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PETITIONER: THE CALCUTTA CREDIT CORPORATION LTD., & ANR.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: HAPPY HOMES (P) LTD.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 23/10/1967

BENCH: SHAH, J.C. BENCH: SHAH, J.C. SIKRI, S.M. SHELAT, J.M.

CITATION:  1968 AIR  471            1968 SCR  (2)  20  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1969 SC1187  (8)  R          1987 SC 759  (11)

ACT: Tenancy-if  notice  to terminate tenancy  can  be  withdrawn without consent of other party.    Transfer of Property Act, Ss. 106, 111, 113-Notice not in accordance  with  s. 106-Accepted by other party  and  acted upon  if effective,Whether tenancy only  determined  whether possession given up.   West  Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary  Provisions) Act 17 of 1950, ss. 2(11), 12 and 13-If expression  ’tenant’ includes ’statutory tenant ---Whether he can subjet.

HEADNOTE:   By a lease commencing from January 1, 1939, for 12  years, a building in Calcutta was let to AB and under the terms  of the lease, subletting or parting with possession without the previous consent of the landlord was prohibited.  After  the expiry  of  the  period  of  the  lease,  AB  continued   in possession  but  on  August 12, 1953,  served  a  notice  in writing  upon the landlord of their intention to vacate  the premises  "on August 31, 1953 at 3.30 P.M." By a  subsequent letter  on  August 26, 1953, AB informed the  landlord  that they did not intend to vacate the premises on August 31  -is originally  intimated,  and  that their  earlier  notice  be treated  as  cancelled.   Although, in  reply  the  landlord refused  to  agree to the withdrawal of the  notice  stating that he had already arranged to let the premises to  another person, AB continued in possession and on May 7, 1954 sublet a  part  of the premises to the  respondent.   The  landlord thereafter instituted a suit for ejectment against AB  which was settled on March 28, 1955 by a consent decree  whereupon AB handed over possession to the landlord of the por-tion of the  premises  in their own occupation.  The  landlord  then sued  the  respondent  for a decree for  possession  of  the premises  and mesne profits and a Single Judge of  the  High Court  decreed  the landlord’s claim.   The  Division  Bench allowed the appeal and dismissed the landlord’s claim. HELD  : The appeal must be allowed and the decree passed  by the Trial Court restored.

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(i)On the expiration of the period of notice dated  August 12, 1953. the tenancy of AB stood determined.  Once a notice is  served determining the tenancy or showing -an  intention to  quit on the expiry of the period of notice, the  tenancy is  at an end, unless with the consent of the party to  whom the notice is given, the tenancy is agreed to be treated  is subsisting. [24C] Tayleur v. Wildin, (1867-68) L.R. 3 Ex.  Cases 303; referred to. (ii)A notice which does not comply with the requirements of s.  106 of the Transfer of Property Act in that it does  not expire at the end of the month of the tenancy, or the end of the year of the tenancy, as the case may be, or of which the duration  is  shorter than the duration contemplated  by  s. 106,  may  still be accepted by the party  served  with  the notice;  and  if that party accepts and net,, upon  it,  the party  serving the notice will be estopped from denying  its validity.  The landlord’s refusal to agree to the withdrawal of the notice since he had already agreed to 21 lease  the  premises  to another person  from  September  1, clearly  showed’ that the offer to terminate the tenancy  on August  31, 1953 was accepted by him and he had  acted  upon that offer.  The tenants Was therefore determinated at  3.30 p.m. on August 31, 1953 on acceptance by the landlord of the notice dated August, 1953. [25A-C: F] There  was  no  force in the contention  that  in  order  to determine  a tenancy under the Transfer of property  Act  it the instance of the tenant. there must be actual delivery of the  possession.   That contention is contrary to  the  plan terms of s. 111 (h) of the Act. [25H] (iii)  Considered in the light of the scheme and  object  of the  Act the expression ’tenant’ in cl. (e) of s. 12 (1)  or in  s. 13(2) must mean a contractual tenant alone and not  a statutory  tenant.   The  definition  in  s.  12(1)  of  the expression  ’tenent’  includes a statutory tenant,  but  the definition does not apply it’ there is anything repugnant in the subject or context.  