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PETITIONER: THAKUR MANMOHAN DEO AND ANOTHER

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE STATE OF BIHAR AND OTHERS.(AND CONNECTED APPEAL)

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 19/09/1960

BENCH: DAS, S.K. BENCH: DAS, S.K. KAPUR, J.L. SUBBARAO, K. HIDAYATULLAH, M. AYYANGAR, N. RAJAGOPALA

CITATION:  1961 AIR  189            1961 SCR  (1) 695

ACT: Ghatwali Tenure-Government ghatwalis-Applicability of  Bihar Land  Reforms Act-Legislative competence-Pith and  substance of  legislation-Bengal  Regulation, 1814 (Regulation  29  of 1814)-Bihar  Land Reforms Act, 1950 (Bihar 30 of 1950),  ss. 2(0) (q)  (r), 23 (1) (f), 32(4).

HEADNOTE: The appellants were holders of ghatwali tenure called Rohini and   Pathrole  ghatwalis  and  were  governed   by   Bengal Regulation XXIX of 1814.  The Bihar Land Reforms Act,  1950, was  enacted  by the Bihar State Legislature and  came  into force  on  September 25, 1950.  In suits instituted  by  the appellants the question  was raised as to whether under  the provisions of the   Act   the  State  could  acquire   their ghatwalis.  They claimed (1)  that    the   Act   was    not applicable  to the Government ghatwali tenures  like  Rohini and  Pathrole ghatwalis which could not be acquired  by  the State  under  S.  3 of the Act, in view  of  the  definition clause  in S. 2 and SS. 23 (1) (f) and 32(4), (2)  that  the Act did not purport to repeal Bengal Regulation XXIX of 1814 and  inasmuch  as  the said Regulation  dealt  with  special tenures, the special law enacted with regard to such tenures would not be affected by the general law with regard to land reforms  as embodied in the Act, and (3) that, in any  case, ghatwali tenures, being of a quasi-military nature, must  be held to fall under Entries 1 and 2 of List I of the  Seventh Schedule  to the Constitution of India and,  therefore,  the Act was outside the competence of the State Legislature. Held:     (i) that all ghatwali tenures including government ghatwalis  came within the definition clause in S. 2 of  the Bihar  Land  Reforms Act, 1950, and that SS. 23(1)  (f)  and 32(4),  though  they might be inapplicable to  the  ghatwali tenures  in question, did not have the effect  of  excluding such  tenures from the operation of the other provisions  of the Act; (2)  that   the  Act  in  pith  and  substance  related   to acquisition  of property and was covered by Entry  36,  List II, Seventh Schedule to the Constitution and had no relation

