24 September 1997
Supreme Court
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THE CHIEF GENERAL MANAGER,STATE BANK OF INDIA & ANR. Vs SHRI BIJOY KUMAR MISHRA

Bench: CJI,B. N. KIRPAL
Case number: Appeal Civil 2633 of 1992


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PETITIONER: THE CHIEF GENERAL MANAGER,STATE BANK OF INDIA & ANR.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: SHRI BIJOY KUMAR MISHRA

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       24/09/1997

BENCH: CJI, B. N. KIRPAL

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                       J U D G M E N T Verma, CJI.      The respondent,  Bijoy Kumar  Mishra was appointed as a Probationary Officer  in the  State Bank of India and posted at Jharsuguda Branch in Bhubaneswar circle by an order dated 24.10.1980.   The respondent  joined duty  on 15.12.1980 and his period  of probation  commenced from  that dated.    The respondent remained  unauthorisedly absent  from  duty  from 2.4.1981 for a long period and the last date of his presence on duty  was in  the first week of August 1983.  Thereafter, he was  absent till  the year 1988.  The maximum permissible period of  probation under the Service Rules was three years which expired  in  his  case  on  14.12.1983,  when  he  was admittedly absent  from duty.  From May 1984 to 1988, he was not even in touch with the Bank.  The respondent submitted a medical certificate  dated 26.5.1984  that he  was suffering from viral  infection from 6.2.1984 to 26.5.1984 and that he was fit to resume his duties on the date of his certificate. Even then he did not report for duty.  The respondent joined M.Phil.   Course in  the Punjab  University at Chandigarh in 1986-87 without  permission.   In these  circumstances,  the Bank  issued   an  order  dated  4.10.1988  terminating  his service.      The respondent  filed a writ petition under Article 226 of the  Constitution of  India  in  the  Orissa  High  Court challenging the termination order.  The High Court has taken the view  that it  shall  be  presumed  that  the  competent authority had  confirmed the  petitioner after 14.10.1983 as no action  contemplated by  Paragraph 16(3)  of the relevant Service Rules  had been taken.  In short, the High Court has held that  on expiry  of the  maximum permissible  period of probation, the  respondent was deemed to have been confirmed on the  post.   On this  basis, by  the impugned order dated 19.11.1991, the  termination order  dated 4.10.1988 has been quashed and a direction given to reinstate the respondent in service with  all consequential  benefits with permission to the bank  to proceed  against the  petitioner in  accordance with law.  Hence this appeal by special leave.      The only  question for  consideration is whether in the facts and  circumstances of  the case, the respondent can be

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deemed  to   have  been   confirmed  without  any  order  of confirmation during his unauthorised absence from duty under the relevant  Service Rules.   The  relevant provisions  are Paragraphs 15  & 16  of the  State Bank  of  India  Officers (Determination of Terms & Conditions of Service) Order 1979, which are as under:      "Probation      15(1)  A   person  appointed  as  a      Probationary Officer  or a  Trainee      Officer shall be on probation for a      period of two years.      (2) Any  other employee of the Bank      promoted  as   an  officer  to  the      Junior Management Grade shall be on      probation for a period of one year.      (3) Any  other person  appointed to      any    grade    including    junior      management  grade   shall   be   on      probation for such period as may be      decided by the competent authority.           Provided  that  the  competent      authority may,  in the  case of any      officer, reduce  or  dispense  with      the period of probation."      "Confirmation      16(1)  An   officer   referred   in      paragraph 15  shall be confirmed in      the service  of the Bank if, in the      opinion of the competent authority,      the   officer    has   satisfactory      completed  the   training  in   any      institution to  which  the  officer      may have been deputed for training,      and the  in-service training in the      Bank.           Provided   that   an   officer      directly recruited  to  the  junior      management grade  may  be  required      also to  pass a  test in a language      other than his mother tongue.      (2)  If,  in  the  opinion  of  the      competent authority, an officer has      not satisfactorily completed either      or both  the trainings  referred to      in  sub-paragraph  (1)  or  if  the      officer has  not  passed  the  test      referred to therein or an officer’s      service is  not  satisfactory,  the      officer’s probation may be extended      by a  further period  not exceeding      one year.      (3)  Where  during  the  period  of      probation, including  the period of      extension, if  any,  the  competent      authority is  of the  opinion  that      the  officer   is   not   fit   for      confirmation:           (a) in  the case  of a  direct           appointee, his services may be           terminated   by   one   months           notice  or   payment  of   one           month’s  emoluments   in  lieu           thereof, and           (b) in  the case of a promotee           from the  Bank’s  service,  he

