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PETITIONER: THE CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA LTD.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: P.S. RAJAGOPALAN ETC.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 19/04/1963

BENCH: GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. BENCH: GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. WANCHOO, K.N. GUPTA, K.C. DAS SHAH, J.C. AYYANGAR, N. RAJAGOPALA

CITATION:  1964 AIR  743            1964 SCR  (3) 140  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1964 SC 752  (7)  R          1964 SC1522  (3)  R          1968 SC 205  (3)  F          1968 SC 218  (3)  RF         1969 SC 590  (6)  R          1970 SC 237  (13,15,20)  R          1971 SC1902  (13)  R          1972 SC 451  (16)  D          1972 SC1579  (3)  R          1974 SC1604  (21)  F          1975 SC1745  (4)  R          1978 SC 275  (5)  E&R        1978 SC 995  (4)  R          1988 SC1618  (4)

ACT: Industrial Disputes--Application claiming special  allowance for  operating  the adding machine--Power  of  Labour  Court -Limitation-Sastry Award--Industrial Dispute  Act,  1947 (14 of 1947), s. 33C(2).

HEADNOTE:     Applications were made by four respondent under s.33C(2) of  the  Industrial  Disputes  Act,  1947,  contending  that besides attending to their routine duty as clerks, they  had been  operating the adding machine provided for use  in  the clearing department of the appellant Bank during the  period mentioned  in  the list annexed to the petitions  and  hence each of them was entitled to the payment of Rs. 10/- p m, as special  allowance  for  operating  the  adding  machine  as provided  for  in para 164(b)(1) of the Sastry  Award.   The appellant  Bank  raised  certain objections but  these  were rejected by the Labour Court which held that the respondents were entitled to the amounts claimed 141 by  them,  and  the same were ordered   to  be   paid.   The appellants came to this Court by special leave.     The contentions raised in this court were that s. 33C(2) did  not apply in the present case and the Labour Court  had

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exceeded  its jurisdiction in entertaining the  applications made by respondents as claims made by them were outside  the scope  of  s, 33(3(2) which postulated the existence  of  an admitted  right in a workman and did not cover  cases  where the  said right was disputed.  Moreover,  special  allowance could  be claimed only by comptists and as  the  respondents had  not  even  claimed  that  they  were  comptists,  their applications should have been rejected.     Held  that s. 33C(2) takes within its purview  cases  of workmen  who  claim  that  the benefit  to  which  they  are entitled  should be computed in term of money,  even  though the  right to the benefit on which their claim is  based  is disputed by their employers.  For the purpose of making  the necessary  determination under s. 33C(2), it is open to  the Labour  Court to interpret the award or settlement on  which the workman’s right rests.     There  is  a distinction between s. 33C(2)  and  L  36A. Whereas  s.  33C(2)’deals with cases  of  implementation  of individual  rights of workmen falling under its  provisions, s. 36A deals merely with a question of interpretation of the award  where  a dispute arises in that  behalf  between  the workmen  and the employer and the appropriate Government  is satisfied  that  the  dispute deserves  to  be  resolved  by reference under s. 36A.     The scope of s. 33G(2) is wider than that of s.  33G(1). Claims  made under s. 33C(1) can be only those claims  which are   referrable  to  settlement,  award  or  the   relevant provisions of Chapter V-A, but those limitations are not  to be found in s. 33C(2). Three categories of claims  mentioned in  s.  33C(1) fall. under s. 33C(2)and in  that   sense  s. 33C(2)   can  itself  be deemed to be a  kind  of  execution proceeding,  but  it is possible that claims  not  based  on settlements, awards or made under the provisions of  Chapter V-A may also be competent under s. 33C (2).     Held  that respondents’ claim for special allowance   as camptists solely on the ground that they could be  described as adding machine operators could not be sustained.     No  period of limitation is provided for an  application under s. 33C(2). 142 Punjab National Bank Ltd. v.K.L. Kharbanda, (1962) 1  L.L.J. 234,  M/s.  Kasturi  and Sons (P) Led. v.  Shri  N.  Saliva- teeswaranb  [1959]  S.C.R.  1,  Shri Ambica  Mills Co.  Ltd. v.  Shri  S  B.  Bhatt,    [1961] 3  S.C.R.   220  and  M/s. Sawatrum  Ramprasad  Mills     Co. Ltd,  Akola  v.  Baliram, (1962) 65 Born.L.R. 91, referred to.

JUDGMENT:     CIVIL   APPELLATE  JURISDICTION:  Civil   Appeals   Nos, 823--826 of 1962.     Appeals  by special leave from the order dated March  7, 1962,  of  the Central Government Labour Court at  Delhi  in L.C.A. Nos. 246 to 249 of 1962.     M.C.  Setalvad, N.V. Phadke, J.P. Thacker, O.C.  Mathur, Ravinder Narain and J.B. Dadachanji, for the appellants.     A.V. Viswanatha Sastri, M.K. Ramamurthi, R.K. Garg, D.P. Singh and S.C. Agarwal, for the respondents.     1963.   April  19.   The  Judgment  of  the  Court   was delivered by     GAJENDRAGADKAR  J.--This group of several’  appeals  has been placed together for final disposal, because the appeals included m the group raise a common question of law m regard to  the  construction  of s. 33C(2) of  the  In.  Industrial