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to  Entries  1  and 2 of List  I.  Consequently,  the  State Legislature was competent to enact the Act 89 696 The State of Bihar v. Maharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh of Darbhanga and Others, [1952] S.C.R. 898, followed. (3)  that  the  principle  that a special  law  relating  to special  tenure is not affected by a subsequent general  law of land reforms had no application to the Act which in  pith and  substance  related to acquisition of  property  and  no question of the repeal of Regulation XXIX of 1814 arose. Raja  Suriya  Pal Singh v. The State of U. P.  and  Another, [1952] S.C.R. 1056, applied.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL  APPELLATE, JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos.  273  and 274 of 1955. Appeals from the judgment and order dated December 10, 1954, of the Patna High Court in Appeals from Original Decree Nos. 309 and 310 of 1954. L.   K.  Jha, J. C. Sinha, S. Mustafi and R. R. Biswas,  for the appellants. Lal  Narayan Sinha, Bajrang Sahai and R. C. Prasad, for  the respondents 1960.   September  19.   The  Judgment  of  the  Court   was delivered by S.  K. DAS J.-These two appeals on a certificate granted  by the High Court of Patna are from the judgment and decree  of the  said High Court dated December 10, 1954.  By  the  said judgment  and  decree the High Court dismissed  two  appeals which arose out of two suits, Title Suit no. 42 of 1950  and Title  Suit  No. 23 of 1952, which were tried  together  and dismissed  with  costs by the learned Subordinate  Judge  of Deoghar. The plaintiffs of those two suits are the appellants  before us.   One  of  the appellants Thakur Manmohan  Deo  was  the holder  of  a ghatwali tenure commonly known as  the  Rohini ghatwali,  situate within the subdivision of Deoghar in  the district  of  the  Santa  Parjanas.   The  other   appellant Tikaitni  Faldani  Kumari  was the holder  of  the  Pathrole ghatwali also situate in the same sub-division.  Both  these ghatwali  tenures were formerly known as  Birbhum  ghatwalis and were governed by Bengal Regulation XXIX of 1814.  In the year 1950 was enacted the Bihar Land Reforms Act                             697 1950  (Bihar  Act 30 of 1950), hereinafter called  the  Act. The Act came into force on September 25, 1950.  The validity of the Act was challenged in the Patna High Court on grounds of  a violation of certain fundamental rights and  the  High Court held it to be unconstitutional on those grounds.   The Constitution  (First  Amendment) Act, 1951, was  enacted  on June 18, 1951, and in appeals from the decision of the Patna High  Court,  this  Court  held in The  State  of  Bihar  v. Maharajadhiraja  Sir Kameshwar Singh of Darbhanga  (1)  that the  Act  was not unconstitutional or void  on  the  grounds alleged, except with regard to the provisions in s. 4(b) and s.  23(f) thereof The validity of the Act is, therefore,  no longer  open to question on those grounds, though in one  of the suits out of which these two appeals have arisen, it was contended that the Act was ultra vires the Constitution. The  principal issue in the two suits which now survives  is issue no. 3 which said: ,Do the provisions of the Bihar Land Reforms  Act,  1950,  purport  to  acquire  the  plaintiffs’

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ghatwalis ? If so, are they ultra vires in their application to  such  ghatwalis  ? This issue was  decided  against  the appellants by the learned Subordinate Judge and the decision of the learned Subordinate Judge was upheld on appeal by the High  Court  of  Patna  in its  judgment  and  decree  dated December  10,  1954, from which decision these  two  appeals have come to us. Three  main  points  have  been  urged  on  behalf  of   the appellants.  The first point is one of construction and  the appellants  contend  that on a proper construction  ,of  the relevant  provisions  of  the  Act, it  does  not  apply  to ghatwali  tenures  like the Rohini and  Pathrole  ghatwalis. Secondly, it is contended that if the provisions of the  Act apply  to the appellants’ ghatwali tenures, then  the  State legislature was not competent to enact it, because  ghatwali tenures  like the Rohini and Pathrole ghatwalis, were  of  a quasi-military  nature  and if the Act applies to  them,  it must  be held to relate to items 1 and 2 of the  Union  List (List  I)  and,  therefore, outside the  competence  of  the State- (1)  [1952] S.C.R. 898. 698 legislature.  The third contention is that the Act does  not purport  to repeal Bengal Regulation XXIX of 1814 and in  as much as the said Regulation deals ,With special tenures, the special law enacted with regard to such tenures would not be affected  by the general law with regard to land reforms  as embodied in the Act.  We shall deal with these three conten- tions in the order in which we have stated them.  But before we do so, it is necessary to explain, briefly, the nature of these ghatwali tenures. We  may  quote  here  some  of  the  provisions  of   Bengal Regulation  XXIX of 1814.  The Regulation says in s. 1  that lands  held by the class of persons denominated ghatwals  in the district of Birbhum form a peculiar tenure to which  the provisions  of  the existing Regulations are  not  expressly applicable;  it  then states that according  to  the  former usages  and  constitution  of the  country,  this  class  of persons  are entitled to hold their lands, generation  after generation,  in  perpetuity,  subject  nevertheless  to  the payment  of a fixed and established rent to the zamindar  of Birbhum  and  to the performance of certain duties  for  the maintenance  of the public peace and support of the  police. The  Regulation  then  lays  down  certain  rules  to   give stability to the arrangement established among the  ghatwals and these rules are contained in ss. 2, 3, 4 and 5. It would be enough if we quote ss. 2, 3, and a part of s. 5. " S. 2. A, settlement having lately been made on the part of the Government with the ghatwals in the district of Birbhum, it  is  hereby declared that they and their  descendants  in perpetuity shall be maintained in possession of the lands so long  as they shall respectively pay the revenue at  present assessed upon them, and that they shall not be liable to any enhancement  of  rent  so  long  as  they  shall  punctually discharge  the  same and fulfill the  other  obligations  of their tenure. S.   3.  The  ghatwali  lands shall  be  considered,  as  at present,  to form a part of the zamindari’ of  Birbhum,  but the  rent of ghatwals shall be paid direct to the  Assistant Collector stationed at Suri, or to                             699 such other public officer as the Board of Revenue may direct to receive the rents. S.   5.  Should  any  of the ghatwals at any  time  fail  to discharge their stipulated rents, it shall be competent  for

