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PETITIONER: THE CALCUTTA GAS COMPANY  (PROPRIETARY) LTD.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL AND  OTHERS

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 05/02/1962

BENCH: SUBBARAO, K. BENCH: SUBBARAO, K. AIYYAR, T.L. VENKATARAMA SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P.(CJ) AYYANGAR, N. RAJAGOPALA MUDHOLKAR, J.R.

CITATION:  1962 AIR 1044            1962 SCR  Supl. (3)   1  CITATOR INFO :  R          1963 SC 703  (45)  R          1966 SC 828  (8)  RF         1973 SC2720  (9)  F          1976 SC 578  (33)  RF         1977 SC1496  (18)  RF         1979 SC 248  (5)  RF         1990 SC  85  (18)  RF         1990 SC1927  (14)

ACT: Gas    and   gas-works-Enactment   by   State    Legislature Constitutional   validity-Writ   Petition--Locus    satandi- Oriental  Gas  Company  Act, 1960 (W.B. 15  of  1960),  s.4- Constitution  of India Arts. 226, 246, Sch.  VII,  List  II, Entries 24,25.

HEADNOTE: By  an agreement entered into by the appellant  company  and the  Oriental  Gas Company, the appellant was  appointed  as Manager  of  the  later company which  owned  an  industrial undertaking  for  the manufacture and sale of  fuel  gas  in Calcutta with the right to receive remuneration as specified in  the  agreement. The West Bengal Legislature  passed  the Oriental Gas Company Act, 1960, and s.4 of that Act provided that  the  said undertaking shall stand transferred  to  the State Government for five years for management and  control. On  October  3,  1960, the  State  Government  issued  three notifications  one of which appointed October, 7,  1960,  as the date on and from which the management and control of the said  undertaking would be taken over by it.  The  appellant by  a petition under Art. 226 of the  Constitution  impugned the  constitutional validity of the said Act and sought  for appropriate  writs  restraining  the  State  Government  for giving effect to it and for quashing the said notifications. The High Court found against the petitioner and rejected the petition. Held, that the State Legislature had the competence to enact the impugned Act and its constitutional validity was  beyond question.

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Article 226 of the Constitution confers a very wide power on the  High Court to issue directions and writs not  only  for the enforcement of fundamental rights but other legal rights as  well.   Since the appellant’s lawful  rights  under  the agreement had been abridged, if not wholly destroyer by  the impugned  Act, it had the locus standi to apply  under  Art. 226 of the Constitution. The State of Orissa v. Madan Gopal Bungta, [1952] S.C.R.  28 and  Chiranjit Lal Choudhuri v. The Union of  lndia,  [1950] C.R. 869, referred to. 2 The  entries in the three Legislative Lists are only  legis- lative  heads  or fields of legislation that  demarcate  the area over which the appropriate legislature operates and  it is  well settled that the language of the entries should  be widely  construed.  If any entries overlap or are in  direct conflict  with each other, every attempt should be  made  to harmonise them, whether the entries belong to the same  List or  different ’Lists, so that no entry may be robbed of  its entire content and made nugatory. In re the Central Provinces and Berar Act, No. XIV of  1938, [1939]  F.  C.  R. 18 and State  of  Bombay  v.  Norothamdas Jethabhai, [1951] S. C. R. 51, referred to. So  construed  Entry  24 of List II  which  is  in  apparent conflict  with  Entry 25 of the same list, must be  held  to cover  all  industries in a State except Gas  and  Gas-works which   are  specifically  dealt  with  by  Entry   25   and exclusively allotted to it. It  is clear that the express intention of the  Constitution was  to carve out Gas and Gas-works industry from  Entry  24 and bring them under Entry 25 and treat them in normal times as State industries.  It would be erroneous to say that such an  interpretation would prevent the Parliament from  making laws  in  respect of Gas and Gas-works during war  or  other national emergencies.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. 138 of 1961. Appeal  by special leave from the judgment and  order  dated November 15, 1960, of the Calcutta High Court in Matter  No. 235 of 1960. M.   C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, B. B. L. Iyengar and B. P. Maheshwari, for the appellant. S.   M. Bose, Advocate-General, West Bengal, B.   Sen, P. K. Chatter , S. C. Bose, Milon Bannerji and P. K. Bose, for the respondents Nos.  1 to 4. 1962.   February 5. The Judgment of the Court was  delivered by SUBBARAO,  J.-This  appeal by special leave is  against  the Judgment  and  Order dated November 15, 1960,  of  the  High Court  of  Judicature at Calcutta  dismissing  the  petition filed by the appellant under 3 Art.  226  of  the  Constitution, and  it  raises  the  con- stitutional validity of the Oriental Gas Company Act,  1960, (W.B,  Act  XV of 1960), hereinafter  called  the  "impugned Act". The facts that have given rise to this appeal may be briefly stated.  The Oriental Gas Company was originally constituted by a deed of settlement dated April 25, 1853, by the name of the Oriental Gas Company, and it was subsequently registered in  England under the provisions of the English Joint  Stock Companies  Act,  1862.   By  Act V of  1857  passed  by  the