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Disputes Act, 1947 (No. 14 of 1947) (hereinafter called  the Act).   We propose to deal with this. point m Civil  Appeals Nos.  823  to 826 of 1962 which have been preferred  by  the appellant,  the  Central  Bank of  India  Ltd,  against  the respondents,  its  employees  and  in  accordance  with  our decision  on the said point the other appeals,  included  in this group would be dealt with on the merits.     Civil   Appeals  823  to  826  of  1962  arise  out   of applications  made by  four  respondents under 143 s.  33C(2)  of  the  Act.  The case  for  each  one  of  the respondents was that besides attending to his routine duties as clerk, he had been operating the adding machine  provided for use in the clearing department of the Branch during  the period mentioned in the list annexed to the petition and  it was alleged that as such, he was entitled to the payment  of Rs.  10/-per ’month as special allowance for  operating  the adding machine as provided for under paragraph 164(b)(1)  of the   Sastry  Award.   On  this  basis,  each  one  of   the respondents made his respective claim for the amount covered by  the  said  allowance payable to him  during  the  period specified in the calculations.     ’The  appellant  disputed the  respondent’s  claims.  It urged three preliminary objections against the competence of the  applications.  According to it, the  respondents  could claim  only non-monetary benefits under the Award that  were capable of computation and so, s. 33G(2)was inapplicable  to their claim. It was also contended that without a  reference made  by the Central Government, the applications  were  not maintainable, and it was pleaded that since the applications involved  a  question of the interpretation  of  the  Sastry Award,  they were outside the purview of s. 33C(2).  On  the merits, the appellant’s case was that the special  allowance claimed by the respondents was payable only to the Comptists and  could not be claimed by the respondents on  the  ground that  they  were operating adding machines.   In support  of this contention, the appellant alleged that a certain amount of  manipulative  skill is required for the  handling  of  a Comptometer  since the operater has to execute a  series  of somewhat  complex operations in quick succession  before  he can arrive at a result.  ’the art of operating a comptometer has  to  be  learnt over several months,  but  the  work  of operating  the adding machine needs no special training  and does not require even the skill which a typist has to  show. That= is why, according to the appellant, 144 no  special  allowance could be claimed by  the  respondents under  paragraph  164(b)(1) of the Sastry Award.     The  Central Government Labour Court before which  these applications  were  made by the respondents  over-ruled  the preliminary  objections raised by the appellant and  on  the merits,  found that the respondents were entitled  to  claim the  special  allowance  under the relevent  clause  of  the Sastry  Award.   That is how the applications  made  by  the respondents were allowed and the respective amounts  claimed by  them  were ordered to be paid by the appellant.   It  is against this order that the appellant has come to this Court by special leave.     The principal contention which has been urged before  us by the appellant is one of jurisdiction.  It is argued t.hat the   Labour   Court  has  exceeded   its   jurisdiction   m entertaining  the  applications  made  by  the   respondents because  the claims made by respondents in their  respective applications are outside the scope of s. 33C(2) of the  Act. In dealing with this point, it is necessary to read  section

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33C:                  "(1)  Where any money is due to  a  workman               from  an  employer under a  settlement  or  an               award or under- the provisions of Chapter  VA,               the workman may without prejudice to any other               mode  of recovery, make an application to  the               appropriate  Government for the  recovery’  of               the  money due to him, and if the  appropriate               Government  is satisfied that any money is  so               due,  it  shall issue a certificate  for  that               amount  to the Collector who shall proceed  to               recover  the  same’ in the same manner  as  an               arrear of land revenue.                    (2)  Where  any workman  is  entitled  to               receive from the employer any benefit which is               145               capable of being computed in terms of ,money.,               the  amount  at which such benefit  should  be               computed may, subject to any rules that may be               made  under  this Act, be determined  by  such               Labour  Court  as  may be  specified  in  this               behalf by the appropriate Government, and  the               amount  so  determined  may  be  recovered  as               provided for in sub-section (1).                  (3) For the purposes of computing the money               value  of a benefit, the Labour Court may,  if               it  so thinks fit, appoint a commissioner  who               shall,  after taking such evidence as  may  be               necessary, submit a report to the Labour Court               and  the  Labour  Court  shall  determine  the               amount  after  considering the report  of  the               Commissioner  and other circumstances  of  the               case." It  is common ground that s. 33C(1) provides for a  kind  of execution  proceedings and it contemplates that if money  is due  to a workman under a settlement or an award,  or  under the  provisions of Chapter VA, the workman is not  compelled to  take resort to the ordinary course of execution  in  the Civil Court, but may adopt a summary procedure prescribed by this  sub-section.I  This  sub-section  postulates  that   a specific  amount is due to the workman and the same has  not been  paid  to  him.   If  the  appropriate  Government   is satisfied  that the money is so due, then it is required  to issue a certificate for the said amount to the Collector and that  leads to the recovery of the said amount in  the  same manner  as an arrear of land revenue.  The scope and  effect of s.33C(1) are ,not in dispute before us.     There is also no dispute that the word "benefit" used in s.  33C(2) is not confined merely to monetary benefit  which could be converted in terms of   146 money,  but  that it takes in all kinds  of  benefits  which may  be monetary as well as non-monetary if the  workman  is entitled  to them, and in sUCh a case, the workman is  given the  remedy  of moving the appropriate Labour Court  with  a request  that the said benefits be computed  or   calculated in terms of money.  Once such computation or ’calculation is made  under   s. 33C(2)the amount so determined  has  to  be recovered  as  provided for in sub-s.(1).  In  other  words, having  provided for the determination of the amount due  to the   workman  in  cases  falling  under  subs.   (2),   the legislature  has clearly prescribed that for-recovering  the said  amount, the workman has to revert to his remedy  under sub-s. (1).       Sub-section (3) empowers the Labour Court to appoint a

