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PETITIONER: THAKUR JUGAL KISHORE SINHA

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: SITAMARHI CENTRAL CO-OPERATIVE BANK LTD. & ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 13/03/1967

BENCH: MITTER, G.K. BENCH: MITTER, G.K. SHELAT, J.M.

CITATION:  1967 AIR 1494            1967 SCR  (3) 163  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1969 SC 724  (23,24)  RF         1969 SC1320  (33)  R          1974 SC 710  (40)

ACT: Bihar and Orissa Co-operative Societies Act,  1935-Assistant Registrar Co-operative Societies acting under s.  48-Whether a  court-Whether  subordinate  to the  High  Court  for  the purpose of contempt of Courts Act, 1952, s. 3.

HEADNOTE: The  appellant  in an appeal to the Joint Registrar  of  Co- operative   Societies  Bihar  alleged  that  the   Assistant Registrar  in deciding a matter against him under s.  48  of the  Bihar  and Orissa Co-operative Societies Act  1935  had discriminated  against  the appellant and  had  used  double standards.  In proceedings under the Contempt of Courts  Act the  High Court of Patna held the appellant guilty.   Appeal with  certificate  was filed in this Court.   The  questions that fell for consideration were : (i) whether the Assistant Registrar  of Co-operative Societies was a court within  the meaning of the Contempt of Courts Act 1952; (ii) If a court, whether it was a court subordinate to the Patna High  Court; (iii) whether the words used by the appellant in his, appeal amounted to contempt. HELD : The appellant had been rightly convicted. (i)  The  Assistant Registrar was functioning as a court  in deciding the dispute in question.  His adjudication was  not based upon a private reference nor was his decision  arrived at in a summary manner, but with all the paraphernalia of  a court and the powers of an ordinary civil court of the land. [173 E] (Decision  confined to cases under the Bihar Act  only).[180 G] Brajnandan  Sinha v. Joyti Narain, [1955] 2 S.C.R.  955  and Shri Virindar Kumar Satyawadi v. The State of Punjab, [1955] 2 S.C.R. 1013, relied on. Shell Co. of Australia v. Federal Commissioner of  Taxation, [1931] A.C. 275, Bharat Bank Limited v. Employees of  Bharat Bank  Ltd.  [1950] S.C.R. 459, Maqbool Hussain v.  State  of Bombay,  [1963] S.C.R. 730, Cooper v. Wilson, [1937] 2  K.B. 309,  Huddari,  Parker & Co. v. Moorehead, (1909)  8  C.L.R.

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330,  Malabar  Hill Co-operative Housing Society  v.  K.  L. Gauba,  A.I.R.  1964 Bom. 147, Raja Himanshu Dhar  Singh  v. Kunwar  B.  P. Sinha, 1962 All.  L.J. 57,  Sukhdeo  v.  Brij Bhushan, A.I.R. 1951 All. 667, In re Annamalai, A.I.R.  1953 Madras  362, Kapur Singh v. Jagat Narain, A.I.R. 1951  Punj. 49,  Lakhama Pesha v. Venkatrao, Swamirao, A.I.R. 1955  Bom. 103, Budhi Nath Jha v. Manital Jadav, A.I.R. 1960 Patna  361 and State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ratan Shukla, A.I.R. 1956 All. 258, referred to. (ii) The Assistant Registrar was a court subordinate to  the High Court for the purpose of s. 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act.   Under  Art. 227 of the Constitution  the  High  Court exercises  judicial  control over all courts  and  tribunals functioning   within   the   limits   of   its   territorial jurisdiction.  Subordination for the purposes of s. 3  means judicial  subordination  and  not  subordination  under  the hierarchy of courts under the Civil- Procedure 164 Code  or  the  Criminal Procedure Code Article  228  of  the Constitution does not indicate that unless a High Court  can withdraw  a case to itself from another court for  disposing of a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution the. latter court is not subordinate to the High Court. [176 D; 179 C, F] (iii)The  words  used by the appellant clearly  amounted  to contempt. [166 E] It  is in the interest of justice and administration of  law that  litigants should show the same respect to a  court  no matter  whether it is the highest in the land or whether  it is one of inferior jurisdiction only. [180 E-F]

JUDGMENT: CRIMINAL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No.18  of 1965. Appeal  from the judgment and order dated December 14,  1964 of the Patna High Court in Original Criminal Misc.  No. 6 of 1964. B.   P. Singh, for the appellant. D.   Goburdhun, for respondent No. 1. U.   P. Singh, for respondent No. 2. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Mitter,  J. This appeal by certificate granted by  the  High Court  at Patna under Art. 134(1)(c) of the Constitution  is directed against the judgment and order of that court  dated December 14, 1964 in Criminal Miscellaneous Appeal No. 6  of 1964  whereby the appellant was found guilty of contempt  of ,court,  i.e.,  of  the  Assistant  Registrar,  Co-operative Societies,  Sitamarhi Circle, exercising the powers  of  the Registrar,  Cooperative Societies, Bihar under S. 48 of  the Bihar and Orissa Cooperative Societies Act, 1935. The  three  questions which were argued before  us  in  this appeal  were :- (1) Whether the Assistant Registrar  of  Co- ,operative  Societies was a court within the meaning of  the Con-’ tempt of Courts Act, 1952; (2) Even if it was a court, whether  it was a court subordinate to the Patna High  Court and  (3) whether the words used by the appellant in  one  of his grounds of appeal to the Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies,  which  formed the basis of  the  complaint,  did amount to contempt of any court. The  facts necessary for the disposal of the appeal  are  as follows.   The  Sitamarhi  Central  Co-operative  Bank  Ltd. (formerly named as Sitamarhi Central Cooperative Union)  was a society registered under the Bihar and Orissa Co-operative