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the State Government; to cause the ghatwali tenure of such defaulter to be sold by public sale in satisfaction of the arrears due from him,  in like  manner,  and  under  the same  rules,  as  lands  held immediately  of  Government, or to make over the  tenure  of such  defaulter to any person whom the State Government  may approve on the condition of making good the arrears due; or to transfer it by grants assessed with the same revenue,  or with   an  increased  or  reduced  assessment,  as  to   the Government  may  appear meet; or  to dispose of it in such other form and manner as shall  be judged by the State Government proper." In a number of decisions of the Privy Council the nature  of these tenures has been explained and in Satya Narayan  Singh v.   Satya  Niranjan  Chakravarti  (1)  Lord   Sumner   thus summarised the position at pages 198-199 of the report: "In  the  Santal Parganas there are for  practical  purposes three classes of ghatwali tenures, (a) Government ghatwalis, created by the ruling power; (b) Government ghatwalis, which since  their  ’creation  and generally at the  time  of  the Permanent  Settlement  have  been included  in  a  zamindari estate  and formed into a unit in its assessment;  and,  (c) zamindari   ghatwalis,  created  by  the  zamindar  or   his predecessor  and alienable with his consent.  The second  of these  classes is really a branch of the first.  The  matter may, however, be looked at broadly.  In itself ’ghatwal’  is a  term meaning an office held by a particular  person  from time to time, who is bound to the performance of its duties, with  a  consideration  to  be  enjoyed  in  return  by  the incumbent  of  the office.  Within this meaning  the  utmost variety  of  conditions  may exist.  There  may  be  a  mere personal  contract of employment for wages, which takes  the form  of  the  use  of land or an  actual  estate  in  land, heritable and (1)  I.L.R. 3 Pat. 183. 700 perpetual, but conditional upon services certain or services to  be  demanded.   The office may  be  public  or  private, important  or  the reverse.  The ghatwal, the guard  of  the pass,  may  be the bulwark of a whole  country-side  against invaders; he may be merely a sentry against petty marauders; he may be no more than a kind of gamekeeper, protecting  the crops from the ravages of wild animals.  Ghatwali duties may be  divided  into police duties and  quasi-military  duties, though both classes have lost much of their importance,  and the  latter  in  any strict form are  but  rarely  rendered. Again  the  duties  of the office may be  such  as  demanded personal  competence  for that discharge; they may,  on  the other hand, be such as can be discharged vicariously, by the creation  of  shikmi  tenures and  by  the  appointment  and maintenance  of a subordinate force, or they may be such  as in their nature only require to be provided for in bulk.  It is plain that where a grant is forthcoming to a man and  his heirs  as  ghatwal, or is to be presumed to have  been  made though   it  may  have  been  since  been   lost,   personal performance  of  the ghatwali services is not  essential  so long  as  the grantee is responsible for them  and  procures them  to be rendered (Shib Lall Singh v. Moorad  Khan  (1)). So  much for the ghatwal.  The superior; who  appoints  him, may also in the varying circumstances of the Organisation of Hindostan be the ruling power over the country at large, the landholder  responsible  by custom for  the  maintenance  of security and order within his estates, or simply the private person,  to whom the maintenance of watchmen is in the  case of  an extensive property, important enough to  require  the