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Legislative Council of India, it was empowered to lay  pipes in Calcutta and its suburbs and to excavate the streets  for the  said  purpose.  By Acts of the Legislative  Council  of India passed from time to time special powers were conferred on the said Company.  In 1946 Messrs.  Soorajmull Nagarmull, a  firm carrying on business in India, purchased 98  percent of the shares of the said Oriental Gas Company Limited.  The said  firm  floated a limited liability  Company  named  the Calcutta Gas Co. (Proprietary) Limited and it was registered in  India with its registered office at Calcutta.   On  July 24,  1948,  under  an agreement  entered  into  between  the Oriental  Gas  Company,  and the Calcutta  Gas  Company  the latter  was appointed the manager of the former  Company  in India  for  a  period of 20 years from July  5,  1948.   The Oriental  Gas  Company  is  the  owner  of  the   industrial undertaking,  inter alia, for the  production,  manufacture, supply,  distribution  and sale of fuel gas  Calcutta.   The Calcutta   Gas   Company,  by  virtue   of   the   aforesaid arrangement,  was in charge of its general management for  a period  of  20  years for  remuneration.   The  West  Bengal Legislature  passed  the impugned Act and  it  received  the assent  of the President on October 1, 1960.  On October  3, 1960, the West Bengal Government issued three notifications- the first declaring that the said Act would come into  force on  October 3, 1960, the second containing the rules  framed under the Act, and the 4 third  specifying October 7, 1960, as the date  with  effect from which the State Government would take over for a period of five years the management and control of the  undertaking of  the  Oriental Gas Company for ’the purposes of,  and  in accordance  with,  the  provisions of  the  said  Act..  The appellant, i.e., the Calcutta Gas Company, filed a  petition under  Art. 226 of the Constitution tn. the High  Court  for West   Bengal   at  Calcutta  for  appropriate   writs   for restraining the State Government from giving effect to  the said   Act   and  for  quashing  the   said   notifications. Respondents  1 to 4 to the petition were the State  of  West Bengal and the concerned officers, and respondent 5 was  the Oriental   Gas  Company  Limited.   In  the  petition,   the appellant  contested the constitutional validity of the  Act on  various  grounds,  and in  the  counter  affidavit.  the contesting  respondents i.e.. respondents 1 to 4, sought  to sustain its validity and also questioned the maintainability of the petition at the instance of the appellant.  Ray,  J., gave the following  findings   on  the  contentions   raised before him:(1) The appellant has no legal right to  maintain the  petition;   (2)  the  appellant  cannot  question   the validity  of  the  Act on the  ground  that  its  provisions infringed  his fundamental rights under Arts. 14, 19 and  31 in view of Art. 31A(1)(b) of the Constitution; (3) the  West Bengal  Legislature had the Legislative competence  to  pass the  impugned Act by virtue of entry 42 of List III  of  the Seventh  Schedule to the Constitution; (4) entry 25 of  List II also confers sufficient authority and power on the  State Legislature  to make laws affecting gas and gas work  ;  and (5)   even  if  the  Act  incidentally  trenches  upon   any production aspect, the pith and substance of the legislation is gas and ,a,,-work within the meaning of entry 25 of  List II.   The learned Judge rejected all the contentions of  the appellant  and  dismissed the petition by  his  order  dated November 15, 1960.  Hence the appeal. 5 Learned  Attorney-General, appearing for the appellant,  has repeated before us all the contentions, except that relating

