under the 1952 Act in consequence of a  deeming  provision, they were not laws in  force  on  the alleged date of contravention is entirely misconceived. Equally  misconceived  is the submission that  this  Court’s decision  in  Shiv  Bahadur Singh’s Case  (1)  supports  the argument.   In that case, dealing with a suggestion that  as the  Vindhya Pradesh Ordinance 48 of 1949 though enacted  on September  11, 1947, i.e., after the alleged  offenses  were committed,  was  in terms made retrospective by a.  2  which says  that  the Ordinance shall be deemed to  have  been  in force  in Vindhya Pradesh from August 9,1949, the  Ordinance was  a  law in force on or from August 9, 1949,  this  Court said:-               "This  however would be, to import a  somewhat               technical meaning into the phrase law in force               used               (1)   [1953] S.C.R. 1188.               26               in Art. 20.  Law in force referred to  therein               must  be taken to relate not to a law  "deemed               to be in force", and thus brought into  force,               but the law factually in operation at the time               or  what  may  be  called  the  then  existing               law..................  It cannot therefore  be               doubted that the phrase "law in force" as used               in  Art. 20 must be understood in its  natural               sense  as being the law in fact  in  existence               and in operation at the time of the commission               of  the  offence  as  distinct  from  the  law

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             "deemed" to have become operative by virtue of               power  of  legislature to  pass  retrospective               laws." As  the Court clearly pointed out, it was  considering  only the  question whether a law made after the alleged act,  can by  providing for its retrospective operation,  make  itself the "law in force", for the purpose of Art. 20; and it  held that  this  could  not be done.  The  words  "law  in  force referred  to  therein must be taken to relate not to  a  law ’deemed  to  be in force"’, in this judgment should  not  be taken apart from its context.  In the words that-immediately follow the Court was saying that "law in force relates to  a law  factually  in  operation at the time, or  what  may  be called the then existing law".  The question to be asked is: Was  the-law said to have been violated in operation at  the alleged date of violation?  The answer, in the cases  before us,  must  be  that it was.  Art.  20(1)  has  therefore  no application. No  other point has been raised before us in the appeals  by the Manager and the Agent.  These appeals (Appeals Nos. 102, 105 and 106) are therefore dismissed. The other four appeals raise a difficult question about  the interpretation of the word "any one of the directors" in  s. 76 Section 76 is in these words:-               "Determination  of  owner in  certain  cases:-               Where  the owner of a mine is a firm or  other               association  of  individuals, any one  of  the               partners or members thereof or where the owner               of a mine is a public company, any one of  the               directors  thereof,  or where the owner  of  a               mine  is  a private company, any  one  of  the               shareholders thereof, may be prosecuted and               27               punished  under this Act for any  offence  for               which the owner of a mine is punishable:-               Provided  that  where a firm,  association  or               company  has  given notice in writing  to  the               Chief Inspector that it has nominated,               (a)   in  the  case  of a  firm,  any  of  its               partners,               (b)   in  the case of an association,  any  of               its members,               (c)   in the case of a public company, any  of               its directors, or               (d)   in  the case of a, private company,  any               of its shareholders,               who  is resident in each case in any place  to               which   this   Act  extends  to   assume   the               responsibilities of the owner of the mine  for               the  purposes  of  this  Act,  such   partner,               member,  director or shareholder as  the  case               may  be, shall so long as he continues  to  be               the owner of the mine for the purpose of  this               Act,  unless notice in writing  canceling  his               nomination or stating that he has ceased to be               a partner, member, director or shareholder, as               the  case  may be, is received  by  the  Chief               Inspector". It  is  on the basis of this section, that  prosecution  has been  launched against all the directors.  If "any  one"  in the  section  is  interpreted to mean  "every  one"  as  was unsuccessfully  contended  on  behalf  of  the   Government- appellant  in  the  High  Court-the  section  justifies  the prosecution  of all the directors.  If however, "any one  of the directors" must be interpreted to mean "one only of  the