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creation of a regular office." It is not disputed before  us that  the  Rohini  and  Pathrole  ghatwalis  are  Government ghatwalis  and  admittedly they are governed  by  Regulation XXIX of 1814. The question now is, does the Act apply to these ghatwalis ? It  is necessary now to read some of the provisions  of  the Act.   Section 2 is the definition section, cl. (o)  whereof defines a " proprietor cl. (q) (1)  (1868) 9 W.R. 126. 701 defines a "tenure " and cl. (r) defines a " tenure-holder ". The definition of the two expressions "tenure" and  "tenure- holder" was amended by Bihar Act 20 of 1954.  The amendments were  made  with retrospective effect and the  amending  Act said that the amendments shall be deemed always to have been substituted.  Now, the three clauses (o), (q) and (r) of  s. 2 are in these terms " S. 2(o)-" Proprietor " means a person holding in trust  or owning  for his own benefit an estate or part of an  estate, and   includes  the  heirs  and  successors-interest  of   a proprietor and, where a proprietor is a minor or of  unsound mind  or  an idiot, his guardian, committee or  other  legal curator; (q)  "tenure"  means the interest of a tenure. holder or  an under-tenure-holder and includes- (i)  a ghatwali tenure, (ii) a tenure created for the maintenance of any person  and commonly known as kharposh, babuana, etc., and (iii)     a share in or of a tenure, but does not include  a Mundari  Khunt Kattidari tenancy within the meaning  of  the Chota  Nagpur  Tenancy  Act, 1908, or  a  bhuinhairi  tenure prepared  and confirmed under the Chota Nagpur Tenures  Act, 1869; (r)  " tenure-holder " means a person who has acquired  from a proprietor or from any other tenure-holder a right to hold land for the purpose of collecting rent or bringing it under cultivation by establishing tenants on it and includes- (i)  the successors-in-interest of persons who have acquired such right, (ii) a person who holds such right in trust, (iii)     a  holder of a tenure created for the  maintenance of   any person, (iv) a gbatwal and the successors-in-interest of a  ghatwal, and (v)  where a tenure-holder is a minor or of unsound mind  or an idiot, his guardian, committee or other legal curator." The definition clauses (q) and (r) state in express terms 702 that   ’tenure’  includes a ghatwali tenure and,  ’  tenure- holder’  includes a ghatwal’ and the  successors-in-interest of  a ghatwal.  The argument on behalf of the appellants  is that  the  definition clauses should be so construed  as  to include   zamindari  ghatwalis  only  and   not   Government ghatwalis.   Firstly, it is pointed out that cl. (r) in  its substantive part says that a ’tenure-holder’ means a  person who has acquired from a proprietor or from any other tenure- holder  a right to hold land for the purpose  of  collecting rent  or  bringing  it  under  cultivation  by  establishing tenants on it; this part, it is submitted, cannot apply to a Government  ghatwal, because a Government ghatwal  does  not acquire from a proprietor or from any other tenure-holder  a right  to  hold land for any of the two  purposes  mentioned therein.  In this connection our attention has been drawn to el.  (o)  which  defines a ’proprietor’ and  it  is  further pointed  out  that,  as stated by  Lord  Sumner,  Government

