10 March 1976
Supreme Court
Download

THAKUR KAMTA PRASAD SINGH (DEAD) BY L.Rs. Vs THE STATE OF BIHAR

Case number: Appeal (civil) 1436 of 1968


1

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 4  

PETITIONER: THAKUR KAMTA PRASAD SINGH (DEAD) BY L.Rs.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE STATE OF BIHAR

DATE OF JUDGMENT10/03/1976

BENCH: KHANNA, HANS RAJ BENCH: KHANNA, HANS RAJ GOSWAMI, P.K.

CITATION:  1976 AIR 2219            1976 SCR  (3) 585  1976 SCC  (3) 772  CITATOR INFO :  F          1977 SC 899  (7)  RF         1977 SC1560  (7)

ACT:      Land Acquisition  Act, 1894-Sections  23 and  24-Market value-Compensation-Potential possibilities.

HEADNOTE:      The respondents  acquired appellant’s  land  under  the Land Acquisition  Act. The  Land Acquisition officer awarded compensation at  the  rate  of  Rs.  3000/-per  acre.  In  a reference  under   s.  18,  the  Additional  District  Judge enhanced the compensation to Rs. 800/- per katha (1/32 of an acre). On  appeal by  the State,  the High Court reduced the compensation to Rs. 475/- per katha.      In an  appeal by  certificate the  appellant  contended that the  High Court  was in  error in  reducing the rate of compensation.      Dismissing the appeal, ^      HELD:  (1)   The  Additional   District  Judge  wrongly excluded certain  sale transactions  on the  ground that the plots in  those transactions  were at some distance from the acquired land.  The High  Court rightly  held that  the said transactions  could   not  be   excluded   altogether   from consideration. The High Court also took into account 3 other sale transactions  which were  relied upon by the appellant. The High  Court rightly  excluded from consideration certain sale deeds  executed by  the appellant.  These  transactions related to  small plots  of land  situated on  road site and were entered  into  after  the  land  in  dispute  had  been notified for acquisition. [586E-H, 587C-D]      (2) Market  value under  s. 23  means the  price that a willing purchaser would pay to a willing seller for property having due  regard to  its existing  condition with  all its existing advantages  and its  potential  possibilities  when laid out  in the  most  advantageous  manner  excluding  any advantages due  to the  carrying out of the scheme for which the property is compulsorily acquired. In considering market value the disinclination of the vendor to part with his land and the  urgent necessity  of the purchaser to buy should be disregarded. [587E-F]

2

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 4  

    (3) There  is an element of guess work inherent in most cases involving  determination of  the market  value of  the acquired land. But, this in the very nature of things cannot be helped.  The essential  thing is  to  keep  in  view  the relevant factors  prescribed by  the Act. The finding of the High Court  is based  upon  consideration  of  the  evidence adduced in  the case  and there  are no grounds to interfere with that finding.[587F-G]

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1436 of 1968.      From the  Judgment and order dated 28-9-67 of the Patna High Court in Appeal from original Decree No. 129/62      V.S. Desai and B.P. Singh for the Appellant.      R.C. Prasad for the Respondent.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      KHANNA, J.-This  is  an  appeal  on  certificate  under article 133(1)  (a) of the Constitution against the judgment of the Patna High Court whereby the appeal of the respondent State against the award of the 586 learned Additional  District Judge Arrah was allowed in part and the  amount of compensation payable to the respondent in a land acquisition case was reduced.      The  respondent-State   acquired  23.70  acres  of  the appellant’s land out of plots Nos. 529 and 1262 appertaining to Khata  No. 1  in village  Tenduni in Shahbad district for the purpose  of constructing an Irrigation Research Station. Notification under  section 4  of the  Land Acquisition  Act (hereinafter referred  to as the Act) was first published on March 8,  1957,  but  this  notification  was  cancelled  on December 2,  1957. Another  notification for the acquisition of the  said land  was issued  under section 4 of the Act on January  1,  1959.  The  Land  Acquisition  officer  awarded compensation to  the appellant  at the rate of Rs. 3,000 per acre, besides  certain other  amounts with  which we are not concerned.  The  total  compensation  awarded  by  the  Land Acquisition officer came to Rs. 86,070.92. The appellant got a reference  made under  section  18  of  the  Act.  Learned Additional  District   Judge  Arrah   who  disposed  of  the reference held  the market  value of  the land to be Rs. 800 per katha. It is stated that there are 32 kathas in an acre. On appeal  by the  State the  High Court assessed the market value of the land at Rs. 475 per katha.      In appeal  before us, learned counsel for the appellant has  assailed  the  judgment  of  the  High  Court  and  has contended that  the High  Court was in error in reducing the rate at  which compensation  had been  awarded.  As  against that, learned counsel for the respondent-State has canvassed for the correctness of the view taken by the High Court.      We have  given the matter our consideration, and are of the view  that there is no merit in this appeal. A number of documents were  filed on  behalf of  the State  to show  the market value of the land in question. Those documents showed that a plot measuring 66 acres in the same village, in which the land  in dispute  is situated, was sold for Rs. 2,000 on March 13, 1958 at the rate of Rs. 94 per katha. Another sale transaction related  to the sale of 22.5 decimals of land on November 22,  1958 at  the rate of Rs. 58 per katha. A third transaction related  to the sale of .06 acre of land for Rs. 100 on  August 12, 1957 at the rate of Rs. 52 per katha. The Additional District  Judge excluded  these sale transactions

