http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 18  

PETITIONER: TEKRAJ VASANDI ALIAS K.L. BASANDHI

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: UNION OF INDIA & OTHERS

DATE OF JUDGMENT10/12/1987

BENCH: MISRA RANGNATH BENCH: MISRA RANGNATH RANGNATHAN, S.

CITATION:  1988 AIR  469            1988 SCR  (2) 260  1988 SCC  (1) 236        JT 1987 (4)   621  1987 SCALE  (2)1278  CITATOR INFO :  F          1992 SC  76  (3,6)

ACT:      Service matter-Dismissal  from service  as a  result of disciplinary   action-Institute    of   Constitutional   and Parliamentary Studies-Whether  ’State’ within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution.

HEADNOTE: %      The  appellant,   an  employee   of  the  Institute  of Constitutional  and  Parliamentary  Studies  (I.C.P.S.,  for short), was  dismissed from  service by order dated November 17, 1982,  as a result of disciplinary action. He challenged the dismissal  order by  a writ  petition  before  the  High Court. The  question whether  the  I.C.P.S.  was  a  ’State’ within the  meaning of  Article 12 of the Constitution arose for consideration  as a major issue in the matter before the High Court.  A Single  Judge of the High Court dismissed the petition, holding  that the  employer was  neither an agency nor  an  instrumentality  of  the  government  and  did  not constitute ’State’  as above  said, and,  therefore, was not subject to  the writ  jurisdiction of  the High  Court.  The appeal  against  that  judgment  of  the  Single  Judge  was dismissed by the Division Bench of the High Court. Aggrieved by the  decision of the High Court, the appellant moved this Court by special leave.      Disposing of the appeal, the Court, ^      HELD: In  the course  of hearing,  Dr.  Anand  Prakash, counsel for  the I.C.P.S.,  respondent No.  2,  stated  that whether the  Institute be  ’State’ or not within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution, the employer was prepared to give  a fresh  opportunity to  the appellant  to meet the charges against  him. With  that concession,  the  order  of dismissal, etc.  passed against  the appellant  should  have been set  aside and  the matter  should have gone before the enquiry officer,  but Dr.  Anand Prakash as also counsel for the Union  of India invited the Court to decide the issue as to whether  the  I.C.P.S.  constituted  ’State’  within  the constitutional meaning of the term. [263H; 264A-C]

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 18  

    The main  question for  consideration then  was whether I.C.P.S. was  a ’State’.  I.C.P.S. could become ’State’ only if it  was found  to be an authority within the territory of India or  under the  control of  the  Government  of  India. [264D,G] 261      I.C.P.S. is  a registered  society. The  emergence of a new generation  within less than two decades of independence gave rise  to a feeling that the people’s representatives in the Legislatures required the acquisition of the appropriate democratic bias and spirit. I.C.P.S. was born as a voluntary organisation to  fulfil this requirement. The Speaker of the Lok Sabha was its first President. Three Ministers, a former Chief Justice  of India and a former Attorney General joined as its  Vice-Presidents. Some  of the  public officers  were associated in  its Administrative  set-up. Services  of some employees of  Parliament were  lent to  it. While Article 12 refers to  Parliament as  such, a  few members of Parliament cannot be  considered as Parliament so as to constitute that body as  referred to  in Article  12. The  Speaker  and  the Ministers who  joined as Vice-Presidents of the Society were there in  their personal  capacities and  not as  Ministers, etc. There  were  many  people  in  the  category  of  Vice- President, Executive  Chairman, Treasurer  and members,  who were not  a part of the Government, and some of them did not belong to Parliament. [281A-F]      The  objects  of  the  Society  were  not  governmental business. Many  of the  objects  of  the  Society  were  not confined to  the two  Houses of Parliament and were intended to have an impact on Society at large. [281G-H]      The Memorandum  of the  Society permitted acceptance of gifts, donations  and subscriptions.  No material was placed before the  Court for  the stand  that the  Society was  not entitled to receive contributions from any indigenous source without government sanction. Since government money has been coming, the  usual conditions  attached to government grants have been  applied and  enforced. If  the Society’s  affairs were really  intended to  be carried on as a part of the Lok Sabha or Parliament as such, the manner of functioning would have been different. The accounts of the Society are subject to  audit   as  the   affairs  of  the  Societies  receiving government grants  are. Government  imposes  conditions  and restrictions when  grants are  made, and the Society is also subject  to   the  same,   and  the   mere  fact  that  such restrictions  are  made is not a determinative aspect.[281H; 282 A-D]      There are  registered societies which have been treated as ’State’,  but  in  the  case  of  each  of  them,  either governmental business  had been undertaken by the Society or what was expected to be the public obligation of the ’State’ had been  undertaken to  be  performed  as  a  part  of  the Society’s function. [282H; 283A] 262      Having given  anxious consideration to the facts of the case, the  Court is  not in a position to hold that I.C.P.S. is either an agency or an instrumentality of the State so as to come  within the  purview of other authorities"in Article 12 of  the Constitution.  I.C.P.S. is  a case  of its  type- typical in  many ways  and normal  tests may,  perhaps,  not properly  apply   to  test   its  character.  Even  if  some institution becomes  ’State’ within  the meaning  of Article 12, its employees do not become holders of Civil posts so as to become  entitled to  the cover  of  Article  311  of  the Constitution.  They  would,  however,  be  entitled  to  the benefits of  Part III of the Constitution. It is unnecessary

