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PETITIONER: THAKUR RAGHUBIR SINGH

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: COURT OF WARDS, AJMER, AND ANOTHER.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 15/05/1953

BENCH: MAHAJAN, MEHR CHAND BENCH: MAHAJAN, MEHR CHAND MUKHERJEA, B.K. HASAN, GHULAM BHAGWATI, NATWARLAL H. JAGANNADHADAS, B.

CITATION:  1953 AIR  373            1953 SCR 1049  CITATOR INFO :  D          1955 SC 795  (9)  R          1956 SC 559  (4)  R          1958 SC 578  (177)  R          1959 SC 459  (40)  E          1959 SC 519  (13)  D          1960 SC 468  (6)  R          1961 SC 705  (13)  E          1961 SC 954  (23)  RF         1962 SC1371  (36,41)  R          1965 SC 632  (11)  R          1969 SC 168  (11)

ACT:    Constitution  of  India, 1950, arts.  19(1)  (f),  19(5), 31-A-Ajmer  Revenue and Land Records Act (XLII of  1950)  s. 112-Ajmer Government Wards Regulation (I of 1888), ss. 6, 7- Law  declaring landlords who habitually infringe the  rights of  a tenant to be disqualified proprietors  and  empowering Court  of  Wards  to  assume management  of  their  lands  - Validity-Infringement  of fundamental  right-Reasonableness- Scope of article 31-A-"Modification of rights," meaning of.

HEADNOTE:        Section 112 of the Ajmer Tenancy and Land Records  Act  (XLII  of  1.950) provided that "if  a  landlord  habitually  infringes  the rights of a tenant under this Act, he  shall,  notwithstanding  any  thing  in  section  7  of  the   Ajmer  Government  Wards Regulation, 1888 (I of 1888) be deemed  to  be  a  ’landlord  who  is disqualified  to  manage  his  own  property’  within  the  meaning of section  6  of  the  said  Regulation  and  his property shall be liable  to  be  taken  under the superintendence of the Court of Wards." Section  6  of  Regulation  I of 1888 provided that the Court  of  Wards  may,  with the previous sanction of the Chief  Commissioner,  assume the superintendence of the property of any landholder  who is disqualified to manage his property.  The petitioner,  whose estate was taken over by the Court of Wards under  the  above-mentioned provisions of law, applied for relief  under  art.  32 of the Constitution for restoration of  his  estate

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and other appropriate reliefs:        Held, (1) that the result of the combined operation of  s. 112 of Act XLII of 1950 and the provisions of ss. 6 and 7  of Regulation I of 1888 was that the Court of Wards could in  its  own  discretion  and on  its  subjective  determination  assume the superintendence of the property of a landlord who  habitually  infringed  the rights of his  tenants,  and  the  exercise  of the discretion of the Court of Wards cannot  be  questioned in a civil court; s. 112 of Act XLII of 1950 read  with  the  provisions  of Regulation  I  of  1888  therefore  infringed   the   fundamental  rights  of   the   petitioner  guaranteed  by  art. 19 (1) of the Constitution and  was  to  that extent void;  (ii) the  provisions  of s. 112 cannot be regarded  as  a  "  reasonable"  restriction  imposed in the  interests  of  the  general  public  on the exercise of the right  conferred  by  art. 19 (1) (f), because they completely negatived the right  by making its enjoyment depend on the mere discretion of the  executive;  136  1050        (iii)that s. 112 was not validated by art. 31-A of the  Constitution  as  it  was  not  "a  law  providing  for  the  acquisition  by  the State of any estate or  of  any  rights  therein  or for the extinction or modification of  any  such  rights"   within  the  meaning  of  art.  31-A.   The   word  "modification"  in  the context of art. 31-A  only  means  a  modfication  of the proprietary right of a citizen  like  an  extinguishment  of that right and cannot include within  its  ambit  a mere suspension of the right of management  of  the  estate for a time, definite or indefinite.

