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PETITIONER: THE ASSOCIATED CEMENT COMPANY LTD.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: SHRI P. D. VYAS AND OTHERS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 11/02/1960

BENCH: GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. BENCH: GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. GUPTA, K.C. DAS

CITATION:  1960 AIR  665            1960 SCR  (2) 974  CITATOR INFO :  R          1966 SC1471  (17)  RF         1979 SC  65  (5)

ACT:        Industrial   Dispute-Standing  Orders-Draft   submitted   by        employer  for approval--Modification by Certifying  Officer-        Jurisdiction-Industrial  Employment (Standing  Orders)  Act,        1946 (20 of 946) ss- 3, 4, 5, 15(2) (b).

HEADNOTE: The draft standing orders submitted by the appellants to the certifying  officer for certification under s. 3(1)  Of  the Industrial  Employment  (Standing Orders)  Act,  1946,  were altered by the latter on the footing that the  modifications were  necessary  so as to be in conformity  with  the  model standing  orders.-  Section  4 Of the  Act,  before  it  was amended in 1956, provided that "it shall not be the function of  the  certifying officer or the  appellate  authority  to adjudicate  upon  the  fairness  or  reasonableness  of  the provisions  of any standing order," while under S. 3(2)  the draft shall be, as far as is practicable, in conformity with the model standing orders, where they have been  prescribed. The   question  was  whether  the  certifying  officer   had jurisdiction to make the modifications in the present case. Held, that there is a distinction between considerations  of fairness or reasonableness and those of practicability,  and that though the certifying officer may not modify the  draft on   the   ground  that  its  provisions   are   unfair   or unreasonable,  he can and must modify it in matters  covered by the model standing      975 orders  if he is satisfied that conformity with  such  model standing  orders is practicable in the circumstances of  the case. Electric  Workers’  Union v. The U. P. Electric  Supply  Co. A.I.R. 1949 All. 504, disapproved.      Jiwan  Mal & Co.  v. Secretary, Kanpur Loha Mills Karmachari Union & Ors., A.I.R. 1955 All. 581 and Mysore Kirloskar Employees’ Association v. Industrial Tribunal, Bangalore and Anr  [1959] 1 L.L.J. 531, approved.

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JUDGMENT:        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal   No.    22    of        1.958.        Appeal  from the judgment and order dated    December     2,        1954, of the Bombay High Court in  Appeal  No. 122 of  1954,        arising out of the Judgment   and order dated September  30,        1954, of the said   High  Court in Civil  Misc.  Application        No. 267/X      of 1954.             R. J. Kolah, S. N. Andley, J. B. Dadachanji,  Rameshwar        Nath and P. L. Vohra, for the appellant.        Gopal Singh and R. H. Dhebar for respondent  No. 2.             1960. February, 11. The Judgment of the Court     was        delivered by        GAJENDRAGADKAR  J.--The  Associated Cement  Companies  Ltd.,        Dwarka  Cement  Works,  Dwarka  and  the  Associated  Cement        Companies  Ltd., Sevalia Cement Works, Sevalia  (hereinafter        called  the appellants) own and manage several cement  works        throughout  India including inter alia cement  manufacturing        factories  at  Dwarka and Sevalia called the  Dwarka  Cement        Works and the Sevalia Cement Works respectively. In 1946 the        appellants  submitted to respondent 2, the  Commissioner  of        Labour, Bombay, in his capacity as certifying officer, draft        standing  orders  for  certification under s.  3(1)  of  the        Industrial  Employment  (Standing Orders) Act, 1946  (20  of        1946) (hereinafter called the Act).     Respondent  2   made        several alterations in the draft   submitted     by      the        appellants. The two important      alterations which are the        subject-matter of the present appeal  were  in  respect   of        items Nos. 8 and 16. Under    item No. 8 the draft  standing        orders  had required that notice of fourteen days  shall  be        given in the   event   of   discontinuance   of   a   shift.        Respondent 2 has    modified it by increasing the period  of        notice from    fourteen days to one month. This modification        has        124        976        been made in accordance with the model standing        order        on  this  subject.  Similarly, item No. 16(2) in  the  draft        standing orders provided that striking work either singly or        with other workers without giving       fourteen       days’        previous notice would be treated as misconduct; whereas item        No’. 16(3) provided that      inciting while on the premises        any  worker to strike work shall be treated  as  misconduct.        These  two  provisions in the draft have  been  modified  by        respondent’s  and  the  order thus  modified  provides  that        striking work illegally either singly or with other  workers        or abetting, inciting, instigating or acting in  furtherance        of  an illegal strike would be treated as misconduct.   This        modification also is consistent with the relevant  provision        in  the  model  standing order.          Feeling aggrieved by the modifications made by  respondent        2 in the draft submitted by them the appellants preferred an        appeal   to   the  Industrial  court   (hereinafter   called        respondent  1).   Respondent  I was  not  impressed  by  the        contentions  raised by the appellants with the  result  that        the  modifications made by respondent 2 were  confirmed  and        the appeal was dismissed.        Thereupon  the  appellants  filed  a  writ  petition,  being        Miscellaneous  Application  No. 267 of 1954, in  the  Bombay        High  Court  challenging  the  validity  of  the  action  of        respondents  2 and 1. Mr Justice Coyajee who heard the  said        application, upheld the contention raised by the  appellants        and  came  to  the conclusion that in  making  the  impugned