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 18  

to examine  the appellant’s case, keeping Articles 14 and 16 of the  Constitution in  view,  as,  on  the  concession  of counsel for I.C.P.S., the proceedings would have to re-open. [283C-E]      In the  result, the  appellant would be entitled to the following reliefs.      The order  of dismissal  set aside  and the proceedings restored to the stage of enquiry. [283F]      The appellant  shall be deemed to have been restored to service and  he  would  become  entitled  to  normal  relief available in  such a situation. He should be deemed to be in service  and   his  suspension   would  not   continue.  His suspension, which  had merged  into dismissal is vacated. It shall,  however,  be  open  to  the  employer  to  make  any direction as is deemed appropriate in that behalf in future. [283F-G]      The appellant  becomes entitled  to salary for the past period subject to his satisfying the authorities that he had not earned any income during that period. [283H]      The appellant  shall be  given a reasonable opportunity by the enquiring officer to meet the charges and the enquiry shall be completed within four months. [283H; 284A]      The enquiry  officer  shall  allow  inspection  to  the appellant of all records relevant to the enquiry. [284B]      Rajasthan State  Electricity Board, Jaipur v. Mohan Lal and Ors., [1967] 3 SCR 377; Smt. Ujjam Bai v. State of Uttar Pradesh, [1963] l SCR 778; Sabhajit Tewary v. Union of India JUDGMENT: Sardar Singh  Raghuvanshi &  Anr., [1975]  3 SCR 619; Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. The 263 International Airport  Authority of  India &  Ors., [1979] 3 SCR  1014;  Managing  Director,  Uttar  Pradesh  Warehousing Corporation &  Anr. v.  Vinay Narayan Vajpayee, [1980] 2 SCR 773; Ajay  Hasia, etc.  v. Khalid  Mujib Sehravardi  &  Ors. etc., [1981]  2 SCR  79; Som  Prakash Rekhi v Union of India and Anr., [1981] 2 SCR 111; B.S.Minhas v. Indian Statistical Institute & Ors., [1984] 1 SCR 395 and P. K Ramachandra Iyer and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., [1984] 2 SCR 200.

&      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Civil  Appeal No. 495 of 1984.      From the  Judgment and  order dated  1.11.1983  of  the Delhi High Court in L.P.A. No. 160 of 1983.      P. P. Rao and A. Mariaputham for the Appellant.      Dr. Anand  Prakash, D.N.  Dwivedi, Mrs.  Anil  Katiyar, C.V. Subba  Rao, Vineet  Kumar and  Deepak K. Thakur for the Respondents.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      RANGANATH MISRA,  J. This appeal by special leave calls in question  the judgment  of a  Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in a Letters Patent Appeal upholding the decision of a learned Single Judge rejecting the writ petition of the appellant. The appellant was an employee of the Institute of Constitutional and Parliamentary Studies (hereafter referred to as  ICPS for  short) and  in a disciplinary action he was dismissed from  service by  order dated 17th November, 1982. When he  assailed the  order in  a writ  petition before the High Court, the question whether lCPS was ’State’ within the meaning  of   Article  12   of  the  Constitution  came  for consideration as  the major issue arising in the matter. The learned Single  Judge dismissed the writ petition by holding

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 18  

that  the   employer  was   neither   an   agency   nor   an instrumentality of  the Government  and did  not  constitute ’State’ within the meaning of Article 12 and, therefore, was not subject  to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court. The appeal against  the judgment of the learned Single Judge was dismissed on 1st November, 1983.      In course  of hearing  of the  appeal Dr. Anand Prakash appearing for  ICPS fairly stated that whether the Institute be ’State’  or not  within the  meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution, the employer 264 was prepared to give a fresh opportunity to the appellant to meet the  charges so  as to dispel from his mind the feeling that he  has not been given reasonable opportunity to defend himself. Ordinarily, with that concession the impugned order entailing the  dismissal of  the employee  and the  judicial determination against  the appellant  should have  been  set aside and  the matter  should have  gone before  the enquiry officer  for   affording  reasonable   opportunity  to   the appellant of  being heard  against the  charges.  Dr.  Anand Prakash, however, invited us to enter into the merits of the issue as  to whether  ICPS constitutes  ’State’  within  the constitutional meaning  of the term The Union of India which appears before  us through  counsel  also  wanted  that  the question should  be decided.  Thereupon we  suggested to the appellant who  was till  then appearing  in  person  to  get represented through  counsel so  that the  matter  could  be appropriately  argued  on  his  behalf  also.  He  has  been rendered suitable  assistance by the Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee and  Mr. P.P.Rao,  Senior Counsel, has appeared on his behalf.      The main  question for consideration now, therefore, is whether ICPS  is ’State’.  For appropriate  consideration of this question  it is necessary to look into the constitution of the  body, the purpose for which it has been created, the manner of  its functioning including the mode of its funding and the  broad features  which have been found by this Court in several  decisions  to  be  relevant  in  the  matter  of determining a  dispute of  this  type.  Article  12  of  the Constitution provides  an inclusive  definition of  the term ’State’ by saying:                     "In  this   part,  unless   the  context                otherwise requires,  ’the State’ includes the                Government and  Parliament of  India and  the                Government and  the State Legislature of each                of  the   States  and   all  local  or  other                authorities within  the territory of India or                under  the   control  of  the  Government  of                India." obviously ICPS  can become ’State’ only if it is found to be an authority  within the  territory of  India or  under  the control of the Government of India.      ICPS, respondent  No.2, is  a society  registered under the  Societies   Registration  Act,  21  of  1860,  and  was registered on  9th March,  1965. As  would appear  from  its Memorandum of Association, the foundation members were 19 in number-13 being  members besides  a President and five Vice- Presidents. The first President of the Soci 265 ety was  the then  Speaker of  the Lok Sabha. The five Vice- Presidents were  the then  Minister of Railways, Minister of Law  and  Social  Security  Minister  of  Communication  and Parliamentary Affairs,  a former (Chief Justice of India and a former Attorney General of India. Dr. L.N. Singhvi, then a member of  the Lok  Sabha, was  its Executive  Chairman. The