Statutory tenant has no interest or estste  in the permises4 Occupied by him, and it  cannot  be said  that  the  legislaturw,  without  making  an   express provision to that effect, intended to invest him with  power to  induct into the premises in his Occupation a person  who would  be  entitled ’to claim the right And  interest  of  a contractual tenant. [31F.  G] Anand Nivas,(private) Ltd. v. Anandji Kalyanji Pedhi &  Ors, [1964] 4  S.C.R.  892;  solomon  v.orwel,[1954]  I  All  E.R.   847 Krishna Prosad Bose v.smt.   sarajubala  Dassi and Anr., A.I.R. 1961   Cal. 505; referred  to. Indra  Kumar Karnani V. Atual Chandra Patitiundi     &  Anr, [1965]  3 S.C.R. 329,: distinguished.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL    APPELLATE     JURISDICTION    :    Civil     Appeal No.     71     of    1965, Appeal  from    the judgment and decree  dated  February  1, 1962, of the Calcutta High Court in Appeal No. 65 of 1959, T.   P.  Das,  M.  G.  Poddar and  V.  N.  Poddar,  for  the appellants.- A.   N. Sinha and S. N. Mukherjee  for the respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Shah, J. A building in the town of Calcutta belonging to the

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the  Chitpore  Golabari Company (Private) Ltd. was  let  out undeia Written lease for a period of twelve years commencing from  January  1, 1939, to Messrs Allen Berry  &  Co.  Ltd.- liereinafteicalled  ’Allen Berry’.  Under the terms  of  the lease  sub-letting  or parting with the  possession  of  the deiiiised  premises  or  any part  thereof  by  the  tenants without the previous consent in writing of the landlord  was expressly prohibited.  After the vxpiry of the period  Allen Berry  continued to hold over the premises.  On  August  12, 1953.   Allen  Berry served a notice in  writin(,  upon  the landlord  intimating their intention to vacate the  premises "oil  August  31,  .1953, at 3-30 P.m."  and  requested  the landlord  to  arrange to take delivery  of  possession.  13y letter dated August 1953.  Allen Berry informed the landlord that  they  did  not intented  to  vtcate  the  premises  on August 31, 1953, as originilly intimated’ 22 or  at all, and that the notice dated August 12 ,  1953,  be treated  as  cancelled.  By letter dated  August  28,  1953, attorney  of  the  landlord informed Allen  Berry  that  the earlier,  notice,  dated  August  12,  1953,  could  not  be withdrawn  except by mutual consent, and since the  landlord had  a-reed to lease the premises to Messrs. lop Rubber  Co. (India) Ltd. with effect from September, 1953, the  landlord was unable to; give his consent to such withdrawal, and that it  would  insist upon Allen Berry vacatin the  premises  as already  intimated.  Allen Berry addressed a letter  to  the landlord  on September 14, 1.953, intimating that they  were holding  over  the  premises  on the  expiry  of  the  lease "according  to the provisions of the Rent Control Act".   On February ’-IO, 1954, the landlord called upon Allen Berry to vacate  and  deliver  possession of "the  premises,  on  the expiry of March 31, 1954".  Allen Berry failed to carry  out the requisition, and on May 7, 1954, they sub-let a part  of the  ground  floor measuring approximately 2100 sq.  ft.  to Happy Homes (P) Ltd.-respondent in this appeal. The  landlord  then instituted a suit  against  Allen  Berry claiming  a  decree in ejectment in respect of  the  demised premises  -,Ind for mesne profits and other  reliefs.   This suit was settled on March 28, 1955 and a consent decree  was passed.  The important recitals in the decree were that  (1) Allen  Berry  had surrendered the tenancy  by  notice  dated August  12, 1953-, (2) that they had hander over  possession of  the portion of the in their occupation to the  landlord; (3)  that the landlord will be it liberty either  to  retain the sub-tenant or to eject him; and (4) that the sub-tenancy lad  been  created  without the ledge  and  consent  of  the landlord. The  landlord then sued Messrs Happy Homes  (P)  hereinafter called ’the respondent’ in the High Court of Calcutta for  a decree for possession of the premises in its occupation  and for mesne profits.  The suit was resisted by the  respondent principally  on two grounds : (i) that the tenancy of  Allen Berry  was  not determined before the sub-letting  in  their favour Lind (ii) that even if it be held that the tenancy of Allen Berry was determined before May 7, 1954, by virtue  of the provisions of the West Bengal.  Rent Control  (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1950, the respondent became a direct tenant of  the  landlord and was entitled to the benefits  of  that Act. S.P.  Mitra,  J.,  decreed the claim  of  the  landlord  for possession  of  the  premises  in  the  occupation  of   the respondent  and for mesne profits at the rate of  Rs.  495/- per month from March 1, 1955 till delivery of possession. During the pendency of the appeal against the decree  passed