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         may be  reverted to  the grade           or cadre  from  which  he  was           promoted."      The respondent being directly appointed as Probationary Officer, the period of his probation was two years according to sub-paragraph  (1) of  Paragraph 15.  The confirmation is provided in Paragraph 16.  Sub-paragraph (1) of Paragraph 16 requires the  satisfaction of  the competent  authority  and also the  passing of the specified tests for confirmation in the service  of the Bank.  Sub-paragraph (2) of Paragraph 16 provides for  the officer’s  probation to  be extended  by a further period not exceeding one year.  If in the opinion of the competent  authority, the  officer does  not fulfil  the requirement, he cannot be confirmed.  According to Paragraph 16(2), the  maximum period of probation, read with Paragraph 15(1) cannot exceed 2+1 years, i.e., 3 years.  Sub-paragraph (3) provides  for termination  of the  service of  a  direct appointee during  the period  of probation  by  one  month’s notice or  payment of one month’s emoluments in lieu thereof an in  the case of a promotee, his reversion to the grade or cadre from which he was promoted.  Thus, the combined effect of Paragraphs  15 &  16 particularly  sub-paragraph  (1)  of Paragraph 15  and sub-paragraph  (2) of Paragraph 16 is that the total  period of  probation of  direct appointee  cannot exceed three years.      The  contention   of  the  respondent  which  has  been accepted by  the High  Court is  that on  the expiry  of the period of  three years  on 14.12.1983, in the absence of the termination  order   being  issued  before  that  date,  the respondent is  deemed to  have been confirmed.  The question is whether this is a correct reading of these provisions?      The point  for decision has to be answered on the basis of the  earlier decisions of this Court.  The High Court has placed reliance  on the  decision of  this Court in State of Punjab v. Dharam Singh, [1968] 3 S.C.R. 1 at p.4, in support of its conclusion.  We would presently show that this is not a correct  reading of  the decisions of this Court including Dharam Singh.      The Constitution Bench held in Dharam Singh as under:      "This Court  has consistently  held      that when  a first  appointment  or      promotion is  made on probation for      a specific  period and the employee      is allowed  to continue in the post      after  the  expiry  of  the  period      without  any   specific  order   of      confirmation, he  should be  deemed      to order of confirmation, he should      be deemed  to continue  in his post      as  a   probationer  only,  in  the      continue   in   his   post   as   a      probationer only  in the absence of      any indication  to the  contrary in      the original  order of  appointment      or promotion  or the service rules.      In such a case, an express order of      confirmation is  necessary to  give      the employee a substantive right to      the post,  and from  the mere  fact      that he  is allowed  to continue in      the post  after the  expiry of  the      specified period of probation it is      not possible to hold that he should      be    deemed     to    have    been      confirmed...In all these cases, the

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    conditions  of   the   probationary      period for  an indefinite  time and      there   was    no   service    rule      forbidding its  extension beyond  a      certain maximum period.      XXX                             XXX      XXX      In  the   present  case,   r.  6(3)      forbids extension  of the period of      probation   beyond   three   years.      Where, as  in the present case, the      service rules  fix a certain period      of   time    beyond    which    the      probationary   period   cannot   be      extended, and an employee appointed      or promoted  to a post on probation      is allowed to continue in that post      after  completion  of  the  maximum      period  of   probation  without  an      express order  of confirmation,  he      cannot be  deemed  to  continue  in      that  post   as  a  probationer  by      implication.   The reason  is  that      such an  implication is negative by      the   service    rule    forbidding      extension   of   the   probationary      period beyond  the  maximum  period      fixed by  it. In such a case, it is      permissible to  draw the  inference      that   the   employe   allowed   to      continue in  the post on completion      of the  maximum period of probation      has been  confirmed in  the post by      implication."              (Emphasis Supplied)      The above  quoted last  extract on  which reliance  was placed by  the High  Court and on which emphasis was laid by Shri K.K.  Venugopal, learned counsel for the respondent has to be  read in  the context  and not divorced therefrom.  In substance, Dharam  Singh held  that where  the Service Rules permitted continuance  in service  as a probationer beyond a certain  period,   an  express   order  of  confirmation  is necessary to  give the  employee a  substantive right to the post, and  the mere  fact that  he is allowed to continue in the post  after the  specified period  of probation  is  not sufficient to  hold that  he should  be deemed  to have been confirmed;   but where  the maximum  period of  probation is provided in the Service Rules and the employee is allowed to continue in that post after completion of the maximum period of probation  without an  express order  of confirmation, he must be  deemed to  have  been  confirmed  in  the  post  by implication.     It  is   significant  that  the  effect  of permitting the  employee to  continue in  the post  even  on completion of  the maximum  period of  probation without  an express order  of confirmation  results in  the only logical inference  that  he  has  been  confirmed  in  the  post  by implication.  In other words, for drawing such inference, it is necessary  that the employer should allow the employee to continue on the post even after expiry of the maximum period of probation  which is  consistent only with the fact of his confirmation on  the post.  This inference is drawn from the conduct of  the employer  which is  consistent only with the fact of confirmation of employee.  In short, it is a rule of evidence applied  to the  facts  of  the  case  because  the continuance  in  employment  after  the  maximum  period  of