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 18  

Public Trustee  in the  Department of  Company  Affairs  and Insurance in  the Ministry of Finance was the Director and a member of  the Lok  Sabha was  the Society’s  Treasurer. The then  Minister  of  Cultural  Affairs  in  the  Ministry  of Education along  with three  members of  the  Lok  Sabha,  a Senior Advocate  of the Supreme Court, a member of the Rajya Sabha, the then Vice-Chancellor of Rajasthan University. the respective Secretaries  of the Lok Sabha and the Rajya Sabha Secretariat and  the Secretary  in the  Ministry of Law were its Members.  The  registered  office  of  the  Society  was initially located  within the Parliament House but was later on shifted  to the  Vithalbhai Patel  House, Rafi  Marg, New Delhi . The objects of the Society inter alia were:           ( I) to promote and provide for constitutional and      Parliamentary  studies   with  special   reference   to      comparative  studies   in  constitutional   systems  of      various   countries   and   working   of   the   Indian      Constitution   and   parliamentary   and   governmental      institutions in their various aspects;           (2) to  undertake study of courses and fundamental      research relating  to  developments  in  constitutional      law,   conventions    and   practices,    parliamentary      procedure, legislative  drafting,  trends  in  judicial      interpretation and allied matters;           (3) to  organise inter alia training programmes in      constitutional  problems   and   matters   of   current      parliamentary importance;           (4) to set up a legislative research and reference      service for  the benefit  of all  interested members of      the Union Parliament and State Legislature irrespective      of their party affiliations;           (5) to  undertake and  provide for the publication      of a  journal and  of research  papers and of books and      brochures with  a view to disseminate democratic values      and  to   foster  broad   based  civic   education  and      awareness, and  in particular,  to pro.  mote study  of      constitutional and parliamentary affairs; 266           (6)  to   establish  and  maintain  libraries  and      information  services   to  facilitate   the  study  of      constitutional and  parliamentary subjects  and  spread      information in regard thereto;           (7) to  invite as  and when feasible, scholars who      may or  may not  be members  of the  Society,  to  take      advantage of  the facilities offered by the Society and      to  benefit   the  Society   by  their   knowledge  and      experience; and           (8) to  institute appropriate  fellowships,  offer      prizes  and   arrange  scholarships   and  stipends  in      furtherance of the objects of the society.      The Memorandum  permitted the  Society to accept gifts, donations and  subscriptions of  cash and  securities and of any  property   either  movable   or  immovable.   The  rule classifies the  members under  heads like  Founder  Members, Life Members,  Honorary Members, ordinary Members, Corporate Members  and   Associate   Members.   ordinary   membership, according  to   the  Rules,   would  extend  to  Members  of Parliament or  of any  State Legislature  or those  who have been or  are members  of the  Judiciary or  advocates of the Supreme Court  or the  High Courts  or persons  employed  in public service  or persons  engaged in  teaching of study of social sciences  particularly of  Political Science,  Law or subjects  related  thereto.  In  the  category  of  Honorary Members were the President, the Vice-President and the Prime Minister of  India. Though  the Memorandum permitted receipt

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 18  

of gifts and donations from outside, it is not disputed that the main source of income of the society has been the annual Central Government grant.      We think it appropriate at this stage to turn attention to judicial  precedents to find out as to what should be the test to  be applied for determining when on institution like respondent No.2  would be  treated  as  ’other  authorities’ under Article  12 of the Constitution. The first in point of time is  the Constitution  Bench judgment  in  the  case  of Rajasthan State  Electricity Board,  Jaipur v.  Mohan Lal  & Ors., [1967]  3 SCR  377 Bhargava, J. who delivered the main judgment observed:                "the meaning of the word ’authority’ given in           Webster’s  Third   New  International  Dictionary,           which   can    be   applicable,   is   a   "public           administrative agency or corporation having quasi-           governmental powers and authorised to 267           administer a revenue-producing public enterprise."           This dictionary meaning of the word ’authority’ is           clearly wide  enough to include all bodies created           by a  statute on  which powers  are  conferred  to           carry  out   governmental  or   quasi-governmental           functions. The  expression "other  authorities" is           wide enough  to include  within it every authority           created by  a statute  and functioning  within the           territory of  India, or  under the  control of the           Government of  India; and we do not see any reason           to narrow  down this  meaning in  the  context  in           which the  words ’other  authorities’ are  used in           Article l 7 of the Constitution In Smt. Ujjam Bai v. State of Uttar Pradesh, [1963] 1 SCR 77 Ayyangar, J. had observed:                "Again  Article  12  winds  up  the  list  of           authorities  falling   within  the  definition  by           referring  to   ’other  authorities’   within  the           territory of  India which cannot obviously be read           as ejusoem  generis with either the Government and           the Legislatures  or local  authorities. The words           are of wide amplitude and capable of comprehending           every  authority   created  under  a  statute  and           functioning within the territory of India or under           the control of the Government of India. Shah, J.,  as he  then was,  added a  note  to  the  leading Judgment of Bhargava and observed:                "I am  unable, however,  to agree  that every           constitutional  or  statutory  authority  on  whom           powers are  conferred by  law is ’other authority’           within the  meaning of  Article 12. The expression           ’authority’ in its etymological sense means a body           invested with power to command or give an ultimate           decision, or  enforce obedience, or having a legal           right to command and be obeyed.                ............   In    determining   what   the           expression  ’other   authority’  in   Article   12           connotes, regard must be had not only to the sweep           of  fundamental  rights  over  the  power  of  the           authority, but  also to the restrictions which may           be  imposed   upon   the   exercise   of   certain           fundamental  rights   (e.g.,  those   declared  by           Article 19)  by the  authority. Fundamental rights           within their allotted fields trans- 268           cend the  legislative and  executive power  of the           sovereign authority.  But some  of  the  important

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 18  

         fundamental rights  are liable to be circumscribed           by the  imposition of  reason able restrictions by           the State.  The true  content  of  the  expression           ’other authority’  in Article  12  must  be  deter           mined  in   the  light   of  this  dual  phase  of           fundamental  rights.   In  considering  whether  a           statutory or  constitutional body  is an authority           within the  meaning of  Article 12,  it  would  he           necessary to bear in mind not only whether against           the authority fundamental rights in terms absolute           are intended  to be  anforced, but also whether it           was intended  by the  Constitution makers that the           authority was invested with the sovereign power to           impose restrictions  on very  important and  basic           fundamental freedoms.                In my  judgment, authorities,  constitutional           or statutory  invested with  power by  law but not           sharing the sovereign power do not fall within the           expression ’State’ as defined in Article 12. Those           authorities  which  are  invested  with  sovereign           power, i.e.,  power to  make rules  or regulations           and to administer or enforce them to the detriment           of citizens  and others fall within the definition           of ’State’  in Article  12, and  constitutional or           statutory bodies which do not share that sovereign           power of  the  State  are  not,  in  my  judgment,           ’State’ within  the meaning  of Article  12 of the           Constitution. Two cases,  the First of Sabhajit Tewary v. Union of India & Ors., [1975]  3 SCR 616 and the other of Sukhdev Singh & Ors v. Bhagatram  Sardar Singh Raghuvanshi & Anr., l 1975] 3 SCR 6 19  were disposed  of by  the same  Constitution Bench  on February 21,  1975. In both these cases, the true meaning of Article 12  of  the  Constitution  fell  for  consideration. Sabhajit Tewary’s  case was  one where  the  status  of  the Council of  Scientific and Industrial Research was examined. This Court  took note  of the  fact that  the Council  was a society registered  under the  Societies  Registration  Act. Under Rule 3, the Prime Minister of India was the ex-officio President of  the Society  and under  Rule 30  the governing body consisted  of persons  appointed by  the Government  of India representing  the administrative  ministry under which the  Council   of  Scientific  and  Industrial  Research  is included and  the Ministry  of Finance.  The Court also took note of  the manner  in which  the affairs  of  the  Society including funding  were conducted.  Ray,  CJ.,in  the  brief judgment that the 269 Court delivered in the case observed: A                "Extracting the features as aforesaid, it was           contented  that  these  would  indicate  that  the           Council of  Scientific and industrial Research was           really  an   agency  of   the   Government.   This           contention is unsound. The society does not have a           statutory character  like the  oil and Natural Gas           Commission, or  the Life  Insurance Corporation or           Industrial Finance  Corporation. It  is a  society           incorporated in  accordance with the provisions of           the Societies  Registration Act. The fact that the           Prime  Minister  is  the  President  or  that  the           Government appoints nominees to the governing body           or  that   the  Government   may   terminate   the           membership will  not establish  anything more than           the fact  that the  Government takes  special care           that the  promotion, guidance  and cooperation  of

