http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 14  

PETITIONER: TATA ENGINEERING & LOCOMOTIVE COMPANY LTD.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: GRAM PANCHAYAT PIMPRI WAGHERE

DATE OF JUDGMENT23/08/1976

BENCH: RAY, A.N. (CJ) BENCH: RAY, A.N. (CJ) BEG, M. HAMEEDULLAH SINGH, JASWANT

CITATION:  1976 AIR 2463            1977 SCR  (1) 306  1976 SCC  (4) 177

ACT:             Bombay  Village  Panchayat  Act (Bom.  6  of  1933),  s.         89--’House,’ if includes ’building’.         Interpretation  of statutes--Rules as an aid--Use of  State-         ment  of  objects and reasons.

HEADNOTE:             The respondent is a village Panchayat constituted  under         the  Bombay Village Panchayat Act, 1933. The  Act  initially         empowered  the Panchayat to levy tax on houses and Lands  as         one  of  the  taxes enumerated in s. 89(2).   In  1939,  the         section  was  amended .and s. 89(1) made  it  obligatory  on         Panchayats  to levy tax on houses and lands.   The  amending         Act  of 1947 provided that every panchayat shall levy a  tax         upon  the  owners  or occupiers of  ’houses  including  farm         buildings and conferred power on the Panchayat to tax  shops         and hotels. The 1952-Amendment conferred power to tax  prem-         ises where machinery is run by steam etc.             In exercise of the powers under s. 89 the respondent, by         a resolution of 1952,  imposed  tax  own  houses within  its         jurisdiction.   In  1954,  s. 89 was amended  and  the  word         ’buildings’  was  substituted  for  the  words  houses’  and         ’houses including farm buildings’.  By a resolution of 1964,         the  respondent  revised the tax on houses and  also  stated         that for factories the tax would be at a concessional  rate.         The  respondent  demanded taxes on the  appellant’s  factory         buildings  for the years 1967 to 1970.  The appellant  chal-         lenged the levy unsuccessfully in the High Court.             In  appeal  to this Court it was  contended  that:   (1)         since  it  was  only in 1954 that the  word  ’building’  was         substituted  for  the word ’house’, the  respondent  had  no         power  to impose taxes on the factory buildings by the  1952         resolution;  and (2) even if the 1952 resolution  authorised         the  levy.   since it was replaced by  the  1964-resolution,         which was not valid as it was not passed in accordance  with         the  Act and the rules, no tax could be levied either  under         the 1952-resolution or under the 1964-resolution.         Dismissing the appeal,             HELD:   (1) The word ’house’ would in its ordinary sense         include  any  ’building’ irrespective of its  user.   Having         regard  10  the  nature of the word as used  in  taxing  and