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Commissioner  for the purposes of computing the money  value of  the benefit, and it lays down that if so appointed,  the Commissioner  shall take such evidence as may  be  necessary and  submit report i to the Labour Court.  The Labour  Court is  then required to proceed to determine the amount in  the light  of  the. report, submitted by  the  Commissioner  and other   circumstances   of  the  case.   This   means   that proceedings  taken under sub-s. (2) maybe determined by  the Labour Court itself or,in a suitable case, may be determined by it after receiving a report submitted by the Commissioner appointed in that behalf. It is clear that if for  computing in  terms of money the value of the benefit claimed  by  the workman, an enquiry is required to be held and evidence  has to  be  taken, the Labour Court may do that  itself  or  may delegate that work to a COmmissioner appointed by it.   This position must be taken to be well settled after the decision of  this  Court  in the Punjab  National  Bank  Ltd.  V.K.L. Kharbanda (1).        The  question  which  arises  for  our  decision  is, however,  slightly different. It is urged by  the  appellant that sub-s.. (2)can be invoked by a workman Who (1) 1962 (1) L.L.J.284 147 is  entitled to receive from the employer the benefit  there specified,  but  the  right of the workman  to  receive  the benefit  has  to be admitted and could not be  a  matter  of dispute between the parties in cases which fall under sub-s. (2).   The  argument is, if  there is a  dispute  about  the workman’s  right  to  claim  the benefit,  that  has  to  be adjudicated  upon  not  under  sub-s.  (2),  but  by   other appropriate proceedings permissible under the Act, and since in   the  present  appeals,  the  appellant   disputed   the respondent’s  right  to ’claim the  special  allowance,  the Labour  Court had no jurisdiction to deal with their  claim. In other words, the contention is that the opening words  of sub-s.  (2)  postulate the existence of and  admitted  right vesting  in a workman and do not cover cases where the  said right is disputed.       On the other hand, the respondents contend that sub-s. (2)  is broad enough:I to take in all cases where a  workman claims  some  benefit  and  wants the  said  benefit  to  be computed in terms of money.  If in resisting the said claim, the   employer ,makes several defences, all  those  defences will have to be tried by the Labour Court under sub-s.  (2). On  this argument all questions arising between the  workmen and  their  employers in respect of the benefit  which  they claim t6 be computed in terms of money would fall within the scope of sub-s. (2).     Before  dealing with the question of  construction  thus raised by the parties in the present proceedings it would be material.  to  refer briefly to the legislative  history  of this provision.  The Act, as it was originally passed,  made relevant  provisions  on  the broad  basis  that  industrial disputes should be adjudicated upon between trade Unions  or representatives of labour on the one hand and the  workmen’s employers  on the other.  That is why section 10  (1)  which deals  with the reference of disputes to Boards   Courts  or Tribunals,  has been interpreted by this 148 Court  to  mean the disputes which are  referable  under  s. 10(1)  should  be disputes which are raised  by  ’the  trade Unions to which the workmen belong or by the representatives of  workmen acting in such a representative  character.   It was,  however,  realised that in denying to  the  individual employees a speedy remedy to enforce their existing  rights,

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the  Act had failed to ’give due protection to them.  If  an individual  employee  does not seek to raise  an  industrial dispute  in  the sense that he does not want any  change  in the  .terms  and conditions of service, but  wants  only  to :implement or enforce his existing rights, it should not  be necessary  for  him to have to take recourse to  the  remedy prescribed  by s. 10(1) of the Act; that was  the  criticism made  against the omission of the Act to provide for  speedy enforcement  of  individual workman’s existing  rights.   In order  to meet this criticism, an amendment was made by  the Legislature in 1059 by section 20 of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950 (No. 48 of 1950). Section  20 of  this  Act  provided for recovery of money  due  from  an employer under an award or decision.  This provision  filled up  the lacuna which was discovered, because even  after  an award  was made individual workmen were not given  a  speedy remedy  to implement or execute the said award, and so  s.20 purported  to supply that remedy.  Section 20( 1 )  provided that  if  money  was due under an award or  decision  of  an industrial tribunal, it may be recovered as arrears of  land revenue or as a public demand by the appropriate  Government on  an application made to it by the person entitled to  the said  money.  Section 20(2) then dealt with the cages  where any  workman was entitled to receive from the, employer  any benefit   under  an   award or  decision  of  an  industrial tribunal  which  is capable of being computed  in  terms  of money,  and   it provided that the amount at which the  said benefit could be computed may be determined. subject to  the rules framed in that behalf, by that industrial tribunal and the amount so determined may be recovered 149 as  provided  for  in  sub-s.  (1).   In  other  words,  the provisions of s.20 (2) roughly correspond to the  provisions of  s.33C(2) of the Act.  There are, however, two points  of distinction.   Section  20(2) was confined to  the  benefits claimable  by  workmen  under an award  or  decision  of  an Industrial tribunal; and the application to be made in  that behalf had to be filed before the industrial tribunal  which made the said award or decision.  These two limitations have not   been  introduced   in   s.  33C(2).   Section    20(3) corresponds to  s.33C:(3).  It  would  thus  be noticed that s..  20   of   this   Act  provides   a   speedy  remedy  to individual  workmen to execute their rights under awards  or decisions of industrial tribunals. Incidentally, we may  add that  section  34 of this Act made a special  provision  for adjudication  as to whether conditions of service  had  been changed during the pendency of industrial proceedings at the instance  of  an individual workman and  for  that   purpose inserted in the Act s.33A.  Act 48 of 1950 by which s.20 was enacted came into force on May 20, 1950.     In  1953,  the  Legislature  took  a  further  step   b? providing  for  additional rights to the workmen  by  adding Chapter  VA to  the  Act, and passed an Amending Act No.  43 of  1953.   Chapter VA deals with the  workmen’s  claims  in cases of lay-off and retrenchment.  Section 25(1) which  was enacted  in  this  Chapter provided  for  the  machinery  to recover moneys due from the employers under this Chapter. It laid down, inter aria, that any: money due from an employer. under  the provisions of Chapter VA may be recovered in  the same  manner  as an arrear of land revenue or  as  a  public demand by the appropriate: Government on an application made to it by the  workman entitled to the said money.  This  was of  course,  without  prejudice to the  workman’s  right  to adopt:any  other  mode of recovery.  This  provision  shows, that  having  created additional rights in  the  workmen  in