JUDGMENT:       ORIGINAL  JURISDICTION:  Petition  No.  29  of   1953. Petition  under  article  32 of the  Constitution  of  India praying  that  the  Court of Wards,  Ajmer,  be  ordered  to forbear   from  carrying  on  the  superintendence  of   the istimrari estate and other properties of the petitioner  and for  restoration  of possession and management of  the  said estate and properties.     J.B. Dadachanji and H. C. Sogain for the appellant.      M.C.  Setalvad,  A ttorney-General  for  India,  (Bhava Datta Sharma, with him) for the respondents.   1953.  May 15.  The Judgment of the Court was delivered by    MAHAJAN  J.-This is a petition under article  32  of  the Constitution seeking relief against alleged infringement  of certain  fundamental rights of the petitioner and arises  in these circumstances.    The  petitioner owns an " istimrari estate" in the  State of Ajmer under an istimrari sanad granted to his ancestor in the  year 1875.  He enjoys therein a life interest  with  an obligation  to perform certain duties as prescribed  by  the Ajmer Land and Revenue Regulation (11 of 1877).    The  Deputy  Commissioner of Ajmer, who is the  Court  of Wards   constituted   under  the  Ajmer   Government   Wards Regulation  (I  of 1888), took over possession  and  assumed superintendence  of the said estate on the  18th  September, 1952,  purporting  to  act under sections 6  and  7  of  the Regulation  read with section 112 of the Ajmer  Tenancy  and Land  Records  Act,  1950 (XLII of  1950),  and  hence  this petition  for  a  writ  of mandamus or  one  in  the  nature thereof, or for the issue 1051

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of  a  direction to the Court of Wards  for  restoration  of possession  of the estate and for an order directing  it  to forbear from carrying on the superintendence of the estate. The  order  made by the Court of Wards  on  the  18th September, 1952, is impugned as being void and of no  effect whatever,   because  it  is  alleged  that   the   statutory provisions  under  which it is purported to have  been  made contravene  the provisions of Part III of  the  Constitution and take away and abridge the petitioner’s rights guaranteed by article 19 (1) (f) of the Constitution.     Section  112 of Act XLII of 1950 is one of a group of  7 sections  in  Chapter  X of the Act  which  deals  with  the subject  of  "  Compensation and Penalties  ".  The  section prescribes penalties for habitual infringement of rights  of tenants and reads thus:-     "  If  a landlord habitually infringes the rights  of  a tenant under this Act, he shall, notwithstanding anything in section 7 of the Ajmer Government Wards Regulation, 1888  (I of 1888), be deemed to be a "landlord who is disqualified to manage his own property " within the meaning of section 6 of the  said Regulation and his property shall be liable to  be taken under the superintendence of the Court of Wards ".       The preceding section 110 is in these terms:-       "If  a landholder or his agent collects from a  tenant any  lag  or neg, he shall be deemed to  have  committed  an offence of extortion within the meaning of the Indian  Penal Code (Act XLV of 186O)    Just  as section II 0 declares an illegal exaction  by  a landlord  to be an offence under the Indian Penal  Code,  in like manner, section 112 declares a landlord who  habitually infringes the rights of a tenant " a person disqualified  to manage his own property " within the meaning of section 6 of Regulation  I  of  1888,  the  consequence  being  that  his property  becomes  liable to be taken over by the  Court  of Wards.   The  section is an ingenious and  novel  device  to punish  landlords  who  habitually infringe  the  rights  of tenants.  It authorizes 1052 the use for punitive purposes of the machinery of Regulation I  of  1888  enacted  to  make  better  provision  for   the superintendence  of  Government Wards in  AjmerMerwara.   By force  of  the  declaration  in  section  112  of  the  Act, landlords who habitually infringe the rights of the  tenants fall  within the category of persons incapable  of  managing their own property and come within the ambit of section 6 of the Regulation, which is in these terms:- ,, The Court of Wards may, with the previous sanction of the Chief  Commissioner,  assume  the  superintendence  of   the property of any landholder who is disqualified to manage his own property ".     The  result therefore of the combined operation of  sec- tion  112  of  Act XLII of 1950 and  of  the  provisions  of Regulation I of 1888, is that the Court of Wards can in  its own  discretion and on its subjective determination,  assume the  superintendence  of  the property  of  a  landlord  who habitually  infringes  the  rights  of  his  tenants.    The condition precedent to such assumption of superintendence is the previous sanction of the Chief Commissioner, the  giving of   which  is  also  a  matter  entirely  resting  on   his discretion.   Section  27 of Regulation I of  1888  provides that " the exercise of any discretion conferred on the Court of Wards or the Chief Commissioner by this Regulation  shall not  be  called  in question in any civil court  ".  It  was conceded  by the learned Attorney-General appearing for  the State  of Ajmere that there was nothing in the  contents  of