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to fundamental rights., which his client had  unsuccessfully raised  before  the  High Court.   His  contentions  may  be summarized thus : (1) The finding of the High Court that the appellant has no locus standi to file the petition cannot be sustained,  as under the impugned Act the appellant’s  legal rights  under  the  agreement entered into by  it  with  the Oriental  Gas  Company  on  July  24,  1948  were  seriously affected. (2) Under Art. 246 of the Constitution  Parliament has exclusive power to make laws with, respect to any of the matters enumerated in List I : Parliament in exercise of the said   power   passed  the   Industries   (Development   and Regulation)  Act, 1951, by virtue of entry 52 of said  List; the  two  entries  in List II, namely, entries  24  and  25, cannot  sustain  the  Act, as entry 24  is  subject  to  the provisions  of  entry  52 of List I; and entry  25  must  be confined  to matters other than those covered by  entry  24, and,   therefore,,  the  West  Bengal  Legislature  is   not Competent  to  make a law regulating- the gas industry.  (3) Assuming  that the State Legislature has power to  pass  the Act by virtue of entry 25 of List II, under Art. 254(1)   of the  Constitution  the law made by Parliament,  namely,  the Industries  (Development  and Regulation) Act,  1951,  shall prevail, and the law made by the State Legislature,  namely, the impugned Act be. void to the extent of repugnancy.   And (4) the view of the High Court that the validity of the  Act could  be sustained under entry 42 of List III is wrong,  as under  the  impugned  Act  the State  only  takes  over  the management  of the Company and manages it for and on  behalf of the Company, whereas the concept of requisition under the said  entry  requires  that  the  State  shall  take   legal possession  of  property  of  the person  from  whom  it  is requisitioned.,  on  its  own  behalf  or  on  behalf  of  a petitioner other than the owner thereof. 6 The  learned Advocate-General of West Bengal, and  Mr.  Sen, who  followed  him,  seek to sustain  the  validity  of  the impugned  Act  not only under entry 25 of List II  but  also under entries 33 and 42 of List III of the Seventh  Schedule to   the  Constitution.   They  further  contend  that   the appellant was constituted as agent under the said  agreement and  that,  as  its rights were preserved by  s.  4  of  the impugned  Act, it has no locus standi to file  the  petition under Art. 226. The  first question that falls to be considered  is  whether the  appellant has locus standi to file the  petition  under Art.  226  of  the Constitution.  The  argument  of  learned counsel  for the respondents is that the appellant was  only managing  the  industry  and it  had  no  proprietary  right therein   and,  therefore,  it  could  not   maintain,   the application.   Article 226 confers a very wide power on  the High  Court  to  issue directions and writs  of  the  nature mentioned  therein for the enforcement of any of the  rights conferred  by  Part III or for any other  purpose.   It  is, therefore,  clear  that persons other  than  those  claiming fundamental  right  can also approach the  court  seeking  a relief thereunder.  The Article in terms does not,  describe the classes of persons entitled to apply thereunder ; but it is   implicit   in  the  exercise   of   the   extraordinary jurisdiction  that  the  relief asked for  must  be  one  to enforce  a  legal right.  In The State of  Orissa  v.  Madan Gopal  Rungta(1) this Court has ruled that the existence  of the right is the foundation of the exercise of  jurisdiction of  the  court  under  Art. 226  of  the  Constitution.   In Chiranjit  Lal Chowdhuri v. The Union of India (2),  it  has been  held  by this Court that the legal right that  can  be