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Societies  Act,  1935, hereinafter referred to as  the  Act. The  appellant was the elected Chairman of the Society,  and was in control of its entire 165 affairs.   The  bank was engaged in carrying on  a  business inter alia in salt, sugar and kerosene oil.  It was  alleged that  the appellant entrusted to one Suraj Banshi  Choudhary the  work of supplying, coal for which purpose he was  given an  advance of Rs. 7,004-5-0 and that out of this  amount  a sum  of  Rs..  5,014-5-9 could not be  realised  from  Suraj Banshi Choudhary.  Thereafter, a surcharge proceeding  under s.  40 of the Act was taken up before the Registrar  of  Co- operative  Societies on December 22, 1953 when a sum of  Rs. 14,288-13-9  was held to be realisable from  *,be  appellant and  another  person.  The appellant went in appeal  to  the State  Government and by an order dated March 28,  1957  the amount was reduced to Rs. 5,014-5-9.  The bank was not  made a  party  to the appeal before the State Government  and  it raised  a dispute under s. 48 of the Act that the  appellant was  liable  for  the whole of the original  amount  of  Rs. 14,288-13-9 on the ,round that the State Government’s  order being ex parte was not binding on it.  This dispute went  to the Assistant Registrar of Co-operative Societies exercising powers of the Registrar under s. 48 of the Act.  On May  15, 1964,  the Assistant Registrar decided the matter  upholding the  contention of the bank and making the appellant  liable for the entire amount of Rs. 14,288-13-9.  In the  meantime, however, the appellant had challenged his liability for  the amount of Rs. 5,014-5-9 as determined in appeal by the State Government  by  a Writ Petition to the High Court  of  Patna which was dismissed.  He then filed a title suit before  the Subordinate  Judge  of  Muzaffarpur who decreed  it  in  his favour and at the time when the contempt matter was heard by the  Patna High Court, an appeal preferred by the bank  from the  said  decree  was pending before  the  District  Judge, Muzaffarpur.  The appellant preferred an appeal to the Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies against the order of the Assistant  Registrar  who was made respondent No. 2  in  the appeal.  One of the grounds of appeal ran as follows :-               "For  that  the order of respondent No.  2  is               mala  fide  inasmuch as  after  receiving  the               order of transfer he singled out this case out               of  so  many for disposal before  making  over               charge and used double standard in judging the               charges against the defendants Nos.  1 and 2.               It  is prayed that it should be declared  that               the  order  of  the  Assistant  Registrar   is               without  jurisdiction, illegal and  mala  fide               and  heavy  costs  should  be  awarded  making               respondent  No. 2 responsible mainly for  such               costs." The  bank  filed an application in the Patna High  Court  on August 14, 1964 for starting proceedings in contempt against the appellant.  The appellant filed a petition showing cause and  in grounds 29 and 30 of his petition, he asserted  that he was within 166 his  legitimate right to call the decision of the  Assistant Registrar  mala fide for the reasons given and that  he  had the  right  to  criticise the discriminatory  order  of  the Assistant  Registrar as the said officer had laid  down  two standards  in judging the alleged liability of  himself  and Sri  Jagannath  Jha by exonerating Jagannath  Jha  from  the liability  for  the entire amount of Rs.  14,288-13-9  while holding  the appellant liable for the entire amount  without

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examining the up-to-date position of payment of the  amounts for which the claim had been preferred.  In a  supplementary affidavit  filed on October 28, 1964, the appellant  further stated  that the order of the Assistant Registrar  was  mala fide  in  that at the time when it was  made  the  Assistant Registrar was due for transfer and he had picked out two  or three cases out of about fifty pending before him. The  High Court at Patna turned down all the contentions  of the  appellant  in an elaborate judgment and held  that  the appellant  was  guilty  of a calculated  contempt.   He  was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment until the rising of the court and to pay a fine of Rs. 200 in default whereof he was to undergo a further simple imprisonment for two weeks. The last of the three points urged before this Court was the weakest  to  be advanced.  There can be no  doubt  that  the words  used  in this case in the grounds of  appeal  clearly amounted  to  ’contempt  of  court  provided  the  Assistant Registrar  was  a court and the Contempt of Courts  Act  was applicable  to  the  facts  of  the  case.   The   Assistant Registrar was charged with having acted mala fide in that he had  singled out the case of the appellant out of  many  for disposal  and  used a double standard  in  his  adjudication against  the  appellant and Jagannath  Jha  clearly  meaning thereby  that  the Assistant Registrar had fallen  from  the path  of rectitude and had gone out of his way in taking  up and disposing of the case of the appellant out of many which were pending before him and which he could not possibly have completed because of his imminent transfer. According to Halsbury’s Laws of England (Third  Edition-Vol. 8) at p. 7 :               "Any  act done or writing published  which  is               calculated  to bring a court or a  Judge  into               contempt,  or  to lower his authority,  or  to               interfere  with the due course of  justice  or               the lawful process of the court, is a contempt               of  court.  Any episode in the  administration               of   justice  may,  however  be  publicly   or               privately   criticised,  provided   that   the               criticism  is fair and temperate and  made  in               good  faith.  The absence of any intention  to               refer to a court is a material point in favour               of a person alleged to be in contempt." 167 We  can, find nothing exculpatory in the reply to  the  show cause  notice filed by the appellant before the  Patna  High Court.  There he sought to justify his complaint made in his grounds of appeal.  The criticism of the Assistant Registrar was neither fair nor temperate nor made in good faith.   The obvious  aim of the appellant in formulating his  ground  of appeal in the way it was done was to show that the Assistant Registrar  had  acted  in a manner  which  was  contrary  to judicial  probity and that he should therefore be  penalised in costs. The  third ground therefore is devoid of any  substance  and cannot be accepted. In  order to appreciate whether the Assistant Registrar  was functioning  as a court, it is necessary to examine  certain provisions   Of   the  Act.   The  Act  which  is   both   a consolidating and an amending one was enacted to  facilitate the  formation,  working and consolidation  of  co-operative societies for the promotion of thrift, self-help and  mutual aid  among  agriculturists  and other  persons  with  common needs.  S. 2(1) defines ’Registrar’ as a person appointed to perform  the duties of a Registrar of cooperative  societies under  the  Act.   Under s. 6(1) the  State  Government  may