3

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 4  

out of consideration on the ground that the plots which were the subject matter of those sales were at some distance from the acquired  land. The  High Court  took the  view, in  our opinion rightly,  that these  sale transactions could not be excluded altogether  from consideration. The High Court also took into  account three  other sale  transactions which had been relied  upon by  the appellant. Those sale transactions related to sale of five dhurs of land for Rs. 275 on October 19, 1957  at the  rate of  Rs. 1,100  per katha, 15 dhurs of land for  Rs. 750  on November  5, 1956  at the  rate of Rs. 1,000 per  katha and  15 dhurs  of land  for  Rs.  750/-  on September 28,  1956 at  the rate of Rs. 1,000 per katha. One katha is said to consist of 20 dhurs. The land which was the subject of  these sale  transactions abutted  the road  and, from the  small size of the plots, it appears that they were purchased for the purpose of constructing 587 shops or  similar buildings  thereon. The land now sought to be acquired  does not  abut the road. It is in evidence that in making acquisition the strip of the land of the appellant up to a depth of 100 ft. from the road was not acquired. The High Court on taking into consideration the above three sale transactions relied  upon by  the appellant  and three  sale transactions relied  upon by  the respondent  found the mean price of  the land  covered by  the six  sale deeds  to be a little more  than Rs.  460 per  katha. The High Court in the circumstances came  to the conclusion that the just and fair market value  of the  land should be assessed at Rs. 475 per katha. The above rate included, according to the High Court, the potential  value of  the land.  In addition to that, the appellant was  held entitled  to 15  per cent  solatium  for compulsory acquisition.  We find  no infirmity  in the above approach of the High Court. The finding of the High Court is based upon  consideration of  the evidence  adduced  in  the case, and no cogent ground has been shown to us as to why we should interfere with that finding.      We may  observe  that  the  High  Court  excluded  from consideration certain  sale deeds executed by the appellant. These transactions  related to  small plots of land situated on the  roadside and  were entered  in to  after the land in dispute had been notified for acquisition. In the opinion of the High  Court, the  said sale  deeds could not form a safe criterion for  assessing the  market value  of the  acquired land because  they had been executed by the claimant himself after the  notification. It was also observed that the plots sold were  quite suitable  for shop or residential purposes. We find no sufficient reason to take a contrary view.      Section 23  of the Act provides that in determining the amount of   compensation  to be awarded for land acquisition under  the   Act  the  Court  shall  inter  alia  take  into consideration the  market value  of the  land at the date of the publication  of the  notification under section 4 of the Act. Market  value means  the price that a willing purchaser would pay  to a  willing seller  for the property having due regard to  its existing  condition  with  all  its  existing advantages and  its potential possibilities when laid out in the most advantageous manner excluding any advantages due to the carrying  out of  the scheme  for which  the property is compulsorily  acquired.  In  considering  market  value  the disinclination of  the vendor  to part with his land and the urgent  necessity   of  the   purchaser  to  buy  should  be disregarded. There  is an  element of guess work inherent in most cases  involving determination  of the  market value of the acquired  land, but  this in  the very  nature of things cannot be helped. The essential thing is to keep in view the

4

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 4  

relevant factors  prescribed by  the Act. If the judgment of the High  Court reveals that it has taken into consideration the relevant  factors, its  assessment of  the  fair  market value of  the acquired land should not be disturbed. No such infirmity has  been brought to our notice as might induce us to disturb  the  finding  of  the  High  Court.  The  appeal consequently fails and is dismissed but in the circumstances without costs. P.H.P.                                     Appeal dismissed. 588