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respect of lay-off and retrenchment the 150 legislature  took  the precaution of  prescribing  a  speedy remedy   for  recovering  the.  said  amounts  from   their. employers..   This Amending Act came into force on  December 23, 1953.     About  three  years later, the  legislature  passed  the Industrial Disputes (Amendment and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act,  1956  (No.  36  of  1956).   This  Act    repealed-the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act No. 48 of 1950, s.  25.I in Chapter VA and inserted s. 33C(1), (9)  and  (3) and s. 36A in the Act.  The result of these modifications is that  the recovery provisions are now contained  in  section 33C  and  an additional provision is made by  s.  36A  which deals with cases where doubt or difficulty may arise in  the interpretation  of any provision of an award or  settlement. This Act came into force on August 28, 1956.     In  order  to  make the  narration  of  the  legislative background of s. 33C complete, we may refer to the fact that by  the  Amendment ACt No. 18 of 1957, two  more  provisions were  added to Chapter VA which are numbered as s. 25FF  and s. 25FFF.  This Act came into force on June 6, 1957.     The  legislative history to which we have just  referred clearly  indicates  that  having provided  broadly  for  the investigation  and settlement of industrial disputes on  the basis  of collective bargaining, the legislature  recognised that  individual workmen should be given a speedy remedy  to enforce  their existing individual rights, and so,  inserted s. 33-A in the Act in 1950 and added s. 33-C in 1956.  These two  provisions  illustrate the cases  in  which  individual workmen      can  enforce their rights without   having   to take recourse to s. 10(1) of  the Act, or without having  to depend  upon their Union to espouse their cause.  Therefore, in  construing s. 33-C we have to bear in mind two  relevant considerations.  The construction 151 should  not be so broad as to bring within the scope  of  s. 33-C cases which would fall under s. 10(1). Where industrial disputes  arise  between employees acting  collectively  and their employers, they must be adjudicated upon in the manner prescribed  by the Act, as for instance, by reference  under s,  10(1).  These  disputes cannot  be  brought  within  the purview of s. 33C. Similarly, having regard to the fact that the  policy  of  the Legislature in enacting s.  33C  is  to provide a speedy remedy to the individual workmen to enforce or execute their existing rights, it would not be reasonable to exclude from the scope of this section cases of  existing rights  which  are sought to be  implemented  by  individual workmen.  In other words, though in determining the scope of s.  33C  we  must  take care  not  to  exclude  cases  which legitimately  fall within its purview, we must also bear  in mind  that cases which, fall under s. 10(1) of the  Act  for instance cannot be brought within the scope of s. 34C.     Let  us  then revert to the words used in s.  33C(2)  in order to decide what would be its true scope and effect on a fair and reasonable construction.  When sub-s. (2) refers to any  workman  entitled  to receive  from  the  employer  any benefit  there  specified, does it mean that he  must  be  a workman  whose  right  to receive the said  benefit  is  not disputed  by the employer?  According to the appellant,  the scope  of subs. (2) is similar to that of sub-s. (1) and  it is  pointed out that just as under sub-s. (1)  any  disputed question about the workmen’s right to receive the money  due under an award cannot be adjudicated upon by the appropriate Government, so under sub-s.(2) if a dispute is raised  about