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’by  S. P. Mitra, J., the landlord transferred the  premises to Messrs Calcutta Credit Corporation Ltd.  The landlord and the trans- 23 feree will collectively be, referred to hereinafter as  "the landlords".   A Division Bench of the, High  Court  reversed the  decree passed by S. P. Mitra, J., and ordered that  the claim of the landlords be dismissed. Whether the tenancy of Allen.  Berry stood determined by the notice  dated  August  12, 1953, may  first  be  considered. Allen  Berry  were tenants holding over in  respect  of  the demised  premises  after  the expiry of the  period  of  the original lease.  By their notice dated August 12, 1953, they intimated  their intention to vacate the premises on  August 31,  1953,  at  3.30  P.M.  They  thereafter  withdrew  this intimation  by letter dated August 25, 1953.   The  landlord did  not agree to the withdrawal of the notice dated  August 12,  1953, and insisted that possession of the demised  pre- mises  be delivered.  By cl. (h) of s. 11 1 of the  Transfer of  property  Act, 1882, a lease of  immovable  property  is determined  on the expiration of a notice to  determine  the lease,  or  to quit, or of intention to quit,  the  property leased, duly given by one party to the other.  It was  urged on  behalf of the landlord that the notice of  intention  to quit the property leased and to determine the lease given by the  tenant to the landlord could not be withdrawn, and  the rotation  of landlord and tenant may be restored only if  by mutual  agreement  between the landlord and tenant  a  fresh tenancy was created.  Reliance in support of this contention was  placed upon the observations made in Foa"s General  Law of  Landlord & Tenant, 8th Edn., at P. 613 :               "A  notice  to quit cannot be "waived"  :  for               once a valid notice is liven, the tenancy will               inevitably be deter-mined upon its expiration.               But  though  the  parties  cannot  waive   the               notice, they may nullify its operation as  ’to               quitting  by  agreeing upon  a  new  tenancy’,               whether on the terms of the former or not,  to               commence ’from the time of its expiration."; and  upon similar observations in Woodfall on  Landlord  and Tenant,  Vol. 1, 26th Edn., Art. 2114, at p. 973;  and  upon the  judment of the Court of Exchequer in Tayleur v.  Wildin (1) Counsel for the respondent contended that the rights and obligations  of the parties are governed by  the  provisions contained  in  s. 113 of the Transfer of Property  Act,  and that  it  is  open to a tenant to  withdraw  the  notice  of intention  to quit before the expiry of the period  thereof. Counsel also contended that the tenancy was not  determined, because  the notice served by Allen Berry was not  a  notice "duly given" within the meaning of s. 1ll of the Transfer of Property Act. Section 113 of the Transfer of Property Act provides: (1)  (1867-68) L. R. 3 Ex.  Cases 303. 24               "A  notice under section 111, clause  (h),  is               waived, with the express or implied consent of               the person to whom it is given, by any act  on               the  part of the person giving it  showing  an               intention to treat the lease as subsisting." Clearly s. 113 contemplates waiver of the notice by any  act on the part of the person giving it, if such an act shows an intention  to  treat the lease as subsisting and  the  other party gives his consent-express or implied thereto.  The law under  the Transfer of Property Act on the question in  hand is not different from the law in England.  Once a notice  is

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served  determining the tenancy or showing an  intention  to quit on the expiry of the period of the notice, the  tenancy is at an end, unless with the consent of the other party  to whom the notice is given the tenancy is agreed to be treated as  subsisting.  It was held in Tayleur v. Wildin(1) that  a notice  determining  a  tenancy  cannot  be  withdrawn.   In Tayleur  v.  Wildin(1) an annual tenancy of a farm  under  a written  lease commencing on Lady Day, i.e., March  25,  was determined by a notice by which the landlord called upon the tenant  to  quit the farm at the expiration of  the  current year’s  tenancy.  