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ghatwals  were  either created by the ruling power  or  were since  their  creation  and generally at  the  time  of  the Permanent  Settlement  included in a  zamindari  estate  and formed  into  a  unit in its assessment;  therefore,  it  is argued  that Government ghatwalis did not acquire any  right from a proprietor or any other tenure-holder.  Secondly, it. is Submitted that sub-cl. (i) of el. (q) and sub cl. (iv) of cl. (r) must be read in the light of the sub. stantive  part of  the  two clauses, even though the  subclauses  state  in express terms that a ’tenure’ includes a ghatwali tenure and a  ’tenure-holder’  includes a ghatwal.  It is  pointed  out that  a  zamindari  ghatwal acquires  his  interest  from  a proprietor  and the substantive part of clauses (q) and  (r) may  apply  to a zamindari ghatwal and his  tenure  but  the substantive  part.of  the  two clauses  cannot  apply  to  a Government ghatwal and his tenure.  We are unable to  accept this line of argument as correct. Where  a statute says in express terms that  the  expression ’tenure’  includes  a ghatwali tenure and the  expression  ’ tenure-holder  ’ includes a ghatwal and  the  successors-in- interest  of a ghatwal, there must be compelling reasons  to out down the amplitude of the                             703 two expressions.  The Bihar legislature must have been aware of   the  distinction  between  Government   ghatwalis   and zamindari  ghatwalis  and if the intention  was  to  exclude Government gbatwalis, nothing could have been easier than to say in the two definition clauses that they did  not-include Government ghatwalis.  On the contrary, the legislature made no  distinction between Government ghatwalis  and  zamindari ghatwalis  but  included  all ghatwali  tenures  within  the definition  clauses.  There are no restrictive words in  the definition clauses and we see no reasons why any restriction should be read into them.  It is worthy of note that the two definition clauses first state in the substantive part  what the general meaning of the two expressions is, and then  say that  the  expressions shall inter alia include  a  ghatwali tenure  and  a ghatwal and the successors-in-interest  of  a ghatwal.  Thus, the two definition clauses are  artificially extended  so  as  to include all ghatwali  tenures  and  all ghatwals  and their successors-in-interest, irrespective  of any consideration as to whether they come within the general meaning  stated in the substantive part of the two  clauses. Such  artificial extension of the two definition clauses  is also apparent from sub-cl. (v) of el. (r) and sub-cl.  (iii) of  cl. (q).  Sub-clause (iii) of el. (q)  excludes  certain tenures  from  the definition clause which  would  otherwise come  within the general meaning of the expression  ’tenure’ and sub-cl. (v) of cl. (r) extends the expression ’  tenure- holder’  to guardians committees and curators.  When we  are dealing  with  an artificial definition of this  kind  which states " means and shall include etc.", there is no room for an argument that even though the definition expressly states that  something is included within a particular  expression, it  must be excluded by reason of its not coming within  the general meaning of that expression. The  learned Counsel for the appellants has also  called  to his  aid certain other provisions of the Act in  support  of the  argument  that  the Act does not  apply  to  Government ghatwalis.  He has referred to s. 23(1) 704 (f)  and  s.  32(4) of the Act.  Section 23 deals  with  the computation  of  net income for the purpose of  preparing  a Compensation  Assessment-roll, by deducting from  the  gross asset  of  each  proprietor or  tenureholder,  certain  sums

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mentioned  in  clauses (a) to (f).  It must be  stated  that what was el. (g) of s. 23(1) before has now become el.  (f), because  the  original el. (f) of s. 23(1) was  held  to  be unconstitutional  by  this Court in The State  of  Bihar  v. Maharajadhiraja  Sir  Kameshwar  Singh  of  Darbhanga   (1). Section  23(1)  so  far as it is relevant  for  our  purpose states: "  S.  23(1)  For the purpose of  preparing  a  Compensation Assessment-roll, the net income of a proprietor or a tenure- holder  shall be computed by deducting from the gross  asset of such proprietor or tenure-holder, as the case may be, the following, namely:- (a) ----------------------------------- (b) ---------------------------------- (c) ---------------------------------- (d) ---------------------------------- (e) ---------------------------------- (f)  any other tax or legal imposition payable in respect of such estate or tenure not expressly mentioned in clauses (a) to  (e)  or  the value, to be  commuted  in  the  prescribed manner, of any services or obligations of any other form  to be  rendered or discharged as a condition precedent  to  his enjoyment of such estate or tenure ". Now,  the  argument before us is that el. (f)  of  s.  23(1) cannot  apply to a Government ghatwal, because he can  still be  asked to perform the services and obligations  which  he had undertaken by reason of the office which he held.  It is submitted  that  the  Act does not purport  to  abolish  the ghatwali  office  and  as  the office  and  the  tenure  are inseparably  connected, the calculation referred to  in  el. (f)  cannot  be made in the case of a  Government  ghatwali. Our attention has also been drawn to a later decision of the Patna High Court (Election Appeals nos. 7 and 8 of 1958)  of March 20, 1959, wherein a distinction was drawn (1)  [1952] S.C.R. 898.                             705 between acquisition and resumption of a ghatwali tenure  and the argument that on the acquisition of the ghatwali  tenure the  office lapsed was not accepted.  We have been  informed at the Bar that that decision is under appeal to this Court. Therefore,  we  do  not propose to say  anything  about  the correctness or otherwise of the view expressed therein.   It is  enough to point out that assuming that the  argument  of the  appellants is correct and el. (f) of s. 23(1) does  not apply,  it does not necessarily follow that the  appellants’ ghatwali tenures cannot be acquired by the State  Government under  s. 3 of the Act.  Section 23(1)(f) provides only  for the  deduction of a particular item from the gross asset  of the  tenure-holder  for  the purpose of  computing  the  net income.   Even  if  el.  (f) does  not  apply,  the  statute provides  for other deductions mentioned in clauses  (a)  to (e).  Those clauses indisputedly apply to a ghatwali  tenure and a Compensation Assessment-roll can be prepared on  their basis.   It  would  not be correct to  say  that  because  a particular item of deduction does not apply in the case of a Government  ghatwali, such ghatwali tenure must be  excluded from the ambit of the Act; such a view will be  inconsistent with  the  scheme  of s. 23.  The scheme of s.  23  is  that certain  deductions  have  to be made  to  compute  the  net income; some of the items may apply in one case and some may not  apply.  The section does not contemplate that  all  the items must apply in the case of each and every proprietor or tenure-holder. We now come to s. 32 of the Act.  Section 32(4) states : "S.  32(4) if the estate or tenure in respect of  which  the