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 8 of 18  

         scientific   and    industrial    research,    the           institution   and    functioning    of    specific           researches,  establishment   or  development   and           assistance to  special institutions or departments           of the  existing institutions for scientific study           of problems  affecting particular  industry  in  a           trade,  the  utilisation  of  the  result  of  the           researches conducted  under the  auspices  of  the           Council towards  the development  of industries in           the country  are  carried  out  in  a  responsible           manner.                This  Court   has   held   in   Praga   Tools           Corporation v.  C.A. Imanual  & Ors., [1969] 3 SCR           773; Heavy  Engineering Mazdoor Union v. The State           of Bihar  & Ors.,  [1969] 3  SCR 995  and in  S.L.           Aggarwal v. General Manager, Hindustan Steel Ltd.,           [1970] 3 SCR 363 that the Praga Tools Corporation,           Heavy  Engineering  Mazdoor  Union  and  Hindustan           Steel Ltd.  are all  companies incorporated  under           the Companies  Act  and  the  employees  of  these           companies Act and the employees of these companies           do  not   enjoy  the   protection   available   to           Government servants  as  contemplated  in  Article           311. The  companies were  held in  these cases  lo           have independent  existence of  the Government and           by the  law related  to corporations.  These could           not be hold to be departments of the Government." The ratio of this decision has been fully relied upon by the High Court in dismissing the claim of the appellant. 270      In Sukhdev  Singh’s case  (supra) the  leading judgment was delivered  also by  Ray,  CJ.  Two  questions  fell  for consideration-( l) whether an order of. removal from service contrary to  Regulations would  enable  the  employee  to  a declaration against the statutory corporation of continuance in service or would it end up in claim for  damages only and (2) whether  the employee  of  a  statutory  corporation  is entitled to  claim protection  of Articles 14 and 16 against the Corporation.  The Court,  therefore, straight  went into the question  as  to  whether  statutory  corporations  were authorities within  the meaning  of Article  12. As  a fact, three corporations being the oil and Natural Gas Commission, the Life  Insurance Corporation  and the  Industrial Finance Corporation were  before the  Court and each one of them had been set  up under  a special  statute. At  page 641  of the Reports, the learned Chief Justice pointed out:                "In the  background of  the provisions of the           three  Acts   under  consideration,  the  question           arises as  to whether  these Corporations  can  be           described to  be authorities within the meaning of           Article 12 of the Constitution . " At page 642 of the Reports the conclusion was reached to the effect that "these statutory bodies are ’authorities’ within the meaning  of Article  12 of  the  Constitution."  We  are really concerned  with what Mathew J., added to the judgment He observed:                "The  test  propounded  by  the  majority  is           satisfied so  far  as  the  oil  and  Natural  Gas           Commission is  concerned as  section 25 of the oil           and  Natural   Gas  Commission  Act  provides  for           issuing, binding direction to third parties not to           prevent  the  employees  of  the  Commission  from           entering upon  their property if the Commission so           directs. In  other words, as section 25 authorises           the Commission  to  issue  binding  directions  to

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 9 of 18  

         third parties  not to prevent the employees of the           Commission from  entering into  their land  and as           disobedience  of  such  directions  is  punishable           under the  relevant provision  of the Indian penal           Code since  those employees are deemed to be pubic           servants under section 21 of the Indian Penal Code           by virtue of section 27 of the Act, the Commission           is  an  ’authority’  within  the  meaning  of  the           expression ’other authorities’ in Article 12 271                Though this  would be  sufficient to make the           commission a  ’State’ according to the decision of           this Court in the Rajasthan Electricity Board case           (supra), there  is a  larger question  which has a           direct  bearing   so  far   as   the   other   two           corporations are concerned, viz., whether, despite           the fact  that there are no provisions for issuing           binding   directions    to   third   parties   the           disobedience   of   which   would   entail   penal           consequences,  the   corporations  set   up  under           statutes to carry on business of public importance           of which  is fundamental to the life of the people           can be considered as ’State’ within the meaning of           Article 12." Mathew, J.  referred to the precedents and other authorities from England,  France and  United States  and at page 654 of the Reports stated:                "The ultimate  question which is relevant for           our purpose  is whether  such a  corporation is an           agency or  instrumentality of  the government  for           carrying on  a business  for the  benefit  of  the           public. In other words, the question is, for whose           benefit  was   the  corporation  carrying  on  the           business? When  it is  seen from the provisions of           that Act  that on  liquidation of the corporation,           its   assets   should   be   divided   among   the           shareholders,  namely,   the  Central   and  State           governments and others, if any, the implication is           clear that  the benefit  of the accumulated income           would go  to the  Central and  State  Governments.           Nobody  will  deny  that  an  agent  has  a  legal           personality different  from that of the principal.           The  fact   that  the  agent  is  subject  to  the           direction of  the principal  does not mean that he           has no  legal personality of his own .............           The crux  of the matter is that public corporation           is a new type of institution which has sprung from           the  new   social  and   economic   functions   of           government and  that it  therefore does not neatly           fit into  old legal categories. Instead of forcing           it into  them, the  later should be adapted to the           needs of changing times and conditions.                I do  not think  there is  any basis  for the           apprehension expressed  that by holding that these           public corporations are ’State’ within the meaning           of Article 12, the employees of these corporations           would become  government servants.  I also wish to           make it clear that I express no opinion on 272           the question whether private corporations or other           like organisations,  though  they  exercise  power           over their  employees which  might  violate  their           fundamental rights,  would be  ’State’ within  the           meaning of Article 12." Then  comes  the  case  of  Ramana  Dayaram  Shetty  v.  The