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the workmen’s right to receive the benefit in question, that cannot  be  determined by the Labour Court. The  only  point which  the Labour Court can determine is one in relation  to the  computation of the benefit in terms of money.   We  arc not  impressed   by  this   argument.  In   our opinion,  on a fair  and  reasonable  construction 152 of  sub-s.  (2)it  is clear that if a  workman’s  right’  to receive  the  benefit  is  disputed. that  may  have  to  be determined  by  the   Labour Court.   Before  proceeding  to compute  the  benefit  in terms of money  the  Labour  Court inevitably  has to deal with the question as to whether  the workman  has  a right to receive that benefit. If  the  said right is not disputed, nothing more needs to be done and the Labour Court can proceed to compute the value of the benefit in  terms of money; but if the said right is  disputed,  the Labour Court must deal with that question and decide whether the  workman  has  the right to    receive  the  benefit  as alleged  by him and it is only if the Labour  Court  answers this  point in favour of the workman that the next  question of  making necessary computation can arise.  It seems to  us that  the opening clause of subs. (2)does not admit  of  the construction for which the appellant contends unless we  add some  words in that clause. The Clause  "Where  any  workman is entitled to receive from the employer any benefit"  does’ not  mean  "where such  workman is  admittedly, or  admitted to  be, entitled to receive such benefit."  The  appellant’s construction  would  necessarily introduce the addition  of’ the   words "admittedly, or admitted to be" in that  clause, and  that clearly is not permissible.  Besides, it seems  to us that if the appellants construction is accepted, it would necessarily  mean  that it  would be at the  option  of  the employer to allow the workman to avail himself of the remedy provided  by sub-s. (2), because he has merely to  raise  an objection  on  ’the  ground that the right  claimed  by  the workman  is  not admitted to oust the  jurisdiction  of  the Labour   Court to entertain the workman’s application.   The claim  under  s.  33  C (9,)  clearly  postulates  that  the determination of the question about computing the benefit in terms of money may, in some cases. have to be preceded by an enquiry into the existence of the right and such an  enquiry must be held to be incidental to the main determination 153 which  has been assigned to the Labour Court by sub-s.  (2). As   Maxwell   has  observed  "where   an  Act   confers   a jurisdiction,  it impliedly also grants the power  of  doing all  such acts, or employing such means, as are  essentially necessary  to its execution(1).,,  We must accordingly  hold that  s. 33C (2) takes within its purview cases  of  workmen who  claimed  that the benefit to which  they  are  entitled should be computed in terms of money, even though the  right to the benefit on which their claim is based is disputed  by their  employers   incidentally, it may be relevant  to  add that  it  would be somewhat odd that under sub-s.  (3),  the Labour  Court  should have been authorised to  delegate  the work  of  computing the money value of the  benefit  to  the Commissioner  if the determination of the said question  was the only task assigned to the Labour Court under sub-s. (2). On  the other hand, sub-s. 3 becomes intelligible if  it  is held that what can be assigned to the Commissioner  includes only a part of the assignment of the Labour Court under sub- s. (2).     It is, however, urged that in dealing with the  question about  the existence of a right set up by the  workman,  the Labour  Court would necessarily have to interpret the  award

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or  settlement on which the right is based, and that  cannot be  within  its  jurisdiction  under  s.  33C  (2),  because interpretation   of   awards   or  settlements    has   been specifically and expressly provided for by s. 36A.  We  have already  noticed  that s.  36A has also been  added  by  the Amending Act No. 36 of 1956 along with section 33C, and  the appellant’s   argument is that the  legislature   introduced the   two  sections together   and    thereby      indicated that    questions of interpretation   fall  within  s.   36A and,therefore,  outside s. 33C (2).  There is no  force  in. this  contention.   Section  36A. merely  provides  for  the interpretation  of any provision of an award  or  settlement where any difficulty or doubt arises as (1) Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes p.350. 154 to  the  said  interpretation.   Generally,  this  power  is invoked  when the employer and his employees are not  agreed as  to the  interpretation of any award or settlement,   and the   appropriate  Government is satisfied that a defect  or doubt has arisen in regard to any provision in the award  or settlement.  Sometimes, cases may arise where the awards  or settlements  are  obscure, ambiguous  or  otherwise  present difficulty in construction.  It is in such cases that s. 3CA can  be  invoked by the parties by  moving  the  appropriate Government  to   make  the  necessary  reference  under  it. Experience  showed  that where awards  or  settlements  were defective in the manner just indicated, there was no  remedy available   to   the  parties  to  have  their   doubts   or difficulties resolved and that remedy is now provided by  s. 36A.   But the scope-of s. 36A .is different from the  scope of  s.  33C (2), because s. 36A is not  concerned  with  the implemention or execution of the award at all, whereas  that is the  sole  purpose of s. 33C (2). Whereas s. 33C(2) deals with cases of implementation of individual rights of workmen falling  under its provisions, s. 36A deals merely   with  a question  of interpretation  of the award where  a  .dispute arises  in that behalf between the workmen and the  employer and the appropriate Government is satisfied that the dispute deserves to be  resolved by reference under s. 36A.     Besides,  there  can be no doubt that  when  the  Labour Court  is given the power to allow an individual workman  to execute or implement his‘ existing individual rights, it  is virtually exercising execution powers in some cases, and  it is  well settled that it is open to the Executing  Court  to interpret  the decree for the purpose of execution.  It  is, of  course, true that the executing Court cannot  go  behind the decree, nor can it add to or subtract from the provision of  the decree.  These limitations apply also to the  Labour Court; but like the executing Court, the 155 Labour Court would also be competent to interpret the  award or  settlement on which a workman bases his claim  under  s. 33C  (2).  Therefore, we feel no difficulty in holding  that for the purpose of making the necessary determination  under s.  33C (2),it would, in appropriate  cases, be open to  the Labour  Court to interpret the award or settlement on  which the workman’s right rests.     We  have  already noticed that in enacting  s.  33C  the legislature  has  deliberately  omitted  some  words   which occurred in s. 20 (94 of the Industrial Disputes  (Appellate Tribunal)  Act,  1950.  It is remarkable that similar  words of  limitation have been used in s. 33C (1) because s. 33  C (1)  deals  with  cases  where any  money  is  due  under  a settlement  or an award or under the provisions  of  Chapter VA. It is thus .clear that claims made under s. 33C (1),  by