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either  Act  XLII  of 1950 or Regulation  I  of  1888  which provided a machinery for determining the question whether  a certain landlord was a person who was habitually  infringing the rights of his tenants.  Under Regulation I of 1888,  the assumption  by the Court of Wards of the superintendence  of the property of a disqualified proprietor depends merely  on the  subjective determination of the Deputy Commissioner  or the  Commissioner  or  of the Chief  Commissioner,  and  the exercise  of  this discretion cannot be  questioned  in  any manner  in  a civil court.  Act XLII of  1950  says  nothing whatsoever on this subject.                     1053       The  contention that the provisions of section 112  of Act XLII of 1950 read with the provisions of Regulation I of 1888  infringe  the  fundamental  right  of  the  petitioner guaranteed by article 19 (1) (f) of the Constitution, is, in our opinion, well-founded and does not require any elaborate discussion.   The petitioner’s right to hold  the  istimrari estate  and his power of disposal over it stand abridged  by the   act  of  the  Court  of  Wards  authorized  by   these provisions.   His  right  to manage  the  estate  and  enjoy possession  thereof stands suspended indefinitely and  until the  time  that the Court of Wards chooses to  withdraw  its superintendence  of the property of the petitioner.   During this period, he can only receive such sums of money for  his expenses as the Court of Wards decides in its discretion  to allow.   Thus, the provisions of section 112 of Act XLII  of 1950 clearly abridge the fundamental right of the petitioner under article 19 (1) (f) and are to that extent void.      The learned Attorney-General canvassed for the validity of  the  provisions  of section 112 on  three  grounds.   He contended  that the determination of the question whether  a certain landholder was a person who habitually infringed the rights  of his tenants did not depend on the opinion of  the Court of Wards, but was a matter that could be agitated  and canvassed in a civil court.  It was said that there were  no words  in the section from which it could be  inferred  that the  determination of this fact depended on  the  subjective determination of the Court of Wards.  It was emphasized that the  section  had  not used the familiar  language  "in  its opinion"  or words like that, which are usually employed  to indicate   whether  a  matter  depends  on  the   subjective determination of an authority or whether it can be  agitated in  a civil court.  This contention, in our opinion, is  not well-founded.  As already pointed out, Act XLII of 1950  has prescribed  no  machinery  for  the  determination  of   the question   whether  a  landlord  is  guilty  of   habitually infringing  the  rights  of his  tenants,  and  rightly  so, because  section II 2 of the Act is merely of a  declaratory character and 1054 declares  such  a landlord as being under a  disability  and suffering  from  an  infirmity.   This  declaration  becomes operative and effective only when the Court of Wards in  its discretion decides to assume superintendence of the property of  such  a  proprietor.  In other words,  when  the  Deputy Commissioner  or the Commissioner or the Chief  Commissioner is of the opinion that such a proprietor should be  deprived of  possession  of  his property,  this  determination  then operates  to  the prejudice of the landlord, but  he  cannot challenge  the exercise of the discretion by these  officers in  view of the provisions of section 27 of Regulation I  of 1888.    The   result  then  is  that  by   the   subjective determination  of  the Court of Wards,  both  the  questions whether a particular person habitually infringes the  rights