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      modifications respondent 2 and respondent I had acted beyond        their jurisdiction.  The learned judge, therefore, set aside        the modifications made and allowed the appellants’ petition.        Against  this order respondent 2 preferred an appeal,  being        Appeal  No. 122 of 1954, before the Court of Appeal  in  the        Bombay  High  Court.   The  appellate  court  reversed   the        decision  of  Coyajee  J.  and  held  that  the  action   of        respondents 2 and I in making the modifications in  question        was  justified by the provisions of the Act.  In the  result        the  petition filed by the appellants was dismissed.  It  is        against  this  decision  that the present  appeal  has  been        preferred by             977        the  appellants; and the short question which it raises  for        our decision is: whether, under the provisions of   the Act,        it was competent to respondents 2 and 1 to   make        the        impugned   modifications  in  the  draft   standing   orders        submitted by the appellants for certification  under the Act        ?        The Act has been passed because it was thought"   expedient        to require employers in industrial establishments to  define        with sufficient precision the conditions of employment under        them  and  to  make the said  conditions  known  to  workmen        employed by them." Standing Orders are defined by s. 2(g) of        the  Act  to mean rules relating to matters set out  in  the        Schedule.   The Schedule sets out 11 matters in  respect  of        which  standing  orders  are  required to  be  made  by  the        employers.  Mr. Kolah, for the appellants, contends that the        main  object  of  the Act is to  require  the  employers  to        provide  for  conditions of service in respect  of  all  the        matters covered by the Schedule, and, according to him,  the        jurisdiction of respondent 2 under the Act as it then  stood        is  confined  only to see that standing orders are  made  in        respect of all the items specified in the Schedule.  In this        connection Mr. Kolah has strongly relied on the provision of        s.  4 which then laid down inter alia that "it shall not  be        the  function  of the certifying officer  or  the  appellate        authority to adjudicate upon the fairness or  reasonableness        of  the provisions of any standing order".  The argument  is        that the Act expressly prohibits respondent 2 or  respondent        I  from enquiring whether any of the provisions made in  the        draft  standing  orders are fair or reasonable,  and  it  is        urged  that,  in making the modifications  in  question,  in        substance  respondent 2 has embarked upon an  enquiry  about        the  reasonableness or fairness of the  relevant  conditions        included  in the draft.  Thus presented the argument  is  no        doubt  attractive ; but there are some other  provisions  in        the  Act  which  show that the argument based  on  the  said        provision  of  s.  4  cannot  succeed.   It  is,  therefore,        necessary  to  consider  the  other  provisions  which   are        material.   Before we do so, we would like to add that by  a        subsequent amendment made in 1956 s. 4 now provides that  it        shall be        978        the  function  of the certifying officer  or  the  appellate        authority to adjudicate upon the fairness or  reasonableness        of  the  provisions of any standing orders.In  other  words,        what was expressly excluded from   the  jurisdiction of  the        authorities  under  the Act has now been  clear  made  their        duty,  and  so the argument based upon the provision  as  it        stood  in  1946  is, after the  amendment  of  1956,  purely        academic.        Section  3 of the Act requires the employer to submit  draft        standing  orders.  Section 3(2) provides that in  the  draft        thus submitted provision shall be made for every matter  set