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compensation  is payable is held by a limited owner  or  the holder of life-interest, the Compensation Officer shall keep the amount of compensation in deposit with the Collector  of the  district and the Collector shall direct the payment  of the  interest accruing on the amount of compensation to  the limited owner or the holder of the life interest during  his lifetime.   Such  amount  shall remain  deposited  with  the Collector until the amount of compensation or 706 portion  thereof  after making payments, if any,  under  the proviso  to this sub-section is made over to any  person  or persons becoming absolutely entitled thereto: Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall be deemed to affect  the  right of any limited owner or the holder  of  a life interest to apply to the District Judge for the payment of  a  part  of the amount of  compensation  to  defray  any expenses   which  may  be  necessary  to  meet   any   legal necessity." It is argued that sub-s. (4) of s. 32 is also not applicable to  a Government ghatwali, because the  expression  ’limited owner  ’  occurring therein has been used in  the  sense  in which  it  is understood in Hindu Law and the  holder  of  a Government  ghatwali is not a limited owner in  that  sense. Learned  Counsel for the appellants has drawn our  attention to  the  expression  " legal  necessity’  occurring  in  the proviso  to sub-s. (4) in support of his argument  that  the expression ’limited owner ’ has the technical sense ascribed to  it in Hindu Law.  On behalf of the respondent  State  it has  been  argued that the expressions ’limited  owner’  and ’legal  necessity ’ are not used in any technical sense  and may apply to persons who under the conditions on which  they hold the tenure cannot alienate or divide it.  Here again we consider  it unnecessary to pronounce on the true scope  and effect of sub-s. (4) of s. 32. The short question before  us is’ are Government ghatwalis excluded from the ambit of  the Act by reason of sub.s. (4) of s. 32 ? Let us assume without deciding, that sub-s. (4) does not apply to ghatwali tenure. What  is  the result ? Section 32 merely  provides  for  the manner  of payment of compensation.  If sub-s. (4) does  not apply,  the payment of compensation will have to be made  in accordance with sub-s.   (1) of s. 32 which says: "  S.  32(1).   When the time  within  which  appeals  under section  27  may  be  made in respect of  any  entry  in  or omission from a Compensation Assessment-roll has expired  or where  any such appeal has been made under that section  and the  same  has been disposed of,  the  Compensation  Officer shall  proceed  to make payment, in the manner  provide&  in this section, to the                             707 proprietors, tenure’ holders and other persons who are shown in  such Compensation Assessment-roll as  finally  published under  section  28 to be entitled to  compensation,  of  the compensation payable to them in terms of the said roll after deducting from the amount of any compensation so payable any amount which has been ordered by the Collector under  clause (c)  of  section  4  or under any other  section  to  be  so deducted." Therefore, the result is not that Government ghatwalis; will go  out of the Act, because sub-s. (4) does not apply.   The result only is that the holders of such tenures will be paid compensation  in  a different manner.   What  rights  others having  a  proprietary interest in a  ghatwali  tenure  have against  the compensation money does not fall  for  decision here. Therefore,  we are of the view that neither s. 23(1)(f)  nor