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 10 of 18  

International Airport  Authority of  India &  Ors., [1979] 3 SCR 1014.  The question  before the  Court was  whether  the International Airport  Authority of India was ’State’ within the  meaning  of  Article  12  so  as  to  be  subjected  to enforcement of fundamental rights against it. Examining this aspect, Bhagwati,  J., as  he then  was spoke for the three- Judge Bench thus:                "Now it  is obvious that the government which           represents the  executive authority of the State ,           may act  through the  instrumentality or agency of           natural   persons    or   it    may   employ   the           instrumentality or  agency of  judicial persons to           carry out  its functions.  In the early days, when           the Government  had  limited  functions  it  could           operate  effectively   through   natural   persons           constituting its civil service and they were found           adequate  to   discharge  governmental  functions,           which were  of traditional  vintage.  But  as  the           tasks of the government multiplied with the advent           of the  welfare State, it began lo be increasingly           felt that  the frame work of civil service was not           sufficient to  handle the  new  tasks  which  were           often  of   specialised   and   highly   technical           character. The  inadequacy of the civil service to           deal with  these new  problems came to be realised           and  it   became  necessary   to   force   a   new           instrumentality  or   administrative  device   for           handling these  new  problems.  It  was  in  these           circumstances and  with a  view to  supplying this           administrative need  that the  public  corporation           came  into   being  as   the  third   arm  of  the           Government. As  early as 1819 the Supreme Court of           the United States in Mac Cullough v . Maryland, (4           Wheat 315)  held that  the Congress  has power  to           charter corporations as incidental to or in aid of           governmental functions  and ,  as pointed  out  by           Mathew J.,  in Sukhdev v. Bhagat Ram, (supra) such           federal   corporations   would   ex-hypothesi   be           agencies of  the Government. In Great Britain too,           the  policy   of  public   administration  through           separate corporations  was gradually  evovled  and           the conduct  of  basic  industries  through  giant           corporations has now become a permanent feature 273           of public  life. So far as India is concerned, the           genesis  of   the  emergence  of  corporations  as           instrumentalities or  agencies of Government is to           be found  in the Government of India Resolution on           Industrial Policy  dated with April, 1948 where it           was stated  inter alia  that ’management  of state           enterprises will  as a  rule be through the medium           of public  corporation under the statutory control           of the  Central Government  who will  assume  such           powers as may be necessary to ensure this.’ It was           in pursuance  of the  policy envisaged in this and           subsequent resolutions  on Industrial  policy that           corporations  were   created  by   Government  for           setting up  and management  of public  enterprises           and   carrying   out   other   public   functions.           Ordinarily,  these   functions  could   have  been           carried out  by Government  departmentally through           service  personnel,  but  the  instrumentality  or           agency of  the corporations  was  resorted  to  in           these cases  having regard  to the  nature of  the           task to  be performed.  The corporations acting as

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 11 of 18  

         instrumentality  or  agency  of  Government  would           obviously be  subject to  the same  limitations in           the field of constitutional and administrative law           as Government  itself, though  in the  eye of  the           law, they  would be distinct and independent legal           entities. If  the Government  acting  through  its           officers is  subject to certain constitutional and           public law  limitations, it must follow a fortiori           that Government acting through the instrumentality           or  agency   of  corporations  should  equally  be           subject to  the same limitations. But the question           is how  to  determine  whether  a  corporation  is           acting as instrumentality or agency of Government.           It  is   a  question   not  entirely   free   from           difficulty." It was again pointed out in the same case that:                "A corporation  may be  created in one of two           ways. It  may be  either established by statute or           incorporated under  a Law  such as  the  Companies           Act, 1956 or the Societies Registration Act, 1860.           Where  a   corporation  is  wholly  controlled  by           Government not  only in its policy making but also           in carrying  out the  functions entrusted to it by           the law  establishing it  or by the Charter of its           incorporation, there can be no doubt that it would           be an instrumentality or agency of Government ..." 274 The Court further stated:                "But the  public nature  of the  function, if           impregnated with  governmental character  or ’tied           or ent-wined with government’ or fortified by some           other additional factor may render the corporation           an  instrumentality   or  agency   of  Government.           Specifically, if  a department  of  Government  is           transferred to a corporation, it would be a strong           factor supportive of this inference.                It will  thus be  seen that there are several           factors  which   may  have  to  be  considered  in           determining whether  a corporation is an agency or           instrumentality of Government. We have referred to           some of  these factors  and they may be summarised           as  under:   whether  there   is   any   financial           assistance given  by the State, and if so, what is           the magnitude  of such assistance whether there is           any other  form of assistance, given by the State,           and if so whether it is of the usual kind or it is           extraordinary, whether there is any control of the           management and  policies of the corporation by the           State and  what is  the nature  and extent of such           control,  whether  the  corporation  enjoys  State           confer red  or State protected monopoly status and           whether  the   functions  carried   out   by   the           corporation are  public functions  closely related           to governmental  functions This  particularisation           of relevant  factors is however not exhaustive and           by its  very nature  it cannot  be,  because  with           increasing  assumption   of  new   tasks   growing           complexities of  management and administration and           the  necessity   of   continuing   adjustment   in           relations between  the corporations and Government           calling  for   flexibility,  adapt   ability   and           innovative skills,  it is  not possible to make an           exhaustive enumeration  of the  tests which  would           invariably and  in all  cases provide an unfailing           answer to  the question  whether a  corporation is