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enforced  under Art. 32 must ordinarily be the right of  the petitioner himself who complains of infraction of such right and  approaches  the court for relief.  We do  not  see  any reason why a different principle should apply in the case of a (1) [1952] S C.R. 28. (2) [1950] S.C.R. 869. 7 petitioner  under Art. 226 of the Constitution.   The  right that can be enforced under Art. 226 also shall ordinarily be the personal or individual right of the petitioner  himself, though  in the case of some of the writs like habeas  corpus or  quo  warranto  this  rule may  have  to  be  relaxed  or modified.   The  questions  therefore,  is  whether  in  the present  case the petitioner has a legal right, and  whether it  has been infringed by the contesting  respondents.   The petitioner  entered into an agreement dated July  24,  1948, with  respondent No. 5; in regard the Oriental Gas  Company. Under  the agreement,the appellant was appointed as  Manager and the general management of the affairs of the Company was entrusted  to  it for a period of 20 years.   The  appellant would  receive  thereunder by way of  remuneration  for  its services, (a) an office allowance of Rs. 3,000/- per mensem, (b) a commission of 10 per cent, on the net yearly profit of the  Company, subject to a minimum of Rs. 60,000/- per  year in the case of absence of or inadequacy of profits and (c) a commission  of  Re.  1/- per ton of all coal  purchased  and negotiated by the Manager.  In its capacity as Manager,  the appellant-Company  was put in charge of the entire  business and its assets in India and it was given all the  incidental powers  necessary  for  the  said  management.   Under   the agreement, therefore, the appellant had the right to  manage the  Oriental  Gas Company for a period of 20 years  and  to receive  the aforesaid amounts toward its  remuneration  for its services.  Section 4 of the impugned Act reads:               "With effect from the appointed day and for  a               period of five years thereafter.-               (a)   the  undertaking  of the  Company  shall               stand transferred to the State Government  for               the purpose of management and control ;               8                (b)  the  Company and its  agents,  including               managing  agents,  if any, and  servant  shall               cease  to  exercise management or  control  in               relation to the undertaking of the company;               (c)   all contracts, excluding any contract or               contracts  in  respect of agency  or  managing               agency,  subsisting  immediately  before   the               appointed day and affecting the undertaking of               the  Company  shall  cease  effect  or  to  be               enforceable Company, its agents or any to have               against the person who was a surety thereto or               had  guaranteed  the performance  thereof  and               shall  be of as full force and effect  against               or  in favour of the State of West Bengal  and               shall be enforceable as fully and  effectively               as if instead of the Company the State of West               Bengal  had been named therein or had  been  a               party thereto:" Under  the said section, with effect from the appointed  day and for a period of five years thereafter, the management of the Company shall stand transferred to the State Government, and  the  Company, its agents and servants  shall  cease  to exercise  management or control of the same.  Under cl.  (c) of  the section, the contracts of agency or managing  agency

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are  not touched, but all the other contracts cease to  have effect against the Company and are enforceable by or against the  State.   It  is not necessary in this  case  to  decide whether   under  the  said  agreement  the   appellant   was constituted as agent or managing agent or a servant. of  the Oriental  Gas  Company.  Whatever may be its  character,  by reason  of  s.  4 of the impugned Act, it  was  deprived  of certain  legal  rights  it possessed  under  the  agreement. Under  the agreement, the appellant had the right to  manage the  Oriental  Gas Company for a period of 20 years  and  to receive remuneration for the same.  But under  9 s.   4  of the impugned Act, it was deprived of  that  right for  a  period of five years.  There was certainly  a  legal right accruing to the appellant under the agreement and that was  abridged , if not destroyed, by the impugned  Act.   It is, therefore, impossible to say that the legal right of the appellant  was  not  infringed  by  the  provisions  of  the impugned  Act.   In the circumstances,  as  the  appellant’s personal  right  to manage the Company and  to  receive  re- muneration therefore had been infringed by the provisions of the statute, it had locus standi to file the petition  under Art. 226 of the Constitution. To  appreciate the rival contentions in regard to the  other points,  it  would  be convenient and  necessary  to  notice briefly  the provisions of the Industries  (Development  and Regulation)  Act,  1951, hereinafter  called  the  "’Central Act.",  and the impugned Act.  The Central Act was,  passed, as its long title shows, to provide for the development  and regulation of certain industries.  Under s. 2 of the Central Act,  it  is  declared that it is expedient  in  the  public interest  that the Union should take under its  control  the industries specified in the First Schedule.  Under beading 2 of  the First Schedule, item (3) is "fuel  gases-(coal  gas, natural  gas  and the like)".. ,Industrial  undertaking"  is defined  to mean any undertaking pertaining to  a  scheduled industry  carried on in one or more factories by any  person or authority including Government ; and "factory" is defined to  mean any premises, including the precincts  thereof,  in any  part of which a manufacturing process is being  carried on or is ordinarily so carried on.  Section 9 authorizes the Government to levy and collect a cess from the industries  : Chapter  III  provides  for  the  regulation  of   scheduled industries  : section 15 empowers the Government to make  or cause  to be made a fall and complete investigation  of  the affairs of any scheduled industry, if- it is of opinion that there is a likelihood of substantial fall in the volume of 10 production  or a marked deterioration in the quality of  any article  produced,  or there is likely to be a rise  in  the price   of  any  article  produced,  therein,  or  that   an undertaking  is being managed in a manner highly  detriment- to the scheduled industry concerned; and s.16 authorizes the Central  Government, after making the said investigation  to issue  such  directions  to the  industrial  undertaking  or undertakings concerned as may be. appropriate in the circum- stances  in order to regulate the production of any  article or articles and fix the standards of production, to  require it  to take such steps to stimulate the development  of  the industry, to prohibit from resorting to any act or  practice which  might  reduce  its production  capacity  or  economic value, or to control the prices or regulate the distribution of  articles produced therein.  Chapter III A confers  power an the Central Government to assume management or control of an  industrial  undertaking in certain  cases:  section  18A