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appoint  a person to be Registrar of Co-operative  Societies for the State or any portion of it, and may appoint  persons to  assist  such Registrar.  Under s. 6 sub-s. (2)  (a)  the State Government may, by general or special order  published in  the  official gazette, confer on  any  person  appointed under sub-s. (1) to assist the Registrar, all or any of  the powers  of  the Registrar under the Act  except  the  powers under  s.  26.  Under s. 13, the registration of  a  society makes  it  a body corporate by the name under  which  it  is registered, with perpetual succession and a common seal  and with  power  to  acquire and hold property,  to  enter  into contracts,  to  institute and defend suits and  other  legal proceedings and to do all things necessary for the  Purposes for which it is constituted.  Chapter V deals with audit and inspection  of  societies.  Under s. 33 the  Registrar  must audit  or cause to be audited by some person  authorised  by him, the accounts of every registered society once at  least in every year.  Under sub-s. (4) of s. 33 the auditor has to submit   a  report  including  therein  inter   alia   every transaction which appears to him to be contrary to law,  the amount of any deficiency or loss which appears to have  been incurred  by the culpable negligence and misconduct  of  any Person,  the amount of any sum which ought to have been  but has  not  been brought into account by any  person  and  any money  or property belonging to the society which  has  been misappropriated  or  fraudulently  retained  by  any  person taking part in the organisation or management of the society or  by any past or present officer of the society or by  any other  person.S.35  provides for certain  inquiries  by  the Registrar.  S. 40 pro- 168 vides inter alia that where as a result of an audit under s. 33  or  an inquiry under s. 35 it appears to  the  Registrar that  any person who has taken part in the  Organisation  or management of the society or any past or present officer  of the society has made any payment which is contrary to law or by reason of his culpable negligence or misconduct  involved the  society in any loss or deficiency, or failed  to  bring into  account any sum which ought to have been brought  into account,  or  misappropriated or fraudulently  retained  any property of the society, he may inquire into the conduct  of such  person and after giving such person an opportunity  of being heard, make an order requiring him to contribute  such sum to the assets of the society.  Sub-s. (3) of s. 40  pro- vides  for an appeal from the order of the Registrar to  the State  Government  on  application made  by  the  person  or officer against whom the order was passed.  S. 48 enumerates various  kinds  of  disputes touching the  business  of  the registered society which must be referred to the  Registrar. Such disputes may be amongst members, past members,  persons claiming  through members, past members or  deceased  member and  sureties of members, past members or deceased  members, or  between  the society and any past  or  present  officer, agent  or  servant  of the society.  Under  sub-s.  (2)  the Registrar may on receipt of such reference- (a)  decide the dispute himself, or (b)  transfer  it for disposal to any person exercising  the powers of a Registrar in this behalf, or (c)  subject  to  any  rules, refer it for  disposal  to  an arbitrator or arbitrators. Under  sub-s. (3) the Registrar may withdraw  any  reference transferred  under cl. (b) of sub-s. (2) or  referred  under cf.  (c)  of the said sub-section and deal with  it  in  the manner  provided in the said sub-section.  Under sub-s.  (6) any  person  aggrieved by any decision given  in  a  dispute

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transferred  or referred under cl. (b) or (c) of sub-s.  (2) may   appeal  to  the  Registrar.   Sub-s.  (7)  gives   the Registrar,  in the case of dispute under this  section,  the power  of  review vested in a civil court under s.  114  and under 0. XLVII, r. 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as also  the inherent jurisdiction specified in s.  151  C.P.C. Sub-s. (8) gives the Registrar the power to state a case and refer  it to the District Judge for decision  whereupon  the decision of the District Judge is to be final.  Under sub-s. (9)  a  decision  of the Registrar under  this  section  and subject to the orders of the Registrar on appeal or  review, a decision given in a dispute transferred or referred  under cl.  (b) or (c) of sub-s. (2) is to be final.  S.  49  gives the Registrar power to summon and enforce the attendance  of witnesses and parties concerned and to examine them upon 169 oath  and to compel the production of any books of  account, documents  or property by the same means and so far  as  may be, in the same manner as is provided in the case of a civil court  under the Code of Civil Procedure.  S. 50  authorises the  Registrar  in  certain cases to  direct  attachment  of property  of any person who with intent to defeat  or  delay the  execution of any order that may be passed  against  him under s. 48 is about to dispose of the whole or any part  of his property or to remove any part of his property from  the local  limits of the jurisdiction of the Registrar.  S.57(1) provides that               "(1)  Save in so far as expressly provided  in               this Act, no civil or revenue court shall have               any  jurisdiction  in respect  of  any  matter               concerned  with the winding up or  dissolution               of a registered society under this Act, or  of               any  dispute  required  by section  48  to  be               referred   to   the  Registrar   or   of   any               proceedings, under Chapter VII-A." Chapter  VII-A  of the Act headed ’distraint’  provides  for recovery  or  a debt or outstanding by distraining while  in the possession of the defaulter any crops or other  products of  the earth standing or ungathered on the holding  of  the defaulter.   The Chapter contains sections making  elaborate provision for the sale of property distrained.  S . 66 gives the State Government power to frame rules for any registered society  or  a class of registered  societies.   The  latest rules are those framed in the year 1959.  Rule 68 lays  down the procedure for adjudication of disputes under s. 48.   It provides  for  a reference to the Registrar in  writing,  on receipt where of the Registrar has to cause notice of it  to be served on, the opposite party requiring him to show cause within  a  specified  time.  After a  written  statement  is filed,  the  Registrar  may decide the  dispute  himself  or transfer  it  to  any  person exercising  the  powers  of  a Registrar in this behalf or to an arbitrator.  There is also a   provision  for  substitution  of  the  heirs  or   legal representatives  of a party to the dispute who dies  pending the  adjudication.   The  Registrar  or  the  arbitrator  is obliged to give a decision in writing after considering  the evidence adduced by the parties. Before the   Registrar   or arbitrator, a party has a right to be represented by a legal practitioner. In   this  case,  the Assistant Registrar  concerned,  along with  several  other  persons, was given the  power  of  the Registrar under various sections of the Act including s.  48 [excepting sub-ss. (6) and (8)] by the State Government.  He was not a nominee of the Registrar. It will be noted from the above that the jurisdiction of the