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 14  

       municipal  legislation,  and the nature and purpose  of  the         statute in the present case,  it is manifest that the legis-         lature used the word ’house’ so that the Panchayat would  be         in a position to levy taxes on all buildings situated in the         village. [319A]             (a) The word ’house’ is not defined in the Act.   There-         fore,  the word must be construed in that sense which  ’peo-         ple,   conversant  with the subject-matter  with  which  the         statute  is dealing,  would attribute to it.   To  ascertain         its  meaning  one must understand  the  subject-matter  with         respect  to  which it is used in a statute.  The  weight  of         judicial  opinion  is in favour of the view  that  the  word         ’house’  is  not restricted to a mere dwelling  house.   but         also  extends  to a ’building which is used  for  business’,         [316 E-F, 317D]             Yorkshire  Insurance v. Clayton 8 Q.B.D. 424. Grant   v.         Langston  1900 A.C. 383, Daniel v. Coulsting 14 L.I.C. P 70,         Folkestone  v.  Woodword L.R. 15 Eq.  159,  Wimbledon  Urban         District  Council  v. Ha.stings  87  L.T.R.  118.  Ravenseft         Properties v. London Borough of Hillingdon 1969 20 P &  C.R.         483  and  Corpus Juris Secundum Vol. 41 pages  364  and  365         referred to.             (b)  The rules. framed under the Act and  placed  before         the  legislature for approval,  are a legitimate aid in  the         construction of the statute as Contemporanea Expositio.  (i)         they made no distinction  between  dwelling  houses’         307         and  ’buildings’, (ii) the 1934-rules used the  word  ’lauds         and buildings’ instead of the words ’lands and houses’;  and         (iii) the 1943-rules defined ’house’ as any  building or set         of buildings within the same enclosure’. [317F]             (c) The Act,  in 1933, empowered a Panchayat to levy tax         not  only on houses but also on lands.  It would be  unsound         to  hold  that a land which is admittedly taxable  would  be         exempt when a factory is built upon it. [317 H]             (d)  In  the Amending Act of 1945 the  expressions  farm         buildings’  and ’houses’ are used without distinction.  [317         G]             (e)  The  1947-Amendment indicates that the tax  was  on         the   business   of shops and hotels and not on  the  houses         where  such business is turn, and the 1952-Amendment  intro-         duces.  one more optional tax in s. 89(2) as different  from         the  obligatory tax on houses and lands in s.  89(1).   [318         E-F]             (f)  The  words  ’houses and lands’ in s.  89  mean  all         buildings,   including factory buildings.  The  substitution         of  the word ’buildings’ in place of the word ’houses’  made         explicit what was implicit in the statute.  From that amend-         ment  it could not be suggested that the factories would  be         included  only within ’buildings’ and not  within  ’houses’.         [318 H]             (g)  The Statement of objects and reasons is  ordinarily         not used as an aid to the construction of a statute.  It  is         sometimes referred to for the limited purpose of finding the         object of the legislature in enacting the statute where  all         other methods of interpretation fail.  [318 G]             (2) Even if the 1964-resolution be invalid,  the demands         made  by the respondent are valid ,red legal,  because,  (a)         the  1952-resolution has not been superseded,  and the  levy         in the present case was not pursuant, at to the 1964 resolu-         tion,   but was pursuant to the 1952-resolution; and (b)  s.         186(8)  of the 1959-Act. which repealed the  1933-Act  indi-         cates  that  any taxes imposed, in so far as  they  are  not         inconsistent with the 1959-Act, shall be deemed to have been         levied under the 1959-Act and continue in force until super-

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 14  

       seded  or  modified and the tax in the present case  is  not         inconsistent with the 1959Act.  [319 C-V]         ARGUMENTS         For the Appellant:             The first question which falls for determination of this         Hon’ble  Court. for the purposes of this appeal, is  whether         the  expression ’house’ as used in s. 89 of the Bombay  Vil-         lage  Panchayat Act, 1933 includes a factory  building;  and         as  such the Resolution dated the 24th February 1952  levies         tax on factory building.  The list of dates is given at  the         end of the Synopsis for ready reference.         Brief facts are as follows:             The Respondent is a Village Panchayat constituted  under         the provisions of Bombay Village Panchayats Act (Act No.  6)         of  1933.   In exercise of the powers conferred  on  it  for         imposition  of  house  taxes under s. 89 as  amended,  by  a         Resolution dated 24-2-1952. the Respondent imposed a  house-         tax on houses within its jurisdiction.             By  another Resolution dated the 10th August  1964,  the         Respondents increased the levy on the factory buildings.             The petitioners have their factory buildings which  were         completed  and occupied by about January  1968.  After  get-         ting  the  necessary information about the value,  costs  of         buildings  etc.  the  respondent sent a  notice  dated  10th         January  1969  making a demand for payment of taxes  on  the         factory  building for the years 1967-68. and 1968-69.   This         was on the basis of the Resolution dated 10th August 1964 at         concessional  rate of 25 nP per Rupees 100/-.   Similar  de-         mands  were  also made subsequently for year  1969-70.   The         aggregate  tax  involved  in this petition  amounts  to  Rs.         1,34,763/-  for  the three years i.e. 1967-68,  1968-69  and         1969-70.   It is this demand for tax which is challenged  in         this petition.         308             In  order to understand the contention of the  petition-         ers, it is necessary to go into the brief legislative histo-         ry of the Acts.         There has been as many as 9 amendments to the Act.             Originally, the Bombay Village Panchayats Act 1933  made         imposition of house-tax optional.  By amending Act No. 18 of         Bombay Village Panchayat Act of 1939 the house-tax was  made         compulsory.             By Bombay Village Panehayats (2nd Amendment Act)   1945,         the  word  "farm buildings" were included in regard  to  the         three districts of Ratnagiri, Kanara and Colaba.  By  Bombay         Village  Panchayat Act 9 of 1947 for the expression  ’Houses         including  farm buildings’ was made applicable  without  any         distinction  between the abovenamed three districts and  the         other districts in the State.  By the same amending Act,  an         additional  tax was included by adding s. 2(vi-a) viz.  "tax         on shops and hotels."             By  Bombay Village Panchayat Amendment Act 9 of 1953  s.         2(vi-b)  was  added providing for a tax  on  premises  where         machinery  is run by steam, oil or electric power or  manual         labour for any trade or business and not for an  agricultur-         al, or domestic purpose.             Then  comes  the  most important  amendment  namely  the         Bombay  Village Panchayats Amendment 1954  (Bombay Act 7  of         1954).  This amendment substituted for the word ’house’  the         word  ’building’.  It also substituted for el.  2(vi-a)  and         2(vi-b)  a new cl. 2(vi-a) providing for tax on the  profes-         sions,  trades and calling specified therein,  namely,  shop         keeping  and  hotel keeping or any other  trade  or  calling         (other than agriculture which is carried on with the help of         machinery run by steam, oil electric power or manual power).