Before the expiry of the year of  tenancy, the  arrears  of rent were paid up by the  tenant,  and  the notice was withdrawn and the tenant continued in  occupation of  the farm under the terms of the original agreement.   It was  held  by the Court of Exchequer that  the  tenancy  was determined  by the notice to quit, and a surety for  payment of  rent  under the original lease was not liable  for  rent falling  due after the expiry of the notice.  Kelly  C.  B., observed that whether the notice is given by the landlord or the  tenant,  the party to whom it is given is  entitled  to insist  upon  it,  and it cannot be  withdrawn  without  the consent  of  both.  The consent of the parties makes  a  new agreement,  and the rent became, due under a new  agreement. ln’  our  judgment,  that principle applies to  the  law  of landlord & tenant in India.  Therefore on the expiration  of the  period of notice dated August 12, 1953, the tenancy  of Allen Berry stood determined. But, it was contended, the notice intimating an intention to quit at 3-30 P.m. on August 31, 1953, was not a notice "duly given"  within the meaning of s. 111(h) of the- Transfer  of Property Act.  It is not necessary to decide for the purpose of this case whether the month of the tenancy of Allen Berry expired  on the midnight of the first day of every  calendar month for’, in our judgment, a notice which is defective may still  determine  the  tenancy, if it  is  accepted  by  the landlord.  A notice which complies with the requirements  of s. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act operates to terminate the tenancy, whether or not the party (1)  (1867-68) L.R. 3 Ex.  Cases 303. 25 served  with  the notice assent,; thereto.  A  notice  which does  not  comply  with the requirements of S.  106  of  the Transfer of Property Act in that it does not expire with the end  of the month of the tenancy, or the end of the year  of the tenancy, as the case may be, or of which the duration is shorter  than the duration comemplated by S. 106, may  still be accepted by the party served with the notice and if  that party  accepts  and acts upon it, the  part.),  serving  the notice  will  be estopped from denying  its  validity.   The defect in the notice served by one, party may undoubtedly be relied  upon  by the other party and he may plead  that  the tenancy  does not stand determined but after the  notice  is accepted  by  the other party who acts upon  it,  the  party serving the notice cannot contend that the notice served  by him  was defective, and on that account the tenancy was  not determined., The reason of the rule is clear.  A tenancy  is determined by service of the notice in the manner prescribed by  S. 111 (h) read with S. 106 of the Transfer of  Property Act.   If  the  notice is duly  given,  the  tenancy  stands determined on the expiry of the period of the tenancy.  Even if the party served with the notice does not assent thereto, the  notice  takes effect.  If the notice is  defective,  it does  not operate to terminate the tenancy by force  of  the statute.   But a tenancy is founded in contract, and  it  is always open to the parties thereto to agree that the tenancy

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shall  be determined otherwise than by notice served in  the manner  provided by S. 106 of the Transfer of Property  Act, or  by  a  notice  of a duration  shorter  than  the  period provided  by the Act.  If the parties so agree, the  tenancy will conic to an end. The landlord according to the terms of the agreement by  its letter  dated August 28, 1953, informed Allen Berry that  it did not agree to the withdrawal of the notice, since it  had already  agreed to lease out the premises to  Messrs  Dunlop Rubber Co. (India) Ltd. with effect from September 1,  1953. The  content,,, of the letter clearly prove, in the  absence of any evidence to the contrary, that the offer to terminate the tenancy on August 31. 1953, was accepted by the landlord and  the  landlord had acted upon that offer.   The  tenancy stood  determined as proposed by Allen Berry.   Allen  Berry could  not  thereafter  claim, in the, absence  of  a  fresh agreement, that there was a subsisting contractual tenancy. We are unable to agree with counsel for the respondent  that in  order  to  determine a tenancy  under  the  Transfer  of Property  Act  at the instance of a tenant.  There  must  be actual   delivery  of  possession  before  the  tenancy   is effectively determined.  That contention is contrary to  the plain  terms of S. 111 (h) of the Transfer of Property  Act. We are therefore of the opinion that by virtue of the notice dated August 12, 1953, and acceptance L 10 Sup CI/68-3 26 thereof  by  the landlord, the tenancy of  Allen  Berry  was determined  at  3-30  P.m.  on  August  31,  1953.   