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ordinary  civil  and revenue courts of the  land  is  ousted under s. 57 L4 Sup.  Cl/67-12 170 of  the Act in case of disputes which fell under S.  48.   A Registrar  exercising powers under S. 48 must  therefore  be held  to  discharge the duties which  would  otherwise  have fallen on the ordinary civil and revenue courts of the land. The Registrar has not merely the trappings of a court but in many  respects he is given the same powers as are  given  to ordinary  civil  courts  of the land by the  Code  of  Civil Procedure  including  the  power  to  summon  and   ;examine witnesses  on oath, the power to order inspection  of  docu- ments,  to hear the parties after framing issues, to  review his  own ,order and even exercise the inherent  jurisdiction of  courts  mentioned  in  s.  151  of  the  Code  of  Civil Procedure.   In  such  -a case, there is  no  difficulty  in holding  that in adjudicating upon a dispute referred  under s.  48  of  the Act, the Registrar is  to  all  intents  and purposes a court discharging the same functions and  ,duties in the same manner as a court of law is expected to do. According to Halsbury’s Laws of England (Third Edition  Vol. 9) at p. 342 :               "Originally  the  term  "court"  meant,  among               other meanings, the Sovereign’s palace; it has               acquired  the  meaning  of  the  place   where               justice is administered and, further, has come               to  mean  the persons  who  exercise  judicial               functions   under  authority  derived   either               immediately  or mediately from the  Sovereign.               All tribunals, however, are not courts, in the               sense  in  which the term  is  here  employed,               namely  to denote such tribunals  as  exercise               jurisdiction  over  persons by reason  of  the               sanction of the law, and not merely by  reason               of     voluntary    submission    to     their               jurisdiction."               Again,               "The  question  is whether the tribunal  is  a               court,  not whether it is a court of  justice,               for  there are courts which are not courts  of               justice.  In determining whether a tribunal is               a  judicial  body the facts that it  has  been               appointed by a non-judicial authority, that it               had  no power to administer an oath, that  the               chairman  has a casting vote, and  that  third               parties   have   power   to   intervene    are               immaterial, especially if the statute  setting               it  up prescribes a penalty for  making  false               statements; elements to be considered are  (1)               the requirement for a public hearing,  subject               to  a power to exclude the public in a  proper               case, and (2) a provision that a member of the               tribunal  shall not take part in any  decision               in  which  he  is  personally  interested,  or               unless  he  has been  present  throughout  the               proceedings." It  is  not necessary to examine the question at  any  great length,  because of certain authoritative pronouncements  of this Court. 171 In  Brainandan  Sinha v. Jyoti Narain(1) the  question  was, whether  a commissioner appointed under the Public  Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850 was a court within the meaning of  the Contempt  of  Courts Act, 1952.  There, after  referring  to

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authorities  like Coke on Littleton and Stroud and  Stephen, the  Privy  Council decision in Shell Co.  of  Australia  v. Federal   Commissioner  of  Taxation(2)  and   the   earlier decisions  in  Bharat Batik Limited v. Employees  of  Bharat Bank Ltd.(4), Maqbool Hussain v. The State of Bombay(5)  and Cooper v. Wilson(5) it was observed :               "It  is  clear, therefore, that  in  order  to               constitute a court in the strict sense of  the               term, an essential condition is that the court               should  have,  apart from having some  of  the               trappings  of  a judicial tribunal,  power  to               give a decision or a definitive judgment which               has  finality and authoritativeness which  are               the    essential   tests   of    a    judicial               pronouncement." Reference was there made to the dictum of Griffith, C.J.  in Huddart, Parker & Co. v. Moorehead(6) where he said:               "I  am  of opinion that  the  words  ’judicial               power’   as   used  in  section  71   of   the               Constitution  mean  the  powers  which   every               sovereign authority must of necessity have  to               decide controversies between its subjects,  or               between  itself and its subjects, whether  the               rights  relate to life, liberty  or  property.               The  exercise  of this power  does  not  begin               until some tribunal which has power to give  a               binding  and authoritative  decision  (whether               subject  to appeal or not) is called  upon  to               take action." Reference may also be made to the decision of this Court  in Shri  Virindar  Kumar Satyawadi v. The State  of  Punjab(7). There  the question was, whether a returning officer  acting under ss. 33 and 36 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951  and  deciding  on  the  validity  or  otherwise  of  a nomination  paper was not a court within the meaning of  ss. 195  (1)  (b),  476  and  476-B  of  the  Code  of  Criminal Procedure.   Here, too, the authorities which were cited  in the case of Brainandan Sinha’s case(1) were reviewed and  it was said :                "It   may   be  stated  broadly   that   what               distinguishes  a court from  a  quasi-judicial               tribunal is that it is charged with a duty  to               decide  disputes  in  a  judicial  manner  and               declares the rights of parties in a definitive               judgment.   To  decide in  a  judicial  manner               involves that the parties (1)  [1955] 2 S.C.R. 955. (3)  [1950] 1 S.C.R. 459. (5)  [1937] 2 K.B. 309, 340. (2)  [1931]  A.C. 275. (4)  [1963] S.C.R. 730. (6)  [1909] 8 C.L.R. 330, 357. (7)  [1955] 2 S.C.R. 1013 at 1018. 172               are entitled as a matter of right to be  heard               in  support  of  their  claim  and  to  adduce               evidence in proof of it.  And it also  imports               an obligation on the part of the authority  to               decide  the matter on a consideration  of  the               evidence  adduced and in accordance with  law.               When a question therefore arises as to whether               an  authority created by an Act is a court  as               distinguished from a quasi-judicial  tribunal,               what  has  to be decided  is  whether  having,               regard  to  the  provisions  of  the  Act   it