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 14  

       The statements of objects and reasons for’ making the impor-         tant  change of the word "building" for the word "house"  is         quoted herein below:               "Under  s. 89(1) of the Act, as it stands at  present,         village  Panchayats  cannot levy property tax  on  buildings         other  than dwelling houses. It is, therefore,  proposed  to         empower  them  to levy such tax on all  buildings  in  their         areas, irrespective of their use."         Two things emerge from the above legislative history  namely         in  1952  when the Resolution dated 24th February  1952  was         passed,  the expression used in s. 89(1) was ’house’.   When         the  Resolution dated 10th August 1964 was passed,  the  ex-         pression  ’house’ was no longer in the statute but  a  wider         and comprehensive expression ’building’ was already  insert-         ed.             On  the above facts and position of law,  the  appellant         urges the following propositions:             I.  Resolution  dated 24th February 1952 cannot  be  the         basis  for  recovery of any taxes by the respondent  on  the         factory  buildings of the appellant inter-alia for the  fol-         lowing reasons :--             (a)  The  plain  reading of the  resolution  dated  24th         February  1952 clearly indicates that the levy was  intended         to be on dwelling house and not on factory buildings.             (b) In a taxing statute, words used have to be construed         as understood in common parlance in the context of the Act.               1962(1)  Suppl. S.C.R. 498, 502 & 503 Motipur  Zamind-         ari Co. (P) Ltd. v. The State of Bihar.             (e)  Though  several  different meanings  of  the  ’word         ’house’ are given, the word ’house’ must be construed in the         context  of the Act in which it appears. In the  context  of         the present Act, the house must mean as understood in common         parlance as ’dwelling place’.  This meaning also appears  as         the first meaning given in all dictionaries.         309         In 1933 in a village nobody could have said that a  factory.         building  means a house.  Therefore, the expression  "house"         must be  given  its  ordinary meaning as meaning a "dwelling         house".             (d) The Legislative History of Section 89, which is  set         out  hereinabove, clearly shows that all kinds of  buildings         including factory buildings were not included in the expres-         sion  ’house’.  The Amendment of 1954 substituting the  word         ’building’  for ’house’ takes the matter beyond any pale  of         doubt.   It must be remembered that these are amendments  to         the  same Act and these Amending Acts clearly  indicate  the         legislative  expositions of the expression ’house’  used  in         the 1933-Act.  It is well established that later Acts should         be regarded as the legislative interpretation. of the former         one.            (i) 1957 SCR page 121 at 138 & 139 Hari Prasad Shivashan-         kar v. A. D. Divikar.         (ii) 1891 (137) US 682 at 692 George H. Cope v. Janet Cope.         (iii) 1928 A-C. 143 Ormand Investment Co. v. Betts.            (iv)  1941 (315) U.S.A. 262 (Head Note 8) Great  Northern         Rly. v. U.S..A.            (v) 1900 (1) Q.B. 156 at 164, &   165  Attorney   General         v. Clerksons.         (vi) [1955] 2 SCR 603, 632 "Bengal Immunity Case".         (vii) [1969] 1 SCR 370, 372 Ghewar Chand v. Workers’ Union.         (e) The High Court has observed in its Judgment as follows.             The  object of the legislature in enacting s. 89 was  to         enable  the Village Panchayat to levy tax from such  sources         as may be necessary for the proper discharge by the Panchay-         at of its duties under the Act.  Having regard to the nature