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itself  can  be  only claims referable  to  the  settlement, award,  or  the relevant provisions of  Chapter  VA.   These words  of limitations are not to be found in s. 33C (2)  and to  that  extent, the scope of s. 33C  (9.)  is  undoubtedly wider  than  that  of s. 33C (1). It is true  that  even  in respect  of the larger class. of cases which fail  under  s. 33C (2), after the determination is made by the Labour Court the execution goes back again to  s. 33C (1).  That  is  why s. 33C (2) expressely provides that the amount so determined may  be  recovered as provided for in  sub-section  (1).  It is  .unnecessary  in  the present appeals  either  to  state exhaustively   or  even  to  indicate  broadly  what   other categories of claims can  fall under s. 33C (2). There is no doubt  that the three categories of claims mentioned  in  s. 33C (1) fall under s. 33C (2) and in that sense, s. 33C  (2) can   itself   be  deemed  to  be  a  kind   of.   execution proceeding;  .but  it is possible that Claims not  based  on settlements, awards or made under the provisions of  Chapter V  A,  may also be competent under s. 33C (2) and  that  may illustrate  its  wider  scope. We would,  however,  like  to indicate 156 some  of the claims which would  not fall under s. 33C  (2), because they formed the subject matter of the appeals  which have  been grouped together for our decision along with  the appeals with which we are dealing at present. If an employee is  dismissed  or  demoted  and it  is  his  case  that  the dismissal  or demotion is wrongful, it would not be open  to him to make a claim for the recovery of his salary or  wages under  s. 33G (2).  His demotion or dismissal may give  rise to  an industrial dispute which may be appropriately  tried, but  once  it is shown that the employer  has  dismissed  or demoted  him,  a  claim that the dismissal  Or  demotion  is unlawful  and. therefore, the employee continues to  be  the workman of the employer and is entitled to the benefits  due to him under a preexisting contract, cannot be made under s. 33 C (2). If a settlement has been, duly reached between the employer  and  his employees and it  fails under s. 18  (9.) or C3) of the Act and is governed by s.(19) 2 it  would  not be open to an employee, notwithstanding the said settlement, to claim the benefit as though the said settlement had  come to  an  end. If the settlement exists and  continues  to  be operative no claim can be made under s. 33C(2)  inconsistent with the  said  settlement.  If the  settlement is  intended to be terminated, proper steps may have to be taken in  that behalf and a dispute that may be arise thereafter may to  be dealt with according. to the, other procedure prescribed  by the Act.  Thus, our conclusion is that the scope  of s.  33G (2)is wider than s. 33G (1) and cannot be wholly assimilated with  it, though for obvious reasons, we do not  propose  to decide  or indicate  what  additional cases would fall under s.  33G  (2) which may not fall  under s. 33G (1).  In  this connection, we may incidentally state that the  observations made  by this Court in the case of Punjab National Bank  Ltd (1),  that s. 33C is a provision in the nature of  execution should  not be interpreted to mean that the scope of s.  33G (2) is exactly the same as s. 33G (1) (page 238). (1) 1962 (1) L.L.J.234. 157     It  now  remains to refer to some  decisions  which  are relevant.  In M/s.  Kasturi and Sons (Private)Lid v. Shri N. Salivateeswaran  (1), where this Court was  considering  the question about the scope  and effect of s. 17 of the Working Journalists   (Condition  of  Service)   and   Miscellaneous Provisions  Act, 1955,(No. 45 of 1955), reference  was  made