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             possesses all the attributes of a court." This  Court then went on to consider whether  the  functions and powers entrusted to the returning officer under the  Act made, him a court.  It was noted that under S. 36(2) of  the Act,  the  returning officer has to examine  the  nomination paper  and decide all objections which may be made  thereto. It  was  noted that the power was  undoubtedly  judicial  in character  but  the  parties  had  no  right  to  insist  on producing  evidence  which they might desire  to  adduce  in support  of their case and there was no  machinery  provided for the summoning of witnesses, or of compelling  production of  documents and the returning officer was entitled to  act suo motu in the matter.  The Court further remarked that  in a  proceeding under S. 36 there was no lis in which  persons with  opposing  claims were entitled to  have  their  rights adjudicated in a judicial manner but the enquiry was such as was usually conducted by an ad hoc tribunal entrusted with a quasi-judicial  power.   Consequently it was held  that  the returning  officer deciding on the validity of a  nomination paper  was  not a court for the purpose of s. 1 95  (1)  (b) Cr.P.C.  with  the result that even as  regards  the  charge under s. 193, the order of the Magistrate was not appealable as  the offence was not committed in or in relation  to  any proceedings in a court.  It  will not be out of place to recapitulate what was  said in  Cooper  v.  Wilson (1) and  referred  to  in  Brainandan Sinha’s case (2).  The passage runs thus :               "A  true  judicial  decision  presupposes   an               existing dispute between two or more  parties,               and  then involves four requisites :- (1)  The               presentation (not necessarily orally) of their               case by the parties to the dispute; (2) if the               dispute  between them is a question  of  fact,               the  ascertainment  of the fact  by  means  of               evidence adduced by the parties to the dispute               and  often with the assistance of argument  by               or  on behalf of the parties on the  evidence;               (3) if the dispute between them is a  question               of law, the submission of legal arguments by (1) [1937] 2 K.B. 309. (2) [1955] 2 S.C.R. 955. 173               the parties; and (4) a decision which disposes               of  the  whole matter by a  finding  upon  the               facts in dispute and an application of the law               of  the land to the facts so found,  including               where  required  a ruling  upon  any  disputed               question of law." In our opinion, all the above requisites are to be found  in this case.  The question before the Assistant Registrar  was whether  the appellant and Jagannath Jha had caused loss  to the bank and whether they were liable to compensate the bank for  it.  This arose out of audit proceedings.  There was  a written  reference  to the Registrar.  There was  a  dispute between  the  bank  on the one hand and  the  appellant  and Jagannath Jha on the other to be decided with the assistance of arguments and on the evidence adduced.  The dispute was a question  of law dependent on the facts of the case and  the decision  disposed  of  the  whole  matter  by  finding  the appellant liable for the entire amount.  As we have  already remarked, the Assistant Registrar had almost all the  powers which  an  ordinary civil court of the land would  have,  of summoning  witnesses,  compelling production  of  documents, examining  witnesses on oath and coming to a  conclusion  on the  evidence  adduced and the arguments  submitted.   Under

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sub-r.  (10)  of r. 68 the parties could be  represented  by legal practitioners.  The result is the same as if a  decree was  pronounced by a court of law.  The adjudication of  the Assistant  Registrar was not based upon a private  reference nor  was  his decision arrived at in a summary  manner,  but with  all the paraphernalia of a court and the powers of  an ordinary civil court of the land. We were however referred to decisions of certain High Courts in  support of the contention that the  Assistant  Registrar was not  a court for the purposes of the Contempt of  Courts Act.  the  latest of these decisions is that of  the  Bombay High  Court in Malabar Hill Co-operative Housing Society  v. K.  L.  Gauba(1).   There an application  was  made  by  the society  against  one K. L. Gauba for the  alleged  contempt committed  by  him on the Third opponent, a nominee  of  the Registrar, appointed under s. 54 of the Bombay  Co-operative Societies Act, 1925.  The facts of the case were as follows. Gauba  and his wife were members of the society and  at  the material  time  were  residing in two flats in  one  of  the society’s  premises.   The terms and conditions on  which  a flat  was allotted to the wife were that an initial  payment of Rs. 6.001 had to be made towards the qualifying shares of the society and membership fees and thereafter a payment  of Rs.  580 per Mrs. Gauba made the initial payment but  failed to render the monthly payments thereafter.  The society made an  application tinder s. 54 of the Act to the Registrar  of Co-operative (1)  A.I.R.1964 Bom. 147 at 152. 174 Societies  relating  to  the dispute  arising  out  of  Mrs. Gauba’s failure to make the monetary payments.  The  dispute was referred to his nominee by the Registrar and the nominee made  an  award  directing Mrs. Gauba to pay a  sum  of  Rs. 49,492-15  to  the  society.  Being unable  to  recover  the money, the Society made another application to the Registrar under S. 54 of the Act praying for a direction for  eviction of  Mrs.  Gauba  from  the  flat  in  her  occupation.   The Registrar,  in exercise of his powers under S.  54  referred this  dispute  to  his nominee Mr. C. P.  Patel  (the  third opponent to the petition before the High Court).  This  case was   numbered  as  Arbitration  Case  of  1961.   In   this arbitration  case, Gauba appeared on behalf of his  wife  as her  agent.  It appears that Mrs. Gauba could not be  served for  some time and the case had to be adjourned  on  certain occasions.  After a number of adjournments, when the  matter was taken up on February 15, 1962, Gauba is alleged to  have abused Mr. Patel calling him "dishonest" and "a cheat".  Mr. Gauba  contended before the High Court that on the  date  on which  he was said to have uttered the abuses Mr. Patel,  in law,  had ceased to function as a nominee of the  Registrar, that the proceedings before Mr. Patel were in the nature  of arbitration  proceedings,  that Mr. Patel was  not  a  court within the meaning of the Contempt of Courts Act and lastly, even  if he was a court, he was not a court  subordinate  to the  Bombay  High  Court under sub-s. (2) of  S.  3  of  the Contempt  of  Courts Act, the alleged contempt being  an  ex facie  contempt amounting to an offence under S. 228  I.P.C. On the question as to whether Mr. Patel was functioning as a court, the Bombay High Court came to the conclusion that the tests laid down by this Court in  Brajnandan Sinha’s case(1) had  not been satisfied.  According to the  learned  Judges, the   Registrar’s   nominee  although   possessing   certain trappings  of  a court, had no independent seisin  over  the case  and  the  power  exercised  by  him  was  that  of  an arbitrator  enabling  him to make an award.  Such  an  award