It   is unnecessary  in  that view to consider  whether  the  notice dated February 20, 1954, requiring Allen Berry to vacate and deliver possession of the premises to the landlord on expiry of March 31, 1954, was a valid notice. Counsel  for  the respondent urged that  granting  that  the tenancy of Allen Berry stood determined by the notice  dated August  12,  1953, and acceptance thereof by  the  landlord, Allen  Berry acquired the status of "statutory tenants"  and could  claim  protection of the West  Bengal  Premises  Rent Control  (Temporary  Provisions) Act 17 of  1950,  and  were competent by virtue of the provisions of that Act to sub-let the premises in their occupation. In  Anand Nivas- (Private) Ltd. v. Anandji Kalyanji Pedhi  & Ors.(1), this Court in dealing with the analogous provisions of  the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates  Control Act,  1947, explained the nature -of the right and  interest of  a "statutory tenant" in premises in his occupation.   It was observed at p. 908 by the majority of the Court :               "A  person  remaining  in  occupation  of  the               premises let to him after the determination of               or  expiry  of the period of  the  tenancy  is               commonly, though in law not accurately, called               a  statutory tenant".  Such a person is not  a               tenant at all he has no estate or interest  in               the  premises occupied by him.  He has  merely               the  protection  of  the statute  in  that  he               cannot  be turned out so long as he  pays  the               standard rent and permitted increases, if any,               and  performs  the  other  conditions  of  the               tenancy.   His right to  remaining  possession               after  the  determination of  the  contractual               tenancy  is  personal : it is not  capable  of               being transferred or assigned, and devolves on               his  death only in the manner provided by  the               statute." In  Solomon v. Orwell (2) , Denning L. J., in  dealing  with

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the  provisions  of the Landlord and Tenant  (Rent  Control) Act, 1949, spoke as follows :               "When  a statutory tenant sub-lets a  part  of               the  premises, he does not thereby confer  any               estate  or  interest  on  the  sub-tenant.   A               statutory  tenant  has no estate  or  interest               himself, and he cannot carve something out  of               nothing.   The sub-tenant, like the  statutory               tenant,   has   only  a  personal   right   or               privilege.  The question is :                (1)      [1964]      4      S.C.R.       892.               (2) [1954] 1 All E.R. 874.               27               What  is the position of the  sub-tenant  when               the  statutory  tenancy comes to an  end  ?  A               statutory  tenancy may, of course, come to  an               end  without a notice to quit, e.g.  by  death                             (if there are no entitled relatives) o r by  the               delivery  up of the premises to the  landlord.               When  the statutory tenancy comes to  an  end,               the  subtenant’s right automatically comes  to               an   end  unless  there  is   some   statutory               protection afforded to him." It  was  urged that the West Bengal  Premises  Rent  Control (Temporary  Provisions) Act 17 of 1950  expressly  conferred upon  a statutory tenant the right to sub-let  the  premises and a sub-tenant inducted into the premises by the statutory tenant acquires, on the determination of the tenancy of  the statutory  tenant,  the rights of a tenant of  the  premises under the landlord.  Reliance in that behalf was placed upon the definition of "tenant" in s. 2 (II) and, ss. 12 & 13  of the  Act.  The expression "tenant" is defined in s.  2  (II) as, meaning any person by whom rent is, or but for a special contract  would be, payable for any premises,  and  includes any  person  who is liable, to be sued by the  landlord  for rent.   Section  12  grants protection  to  tenants  against eviction.   