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 12 of 18  

         governmental instrumentality or agency. At page  1052 of the Reports the Court proceeded to consider whether International  Airport Authority  of India  could be said to  be an  ’authority’ falling  within the  meaning  of ’State’ in  Article 12.  The constitution  of the  body, the manner of  filling it  up? Government’s  power of control in the matter  of appointment  of members  and  termination  of membership were utilised as tests for examining whether 275 the Airport  authority was  ’State’. After  referring to the special A aspects, the Court observed:                "It will  be seen  from these provisions that           there are certain features of the respondent which           are eloquent  and throw  considerable light on the           true nature  of the first respondent. In the first           place, the  Chairman  and  Members  of  the  first           respondent  are   all  persons  nominated  by  the           Central Government  and the Central Government has           also the  power to  terminate their appointment as           also  to   review  them   in   certain   specified           circumstances.  The  Central  Government  is  also           vested with  the power to take away the management           of any  airport from  the first  respondent and to           entrust it  to any  other person  or authority and           for  certain   specified  reasons,   the   Central           Government   can    also   supersede   the   first           respondent. The  Central Government has also power           to give directions in writing from time to time on           questions  of  policy  and  these  directions  are           declared binding on the first respondent." Reference was  made to  the case of Sabhajit Tewary (supra). Bhagwati, J. referring thereto stated :-                "This  decision   does  not   lay  down   any           principle or  test for  the purpose of determining           when a corporation can be said to be an authority.           If at  all, any  test  can  be  gleaned  from  the           decision, it  is whether the corporation is really           an agency of the Government." and ultimately it was held that the Authority was ’State’ under Article 12. This case  clearly approves  the treatment  of the matter by Mathew, J.  in Sukhdev  Singh’s case  (supra). The two-Judge Bench in  the  case  of  Managing  Director,  Uttar  Pradesh Warehousing Corporation  & Anr.  v. Vinay  Narayan Vajpayee, [1980] 2  SCR 773  was cited  but  we  do  not  consider  it necessary to  refer to the same. On the other hand reference to the two later decisions of this Court may be more useful. Those are  Ajay Hasia etc. v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi & Ors. etc., [1981] 2 SCR 79 of a Constitution Beocll and the other is Som  Prakash Rekhi v. Union of India & Anr., [1981] 2 SCR 111 being  a three-Judge  Bench decision. It is pertinent to indicate that  both the judgments were delivered on November 13, 1980. 276      In Ajay  Hasia’s case an Engineering College was also a Society registered under the Jammu & Kashmir Registration of Societies  Act,   l898,  and  the  question  that  fell  for consideration was  whether it  was an  authority within  the meaning of  Article 12.  The Court found that the Memorandum of Association  of the  Society in  clause (3)  set out  the objects for  which the  Society was  incorporated  and  they included among  other things  establishment of  the  college with a  view to  providing instructions and research in such branches of  engineering and  technology as  the college may think fit  and for the advancement of learning and knowledge

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 13 of 18  

in such  branches. Reference  was made  to the Memorandum of Association,  the  objects  and  the  powers  of  the  State Government to  make appointments  and to  the fact  that the State government with the approval of the Central Government had the  power  to  take  such  action  and  to  issue  such directions as  are  necessary  in  respect  of  all  matters relating to the functioning of the college as noticed in the review of  the activities.  the Court  also took note of the fact  that   the  founding   members  of  the  society  were enumerated in clause (9) of the memorandum and they were the Chairmen to  be appointed  by the  State Government with the approval of  the Central  Government, two representatives of the State  Government, one  representative  of  the  Central Government, two representatives of the All India Council for Technical Education to be nominated by the Northern Regional Committee, one  representative of  the University of Jammu & Kashmir, one  nonofficial  representative  of  each  of  the Punjab, Rajasthan,  UttarPradesh and  Jammu & Kashmir States and  to  be  appointed  by  the  respective  Governments  in consultation with  the Central  Government and the principal who shall also be the ex-officio Secretary. The rules of the Society were  referred to  with a  view to  finding out  the details of  functioning. Sabhajit Tewary’s case was referred to  and  distinguished  and  the  tests  laid  down  in  the International  Airport   Authority’s   case   (supra)   were approved. Ultimately  the Court  summarised the  position as under: "              The  tests  for  determining  as  to  when  a           corporation can  be said  to be an instrumentality           or agency of Government may now be culled out from           the  judgment   in   the   International   Airport           Authority’s case.  These tests  ate not conclusive           or  clinching,  but  they  are  merely  indicative           indicia which  have  to  be  used  with  care  and           caution because while stressing the necessity of a           wide meaning to be placed on the expression ’other           authorities’. it  must be  realised that it should           not stretched so far as to bring in 277           every autonomous  body which  has some  nexus with           the Government within the sweep of the expression.           A wide  enlargment of the meaning must be tempered           by  a   wise  limitation.  We  may  summarise  the           relevant tests  gathered from  the decision in the           International Airport Authority’s case as follows:                (1) "one  thing is  clear that  if the entire                share capital  of the  corporation is held by                Government it  would go  a long  way  towards                indicating  that   the  corporation   is   an                instrumentality or agency of (Government                (2) "Where  the financial  assistance of  the                State is  so much  as to  meet almost  entire                expenditure  of  the  corporation,  it  would                afford some  indication  of  the  corporation                being    inpregnated     with    governmental                character. "                (3) "It may also be a relevant factor whether                the corporation  enjoys monopoly status which                is State conferred or State protected."                (4) "Existence  of deep  and pervasive  State                control may  afford an  indication  that  the                corporation   is    a   State    agency    or                instrumentality."                (5) "If  the functions of the corporation are                of public  importance and  closely related to