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 14  

       of  the word house as used in taxing legislation in  England         and  this  country, the legislature used the word  house  so         that  the village panchayat would be in a position  to  levy         taxes on all buildings situated in the village.             These observations are erroneous because the word  house         as  used in the taxing legislation has been  interpreted  in         England  as  meaning a dwelling house and not  as  including         every  building.  The High Court has relied on  three  deci-         sions for this purpose :--         (i) 1906 Appeal Cases 299 Lewin v. End.         (ii)  87  Law  Times Reports 118  Wimbledon  Urban  District         Council v. Hastings.         (iii) 1900 A.C. 383 Grant v. Langston.             The  authority  of Wimbledon Urban District  Council  87         L.T.R.  118  has no bearing because it was’ not  a  case  of         taxing statute.  It was under the Public Health Act and  the         definition  of building in terms included a school  building         and  therefore,  it was held that the nuisance in  an  over-         crowded school came within the mischief of the Act and  that         the Act  applied  to.  school buildings also.  It is  impor-         tant  to  remember that the decision in the  case  Wimbledon         Urban District Council was based on the decision in Reg.  v.         Mead  (59 J.P. 150; 11 T.L.R. 242).  This was again  a  case         under the Public Health Act dealing with the overcrowding in         a shelter house.             (f)  Both the authorities namely, 1900 AC 383  Grant  v.         Langston as well as 1906 A.C. 299 Lewin v. End relied by the         High  Court accepted the position that the house must  be  a         dwelling house. If it is not so used, then the structure and         the character of the building as a whole should  be  regard-         ed   in  order to see whether it is fit for such use by  any         class  or  condition  of  persons  in the  ordinary  way  of         living.  Obviously, a factory building does not satisfy this         test.         310             II. The second question which arises is that even if the         Resolution  dated 24th February 1952 is held to  be  validly         levying  a  tax on factory  buildings, it is  admitted  that         another  Resolution dated 10th August 1964 was also pass  by         the  Respondent  though the Respondent relies  only  on  the         Resolution  of 24th February 1952 and has conceded that  the         Resolution  of 10th August 1964 is void and illegal for  not         having been passed in accordance with the Act and the  Rule.         The  Resolution  of 1964 clearly replaced  and  modified  in         Resolution  of 1952.  If the Resolution of 1964  is  illegal         and  void, the resolution of 1952 is not  automatically  re-         vived.  On the contrary, a fresh levy then would have to  be         imposed.  That not having been done, there is no valid  levy         of tax on the factory building of the petitioners.               See  [1963] Suppl. 2 SCR 435, 446 Firm A.T.B.  Melttab         Majid & Co. v. State of Madras.         (Once the old Rule has been substituted by the new Rule,  it         ceases to exist and does not automatically got revived  when         the new rule is held to be invalid).         The above ratio equally applies to the earlier Resolution of         24th  February 1952 which was replaced by  resolution  dated         10th August 1964.         S.  186(8) of 1958 Act (Bombay Act III of 1959) provides  as         follows:               any  appointment,  notification,  notice,   tax,  fee,         order,   scheme, licence, permission, rule, by-law, or  form         made,  issued,  imposed or granted in respect  of  the  said         villages  and  in force on the date of the  commencement  of         this  Act  shall in so far as they are not  inconsistent  be         deemed  to have been made, issued, imposed or granted  under