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s. 32(4) have the necessary and inevitable result  contended for by the appellants, viz., that the appellants’,  ghatwali tenures must be excluded from the operation of the Act  even though the definition clauses expressly include them. This  brings us to the second point urged before  us.   That point can be disposed of very shortly.  It is contended that if the provisions of the Act apply to Government  ghatwalis, then the Act falls outside the legislative competence of the State  Legislature  in  as  much as  the  Act  then  becomes legislation with regard to items 1 and 2 of the Union  List. These two items are- "1.  Defence  of  India and  every  part  thereof  including preparation  for  defence  and  all  such  acts  as  may  be conducive  in times of war to its prosecution and after  its termination to effective demobilisation. 2.   Naval, military and air forces; any other armed  forces of the Union." It  is,  we think, quite obvious that the Act  has  no  con- nection  whatsoever with the defence of India or  the  armed forces of the Union.  As Lord Sumner had pointed out as  far back  as 1923, though ghatwali duties might be divided  into police  duties and quasi military duties, both classes  find lost  their  importance and the latter were rarely  if  ever demanded.  This 708 Court had observed in The State of Bihar v.  Maharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh of Darbhanga and Others (1): "The pith and substance of the legislation, how. ever, in my opinion, is the transference of ownership of estates to  the State  Government and falls within the ambit of  legislative head entry 36 of List II.  There is no scheme of land reform within  the  frame work of the statute except that  a  pious hope is expressed that the commission may produce one.   The Bihar Legislature was certainly competent to make the law on the  subject  of  transference of estates  and  the  Act  as regards such transfers is constitutional." (per Mahajan, J., at p. 926 of the report). We  think  that in pith and substance  the  legislation  was covered by item 36 of List II (as it then stood) and it  has no relation to items 1 and 2 of List I. Now,  as to the last argument founded on Regulation XXIX  of 1814.  In our view the Act in pith and substance related  to acquisition of property and consequently no question of  the repeal of Regulation XXIX of 1814 arose; nor is it necessary to  consider  the principle that a special law  relating  to special tenures is not affected by a subsequent general  law of land reforms.  Such a principle has no application in the present  case.   The  Act expressly  includes  all  ghatwali tenures within its ambit and provides for the vesting of all rights therein absolutely in the State of Bihar on the issue of  a  notification  under  s. 3  and  under  s.  4  certain consequences  ensue  on  the issue of  such  a  notification notwithstanding anything contained is any other law for  the time  being in force.  It is worthy of note that the  Bengal Permanent  Settlement Regulation, 1793 (Bengal Regulation  1 of  1793), did not stand in the way of acquisition of  other permanently settled estates, and it is difficult to see  how Regulation XXIX of 1814 can stand in the way of  acquisition of  ghatwali  tenures.  The point is really covered  by  the decision of this Court in Raja Suriya Pat Singh v. The State of U. P.(2) where it was observed : (1)  [1952] S.C.R. 898. (2) [1952] S.C.R. 1o56, 1078-79. 709 " The Crown cannot deprive a legislature of its  legislative

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authority  by  the  mere fact that in the  exercise  of  its prerogative  it makes a grant of land within  the  territory over  which such legislative authority exists and  no  court can annul the enactment of a legislative body acting  within the  legitimate  scope  of its  sovereign  competence.   If, therefore, it be found that the subject of a Crown grant  is within  the competence of a provincial legislature,  nothing can  prevent  that legislature from  legislating  about  it, unless  the  Constitution  Act  itself  expressly  prohibits legislation   on   the   subject   either   absolutely    or conditionally." For the reasons given above, we hold that none of the  three points urged on behalf of the appellants has any  substance. The appeals fail and are dismissed with costs; there will be only one hearing fee. Appeals dismissed.