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 14 of 18  

              governmental  functions,   it  would   be   a                relevant   factor    in    classifying    the                corporation as  an instrumentality  or agency                of Government.                (6)  "Specifically,   if  a   department   of                Government is  transferred to  a corporation,                it would  be a  strong factor  supportive  of                this inference  of the  corporation being  an                instrumentality or agency of Government." The Court thereafter proceeded to say:                "We may  point out  that it is immaterial for           this purpose whether the corporation is created by           a statute  or under a statute. The test is whether           it is an instrumentality 278           or agency  of the  Government and not as to how it           is created.  The inquiry  has to  be not as to how           the juristic  person is  born but  why it has been           brought into  existence. The  corporation may be a           statutory corporation  created by  a statute or it           may be  a Government  Company or  a company formed           under the  Companies Act,  1956 or  it  may  be  a           society    registered    under    the    Societies           Registration  Act,   1860  or  any  other  similar           statute. Whatever  be  its  genetical  origin,  it           would be  an ’authority’  within  the  meaning  of           Article 12  if it  is an instrumentality or agency           of the  Government  and  that  would  have  to  be           decided on a proper assessment of the facts in the           light of  the relevant  factors.  The  concept  of           instrumentality or agency of the Government is not           limited to  a corporation created by a statute but           is equally  applicable to a company or society and           in a  given case it would have to be decided, on a           consideration of the relevant factors, whether the           company or society is an instrumentality or agency           of the Government so as to come within the meaning           of the expression ’authority’ in Article 12." At pages  99 and  100 of the Reports, the Constitution Bench referred to  the facts  of the  particular case  and came to hold that  the society  was an  instrumentality or agency of the State.  In Som  Prakash Rekhi’s case (supra) at page 137 of the  Reports, Krishna Iyer, J. referred to the five tests and concluded by saying that:                "The finale  is reached  when the  cumulative           effect of  all the  relevant factors above set out           is assessed  and once  the body  is found to be an           instrument or  agency of  Government, the  further           conclusion emerges  that  it  is  ’State’  and  is           subject to  the same constitutional limitations as           Government At page 138 the criticism against the conclusions reached in the c,  Airport Authority’s  case was  taken note of and the learned Judge observed:           "There is no doubt that Bhagwati, J. broadened the           scope of  State under  Article 12 and according to           Shri G.B.  Pai the  observations spill over beyond           the requirements of the case and must be dismissed           as obiter." 279 Pathak, J.,  as he  then was,  added a  brief  note  to  the judgment by A saying:           "I must  confess to  some hesitation  in accepting           the  proposition   that   the   Bharat   Petroleum           Corporation  Limited   is  a  ’State’  within  the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 15 of 18  

         meaning of  Article 12 of the Constitution. But in           view of  the direction  taken by  the law  in this           Court   since    Ramana   Dayarama    Shetty    v.           International Airport Authority I find I must lean           in  favour   of  that  conclusion.  I  would  have           welcomed a  wider range of debate before us on the           fundamental principles  involved in  the issue and           on the implications flowing from the definition in           the Companies Act, 1956 of a ’Government Company’?           but perhaps a future case may provide that." We have  thus the tests available in the two decisions to be applied to  the facts  of the case in hand for determination as to  whether ICPS is ’State’ within the meaning of Article 12.      There are  two more  cases to which brief reference may now be  made-B.S. Minhas  v. Indian  Statistical Institute & Ors., [1984]  1 SCR  395 and P.K. Ramachandra Iyer & Ors. v. Union of  India &  Ors., [1984]  2 SCR  200. The case of the Indian Statistical Institute is also of a society registered under the  Societies Registration  Act. The Court found that the entire  money required  for funding  the  Institute  was provided by  the Central  Government and  even if  any other money was  to be  received by the Institute it could be done only with  the approval  of the  Central Government  and the accounts of  the Institute  were  to  be  submitted  to  the Central Government  for its  scrutiny and  satisfaction. The Society had  to comlpy  with all directions as may be issued by the  Central Government.  ’The  control  of  the  Central Government was  deep and pervasive and, therefore, it was an instrumentality of the Central Government and as such was an authority  within   the  meaning   of  Article   12  of  the Constitution. ln coming to this conclusion, the Court relied upon  the  tests  indicated  in  the  International  Airport Authority’s case as also in the case of Ajay Hasia.      In   Ramchandra   Iyer’s   case,   the   question   for consideration was whether the Indian Council of Agricultural Research (ICAR)  was a  set up within the meaning of Article 12 of  the Constitution.  ICAR is  also a Society registered under the  Societies Registration  Act. The Court found that when it was set up, it was an attached office of the 280 Government of Tndia and had not undergone any change when it got transferred into a Society. Applying the tests indicated in International  Airport Authority case as also the case of Ajay Hasia,  the Court came to the conclusion that there was little doubt that it was an instrumentality or agency of the State. It further stated:                "ICAR came  into  existence  as  an  integral           department of the Government of India and later on           became  an   attached  office   of   the   Central           Government.  The   composition  of   the  ICAR  as           evidenced by  Rule 3  could  not  have  been  more           governmental in  character than  any department of           the Government."      It is  time to turn to the facts of the present case to find out  as to what the conclusion should be when the tests formulated by  the several  cases of  this Court referred to above are  applied. There  cannot indeed  be a strait jacket formula. It  is not  necessary that  all the tests should he satisfied for  reaching the conclusion either for or against r holding an institution to be ’State’. In a given case some of the  features may emerge so boldly and prominently that a second view  may not  be possible.  There may  yet be  other cases where  the matter  would be  on the border line and it would be difficult to take one view or the other outright.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 16 of 18  

    Our struggle  for  independence  which  spread  over  a century bore  fruit in  1947.  During  the  long  period  of struggle, the  British Government  following the  pattern of the democratic  system prevailing  in their  own country had patronised the  evolution of  a process  of self government. The Government  of India  Act of  1935 which  was a positive improvement on  the previous  Acts had introduced provincial autonomy and the Indian Independence Act, 1947, adopted that pat tern  of Government.  Even the  Constitution  which  the people of  India gave unto themselves in 1949 and which came into force  from the  26th of  January, 1950,  followed that pattern, of  course, with  considerable modifications.  Thus when we  became independent a democratic pattern had evolved in this  country through more or less an historical process. Soon the  princely States disappeared by a process of merger and the  Constitution ultimately came to have a federal base the federating States as the units and the federation at the Centre.      Democracy  pre-supposes   certain  conditions  for  its successful working.  It is  necessary that  there must  be a deep sense of understanding, mutual confidence and tolerance and regard and acceptance 281      Of the  views of others. In the early years of freedom, the spirit  of sacrifice  and a  sense of  obligation to the leadership  that   had  helped   the  dream  of  freedom  to materialise had  been  accepted.  The  emergence  of  a  new generation within less than two decades of independence gave rise to  a feeling  that the people’s representatives in the Legislatures required  the acquisition  of  the  appropriate democratic bias  and spirit.  ICPS was  born as  a voluntary organisation to fulfil this requirement. At the inception it was certainly not a governmental organisation and it has not been the  case of the parties in their pleadings nor have we been told at the bar during the long arguments that had been advanced that  the objects  of ICPS  are those  which are  a State obligation to fulfil. The Society was thus born out of a feeling  that there  should  be  a  voluntary  association mostly consisting of Members of the two Houses of Parliament with some  external support to fulfil the objects which were adopted by the Society.      To Start  with, the  Society was  accommodated  in  the Parliament House  but in  due course  it  shifted  out.  The President   of   India   inaugurated   the   Society.   Very appropriately the  Speaker of the Lok Sabha became its first President and  three Ministers,  a former  Chief Justice  of India and  a former  Attorney General  joined as  its  Vice- Presidents. Some of the public officers were also associated in the  administrative set-up  of  the  Society.  Individual Members of  Parliament  and  the  corporate  body  known  as Parliament are certainly two different concepts. Services of some of  the  employees  of  Parliament  were  lent  to  the Society. While  Article 12  refers to  Parliament as such, a few Members of Parliament cannot be considered as Parliament so as  to constitute that body as referred to in Article 12. The Speaker  and the Ministers who joined as Vice-Presidents of the Society were there in their individual capacities and not as Ministers, though designations were indicated. In the category of  Vice-Presidents, Executive  Chairman, Treasurer and members,  there were  many people  who were really not a part of  Government as  such and some of them did not belong to Parliament.      The  objects  of  the  Society  were  not  governmental business but  were certainly the aspects which were expected to equip  Members of  Parliament and  the State Legislatures