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 14  

       this  Act  in respect of the village and shall  continue  in         force  until it  is superseded or modified by  any  appoint-         ment,  notification, notice,  tax, fee,    order,    scheme,         licence,   permission,   rule,   by-law   or   form    made,         issued, imposed or granted under this Act;             This also shows that on passing of the resolution  dated         10th  August 1964, the resolution dated 24th  February  1952         ceased 10 be effective.             The  Respondents rely on rules framed in 1938 but  Rules         cannot be a;.d to the interpretation of the main Section.             The  Respondents  also relied on  the  Resolution  dated         10th August  1964 and from the language thereof contend that         factory buildings were treated as ’house’.  Now in the first         place  in 1964 the word "House"---has already been.  substi-         tued  by the word "building" so when the respondents  passed         the resolution on 10th August 1964, it fixed two rates;  one         for all houses as is clearly indicated in the resolution  at         the  rate  of 40 paise for Rs. 100/- and other  for  factory         buildings  which was at the concessional rate.  This 0n  the         contrary, supports the submissions of the appellant that all         houses were treated as one class of buildings and all facto-         ries were treated as other class of buildings.             The  Respondents  also rely on the meaning of  the  word         ’house’  given in Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary at item  (17)         as  also  on  Corpus Juris Secundum Vol. 41  pp.  363.  364.         However, every word has more than one meaning and it has  to         be construed in the context of the Act in which it  appears.         So  construed  in the context of the present Act,  the  word         ’house’ cannot take in a factory building.             For  the  Respondent:    The impugned levy  of  tax  was         imposed  by the Resolution of the respondent Gram  Panchayat         dated 24-2-1952.  This Resolution was passed in exercise  of         the  powers conferred on the respondent by S. 89(1)  of  the         Bombay Village Panchayat Act 1933 (Bombay Act 6 of 1933)  as         it stood in 1952.             Though  the Act of 1933 was repealed by the Act of  1959         (Born. Act 3 of 1959),  the levy remained in force by virtue         of S. 186(8) of the 1959 Act.         311         Appellants’ only contention regarding this levy is that  the         word "houses" occuring in the phrase "Houses and land" in S.         89(1)  of  the 1933 Act does not take in  buildings  housing         factories, but has the narrow meaning "dwelling houses", and         hence the levy on its factory buildings is illegal.         The  short question which, therefore, arises for  considera-         tion  is what was the legislative intent in respect  of  the         word "Houses" as used in S. 89 (1) of the 1933 Act.  Was  it         used in the narrow sense of a dwelling house or in th  wider         sense of any  building  irrespective of the use to which  it         is put.         The word "House" is not defined in the Act. The dictionaries         relied  on  by the Appellant give various meanings  of  that         word;  but  dictionary  meanings are not  relevant  in  such         cases.   The  correct approach is to construe  the  word  in         "that sense which people conversant with the subject  matter         with which the statute is dealing, would attribute to it."         [1962] 1 SCR 279, 282 Ramavtar v. Assistant Sales Tax  Offi-         cer, Akola [1962] 1 SCR Supp. 498         Motipur Zamindari Co.         v.         The State of Bihar.         Though  the  word "house" has several meaning  in  non-legal         parlance  in  connection  with taxing  statutes,  it  has  a         definite  meaning  in legal parlance, "any building  in  the         ordinary sense irrespective of its user."