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      out  in  the  Schedule  which  may  be  applicable  to   the        industrial  establishment, and where model  standing  orders        have been prescribed, shall be, so far as is practicable, in        conformity with such model.  It is common ground that  model        standing  orders have been proscribed in the  present  case,        and  so  it follows that under s. 3, sub s.  (2)  the  draft        submitted by the appellants had to be in conformity with the        model  sanding orders so far as was practicable.   In  other        words, the effect of s. 3 sub-s. (2) is ’that, unless it  is        shown  that  it is impracticable to do so,  the  appellants’        draft had to conform to the model.  This position cannot  be        disputed.  Then, the -next relevant provision of the Act  is        contained in s. 4 which provides that standing orders  shall        be  certifiable  under  this Act if (a)  provision  is  made        therein  for every matter set out in the Schedule  which  is        applicable  to  the industrial establishment,  and  (b)  the        standing  orders  are  otherwise  in  conformity  with   the        provisions  of this Act.  The rest of the provision of s.  4        has  already been cited and considered by us.   Having  thus        provided  for the tests which have to be satisfied before  a        draft   submitted  by  the  employer  can  be   treated   as        certifiable,  s.  5  provides  for  the  procedure  of   the        proceedings  which are taken before the certifying  officer.        Section  5 (2) lays down that after notice is given  to  the        parties  concerned  the  certifying  officer  shall   decide        whether  or  not any modification of, or  addition  to,  the        draft  submitted by the employer is necessary to render  the        draft  standing orders certifiable under the Act, and  shall        make an order in writing accordingly.  Sub-section (3) of s.        5 then provides for        979        certifying  the  draft after making modifications,  if  any,        under  sub-s.  (2).   There is one  more  section  to  which        reference  may be made.  Section 15(2)(b) provides that  the        rules  which the appropriate government may make  under  the        Act  may set out model standing orders for the  purposes  of        this Act.  The cumulative effect of these provisions is that        the  certifying officer has to be satisfied that  the  draft        standing  orders  deal  with every matter  set  out  in  the        Schedule and are otherwise in conformity with the provisions        of the Act.  This latter requirement necessarily imports the        consideration  in specified in s. 3, sub-s. (2), that is  to        may, the draft standing order must be in conformity with the        model standing order which is provided under s. 15(2)(b) for        the  purposes  of  the Act, and, as we  have  already  seen,        unless it is shown that it would be impracticable to do  so,        the  draft  standing order must be in  conformity  with  the        model   standing  order.   It  is  quite  true   that   this        requirement does not mean that the draft standing order must        be in identical words but it does mean that in substance  it        must  conform  to the model prescribed  by  the  appropriate        government.        The question which then arises is: was it or was it not open        to  respondent 2 to consider whether the draft submitted  by        the  appellants  should not conform to  the  model  standing        order  in respect of the topics with which we are  concerned        in  the  present appeal?  The answer to this  question  must        obviously  be in the affirmative.  It was not only  open  to        respondent  2 to enquire into the matter but it was  clearly        his duty to do so before holding that the draft orders  were        certifiable  under  s. 4. Now such  an  enquiry  necessarily        involves the consideration of the question as to whether  it        would  be  practicable to insist upon  conformity  with  the        model  standing order in regard to the matters  in  dispute.        If  respondent 2 was satisfied that it would be  practicable