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 17 of 18  

with the  requisite  knowledge  and  experience  for  better functioning. Many of the objects adopted by the Society were not confined  to the  two  Houses  of  Parliament  and  were intended to have an impact on society at large.      The Memorandum  of the  Society permitted acceptance of gifts, 282 donations and subscriptions. There is material to show that the Ford Foundation, a US based Trust had extended support for some time. Undoubtedly, the annual contribution from the Government has been substantial and it would not be wrong to say that they perhaps constitute the main source of funding, Yet some money has been coming from other sources. In later years, foreign funding came to be regulated and, therefore, it became necessary to provide that without Government clearance like any other institution, ICPS was not to receive foreign donations. No material has been placed before us f the stand that the Society was not entitled to receive Contributions from any indigenous source without Government sanction. Since Government money has been coming, the usual conditions attached to Government grants have been applied and enforced. If the society’s affairs were really intended to be carrier on as a part of the Lok Sabha or Parliament as such, the manner of functioning would have been different. The accounts of the Society are separately maintained and subject to audit in the same way as the affairs of societies receiving Government grants are to be audited. Government usually impose certain conditions and restrictions when grants are made. No exception has been made in respect of the Society and the mere fact that such restrictions are made is not a determinative aspect.      Considerable attempt  has been made by Mr. Rao, learned counsel for  the appellant,  to show that in the functioning of the  Society there  is  deep  and  pervasive  control  of government. We have examined meticulously the correspondence and  the   instances  where  control  was  attempted  to  be exercised or  has, as a fact, been exercised but these again are features which appear to have been explained away      We were  taken through  the  report  submitted  by  the Tripathi Committee  which had been set up to suggest changes in the set up and affairs of the Society. The report and the steps taken on the basis of the report are also not material which can  be taken to be indisputable features for reaching the conclusion  one way  or the  other. We  were  shown  the correspondence by  the Minister  of Law  with the  Executive Chairman of  the Society. Undoubtedly the Minister has tried to exercise  his authority  as the controlling department of Government in  the matter  of making  the grant.  As we have already pointed that itself may not be a conclusive feature.      We have  several cases  of societies  registered  under Societies  Registration  Act  which  have  been  treated  as ’State’ but in each of 283 those  cases   it  would  appear  on  analysis  that  either governmental business  had been undertaken by the Society or what was expected to be the public obligation of the ’State’ had been  undertaken to  be  performed  as  a  part  of  the Society’s function.  In a Welfare State, as has been pointed out on  more than  one occasion  by this Court, Governmental control is very pervasive and in fact touches all aspects of social existence.  ln the  absence of  a fair application of the tests  to be made, there is possibility of turning every non-governmental society  into an  agency or instrumentality of the State. That obviously would not serve the purpose and may be  far from  reality. A broad picture of the matter has

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 18 of 18  

to be  taken and a discerning mind has to be applied keeping the realities and human experiences in view so as to reach a reasonable   conclusion.    Having   given    our    anxious consideration to  the facts  of this  case, we  are not in a position  to   hold  that   ICPS  is  either  an  agency  or instrumentality of  the State  so  as  to  come  within  the purview  of   ’other  authorities’  in  Article  12  of  the Constitution. We  must say  that ICPS is a case of its type- typical in  many ways  and the  normal tests may perhaps not properly apply to test its character.      While we were referring to the cases in an earlier part of our  judgment, we  have noticed  the caution indicated by this Court  that even  if some  institution becomes  ’State’ within the  meaning of  Article 12,  its  employees  do  not become holders  of civil  posts so  as to become entitled to the cover  of Article  311. They would, however, be entitled to the  benefits of  Part III  of the  Constitution.  It  is unnecessary to examine the appellant’s case keeping Articles 14 and  16 of  the Constitution in view as on the concession of Dr. Anand Prakash the proceedings will have to reopen.      Before we  part with  this case,  we must indicate what reliefs the  appellant would  be entitled  to. Now  that the order of the dismissal is set aside and the proceedings have been restored  to the  stage of enquiry, the appellant shall be deemed  to have  been restored  to service. The appellant would have become entitled to the normal relief available in such a  situation. He  should be deemed to be in service and we do  not agree  with Dr. Anand Prakash that his suspension should  continue.  His  suspension  which  had  merged  into dismissal has  been vacated.  It shall, however, be open for the employer  to make any direction as is deemed appropriate in that  behalf in future. The appellant, therefore, becomes entitled to  the salary  for the  past period subject to his satisfying the  authorities that he has not earned any other income during  that period.  The appellant  shall  be  given reasonable opportunity  by the enquiring officer to meet the charges 284 and the  enquiry shall be completed with in four months. The appellant has  personally assured  us in  Court that he will fully cooperate  in the  enquiry. The  enquiry officer shall allow inspection to the appellant of all records relevant to the enquiry.      We make no order as to costs. S.L.                                    Appeal disposed of. 285