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directors, it does not matter which one" as was contended by the  appellants  in  Appeals  Nos.  103  and  104,  the  two directors-and  as  held  by  the High  Court,  it  would  be necessary  to  consider their further  contention  that  the section  contravenes  Art. 14 of the  Constitution,  and  is therefore void, so that the High Court’s order directing the Inspector  of Mines to select one of the directors  for  the prosecution cannot be sustained.  For, on the interpretation that  "any  one of the directors", means "only  one  of  the directors"  the  authorities have got the right  to  proceed against  one  of the directors, out of the  several  and  it might be argued that the exercise of 28 this discretion is wholly unfettered and unguided and Of the High Court could not in law, ask the authorities to exercise this   discriminatory  provision  of  law.   The   important question that arises for decision therefore is how the words "any one of the directors" should be interpreted. It  is  quite  clear and indeed not disputed  that  in  some contexts,  "any  one" means "one only it matters  not  which one";  the phrase "any of the directors" is therefore  quite capable  of meaning "one only of the directors, it does  not matter  which  one".  Is the phrase however  capable  of  no other  meaning?   If  it  is not,  the  courts  cannot  look further,  and  must interpret these words  in  that  meaning only, irrespective of what the intention of the  legislature might  be believed to have been.  If however the  phrase  is capable  of another meaning, as suggested, viz., "every  one of  the directors" it will be necessary to decide  which  of the two meanings was intended by the legislature. If  one  examines the use of the words "any one"  in  common conversation or literature, there can be no doubt that  they are not infrequently used to. mean "every one"-not one,  but all.   Thus we say "any one can see that this is wrong",  to mean  "everyone can see that this is wrong".  "Any  one  may enter"  does not mean that "only one person may enter",  but that all may enter.  It is permissible and indeed profitable to turn in this connection to the Oxford English Dictionary, at p. 378 of which, we find the meaning of "any" given thus: "In affirmative sentences, it asserts, concerning a being or thing of the sort named, without limitation as to which, and thus  collectively  of  every  one of  them".   One  of  the illustration  given is"I challenge anyone to  contradict  my assertions." Certainly, this does not mean that one only  is challenged;  but that all are challenged.  It is  abundantly clear  therefore that "any one" is not infrequently used  to mean "every one". But, argues Mr. Pathak, granting that this is so, it must be held  that  when  the  phrase "any one"  is  used  with  the preposition  "of", followed by a word denoting a  number  of persons, it never means "every one". 29 The extract from the Oxford Dictionary, it is interesting to notice, speaks of an assertion "concerning a being or  thing of the sort named"; it is not unreasonable to say that,  the word "of" followed by a word denoting a number of persons or things is just such " naming of a sort" as mentioned  there. Suppose, the illustration "I challenge any one to contradict my  assertions"  was changed to "I challenge any one  of  my opponents  to  contradict  my assertion."  "Any  one  of  my opponents"  here would mean "all my opponents"-not one  only of the opponents. While  the  phrase "any one of them" or any  similar  phrase consisting  of "any one", followed by "of which is  followed in its turn by words denoting a number of persons or things,

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does not appear to have fallen for judicial construction, in our  courts  or in England-the phrase "any  of  the  present directors"  had  to be interpreted in an old  English  case, Isle  of  Wight Railway Co. v. Tahourdin (1).  A  number  of shareholders required the directors to call a meeting of the company  for two objects.  One of the objects was  mentioned as  "To remove, if deemed necessary or expedient any of  the present  directors,  and  to elect directors,  to  fill  any vacancy  on  the Board".  The directors issued a  notice  to convene a meeting for the other object and held the meeting. Then  the  shareholders, under the  Companies  Clauses  Act, 1845,  issued a notice of their own convening a meeting  for both the objects in the original requisition.  In an  action by  the  directors  to restrain  the  requisitionists,  from holding the meeting, the Court of Appeal held that a  notice to.  remove "any of the present directors" would  justify  a resolution for removing all who are directors at the present time.   "Any",  Cotton, L. J., pointed  out,  would  involve "all".  It is true that the language there was "any of the  present directors" and not "any one of the present directors" and it is urged that the word "one", in the latter phrase makes all the  difference.  We think it will be wrong to put too  much emphasis  on the word "one" here.  It may be pointed out  in this connection  (1) (1883) 25 Ch.  D. 320. 30 that  the  Permanent Edition of the Words and  Phrases  (1), mentions an American case Front & Hintingdon Building & Loan Association v. Berzinski, where the words "any of them" were held to be the equivalent of "any one of them". After  giving the matter full and anxious consideration,  we have  come to the conclusion that the words "any one of  the directors"  is ambiguous; in some contexts, it  means  "only one  of  the directors, does not matter which one",  but  in other  contexts, it is capable of meaning "every one of  the directors".  Which of these two meanings was intended by the legislature  in  any particular statutory phrase has  to  be decided  by the courts on a consideration of the context  in which  the words appear, and in particular, the  scheme  and object of the legislation. The plain object of s. 76 of the Mines Act is to ensure that no  lacuna remains in the application of the  provisions  in the  Act to owners of mines, in the cases where the mine  is owned  not  by  an  individual,  but  by  a  firm  or  other association of individuals, or a public company or a private company.  It provides that where the owner of the mine is  a firm  or  other association of individuals, any one  of  the partners or members thereof may be punished; where the owner is  a  private company, any one of the shareholders  may  be prosecuted  and  punished and where the owner  is  a  public company not "any one of the shareholders" but any one of the directors  may  be  prosecuted and  punished.   There  is  a proviso  under which on notice being given of nomination  of "any"  of  the  partners of the firm, or  in’  the  case  of association  any of the members; in the case of  the  public company  any of its directors, and in the case of a  private company  any of its shareholders, the ownership of the  mine shall be determined only in accordance with the  nomination. There  can be no question that where a mine is owned by  one individual  A-the one and complete owner-would be liable  to all penalties which ownership entails.  When the legislature thought  it  desirable to make special provision  where  the mine (1) Vol. 3A.