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      to  insist  upon  such conformity it  would  be  within  his        competence to make the suitable modifications in the  draft.        If, on the other hand, he took the view that it would not be        practicable to insist upon such conformity he would, despite        the  disparity  between the model and the draft,  treat  the        draft  as certifiable.  In the present case respondent 2  as        well        980        as respondent I have held that it was practicable to  insist        upon conformity with the model standing order regard to  the        matters in dispute; and so they have    made        suitable        modifications.   Having  regard to the  relevant  provisions        which we have just considered, it seems difficult to  accept        the  plea  that  in making  the  modifications  in  question        respondent   2   and  respondent  1  have   exceeded   their        jurisdiction.  It is important to make a distinction between        considerations  of  fairness  or  reasonableness  which  are        excluded from the purview of the enquiry before respondent 2        and respondent I from considerations of practicability which        are  necessarily  imported  in such an  enquiry.   The  line        separating   the  one  from  the  other  may  be  thin   but        nevertheless  it  is  a  firm and  existing  line  which  is        statutorily  recognised in the respective provisions  o  the        Act.   Respondent 2 may not modify the draft on  the  ground        that  its provisions are unfair or unreasonable but  he  can        and  must modify the draft in matters covered by  the  model        standing order if he is satisfied that conformity with  such        model standing order is practicable in the circumstances  of        the  case.   In our opinion, therefore, the High  Court  was        right  in  holding that the authorities under  the  Act  had        acted  within  their  jurisdiction in  making  the  impugned        modifications.   We may mow refer to the decisions to  which        our  attention  was invited by Mr. Kolah.   In  Guest,  Keen        Williams (Private) Ltd v. Sterling (P.  J.) & Ors. (1)  this        Court  had occasion to consider the effect of a part of  the        provision  contained in S. 4 of the Act as it  stood  before        its  amendment in 1956.  It is, however clear that  in  that        case  the point raised for our decision now did not fall  to        be  considered.   In  Electric Workers’ Union  v.  The  U.P.        Electric Supply Co. (2), Mr. Justice Wanchoo, who was acting        as  the appellate authority under the Act, appears  to  have        held that the provision contained in S. 3(2) had nothing  to        do  with the power of the certifying officer  to  substitute        the model for the draft.  Acoording to the learned judge the        said  provision  was intended merely to help and  guide  the        employers  as to how they should frame their draft  standing        orders.  This decision apparently supports        (1) (1960) 1 S.C.R. 348        (2) A.I.R. 1949 All. 504.                                     981        the  argument  that the certifying officer cannot  make  any        changes   in  the  provisions  of  the  draft  where   those        provisions  are  clear  on  the ground  that  they  are  not        reasonable and fair and that other provisions which may have        been provided in the model standing orders   should       be        substituted for them. If, in making these   observations, it        was  intended  to decide that, before certifying  the  draft        standing  orders submitted by the employer,  the  certifying        officer  cannot  enquire  and decide  whether  it  would  be        practicable  or  not  to make the provisions  in  the  draft        conform to the model standing orders, with respect, we would        hold  that the said decision is inconsistent with  the  true        effect  of  the  relevant  provisions of  the  Act.  We  may        incidentally add that the observations made by Wanchoo J. in        that case have not been approved by the Allababad High Court

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      in  Jiwan  Mal  &  Co.  v.  Secretary,  Kanpur  Loha   Mills        Karamchari Union & Ors. (1). In Mysore  Kirloskar  Employees        Association  v. Industrial Tribunal, Bangalore &  Anr.  (2),        the  Mysore High Court has considered this question  and  it        appears  to have concurred more with the view  expressed  by        the  Bombay  High Court which is the subject-matter  of  the        present appeal than with the observations of Wanchoo J.             There  is  one more point to which  reference  must  be        made.  Mr. Kolah attempted to argue before us that, even  if        the authorities under the Act had jurisdiction to deal  with        the matter and examine whether or not it was practicable  to        insist  upon conformity with the model standing orders,  the        modifications made by them on the merits are  impracticable.        We have not allowed Mr. Kolah to urge this contention before        us  because such a plea was not raised by the appellants  in        their petition for a writ before the Bombay High  Court, and        it would not be open to them to raise it for the first  time        before  us. Besides, in a petition for a writ of  certiorari        it would normally not be open to the appellants to challenge        the merits of the findings made by the authorities under the        Act.             The  result is the appeal fails and is  dismissed  with        costs.                                          Appeal dismissed        (1) A.I.R. 1955 All. 581.    (2) (1959] 1 L.L. J. 531.        982