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enables it to take control of an industrial undertaking, and s.  18B(1),  inter alia, provides that on the issue  of  the notified  order  under  s. 18A, all  persons  in  charge  of management, including persons holding office as managers  or directors  of the industrial undertaking immediately  before the  issue  of the notified order shall be  deemed  to  have vacated  their  offices as such, and that  any  contract  of management  between  the  industrial  undertaking  and   any managing  agent  or any director thereof holding  office  as such  immediately  before the issue of  the  notified  order shall  be deemed to have been terminated and the  person  or persons  appointed under the Act shall be empowered to  take over  the management and conduct the affairs of the  Company in  the  place  of the previous  management.   Chapter  IIIB enables  the Central Government for securing  the  equitable distribution and availability at fair prices of any  article or  class of articles relatable to any  hanreeetd  industry, and for controlling and ugsdlciulg the supply, distribution, and price of the 11 said  articles.  Section 20 of the Act declares  that  after the  commencement of the Act, it shall not be competent  for any  State Government or a local authority to take over  the management  or control of any industrial  undertaking  under any  law  for the time being in force which  authorizes  any such  Government  or  local authority so  to  do.   Briefly’ stated,  the Central Act declares that it is  expedient,  in the public interest to take under its control the  scheduled industries;  its provisions are designed to provide for  the development  and  regulation  of the,  said  industries;  it enables the Central Government, for the purpose of promoting and regulating the said industries, to investigate into  the affairs  of  an  undertaking, to  regulate  its  production, supply  and distribution, arid, if necessary, to  take  over the management of the undertaking. Coming to the impugned Act, its provisions are confined only to  the  affairs of the Oriental Gas Company  Limited.   Its long  title shows that it was passed to provide  the  taking over for a limited period of the management and control, and the  .subsequent  acquisition  of  the  undertaking  of  the Oriental Gas Company Limited.  Its preamble says that it was thought  expedient  to  provide  for  the  increase  of  the production  of  gas and improving the  quality  thereof  for supply to industrial undertakings, hospitals and other  wel- fare institutions, to local authorities for street  lighting and  to the public in general for domestic  consumption  and for  that  purpose  to provide for the  taking  over  for  a limited  period  of  the management  and  control,  and  the subsequent  acquisition,  of the undertaking.  Under  s.  4, with effect from the appointed day and for a period of  five years thereafter the undertaking of the Company shall  stand transferred  to  the  State Government for  the  purpose  of management and control.  Under s. 6, the undertaking of  the Company  shall be run by the State Government and  shall  be used and 12 utilised by the State Government for purposes of  Production of  gas and supply thereof to public institutions  mentioned therein  and for other purposes.  Sections 8 and  9  provide for  payment  of  compensation  for  taking  over  the  said management.  It would be seen that the impugned Act  intends to  serve  the same purpose as the Central Act,  though  its operation is confined to the Oriental Gas Company.  Both the Acts are conceived to increase ,-he production, quality  and supply  pertaining to an industry, and for that  purpose  to