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would not be equated with a judgement or a decision given by a  Court.   The learned Judges relied strongly on  the  fact that  the Registrar had power to withdraw the  dispute  from his nominee and that the latter was in duty bound to  decide the dispute within two months.  All this, in the opinion  of the learned Judges, went to establish that the,  proceedings were  those  in arbitration and not before a  court.   After referring to Brainandan Sinha’s case(1) and to Shell Co.  of Australia  v.  Federal  Commissioner  of  Taxation  (2)  the learned  Judges  concluded  their  judgment  on  this  point observing :               "Thus  apart  from the fact that  the  statute               refers  to  the decision of a  nominee  as  an               award in express terms,               (1) [1955]2 S.C.R. 955.               (2) [1931] A.C. 275.               175               and a reference to him is a reference for  his               arbitration, the provision of the Act relating               to   the  appointment  of  a  nominee   itself               indicates  that  the power,  which  a  nominee               derives  for  deciding the dispute, is  not  a               power derived by him from the State." The next decision referred to us was that of a single  Judge of  the Allahabad High Court in Raja Himanshu Dhar Singh  v. Kunwar  B. P. Sinha(1).  In this case a dispute arising  out of certain resolutions passed by the Hind Provincial  Flying Club   were  referred  to  the  Registrar  of   Co-operative Societies under the provisions of the Co-operative Societies Act of Uttar Pradesh and the Registrar delegated his  powers to the Assistant Registrar to arbitrate in the matter.   The Assistant  Registrar  issued an injunction that  no  further meeting should be called and this direction was flouted  and disobeyed.   The learned Judge came to the  conclusion  that "only  those arbitrators can be deemed to be courts who  are appointed  through  a court and not  those  arbitrators  who function without the intervention of a court." In  our  opinion, neither of these decisions lays  down  any reasoning  which would compel us to hold that the  Assistant Registrar  of Co-operative Societies in this case was not  a court.   In the Bombay case, the matter was referred to  the Assistant  Registrar  as  a nominee who had  to  act  as  an arbitrator  and  make an award.  So also  in  the  Allahabad case, the Assistant Registrar merely acted as an arbitrator. In   the  case  before  us,  the  Assistant  Registrar   was discharging the functions of the Registrar under s. 6(2)  of the  Act  under  the  authority  of  the  State   Government delegating the powers of the Registrar to him. It was sought to be argued that a reference of a dispute had to be filed before the Registrar and under sub-s. 2(b) of s. 48  the  Registrar  transferred  it  for  disposal  to   the Assistant Registrar and therefore his position was the  same as that of a nominee under the Bombay Co-operative Societies Act.   We  do  not think that  contention  is  sound  merely because sub-s. (2) (c) of s. 48 authorises the Registrar  to refer   a   dispute  for  disposal  of  an   arbitrator   or arbitrators.  This procedure was however not adopted in this case and we need not pause to consider what would have  been the  effect  if  the matter had been  so  transferred.   The Assistant  Registrar  had all the powers of a  Registrar  in this case as noted in the delegation and he was competent to dispose of it in the same manner as the Registrar would have done.   It  is interesting to note that under r.  68  sub-r. (10)  of the Bihar and Orissa Cooperative  Societies  Rules, 1959 :