By sub-s. (1), insofar as it is material, it  is provided :               "(1) Notwithstanding anything to the  contrary               in  any other Act or law, no order  or  decree               for the recovery of possession of any premises               shall  be made by any court in favour  of  the               landlord against a tenant, including a  tenant               whose lease has expired :               Provided that nothing in the sub-section shall               apply to any suit for decree for such recovery               of possession,               (a)  against a tenant who has transferred  his               tenancy  right  in  whole  or  in  part   with               possession otherwise than by sub-lease;               (b)   against such transferee;               (c)against  a  tenant who has  sub-let  the               whole  or a major portion of the premises  for               more than seven consecutive months:               Provided that if a tenant who has sublet major               portion of the premises agree to possess as  a               tenant the portion of the premises not sub-let               on  payment  of rent fixed by the  Court,  the               Court  shall pass a decree for ejectment  from               only a portion of the premises sub-let and fix               proportionately fair rent for the portion kept               in  possession  of such tenant  which  portion               shall  thenceforth constitute  premises  under               clause (8) of section 2 and the rent so -fixed

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             shall be deemed standard rent               28               fixed  under  section 9, and  the  rights  and               obligations of the sub-tenants of the  portion               from which the tenant is ejected shall be  the               same as of sub-tenants under the provisions of               section 13; Section   12(1)   confers  protection  to   a   tenant-which expression includes a tenant whose lease has expired-against eviction  by  any order or decree of the  Court.   But  that protection is lost in cases contemplated by cls. (a) to  (i) of sub-s. (1). If  a  tenant  has sub-let the premises let to  him  in  its entirety, lie loses the protection of s. 12.  If he has sub- let  a  major portion of the premises for  more  than  seven consecutive  months,  he also loses the protection.   It  is implicit that if the tenant has sub-let only a small portion of   the  premises  occupied  by  him  does  not  lose   the protection.   The  tenancy continues, and the  subtenant  of such a small portion would, it is apprehended be entitled to remain  in possession.  Where, however, a major  portion  of the  premises  has  been sub-let, it would be  open  to  the tenant  to offer to possess as a tenant the portion  of  the premises  not sub-let by him.  In that case the  sub-tenants would  have the same rights and privileges as are  conferred by s. 13.  Section 13 provides :               "(1)Notwithstanding  anything  contained  in               this  Act,  or in any other law for  the  time               being  in force, if a tenant inferior  to  the               tenant of the first degree sublets a whole  or               in  part the premises. let to him except  with               the consent of the’ landlord and of the tenant               of a superior degree above him, such sub-lease               shall  not be binding on  such  non-consenting               landlord, or on such non-consenting tenant.               Explanation.-In this sub-section-               (a)"a  tenant of the first degree" means  a               tenant  who  does  not hold  under  any  other               tenant;               (b)"a tenant inferior to the tenant of  the               first   degree"   means   a   tenant   holding               immediately or mediately under a tenant of the               first degree;               (c)"landlord"  means  the  landlord  of   a               tenant of               the first degree.               (2)Where  any premises or any part  thereof               have               been orhas  been sub-let by "a  tenant  of               the first               degree"  or by "a tenant inferior to a  tenant               of   the   first  degree",   as   defined   in               explanation  to sub-section (1), and the  sub-               lease is binding on the landlord of such               29               last mentioned tenant, if the tenancy of  such               tenant  in either case is lawfully  determined               otherwise than by virtue of a decree in a suit               obtained  by the landlord by reason of any  of               the,  grounds specified in clause (h)  of  the               proviso to sub-section (1) of section 12,  the               sub-lessee  shall be deemed to be a tenant  in               respect of such premises or part, as the  case               may be, holding directly under the landlord of               the tenant whose tenancy has been  determined,