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to the fact that the, procedure prescribed by the said s. 17 was different from the procedure prescribed by  s.  33C (2), and   it   was  observed  that under  the  latter  provision where an  employee makes a claim for some money, an  enquiry into  the claim is contemplated by the Labour Court, and  it is only after the Labour Court  has decided the matter  that the  decision  becomes   enforceable under  s.  33C  (1)  by summary procedure.  No such enquiry was contemplated by  the said s. 17. In  Shri  Ambica  Mills Co. Ltd. v. Shri  S.B.  Bhatt   (2), section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 (No. 4 of 1936) fell  to be construed, and it was held that under  the  said section, when the authority exercises its jurisdiction which is  made exclusive by s. 22, it has necessarily to  consider various   questions   incidental  to  the   claims   falling thereunder,  and  it  was added that although  it  would  be inexpedient  to  lay  down  any   hard  and  fast  rule  for determining  the  scope of such  questions, care  should  be taken not to unduly extend or curtail its jurisdiction-   As we  have  already  indicated.  we  have  adopted  the   same approach in interpreting s. 33C (2). The  respondents  relied on the  decision   of  the   Bombay High   Court in M/s.  Sawa tram Ramprasad  Mills  Co.  Ltd., Akola  v.  Baliram  (3). In  support   of  the  very   broad construction  which  they seek  to place on the   provisions of  s.  33C (2).  In that case, the High Court  was  dealing with a claim made under Chapter VA of the Act, (1) [1959] S.C.R. 1.     (2) [1961] 3 S.C.R. 220. (3) (1962) 65 Bom. L.R. 91. 158 and  there  can  be. no doubt that  such  a  claim  together with  .all  a question incidental ’to its  decision  can  be properly  determined  under  s. 33C (2).   In  reaching  its conclusion,  the High Court has no doubt made certain  broad and  general  observations  in regard to the  scope  of  the jurisdiction  conferred   on the Labour Court under  s.  33G (2).  Those observations are in the nature of  obiter  dicta and  in so far as they may be inconsistent with our  present decision,  they  should be held to be not justified  by  the terms  of s. 33C (2).  In the result, the preliminary  point raised  by  the  appellant  that the  Labour  Court  had  no jurisdiction  to  entertain  the  respondents’  applications fails and must be rejected.     That  takes us to the merits of the respondents’  claim. We  have  already  seen that the main  basis  on  which  the respondents   have  claimed  the  special  allowance   under paragraph 164 (b) (1) of the Sastry Award is that they  have been  operating  upon the adding machines  provided  by  the appellant   for  use  in  its  clearing   department.    The appellant, however has contended that the special  allowance can be claimed only by Comptists, and since the  respondents had  not  even  claimed  that  they  are  Comptists,   their applications should be rejected.  For deciding this dispute. it is necessary to refer to  the relevant provisions of  the Sastry  Award as they were modified by the decision  of  the Labour   Appellate Tribunal. Chapter X of the Sastry   Award deals with the problem of special  allowances.  In paragraph 161 of this Chapter, the Sastry Tribunal observed that there were  certain  posts even in the  clerical  and  subordinate grades    for   which   an   incumbent   requires    special qualifications  or  skill  for  the  efficient discharge  of his duties, and so, it thought that an extra payment in such cases   is    necessary  by  way  of  recognition   of   and compensation for this special skill or  responsibility.   In paragraph    162,  the Tribunal examined three  alternatives

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suggested for 159 its  acceptance  for making a  provision  for  some  special payment, and .it ultimately decided that a special allowance should  be paid to those categories of employees   who,   by their     special   qualifications   or    skill,    deserve recognition’.  In paragraph 163, the Tribunal observed  that the  special allowance which it was about to  prescribe  was the  minimum  and i.t was open to the banks  to  pay  higher allowance if they thought necessary to do so.  Then followed paragraph  164 in which it specified  10 categories fit  for special  allowances.   The  first of  these  categories  was Graduates  and the claim of this category of  employees  was dealt  with by the Tribunal in paragraph  164(a).  Paragraph 164(b)  deals with the  remaining  9  categories   and   the Comptists are the first in these 9 categories.  The Tribunal provided   that  the  Comptists  should   receive Rs.   10/- p.m.   as  special   allowance  in  cases of  all  the  four classes of banks A,B,C and D.  It is on this provision  that the respondents rely in support of their claim.     When  the Sastry Award went before the Labour  Appellate Tribunal,  the  Labour  Appellate Tribunal dealt  with  this question  in  paragraph 140 of its decision.   The  Tribunal observed  that during  the course of the hearing  it  became clear   that   the   nomenclature  by    which.   particular categories   of  employees are described differed from  bank to bank,   and so, in  order to avoid disputes between banks and   their  employees  as to whether a particular  category of employees  is entitled to a special allowance under  the’ Award or not the, Tribunal asked the banks to supply it with statements  of  different names given to the  categories  of employees for whom special allowances have been ’provided by the  Sastry Award. Accordingly, some of the  banks  supplied the  necessary     information.  The Tribunal then  set  out eight of  the    categories  the  equivalents of which   had been supplied in the statements of the banks. As against 160 the  Comptists, Statement No. B-247 which had been  supplied by the Imperial Bank of India, showed that the  nomenclature adopted by the said Bank in respect of the said category was adding machine operators, Addressographers.  Having set  out these  equivalents,1.  the Tribunal took the  precaution  of adding that the equivalents set out by it were helpful,  but did not exhaust the subject, and so, in the absence of data, it had  to be  left  to the  banks to  pay  the  appropriate allowances having regard to the duties and  responsibilities of a post. That is how the matter ended.      In  the  present proceedings, the respondents  seem  to base  their case on the sole basis that they are  .operating the adding machines and can, therefore, be treated as adding machine operators, and they argued that since adding machine operators were equated in the statement of the Imperial Bank of  India with Comptists, they must be held to be  Comptists for the purpose of paragraph 164 (b) (1) of the Sastry Award and thus entitled to the special allowance of Rs. 10/-.   In fact, in allowing the respondents’ claim the Tribunal  seems to  have accepted this contention, for it has observed  that according to the decision of the Labour appellate  Tribunal, the adding machine operators must be held to be in the  same category as Comptists. In other words, the Tribunal  appears to have taken the view that since the Imperial Bank of India described  the  employees who did the work of  Comptists  as adding machine operators, it followed that whenever any bank employee was operating on the adding machine for   howsoever small a period it may be, he must be held to be a  Comptists