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             "In   proceedings  before  the  Registrar   or               arbitrator  a  party may be represented  by  a               legal practitioner." (1)  [1962]  All. L. J. 57. 176 In  conclusion, therefore, we must hold that  the  Assistant Registrar was functioning as a court in deciding the dispute between the bank and the appellant and Jagannath Jha. Then  comes the question as to whether the Assistant  Regis- trar  was  a  court  subordinate to  the  High  Court.   The foundation ,of the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant  is provided by the difference in the  wording  of Arts  . 227 and 228 of ,the Constitution.  Under sub-s.  (1) of S. 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952 every High Court shall  have and exercise the same jurisdiction,  powers  and authority,  in  accordance  with  the  same  procedure   and practice,  in respect of contempts of courts subordinate  to it  as  it  has and exercises in respect  of  contempts  ,of itself.  Sub-s. (2) lays down that the High Court shall  not take cognizance of a contempt alleged to have been committed in respect of a court subordinate to it where such  contempt is an offence punishable under the Indian Penal Code.  Under Art.  227 every High Court shall have  superintendence  over all  courts  land tribunals throughout  the  territories  in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction.  Under Art. 228 if  the  High Court is satisfied that a cause pending  in  a court  subordinate to it involves a substantial question  of law  as  to  the  interpretation  of  the  Constitution  the determination of which is necessary for the disposal -of the case,  it shall withdraw the case and may either dispose  of the  case itself or determine the said question of  law  and return the case to the court from which the case has been so withdrawn.  -On  the  basis of the  difference  in  language between  these  two  Articles  it  was  contended  that  the legislature  in passing the Contempt of Courts Act  in  1952 must  be  taken  to  have  contemplated  the  cognizance  of contempts  of such courts only as would be covered  by  Art. 228  and not Art. 227.  This has given rise to  considerable judicial conflict as we shall presently note.  In Sukhdeo v. Brij  Bhushan(1)  the question was  whether  the  Panchayati Adalats  constituted under the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act,  1947 were  courts  within the meaning of the Contempt  of  Courts Act.    After  an  exhaustive  analysis  of  the  power   of superintendence   of  the  High  Courts   under   successive Government of India Acts 1915, 1935 and the Constitution,  a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court held that  court, after   the   Constitution,   ]lad   the   same   power   of superintendence  which  it  had after  the  passing  of  the Government  of India Act, 1935 and that "in exercise  of  it can  check  the  assumption or  excess  of  jurisdiction  by Panchayat Adalats or compel them to exercise their jurisdic- tion  and do their duty and they were therefore,  judicially subordinate to the Allahabad High Court." In re Annamalai(2) the .,question was whether a civil revision petition against an order ill (1) A.I.R. 1951 All. 667. (2) A.I.R. 1953 Mad. 362. 177 the nature of an award passed by the Deputy Registrar of Co- operative  Societies  was entertainable by  the  High  Court acting  under Art. 227 of the Constitution and  there  after examining  a  number of authorities, a single Judge  of  the Madras  High  Court  concluded  that  the  High  Court   had revisional   jurisdiction   under  Art.  227   by   way   of superintendence over the judicial work of a duly constituted

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tribunal  like the Deputy Registrar under  the  Co-operative Societies  Act.   Of  course, the  question  the  court  was immediately concerned with there was the scope of the  power of superintendence, and it was observed that :               "Superintendence includes power to guide,  and               encourage Judges of the subordinate Courts, to               direct  subordinate  courts and  tribunals  to               carry  out its orders; and to  direct  enquiry               with  a view to take disciplinary  action  for               flagrant maladministration of justice." It  was not necessary for the purpose of that case  to  take note   of  the  difference,  if  any,  between   the   words ’superintendence’  and ,subordination’.  In Kapur  Singh  v. Jagat  Narain(1) a Division Bench of the Punjab  High  Court took the view that "superintendence’ would include the power to deal with a content of court of a kind not punishable  by the  Court of the Commissioner itself appointed to  hold  an inquiry under Public Servants Inquiries Act, 1850) and  that for  the  purpose  of the Contempt of Courts  Act  the  word "subordinate"  would include all courts and  tribunals  over which  the High Court is given the power of  superintendence under  Art.  227 of the Constitution." In Lakhana  Pesha  v. Venkatrao  Swamirao(1) the question was, whether  the  Chief Judge  of  the  Court  of Small  Causes  acting  as  persona designate  under  the  Bombay  Municipal  Act  was  a  court subordinate to the High Court for the purpose of ss. 2 and 3 of  the Contempt of Courts Act.  Chagla, C.J. took the  view that               "the  power of superintendence conferred  upon               the  High Court under Art. 227 is clearly  not               only administrative but also judicial and  the               restriction imposed upon the High Court by  s.               224(2),  Government  of India Act  is  thereby               removed.    Now,   the   power   of   judicial               superintendence which has been conferred  upon               the  High  Court  is in respect  not  only  of               courts  but also of Tribunals  throughout  the               territories  in  relation to  which  the  High               Court exercises jurisdiction, and the question               that  arises  is  whether  in  view  of   this               constitutional  position it could not be  said               of  a ’persona designata’ that it is  a  court               subordinate to the High               Court. (1)  A.I.R. 1951 Punjab 49. (2)  A.I.R. 1955 Bombay  163. 178                      Now, the subordination contemplated  by               S. 3 is a judicial subordination and there can               be no doubt that the Chief Judge, although  he               is  a persona designata’, is a tribunal  which               would  fall  within the purview and  ambit  of               Art. 227." Further, according to the learned Chief Justice there was no reason or principle on which any distinction could be  drawn between  a  civil court which was subordinate  to  the  High Court and a tribunal which was subordinate to the High Court under Art. 227 of the Constitution. The nature of jurisdiction exercised by the High Court under Art.  227 of the Constitution was gone into at length  by  a Full  Bench  of the Patna High Court in Budhi  Nath  Jha  v. Manilal Jadav (1).  There it was observed that               "It  is  also  apparent  that  the  power   of               revision  conferred upon the High Court  under               Art.  227  of the Constitution is  similar  in