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             on  terms  and conditions on  which  the  sub-               lessee would have held under the tenant if the               tenancy   of  the  latter  had  not  been   so               determined:               Provided............. We are not directly concerned in the present -case with sub- s. 1 of s. 13.  That sub-section only deals with sub-letting by  a tenant inferior to "the tenant  of  the  first degree. In  the present case, Allen Berry were direct  tenants  from the  landlord  and  initially were  "tenants  of  the  first degree".  Sub-section (2) deals with cases of sub-letting by tenants  of the first degree or by a tenant inferior to  the tenant of the first degree as defined in the Explanation  to sub-s. (1), and such sub-lease is binding on the landlord of such last mentioned tenant.  It is provided thereby that  if the tenancy of such tenant is lawfully determined  otherwise than for personal occupation, the sub-leasee will be  deemed to  be a tenant in respect of such premises or part  thereof and  will  hold directly under the landlord  of  the  tenant whose tenancy has been determined. Counsel for the respondent contended that a sub-tenant of  a statutory  tenant is entitled to the protection of s.  13(2) of   Act  17  of  1950,  and  relied  upon   the   following observations  made by this Court in Indra Kumar  Karnani  v. Atul Chandra Patitundi and    Anr. (1) :               "Section  13(2) refers to both the classes  of               subleases and states that if the sub-lease has               been made by a tenant of the first degree, the               sub-lessee  shall be deemed to be a tenant  in               respect of the premises demised to him if  the               tenancy of such tenant is lawfully  determined               under the provisions of the Act otherwise than               by  virtue of a decree in a suit  obtained  by               the  landlord by reason of any of the  grounds               specified  in cl. (h) of the proviso  to  sub-               section         (1)         of         section               12. . . . . . . . . . . . . It follows that in               the  case  of sub-letting by a tenant  of  the               first  degree  no consent of the  landlord  to               subletting   is   required  as   a   condition               precedent for acquisi-               (1)[1965] 3 S.C.R. 329.               30               tion  by the sub-lessee of the  tenants  right               but  in the case of sub-letting by  a  ten-ant               inferior to the tenant of the first degree the               consent of the landlord and also of the tenant               of the superior degree above him- to -the sub-               letting  is necessary if the sub-lessee is  to               acquire the rights of the tenant  contemplated               by S. 13 (2)." But the Court decided in Indra Kumar Karnant’s case(1)  that a  covenant  in  the lease prohibiting a  tenant  from  sub- letting, in respect of premises governed by the West  Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act 17 of  1950 does  not prevent the sub-tenant under a contractual  tenant from setting up the claim that he has become entitled  under s. 13 (2) of the Act to the rights of the tenant in  respect of the premises or part thereof sub-let to him.  The case is not  an  authority for the proposition that a  tenant  whose tenancy  is  determined,  and who  continues  to  remain  in occupation merely by virtue of the protection conferred upon him by the statute is entitled to sub-let. Counsel  then contended that the Legislature  has,  notwith- standing  the  disabilities  of the,  statutory  tenant,  by

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express  enactment  conferred  upon  him  the  privilege  of inducting  into the premises held by him a  sub-tenant,  who would  be  entitled  to claim the rights  of  a  contractual tenant  against the landlord in the events mentioned in  the proviso  to S. 12 (1) (c) and s. 13 (2).  Relying  upon  the definition of tenant in s. 2(11) of the Act, counsel  argued that  in s. 12 the expression "tenant" includes a  statutory tenant  as well as a contractual tenant, and that if a  sub- tenant in respect of a part of the premises is -protected by the express provision contained in the provision 12(1)(c), a sub-tenant  of the entire premises whether the tenant  is  a contractual  tenant  or a statutory tenant  is  entitled  to protection  of the Act.  