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enable  the  appropriate Government, if necessary,  to  take over the management for regulating the industry concerned to achieve the said purposes.  The impugned Act occupies a part of  the  field  already covered by  the  Central  Act.   The question is whether the State Legislature has constitutional competency to encroach upon the said field. At  this stage it would be convenient to read  the  relevant Articles of the Constitution.               Article  246. (1) Notwithstanding anything  in               clauses  (2) and (3) Parliament has  exclusive               power to make laws with respect to any of  the               matters  enumerated in List I in  the  Seventh               Schedule (in this Constitution referred to  as               the ,Union List").               (3)   Subject  to  clauses (1)  and  (2).  the               Legislature  of any State has exclusive  power               to  make  laws  for such  State  or  any  part               thereof  with  respect to any of  the  matters               enumerated in List II in the Seventh  Schedule               (in  this  Constitution  referred  to  as  the               ,State List").                             List I-Union List               Entry 7. Industries declared by Parliament  by               law to be necessary for the purpose of defence               or for the prosecution of war.               13               Entry 52.  Industries, the control of which by               the Union is declared by Parliament by law  to               be expedient in the public interest.                             List II-State List               Entry   24.    Industries   subject   to   the               provisions of entries 7 and 52 of List I.               Entry 25.  Gas and gas-works.               Entry 26.1 Trade and commerce within the State               subject to the provisions of entry 33 of  List               III.               Entry 27.  Production, supply and distribution               of goods subject to the provisions of entry 33               of List Ill. Before  construing the said entries it would be  useful  to’ notice some of the well settled rules of interpretation laid down  by the Federal Court and this Court in the  matter  of construing the entries.  The power to legislate is given  to the   appropriate   Legislatures   by  Art.   246   of   the Constitution.   The  entries  in the three  Lists  are  only legislative heads or fields of legislation : they  demarcate the  area  over  which  the  appropriate  Legislatures   can operate.   It  is also well settled  that  widest  amplitude should be given to the language of the entries.  But some of the  entries in the different List or in the same  List  may overlap  and  sometimes  may also appear  to  be  in  direct conflict with each other.  It is then the duty of this Court to  reconcile  the entries and bring about  harmony  between them.  When the question arose about reconciling entry 45 of List I, duties of   excise,  and entry 18 of List II,  taxes on the sale of goods,  of  Government of  India  Act,  1935, Gwyer, C. J.,  in ln re The Central Provinces and Berar  Act No.  X IV of 1938 (1), observed:               "A  grant  of  the  power  in  general  terms,               standing   by  itself,  would  no   doubt   be               construed  in the wider sense; but it  may  be               qualified                (1)  (1939) F. C. R. 18, 42, 44,               14               by  other  express  provisions  in  the   same

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             enactment, by the implication of the  context,               and even by considerations arising out of what               appears to be the general scheme of the Act." The learned Chief Justice proceeded to state               ".......... an endeavor must be made to ,solve               it,  as  the Judicial Committee have  said  by               having  recourse to the context and scheme  of               the   Act,  and  a  reconciliation   attempted               between     two     apparently     conflicting               jurisdictions  by  reading  the  two   entries               together  and  by  interpreting,  arid,  where               necessary,  modifying the language of the  one               by  that  of  the other.   If  indeed  such  a               reconciliation should prove impossible,  then,               and  only then, will the  non-obstante  clause               operate and the federal power prevail." The Federal Court in that case held that the entry "taxes on the  sale of goods" was not covered by the entry "duties  of excise" and in coming to that conclusion, the learned  Chief Justice observed:               "Here are two separate enactments, each in one               aspect  conferring the power to impose  a  tax               upon  goods;  and it would accord  with  sound               principles  of construction to take  the  more               general power, that which extends to the whole               of  India, as subject to an exception  created               by the particular power, that which extends to               the provinced only. it is not perhaps strictly               accurate  to speak of the provincial power  as               being  excepted out of the federal power,  for               the  two  are independent of one  another  and               exist  side  by  side.   But  the   underlying               principle  in the two cases must be the  same,               that  a  general  power ought  not  to  be  so               construed as to make a nullity of a particular               15               power conferred by the same Act and  operating               in the same field, when by reading the  former               in a more restricted sense effect can be given               to  the  latter in its  ordinary  and  natural               meaning." The  rule of construction adopted by that decision  for  the purpose  of  harmonizing  the  two  apparently   conflicting entries in the two Lists would equally apply to an  apparent conflict  between two entries in the same  List.   Patanjali Sastri,  J.,  as  he  then was,  hold  in  State  of  Bombay v.Narothamdas Jethabai(1) that the words "administration  of justice" and (,constitution and organization of all  courts" in  item  one  of List II of the  Seventh  Schedule  to  the Government  of  India  Act, 1935, must be  understood  in  a restricted  sense excluding from their  scope  "jurisdiction and  powers of courts" specifically dealt with in item 2  of List  II.   In  the words of the learned Judge,  if  such  a construction was not given "the wider construction of  entry 1 would deprive entry 2 of all its content and reduce it  to useless  lumber."  This rule of construction  has  not  been dissented  from in any of the subsequent decisions  of  this Court.   It may, therefore, be taken as a well settled  rule of  construction  that  every  attempt  should  be  made  to harmonize  the  apparently conflicting entries not  only  of different Lists but also of the same List and to reject that construction which will rob one of the entries of its entire content and make it nugatory. With this background let us construe the aforesaid  entries. There are three possible constructions, namely, (1) entry 24