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of his tenants and whether his property should be taken over by the Court of Wards, stand settled and the landlord cannot have  recourse  to a civil court on  these  questions.   The learned Attorney-General was not able to draw our  attention to any provision in the Court of Wards Act or in Act XLII of 1950  which  enabled  the landlord, held to  be  a  habitual infringer of the rights of his tenants, to have recourse  to a  civil court to test the correctness of the  determination made by the Court of Wards.  The provisions of Regulation of 1888 clearly indicate the contrary. Next,  it  was  argued that the provisions  of  section  112 amount  to  reasonable restrictions on the exercise  of  the right conferred by article 19 (1) (f) of the Constitution on a  citizen, and these restrictions are in the  interests  of the general public.  In our judgment, this. argument also is not  sound.  As indicated above, the provisions  of  section 112 of Act XLII of 1950 are penal in nature and are intended by way of punishment of a landlord who habitually  infringes the  rights of his tenants.  He is punished by being  placed at the mercy of the Court of Wards and by being made subject to  the  stringent provisions of Regulation I of  1888.   An enactment  which prescribes a punishment or penalty for  bad behaviour or for misconduct of a landlord cannot possibly be regarded as restriction on a fundamental 1055 right.  Indeed, a punishment is not a restriction.  This was frankly  conceded  by the learned Attorney-General.   It  is still  more  difficult  to  regard such  a  provision  as  a reasonable restriction on the fundamental right.  When a law deprives  a  person  of possession of his  property  for  an indefinite   period  of  time  merely  on   the   subjective determination of an executive officer, such a law can, on no construction of the word "reasonable" be described as coming within that expression, because it completely negatives  the fundamental right by making its enjoyment depend on the mere pleasure  and  discretion  of  the  executive,  the  citizen affected  having no right to have recourse for  establishing the  contrary in a civil court.  Section 112 of Act XLII  of 1950  cannot  therefore be held valid as coming  within  the scope of article 19 (5) of the Constitution.      Lastly, it was contended by the learned AttorneyGeneral that  section  112  was  valid by  reason  of  the  curative provisions  of  article  31 -A of  the  Constitution.   That article validates laws which would otherwise contravene  the fundamental right in article 31(2) of the Constitution,  but its   operation   is  restricted  to  laws   providing   for acquisition of estates etc.  It runs as follows:- "  Notwithstanding anything in the foregoing  provi- sions of this Part, no law providing for the acquisition  by the State of any estate or of any rights therein or for  the extinguishment  or modification of any such rights shall  be deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by any provisions of this Part........       Section II 2 of Act XLII of 1950, intended to regulate the rights of landlords and tenants, is obviously not a  law providing  for  "  the acquisition by the  State  "  of  the estates of the landlords, or of any rights in those estates. It  is  also not a law providing for the  extinguishment  or modification  of  any such rights.   The  learned  Attorney- General  laid  emphasis on the word modification "  used  in article 31 -A, That word in 1056 the context of the article only means a modification of  the proprietary  right  of a citizen like an  extinguishment  of

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that  right  and  can not include within its  ambit  a  mere suspension of the right of management of estate for a  time, definite  or indefinite.  Historically speaking, article  31 -A which has relation to article 31(2) of the  Constitution, has  no relevancy whatsoever to the law enacted  in  section 112 of the Act XLII of 1950.       For  the  reasons given above, we are of  the  opinion that  the law enacted in section 112 of Act XLII of 1950  is not  saved either by clause (5) of article 19 or by  article 31-A  of  the  Constitution.  It  manifestly  infringes  the fundamental right of the petitioner guaranteed by article 19 (1) (f) of the Constitution.  That being so, the  petitioner is entitled to a direction that possession of his estate  be restored to him.  We accordingly direct the Court of  Wards, Ajmer-Merwara, constituted under the Ajmer Government  Wards Regulation, I of 1888, to forbear from carrying on  superin- tendence of the petitioner’s istimrari estate and the  other properties  taken  possession  of,  and  to  restore   their possession to the petitioner.  The petitioner will have  the costs of this petition.                         Petition allowed. Agent for the petitioner : I. N. Shroff. Agent for the respondents: G. H. Rajadhyaksha. 1057