According to counsel ss. 12(1)  (c) proviso  and  13(2) are parts of a single  scheme,  and  the expression   ’tenant’  in  both  the  sections  includes   a statutory tenant, and sub-tenants inducted by the  statutory tenants  in the premises are entitled to the  protection  of the Act.  Reliance in support of this contention was  placed upon  a  Full Bench judgment of the Calcutta High  Court  in Krishna  Prosad Bose v. Smt.  Sarajubala Dassi and  Anr.  (2 wherein it was held that a tenant under the -Act includes an extenant,  that is, a tenant whose contractual  tenancy  has come to an end, but who is still in possession (occupation)- actual  or constructive-of the premises; and such  a  tenant who continues in possession by virtue of protection  against eviction  under  the  West  Bengal  Premises  Rent   Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1950, is entitled to sub-let the premises  and  the  sub-tenant may  claim  the  benefit  and protection of S. 13 (2). (1) [1965] 3 S.C.R. 329. (2) A.I.R. 1961 Cal. 505.  31 We are unable to agree with the contention raised by counsel for the respondent.  In our view, since--a statutory  tenant has  merely a personal right_ to protect    his  possession, and  has no estate or interest in the premises  occupied  by him,  he cannot convey an estate or interest which  he  does not possess.  A statutory tenant by parting with  possession forfiets  the protection of the Act, and unless the  statute expressly provides or clearly implies otherwise, the  person inducted by cannot claim the protection of the Act.  In  our judgment,  cl.  (c) ’of S. 12(1) applies only to a  case  in which  the  tenant has an interest in the  estate  which  he could  sub-let.   Similarly, s. 13 contemplates  a  case  in which a contractual tenant has sub-let the premises.  If  it be held that the expression ’tenant’ in s. 13(2) and in  cl. (c) of s. 12(1) includes a statutory tenant, an estate or an interest  in the demised premises would be conferred by  him upon a transferee which the tenant himself does not possess, and  that a tenant who has acted contrary to the  provisions of cls. (m), (o) & (p) of s. 108 of the Transfer of Property Act,  or  has  used  the property  for  immoral  or  illegal purposes,  or has committed acts of negligence  and  default which  may  materially  deteriorate  the  condition  of  the premises, or has otherwise been guilty of conduct which is a nuisance   or  annoyance  to  occupiers  of   adjoining   or neighbouring premises including the landlord, or has  failed to  pay rent exceeding two months and has  thereby  incurred liability  to forfeit the protection of the statute  granted to him by s. 12(1) and whose right has been forfeited by due notices,  may still sub-let the premises and the  sub-lessee would then be entitled to claim the right under s. 13(2)  on the determination of the tenancy of the tenant. Considered in the light of the scheme and object of the Act, the expression "tenant" in cl. (c) of s. 12 (1) or in s.  13

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(2)  must, in our judgment, mean a contractual tenant  alone and not a statutory tenant.  The definition in s. 2 ( 1 1  ) of the expression "tenant" includes a statutory tenant.  But the definition does not apply if there is anything repugnant in  the,  subject-or  context.  A statutory  tenant  has  no interest  or estate in the premises occupied by him, and  we are  unable to hold that the Legislature without  making  an express provision to that effect intended to invest him with power to induct into the premises in his occupation a person who  would be entitled to claim the right and interest of  a contractual  tenant.  If the view which has appealed to  the High Court of Calcutta be accepted, a statutory tenant whose right  of  occupation  is determined by a  notice  to  quit, because   of  conduct  which  entails  forfeiture   of   the protection  of  the Act, may induct a sub-tenant  so  as  to defeat  the claim of the landlord, and presumably  a  tenant sued in ejectment may also exercise that privilege, for  the fight if granted would enure till a decree in eject- 32 ment  is  passed.   The Legislature has not  made  any  such express  provision,  and no provision to that  effect  which makes  the  right of the landlord conferred by  the  Act  to obtain  a  decree  in ejectment against  his  tenant  wholly illusory may be implied. The appeal is therefore allowed and the decree passed by the trial  Court  restored  with  the  modification  that  mesne profits  will be payable from September 1, 1953 at the  rate of  Rs.  495/per  month till delivery  of  possession.   The landlords will be entitiled to their costs in this,Court and before the, Division Bench of the High Court. R.K.P.S. Appeal allowed. 33