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             nature  to  the appellate power  of  the  High               Court,  though  the power under  Art.  227  is               circumscribed  by various limitations.   These               limitations,   however  do  not   affect   the               intrinsic  quality of the power granted  under               Art.  227  of the Constitution, which  is  the               same as appellate power." The learned Chief Justice of the Patna High Court relied  to a very great extent on a passage from Story reading :               "The   essential   criterion   of    appellate               jurisdiction is, that it revises and  corrects               the proceedings in a cause already  instituted               and does not create that cause.  In  reference               to    judicial    tribunals    an    appellate               jurisdiction,  therefore, necessarily  implies               that  the  subject  matter  has  been  already               instituted and acted upon by some other court,               whose  judgment  or  proceedings  are  to   be               revised."   For  the  purpose  of this case, it is  not  necessary  to decide  whether revisional jurisdiction is the same  as  the appellate  jurisdiction but it is enough to hold that  under Art.  227  of  the Constitution, the  High  Court  exercises judicial  control over all courts and tribunals  functioning within the limits of its territorial jurisdiction. Our attention was drawn to a judgment of the Allahabad  High Court  in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ratan Shukla(2).   There proceedings were instituted against the respondent, a  vakil practising in the District Judgeship of Kanpur, on a  report made  by  the District Judge, Kanpur on being moved  by  the Additional District Magistrate of Kanpur in whose court  the alleged contempt (1) A.1,R. 1960 Patna 361. (2) A.I.R. 1956 All. 258. 179 was committed by the Opposite party.  There both the  Judges were  of opinion that the act of the opposite party did  not amount  to contempt of court, and Beg.  J. did not  g0  into the question as to whether the authority where the  contempt of  court  was said to have been committed was acting  as  a court or not.  Desai, J. however relying to a large  extent, on  the  language of Arts. 227 and 228 of  the  Constitution held  that the Magistrate even if he was acting as  a  court was  by no means, in the circumstances, a court  subordinate to the Allahabad High Court.  In  our  opinion,  Art. 228 of the  Constitution  does  not indicate  that  unless a High Court can withdraw a  case  to itself  from  another court for disposing of  a  substantial question   of   law  as  to  the   interpretation   of   the Constitution,  the  latter court is not subordinate  to  the High  Court.   This  Article  is  only  intended  to  confer jurisdiction and power on the High Court to withdraw a  case for the purpose mentioned above from the ordinary courts  of law  whose decision may, in the normal course of things,  be taken up to the High Court by way of an appeal.  Art. 227 is of  wider ambit; it does not limit the jurisdiction  of  the High  Court to the hierarchy of courts functioning  directly under  it  under  the  Civil  Procedure  Code  and  Criminal Procedure Code but it gives the High Court power to  correct errors  of  various  kinds of au  courts  and  tribunals  in appropriate  cases.  Needless to add that errors as  to  the interpretation of the Constitution is not out of the purview of  Art.  227 although the High Court could not,  under  the powers conferred by this Article, withdraw a case to  itself from a tribunal and dispose of the same, or determine merely

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the  question  of  law  as  to  the  interpretation  of  the Constitution arising before the tribunal.  In our view,  the subordination  for  the purpose of s. 3 of the  Contempt  of Courts   Act   means   judicial   subordination   and    not subordination under the hierarchy of courts under the  Civil Procedure Code or the Criminal Procedure Code. It may not be out of place to note that "subordinate courts" have  been dealt with in Chapter VI of the Constitution  and Art.  235  of  the Constitution gives the  High  Court  "the control  over  District  Courts  and  courts   subordinating thereto"  by  providing  for powers  like  the  posting  and promotion,  and the grant of leave to persons  belonging  to the  judicial  service  of a State.   Such  control  is  not judicial  control and a court may be subordinate to  a  High Court for purposes other than judicial control.  Even before ,"tie  framing of the Constitution s. 2 of the  Contempt  of Courts  Alit,  1926 made express provision giving  the  High Courts  in India the same jurisdiction, power and  authority in  accordance  with  the same  practice  and  procedure  in respect  of contempt of courts subordinate to them  as  they had in respect of contempts of themselves.  The preamble  to the Act shows that it was 180 enacted for the purpose of resolving doubts as to the powers of  High Courts to punish contempts of courts and to  define and  limit  the powers exercisable by the  High  Courts  and Chief Courts in punishing contempts of court.  The  Contempt of  Courts Act, 1952 repealed the Act of 1926 and  reenacted the  provisions thereof in substantially the same  language. In  England  "the  Queen’s  Bench  Division  has  a  general superintendence over all crimes whatsoever and watches  over the proceedings of inferior courts, not only to prevent them from  exceeding  their  jurisdiction  or  otherwise   acting contrary   to  law,  but  also  to  prevent   persons   from interfering  with  the course of justice in such  courts"  : (See Halsbury’s Laws of England-Third Edition), Vol. 8, page 19. Generally  speaking  "any conduct that tends  to  bring  the authority  and administration of the law into disrespect  or disregard or to interfere with or prejudice party  litigants or  their  witnesses  during their  litigation"  amounts  to contempt of court : see Oswald on Contempts page 6. In order that courts should be able to dispense justice without  fear or  favour,  affection  or ill-will, it  is  essential  that litigants who resort to courts should so conduct  themselves as not to bring the authority and the administration of  law into  disrespect or disregard.  Neither should  they  exceed the  limits  of  fair  criticism  or  use  language  casting aspersions  on the probity of the courts or questioning  the bona fides of their judgments.  This applies equally to  all Judges  and all litigants irrespective of the status of  the Judge, i.e., whether he occupies one of the highest judicial offices  in the land or is the presiding officer of a  court of  very  limited jurisdiction.  It is in the  interests  of justice and administration of law that litigants should show the same respect to a court, no matter whether it is highest in  the land or whether it is one of  inferior  jurisdiction only.   The  Contempt of Courts Act, 1952  does  not  define ’contempt’  or ‘ courts’ and in the interest of justice  any conduct  of the kind mentioned above towards any person  who can   be  called  a  ’court’  should  be  amenable  to   the jurisdiction  under  the Contempt of Courts Act,  1952.   It must  be  borne in mind that we do not propose to  lay  down that  all Registrars of all Co-operative Societies  ’in  the different  States  are  "courts"  for  the  purpose  of  the

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Contempt  of  Courts Act, 1952.  Our decision  is  expressly limited  to the Registrar and the Assistant  Registrar  like the  one  before  us governed by "he Bihar  and  Orissa  Co- operative Societies Act.    The second point also fails and the appeal is dismissed. G.C.                              Appeal dismissed. 181