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31 is  owned by a firm, or an association of individuals, or  a company,  it  does  not stand to reason  that  it  of  would ordinarily  permit  all  the partners except  one,  all  the members of the association except one, all the  shareholders of  the private company except one and all the directors  of the public company except one to escape the penalties.   The purpose of the Act is to secure safety and proper conditions of  work for labour.  To enforce the provisions of  the  Act and  the rules, regulations and bye-laws under it,  designed to achieve this purpose, the legislature, makes in its  18th section’ the manager, the agent, and the owner,  responsible for   their  proper  observance.   Contravention   is   made punishable  by  fine  or imprisonment.  In  this  scheme  of things,  it  is reasonable to expect that  the  legislature, would take particular care to see that everybody  performing the  function  which  an individual  owner  is  expected  to perform,  would be treated in the same way as an  individual owner.  In the case of a firm this position is filled by all the   partners;  in  the  case  of  other   association   of individuals  this position is filled by all the members;  in the case of a private company this position is filled by all the  shareholders  thereof  while in the case  of  a  public company  the  position  is  filled  by  all  the   directors together.   It  is  to be expected therefore  that  all  the partners in the case of a firm, all the shareholders in  the case of a private company and all the directors in the  case of  a public company should be subjected to prosecution  and punishment in the same way as an individual owner of a mine. When  we find in this background the legislature  using  the words  "any one of the directors, any one of  the  partners, any    one    of    the   members,   any    one    of    the shareholders..................   may   be   prosecuted   and punished",  ’words  which are capable of  meaning  "all  the directors, all the members, all the shareholders and all the partners,  as  also  the  other meaning  "only  one  of  the directors,  only  one  of the partners",  only  one  of  the members, only one of the shareholders," we have no doubt  at all  that the legislature used the words in the  former  and not in the latter sense. 32 But,  argues Mr. Pathak, you must not forget the Of  special rule  of  interpretation  for "penal statute"  that  if  the language  is ambiguous, the interpretation in favour of  the accused should ordinarily be adopted.  If you interpret "any one"  in  the  sense suggested by him,  the  legislation  he suggests is void and so the accused escapes.  One of the two possible constructions, thus being in favour of the accused, should  therefore be adopted.  In our opinion, there  is  no sub.  stance  in  this  contention.   The  rule  of   strict interpretation of penal statutes in favour of the accused is not  of universal application, and must be considered  along with  other  will established rules of  interpretation.   We have already seen that the scheme and object of the  statute makes  it reasonable to think that the legislature  intended to subject all the directors of a company owning coal  mines to  prosecution  and  penalties, and not  one  only  of  the directors.  In the face of these considerations there is  no scope  here  of  the  application of  the  rule  for  strict interpretation of penal statutes in favour of the accused. The High Court appears to have been greatly impressed by the fact that in other statutes where the legislature wanted  to make  every one out of a group or a class of persons  liable it  used clear language expressing the intention;  and  that the phrase "any one" has not been used in any other  statute

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in  this  country  to  express  "every  one".   It  will  be unreasonable,  in our opinion, to attach too much weight  to this  circumstance; and as for the reasons mentioned  above, we think the phrase "any one of the directors" is capable of meaning "every one of the directors", the fact that in other statutes,  different  words were used to express  a  similar meaning is not of any significance. We have, on all these considerations come to the  conclusion that  the words "any one of the directors" has been used  in s.  76  to mean "every one of the directors", and  that  the contrary  interpretation  given  by the High  Court  is  not correct. On the interpretation that "any one of the directors"  means "every  one of the director,%", no question of violation  of Art. 14 of the Constitution arises. 33 We,  therefore, allow the Appeals Nos. 98 and 99, set  aside the orders of the High Court in Writ Petitions Nos. 475  and 476 of 1956 and order that these writ petitions be rejected. Appeals Nos. 103 and 104 are dismissed. Appeals Nos. 98 and 99 allowed. Appeals Nos. 100 to 106 dismissed.