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probation is consistent only with the confirmation, and that follows  from  the  employer’s  conduct  of  permitting  the employee to  continue to work on that post after the maximum period of probation.      It is  obvious that  the decision  in Dharam  Singh can have no  application in a case where the employee was absent from duty  from a  date much  prior to  the  expiry  of  the maximum  period   of  probation  and  remained  absent  even thereafter for a long time.  There was no occasion in such a case for  the employer to allow the employee (respondent) to continue to work on the post after the expiry of the maximum period of  probation because  he  was  absent  and  was  not working on  the post at the time of the expiry of the period of probation.   Deemed confirmation results from the conduct of the  employer in  permitting continuance in service after the expiry  of the  maximum period of probation fixed by the rules. When  there is  no such  conduct of the employer, the very fondation  for the  argument of deemed confirmation and reliance on  Dharam Singh  is nor existent.  In our opinion, this discussion  alone is  sufficient   to indicate that the High Court  has misread  Dharam Singh to grant relief to the respondent.   However, we  may refer to some later decisions also to indicate that this is the correct position in law.      In Kedar  Nath Bahl v. State of Punjab, (1974)3 SCC 21, there was  no maximum  period of probation prescribed in the rules and,  therefore, it  was held  that there  could be no automatic confirmation.   A  seven-Judge  Bench  in  Samsher Singh v.  State of Punjab & Anr., (1974) 2 SCC 831 at p.853, held that  the provision  regarding the  maximum  period  of probation was  directory and  not mandatory and the decision in Dharam Singh was construed as under:      "In  Dharam  Singh’s  case  he  was      allowed  to   continue  without  an      order of confirmation and therefore      the  only   possible  view  in  the      absence of anything to the contrary      in the  Service Rules  was that  by      necessary implication  he  must  be      regarded as having been confirmed."      There can thus be no doubt that the deemed confirmation which is inferred from the employer’s conduct is permissible only when  it follows  from the positive act of the employer permitting the employee to continue to work on the post even after  completion   of  the   maximum  period  of  probation permitted under  the Service  Rules since  no other  inf  is possible in  such a situation from the employer’s conduct of continuing to take work from the employee after that period.      The  decision   by   Two-Judge   Bench   in   Municipal Corporation, Raipur  v. Ashok  Kumar Misra, (1991)3 SCC 325, is distinguishable.  In that case, the note under Clause (2) of Rule 8 permitted continuance in service without extension of the probationary period or confirmation or discharge from service at the end of the period of probation.      No separate  discussion of  Jail Kishan v. Commissioner of Police  & Anr., 1995 Supp (3) SCC 364 and State of Punjab v. Baldev  Singh khosla, (1996) 9 SCC 190 is called for.  In view of  the clear  law laid  down in the Constitution Bench decision of  this Court in Dharam Singh and Samsher Singh as indicated  above,  those  decisions  cannot  be  treated  as authorities for  a proposition  inconsistent with  that laid down by  the Constitution  Bench.   It must b mentioned that Shri K.K.  Venugopal, learned  counsel for  the  respondent, made no  attempt to  rely on  any of  these decisions and he confined  the  respondent’s  case  to  the  reading  of  the Constitution Bench  decision in  Dharam Singh.   As  we have

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already  indicated   Dharam  Singh   does  not  support  the respondent’s contention.      Consequently, this  appeal is  allowed and the impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside.