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PETITIONER: THE ADDITIONAL SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: YESHWANT MADHAO MAHAJAN

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 29/11/1961

BENCH:

ACT:      Abolition of  Proprietary  Rights-Land  lying fallow-When to  be regarded  as ’home farm’-Madhya Pradesh Abolition  of Proprietary Rights (Estates, Mahals, Alienated  Lands) Act,  1951 (Madh. Pra. 1 of 1951), ss. 2, 4.

HEADNOTE:      In 1947  S conveyed  by a  sale deed  to M an undivided half  share of  Land in  his village. On the same day S executed a Kabulayat for 5 years in respect of  the same land for cultivation. In 1951 the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights (Estates, Mahals, Alienated Lands) Act, 1951, came into force  and the  Compensation Officer  started enquiry  about   assessment  of   compensation.  M claimed to  retain possession of the half share in all the fallow lands in the village which had been leased by  him for  cultivation to  S on  the plea that these lands were ’home farm’. The claim 711 was  rejected  by  the  Compensation  Officer  and confirmed    by    the    Additional    Settlement Commissioner. The High Court of Nagpur quashed the order. In  appeal to  the Supreme  the  Additional Settlement Commissioner  contended that in respect of an undivided interest in the land, the superior holder is  not entitled  to the benefit of s. 4(2) of  the   Act  because  it  is  not  a  ’holding’, alternatively, that  the land  which was,  at  the date of  vesting, lying  fallow otherwise  than in accordance with  the usual  agricultural  practice could never be regarded as ’home farm’. ^      Held,  that   a  part  of  a  holding  or  an undivided interest  in a  " holding"  in Berar may also be  ’home farm’  land if it otherwise fulfils the requirement  of cl. (i), (ii) or (iii) of sub- cl. (3) of s. 2(g) of the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary  Rights (Estates, Mahals, Alienated Lands) Act, 1951.      The land  having been  granted in  lease  for cultivation it  is by virtue of s. 4(2) of the Act to  be   retained  in   the  possession   of   the proprietor.  Grant  of  a  lease  for  cultivation evidences  an   intention  on   the  part  of  the proprietor that  the land  is to  be converted  to agricultural purposes,  and default on the part of the lessee  to cultivate the land will not deprive

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the lessor  proprietor of  the benefit  granted to him by the statute.

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION:  Civil  Appeal No. 281 of 1959.      Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated October 12, 1955, of the former Nagpur High Court in Misc. Petition No. 288 of 1954.      H. R.  Khanna  and  R.  H.  Dhebar,  for  the appellants.      S. N.  Kherdekar and  A. G.  Ratnaparkhi, for respondent No. 1      1961. November  20. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      SHAH, J.-Out of a total area of 2,375 acres 3 gunthas of Dhanora-an Izara village in Taluka 712 Pusad in  the State  of Madhya Pradesh-2,283 acres and 28  gunthas is assessed land and the remaining 91 acres  and 15  gunthas is unassessed. One Surat Singh who  was the  proprietor of  the village, by sale  deed   dated  May   24,  1947,  conveyed  an undivided half  share in  the village  to Yeshwant Madhao Mahajan-hereinafter  called Mahajan-for Rs. 25,000/- and  on the same day executed a kabulayat (lease deed) for five years in respect of the same land for  cultivation at  an annual  rental of Rs. 3,000/-. The  Legislature of  the  Madhya  Pradesh State enacted  the  Madhya  Pradesh  Abolition  of Proprietary  Rights  (Estates,  Mahals,  Alienated Lands) Act,  1 of 1951-hereinafter called the Act- to  provide  for  acquisition  of  the  rights  of proprietors in estates, mahals, alienated villages and alienated  lands in Madhya Pradesh and to make provision for  other matters  connected therewith. The Act  was brought  into operation  on March 14, 1951. The Compensation Officer, Yeotmal started an enquiry  about   assessment  of   compensation  in respect of the village Dhanora which had vested by the operation  of s.  3 of  the Act  in the  State Government.  Before   the  Compensation   officer, Mahajan claimed  to retain  possession of  a  half share in all the fallow lands in the village which had been  leased by him under the deed (kabulayat) dated May,  24, 1947,  to Surat  Singh on the plea that these  lands were "home farm". This claim was rejected by the Compensation Officer and the order of  the  Compensation  Officer  was  confirmed  in appeal by  the Additional Settlement Commissioner. Mahajan  then   applied  to   the  High  Court  of Judicature  at   Nagpur  under  Art.  226  of  the Constitution for a direction quashing the order of the Additional  Settlement  Commissioner  and  the Compensation Officer  and for  a declaration  that the lands  mentioned in Schedule A attached to the petition be  declared home-farm  and for a writ of mandamus against  the State  of Madhya  Pradesh to deliver possession  of all  the lands mentioned in that Schedule. 713 The High Court quashed the order of the Additional Settlement Commissioner in so far as it related to

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the undivided  half share  in Survey  Nos. 1 to 91 except  those   in  possession  of  the  specified tenants and also those already recognised as home- farm and  directed  the  Compensation  Officer  to decide the  claim made  by Mahajan in the light of the law  laid down  in the  judgment. Against  the order passed  by the  High Court,  the  Additional Settlement Commissioner  and the  State of Bombay, which had  by virtue  of the States Reorganization Act, 1956,  been  substituted  for  the  State  of Madhya Pradesh,  have appealed  to this Court with special leave.      The dispute  in this appeal relates to a half share in  those lands  in the  village  which  had remained fallow  on the  date of  the notification under s.  3 of the Act. By virtue of the sale deed dated May  24, 1947, Mahajan was the proprietor of the undivided half share in the entire village and under the  kabulayat he had granted to Surat Singh a lease  for cultivation  of  the  undivided  half share purchased  by  him.  Undoubtedly  the  lands specified in  Schedule A  to the  petition were on the crucial  date lying fallow. The question which falls to  be determined is whether those lands can be regarded  home-far": if they be so regarded, by virtue of  s. 4(2)  of the  Act  Mahajan  will  be entitled to retain possession of those lands.      Section 3  of the  Act provides, in so far as it is  material, that  "on and  from a  date to be specified  by   a  notification   by   the   State Government in  this behalf, all proprietary rights in  an   estate,  mahal,   alienated  village   or alienated land,  as the  case may  be, in the area specified  in   the  notification,  vesting  in  a proprietor  of   such  estate,   mahal,  alienated village, alienated  land, or  in a  person  having interest in  such proprietary  right  through  the proprietor, shall  pass from  such  proprietor  or such other person to and vest in the State for the purposes of  the State  free of all encumbrances." Section 4(1) sets out the 714 consequence of the vesting. By cl. (a) of s. 4(1), all rights,  title and  interest  vesting  in  the proprietor or  any person  having interest in such proprietary right  through the  proprietor in such area including  land (cultivable or barren), cease and are  vested in  the State  for the purposes of the State free from all encumbrances. But sub-s. 2 provides that  "Notwithstanding anything contained in subsection  (1), the  proprietor shall continue to retain  the possession of his home-stead, home- farm land................"  . ’Home-farm  land’ is defined, in  so far  as it is material, in s. 2(g) as:           "(1)      x       x      x      x      x x           (2)         x       x    x      x      x x           (3)  in  relation  to  Berar,  all  land      included in holdings which is-           (i) under  the personal  cultivation  of      the superior holder including land allowed to      lie  fallow  in  accordance  with  the  usual      agricultural practice;

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         (ii) held  by a lessee from the superior      holder; and           (iii) held by a tenant from the superior      holder other than a specified tenant." ’Land’ is  defined as "including land covered with water."   Section    7   authorises   the   Deputy Commissioner to  take charge  of all  lands, other than occupied  lands and  home-stead lands, and of all interests  vesting in  the State under s. 3 on the date  of the  vesting, and,  by s.  8, duty is imposed on  the  State  Government  to  pay  every proprietor, who is divested of proprietary rights, compensation  in   accordance   with   the   rules contained in Schedule I.      Mahajan  was   undoubtedly  at  the  date  of vesting the  superior holder  of the half share in the fallow lands which were held by Surat Singh as lessee from him. Prima facie the claim of Mahajan 715 was covered  by cl.  (g) (3)  (ii) of  s. 2 of the Act, and  Mahajan was  entitled to  the benefit of the exception  in s.  4 (2).  But counsel  for the State contends  that in  respect of  an  undivided interest in  land,  the  superior  holder  is  not entitled to  the benefit of s. 4(2), because it is not a  "holding." Alternatively,  he contends that the land  which is,  at the date of vesting, lying fallow otherwise than in accordance with the usual agricultural practice  can never  be  regarded  as home-farm." In  our view, there is no substance in either of  these contentions.  Schedule A  to  the petition sets  out the  description of the various lands which  Mahajan claimed  should be treated as "home-farm" land. Each of these lands is assessed. The expression  ’holding’ is  not defined  in  the Act, but  by cl.  (d)  of  s.  2  expressions  not defined in  the Act  in relation to Berar but used or explained in the Berar Land Revenue Code, 1928, have the  meaning assigned to those expressions in the  latter  Act.  The  Berar  Land  Revenue  Code defines  ’holding’   as  "(a)  a  parcel  of  land separately assessed  to land  revenue;  and(b)  in reference to  land held  by a  tenant-a parcel  of land held  from a  landlord under one lease or set of  conditions."  Evidently,  the  survey  numbers included  in  Schedule  A  to  the  petition  were "holdings" within  the meanings  of the Berar Land Revenue Code  and therefore  within the meaning of that expression  as used  in the  Act. It  is true that Mahajan  was not  entitled to the entire area of each of these holdings but by the definition in the Act  all lands  included in holdings in Berar, provided they  fulfil the  conditions in  cl. (i), (ii) or  (iii) of  sub-cl.  (3),  are  "home-farm" lands. In  other words a part of the holding or an undivided interest  in the  holding  may  also  be "home-farm"  land  if  it  otherwise  fulfils  the requirements of  cl.(i)  (ii)  or  (iii)  of  sub- cl.(3).      That a  half share  in the  village-which  is included  in  the  Schedule  to  the  petition-was granted 716 to Surat  Singh on lease for cultivation cannot be gain said  in view of the express covenants of the

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kabulayat. Certain  lands in  the village,  it  is true, were lying fallow wholly or partially at the date of  the vesting,  but the  lands having  been granted in lease for cultivation, in our judgment, they are  by virtue  of s.  4(2) to be retained in the possession  of the  proprietor,  provision  of cl.(1) of  s. 4  notwithstanding. By sub-s. (2) of s. 4  all  "home-farm"  lands  are  to  remain  in possession of  the proprietor: there is no express exclusion of  lands lying  fallow from the benefit of s.  4 (2)  and none  such can be implied either from the scheme of the Act or the context in which s. 4  (2)  occurs.  If  Mahajan  had  remained  in occupation as proprietor and had allowed the lands to remain fallow they may have vested in the State and Mahajan  may not  have been  entitled to claim the benefit of s. 4 (2) unless his case fell under cls. (i)  and (iii)  of s. 2 (g)(3), but the grant of a  lease for cultivation evidences an intention on the  part of Mahajan that the land be converted to agricultural  purposes and  default on the part of the  lessee to  cultivate those lands will not, deprive  the   lessor-proprietor  of  the  benefit granted to him by the statute.      In our  view, the  High Court  was  right  in holding that  the words of cl. (ii) of s. 2(g) (3) were explicit  and a survey number which was lying fallow but  was held by a lessee from the superior holder fell within the definition of "home-farm."      The appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed with costs.                                  Appeal dismissed. 717