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and  as such  entitled to the special allowance.   -In.  our opinion,  this  is  clearly erroneous.It is  true  that  the Imperial  Bank of India adopted the nomenclature  of  adding machine operators for its Comptists and that may  presumably be for the reason. that at the relevant time, its  Comptists were 161 doing   the  work  of  adding  machine  operators  and   Ad- dressographers;  so that it made no difference  whether  the bank  called them Comptists or adding machine  operators  or Addressographers,   all  the  three  types  of  work   being entrusted to one category of employees; but however that may be,  the nomenclature adopted by the Imperial Bank of  India cannot  be said to be binding on the other banks  which  did not adopt it, and so, it is obviously erroneous to hold that the equivalent adopted by the Imperial Bank of India must be taken to have been adopted by all the other banks.   Indeed, the  Award  recently  made by Mr.  Justice  Desai  who   was appointed   the   National Industrial Tribunal in  the  Bank Disputes    clearly  brings  out  the  distinction   between Comptists  on  the one hand, and adding  machine  operators, addressographers  and  photostat machine  operators  on  the other in paragraphs 5. 242 and 5. 265.     In the present appeals, no evidence was led on behalf of the  respondents.   The  appellant,  however,  examined  its officer  Mr. Shivodkar.  This witness stated that an  adding machine  can  be  operated by a clerk with  half  an  hour’s practice.  It only does additions mechanically.  Operating a comptometer, however, involves complicated calculations  and in order to handle it efficiently, the employee has to  take three   months   training  and practising.   He  added  that about  two hours’ work is put on the adding machine  by  the several  respondents,  but it is included  in  their  normal working hours.  There has been some discussion at the Bar in the  present appeals as to the nature of the work  which  is done on the comptometer and on the adding machine, but there can be no doubt that compared to the comptometer, the adding machine  is a simple mechanism and for operating on it,  not much experience or technical training is required; in  fact, it may not even require that amount of skill and  efficiency which  is expected of a typist and it is significant that  a claim made 162 by  the  typists for special allowance was rejected  by  the Sastry Tribunal.  That shows how the respondents’ claim  for special  allowance  as Comptists solely on the  ground  that they can be described as adding machine operators, cannot be sustained.    Therefore,  -the  sole  basis  on  which   the respondents’  claim has been allowed by the Labour Court  is unsound, and so the order passed by it cannot be affirmed.     It has, however, been urged before us by the respondents that  they  should be given an opportunity  to  substantiate their  claims on  the merits.  It is argued that  they  were advised that the equivalent supplied by the Imperial Bank of India by itself furnished a firm basis for their claims, and so,  no other allegations were made by them in  the  present proceedings  and  no evidence was led by them to  prove  the nature of the work done by them and the e for which they  do the  special  kind  of  work to  justify   the   claim   for special   allowance.  On the  other    hand,  the  appellant has  strenuously contended     that  the  delay   made    by the  respondents    in   making  the  present   applications speaks for itself, and so, no indulgence should be shown  to the  respondents  for  remanding the present  cases  to  the Labour  Court once it is found that the basis on  which  the

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claim has been allowed is not justified in law.  It is  true that  though  the  Sastry ward was passed in  1953  and  the Labour Appellate Tribunal’s decision was pronounced in  1954 and it became final on October 21, 1955, the respondents did not  make their claims until 1962.  We have had occasion  in the past to emphasise the fact  that industrial adjudication should not encourage unduly belated claims; but on the other hand,  no limitation is prescribed for an application  under s. 33C(2) and it would, on the whole, not be right for us to refuse an opportunity to the respondents to prove their case only   on the ground that they moved the Labour Court  after considerable delay. We would, therefore, 163 set  aside the order passed by the Labour Court  and  remand the  proceedings  to  that Court with a  direction  that  it should allow the  parties to  amend their pleadings if  they so  desire  and  to  lead  evidence  in  support  of   their respective  cases.   It may be open to  the  respondents  to prove  that  they are doing the work which may  be  properly described as the work of Comptists.  In that connection,  it may also be open to them incidentally to show that the  work which  was being done in the Imperial Bank of India  by  the adding  machine operators who were shown as  equivalents  of the Comptists at the relevant time is being done by them  in the appellant’s branches.  If the Labour Court is  satisfied that  the  work done by the respondents  can  be  reasonably treated as the work of Comptists as  properly understood  in the   banking industry, then it should proceed to  determine the  respondents’  claim  on that basis.   We  have  already referred   to  the fact that the Labour  Appellate  Tribunal made  it  perfectly clear that the  particular  nomenclature was   not  decisive and  that what mattered in  these  cases was the nature of the duties and responsibilities of a post. If  the  nature of the duties and  responsibilities  of  the posts  held  by  the respondents  legitimately  Justify  the conclusion  that  they  are  comptists,  then  the   special allowance  can  be claimed by them. It is in  the  light  of these  observations that the Labour Court should proceed  to deal with these cases after remand.  If the parties want  to amend their pleadings, they should move the Labour Court  in that  behalf  within a fortnight after the  receipt  of  the record  in that Court. Then the Labour Court should  fix  an early  date for taking evidence and should deal  with  these matters as expeditiously as possible.     The  result  is, the appeals are   allowed,  the  orders passed  by  the Labour Court are set aside and  the  matters sent back to that Court for disposal in 164 accordance with law.  There would be no order as to costs.                                Appeals allowed.                                 Cases remanded.