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of List II, which provides for industries generally,  covers the industrial aspect of gas and gas-works leaving entry  25 to provide for other aspects of gas and gas-works; (2) entry 24  provides generally for industries, and entry  25  carves out of it ’the specific industry (1) [1951] S.C.R.51. 16 of  gas. and gas-works, with the result that the indus   try of  gas and gas-works is excluded from entry   24 ;  and (3) the  industry  of  gas and gas-works falls  under  both  the entries,  that is, there’ is a real overleaping of the  said entries.   Having  regard to the aforesaid  principle  while giving the widest scope to both the entries, we shall  adopt the interpretation which reconciles and harmonizes them. The first question that occurs to one’s mind is, what is the meaning of the expression ",indus. try" in entry 24 of  List II ? Is it different from the meaning of that expression  in entry  52 of List I ? Whatever may be its  connotation,  it, must bear the same meaning in both the entries for the,  two entries are so interconnected that conflicting or  different meanings given to them would snap the connection Entry 24 is subject to the provisions of entry 7 and entry 52 of List I. Entry  7  of  List I provides  for  industries  declared  by Parliament by law to be necessary for the purpose of defence or  for the prosecution of war; and entry 52 for  industries the control of which by the Union is declared by  Parliament by  law to be expedient in the public  interest.   Therefore ordinarily  industry is in the field of State legislation  ; but,  if Parliament by law makes a relevant  declaration  or declarations,  the industry or industries so declared  would be taken off its :field and passed on to Parliament.  In the promises, the expression "industry" in all the entries  must be given the same meaning.  Now, what is the meaning of word "industry"?   In Ch.  Tika Ramji v. State of  Uttar  Pradesh the  expression "industries" is defined to mean the  process of  manufacture or production and does not include  the  raw materials  used in the industry or the distribution  of  the products  of the industry.  It was Contended that  the  word "industry" was P. word of wide (1)  [1956] S.C.R. 393. 17 import  and  should be construed as including not  only  the process  of  manufacture or production but  also  activities antecedent thereto such as acquisition of raw materials  and subsequent thereto such as disposal of the finished products of that industry.  But that contention was not accepted.  It is  not  necessary  in this case to attempt  to  define  the expression "industry" precisely or to state exhaustively all its  ingredients.  Assuming that the expression  means  only production  or  manufacture,  would it  take  in  its  sweep production  or manufacture, of gas?  Entry 24 in List II  in its widest amplitude takes in all industries, including that of  gas  and gas-works.  So too, entry 25 of the  said  List comprehends gas industry.  There is, therefore, an  apparent conflict  between  the  two entries and  they  overlap  each other.   In  such a contingency the doctrine  of  harmonious construction  must  be invoked.  Both  the  learned  counsel accept  this principle.  While the learned  Attorney-General seeks  to  harmonize both the entries by giving  the  widest meaning  to  the  word  "industry"  so  as  to  include  the industrial aspect of gas and gas-works and leaving the other aspects  to be covered by entry 25, learned counsel for  the contesting  respondents seeks to reconcile them  by  carving out gas and gas-works ill all its aspects from entry 24.  If industry in entry 24 is interpreted to include gas and  gas-

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works, entry 25 may become redundant, and in the context  of the succeeding entries, namely, entry 26, dealing with trade and commerce, and entry 27, dealing with production,  supply and distribution 4 of goods, it will be deprived of all  its contents  and reduced to ",useless lumber".  If  industrial, trade, production and supply aspects are taken out of  entry 25,  the substratum of the said entry would disappear  :  in that  event  we would be attributing to the authors  of  the Constitution  ineptitude, want of precision  and  tautology. On the other hand, the 18 alternative contention enables entries 24 and 25 to  operate fully  in their respective fields : while entry 24 covers  a very  wide field, that is, the field of the entire  industry in the State, entry 25. dealing with gas and gas-works,  can be  confined  to  a  specific  industry,  that  is,the   gas industry.  There may be many good reasons for the authors of the  Constitution giving separate treatment to gas and  gas- works.  If one can surmise, it may be that, as the  industry of  gas and gas-works was confined to one or two States  and was not of all India importance, it was carved out of  entry 24 and given a separate entry, as otherwise if a declaration by law was made by Parliament within the meaning of entry  7 or  entry  52  of  List I, it would  be  taken  out  of  the legislative  power of States.  Be it as it may, the  express intention  of  the Constitution is to treat  it,  in  normal times,  as a state subject and it is not in the province  of this Court to ascertain and scrutinize the reasons for doing so.  It is suggested that this interpretation would  prevent Parliament  to  make  law in respect of  gas  and  gas-works during  war  or other national emergency.   Apart  from  the relevancy  of such a consideration, the apprehension has  no justification,  for under Art. 249 Parliament is enabled  to take  up  for legislation any matter which  is  specifically enumerated  in  List  II  whenever  the  Council  of  States resolves  by two-thirds majority that such a legislation  is necessary  or expedient in the national interest.   So  too, under Art. 250 Parliament can make laws with respect to  any of   the  matters  enumerated  in  the  State  List,  if   a Proclamation  of  Emergency is in  operation.   Article  252 authorizes  the  Parliament  to legislate for  two  or  more States,  if the Houses of the Legislatures of those  :States give  their  consent to the said course.   Subject  to  such emergency or extra- ordinary powers, the entire industry  of gas and gas-works is within exclusive legislative competence of  a  State.  It is, therefore, clear that  the  scheme  of harmonious  construction  suggested on behalf of  the  State gives’ full 19 and  effective  scope of operation for both the  entries  in their  respective  fields, while that suggested  by  learned counsel  for  the  appellant deprives entry 25  of  all  its content   and   even  makes  it   redundant.    The   former interpretation must, therefore, be accepted in preference to the latter.  In this view,’ gas and-gas works are within the exclusive   field   allotted  to  the   States.    On   this interpretation the argument of the learned Attorney- General that,  under Art. 246 of the Constitution,  the  legislative power  of State is subject to that of Parliament  ceases  to have  any  force,  for  the  gas  industry  is  outside  the legislative field of Parliament and is within the  exclusive field of the Legislature of the State.  We, therefore,  hold that the impugned Act was within the legislative  competence of  the West Bengal Legislature and was, therefore,  validly made.

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In this view the alternative argument advanced on behalf  of the State, namely, that the impugned Act was made by  virtue of entry 33 and entry 42 of List III need not be considered. We  should not be understood to have expressed our view  one way or other on this aspect of the case. Nor is the contention of learned Attorney General that s. 20 of  the  Central  Act Would still  be  valid  vis-a-vis  gas industry has any force.  Under s.  20 of the Central Act,               "After the commencement of this Act, it  shall               not be competent for any State Governmentor  a               local authority to take over the management or               control  of any industrial  undertaking  under               any  law  for the time being  in  force  which               authorizes   any  such  Government  or   local               authority so to do." We  have expressed the view that the Legislature of a  State has  the  exclusive  power to make law  in  respect  of  gas industry by virtue of entry 25 of List II, and that entry 24 does  not  comprehend gas industry.  As  we  have  indicated earlier,  the  expression "industry" in entry 52 of  List  I bears the 20 same meaning as that in entry 24 of List II, with the result that the said expression in entry 52 of List I also does not take in a gas industry.  If so, it follows that the  Central Act,  in  so  far  as it purported  to  deal  with  the  gas industry,   is   beyond  the   legislative   competence   of Parliament.   Section 20 is an integral part of the  Central Act, and if it is taken out of the Act, it can only  operate in  vacuum.   The  said  section  was  introduced  for   the effective  implementation of the provisions of  the  Central Act.  It was also enacted by virtue of entry 52 of List I of the  Seventh Schedule to the Constitution.  If the  Act  was constitutionally  void in so far as it purported  to  effect the  gas  industry, for the aforesaid reasons, s.  20  would equally-  be void to the same extent for the  same  reasons. In this context two decisions of this Court, namely Raghubir Singh v. State of Ajmer(1), and State of Bihar v. Ummh  Jha( 2) may usefully be consulted, for in the said decisions this court  held that ancillary provisions enacted  for  carrying out  the objects of a main Act would fall with the main  Act on  the ground that they were enacted only to  subserve  the purpose  of the main Act.  Section 20, therefore,  will  not avail  the appellant to question the validity of  the  State action. In  the  result,  we  agree with the  High  Court  that  the impugned  Act was within the legislative competence  of  the West  Bengal  State Legislature and was validly  made.   The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs of respondents 1 to 4. Appeal dismissed. (1)  [1959] Supp. (1) S.C.R. 478. (2)  A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 50. 21