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 14  

       Grant v. Langston         (1900 A.C, 383, 390             The  ground floor of a building not  communicating  with         the  upper floor and used for business purposes was held  to         be a "house".         (1906)  A.C. 299, 303 last para---observations of Lord  Rob-         ertson).         Stroud  Judicial  Dictionary, Fourth Edition, Vol.  2,  page         1263 Item--(17)             (A brief report of the case of Ravenseft Properties  vs.         London Borough of Hillingdon, decided by the Tribunal  under         the  Compulsory  Purchase Act 1965, appears  in  "Land  Law,         cases  and  Materials"  by R.H. Mandsley and  E.  Ii.  Burn,         Third  Edition  p. 832.  The relevant  observation  is  "The         weight of judicial opinion appears to me to be  conclusively         in  favour  of the view that the word ’House’ extends  to  a         building  which is used for business and should not  be  re-         stricted to mere dwelling house."         The position in U.S.A. is also the same :-         Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 41, p. 364 (Co1. 1) & p. 365.         Words  and  Phrases,  Permanent  Edition  (West   Publishing         House)--p. 686.         There is important intrinsic evidence in the present case to         show that at the relevant time the concerned Legislature was         aware  that the word "House" and "Building" were  synonymous         and interchangeable.  The  1933-Act  emers the Government to         make  rules  for various purposes.  These rules  had  powers         placed before the Legislature for approval (or modification,         if  thought fit) before they could come into  force.   Under         Cl,  (n)  of  S-108 Govt. could make rules  for  fixing  the         maximum rate of tax to be imposed under S. 89(1).         The  rule is framed by Government in this respect on  18-12-         1934 i.e. immediately after passing the 1933-Act.  The words         used  in rule are  lands,  and ’Buildings’ instead of  ’land         and houses’.  ’these rules are a legitimate aid to construc-         tion of the statute as Contemporanea Expositio.         (Craies  on  Statute  Law Vlth Edition p.  157;  Maxwell  on         Interpretation of Statutes 12th Edition p. 264).            41104SCI/76         312             The  rules  framed  on 18-1-43 define  "House"  as  "any         building or set of buildings within the same enclosure".         In the amending Act of 1945 and its statement of objects and         reasons the expressions "farm--buildings" and  "farm-houses"         are used without distinction.             Although  the  1933-Act  was amended it  was  not  found         necessary to change the expression ’houses and lands" occur-         ing  in  S. 89.  That expression  continued  unchanged  till         after 1952.         It  is  also worthy of note that the tax is  not  on  houses         alone  but on lands as well.  It is unthinkable that a  land         which  is admittedly taxable would be intended to be  exempt         when a building housing a factory is built upon it.                 Under  the 1933-Act as initially enacted, S.  89’(1)         conferred  power  (but imposed no obligation)  upon  Village         Panchayats to levy any one of the taxed enumerated in Sub-S.         (2).  The first of these was the tax on "houses and  lands".         It was thus optional.  No tax was mentioned in S. 89(1).         By the 1939 amendment this scheme was changed.  New S. 89(1)         made  it  obligatorY on Village Panchayats to  levy  tax  on         houses and lands which were not subject to payment of  agri-         cultural assessment.  The six other taxes which were option-         al were retained in S. 89(2).  This clearly shows that those         taxes  were other than the tax on houses and lands  (when  a         tax  on  shops and hotels came to be added to this  list  as

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 8 of 14  

       (vi-a) it was a tax on shop-business and hotel-business  and         not  on  the houses where such business was run.   This  can         also be seen from s. 124 of the 1949-Act which repealed  the         1933-Act.  The next amendment of 1945 split up S. 89(1),  to         make  separate  provision  for taking farm buildings in  the         three  districts of Kolaba, Ratnagiri and Kanara where  farm         buildings  used  to be built on agricultural land  and  were         thus escaping assessment.         Additions  were  similarly made to the list of taxes  in  S.         89(2)  from to time and were all taxes of a  different  kind         from the obligatory tax houses and lands provided for in  S.         89 (1).         The  L.A. Bill No. 51 of 1952 was passed in 1953 i.e.  after         the levy question in this case had been already imposed  and         further,  add only to the list in S. 89(2) one more kind  of         tax different from the obligatory tax "houses & lands".         The  last  amendment is of 1954.  This substitues  the  word         "Buildings"  for the word "houses’ in S. 89(1).  The  amend-         ment is not relevant as it was made much after 24-2-52  when         the  impugned  levy was imposed. What is relied  on  by  the         appellant  is  the mention in the statement of  objects  and         reasons  viz.  that  under S. 89(1) of the Act  as  it  then         stood, Village Panchayats could not levy tax on buildings.         Now,  it is well settled that statement of objects and  rea-         sons  for a given statute cannot be used as aid to the  con-         struction of that statute.  The statement can be referred to         for the limited purpose of finding the object of the  Legis-         lature  in enacting that statute when all methods of  inter-         pretation fail.  Even for this limited purpose,  the  state-         ment of objects and reasons for an amending Act enacted more         than  twenty  years  later cannot be looked  into  when  the         question is of construction of the original Act enacted more         than  20 years earlier. Apart from this,  the  Contemporents         Expositio  provided by the Rules referred to  earlier  which         are  a legitimate aid to construction of the  original  Act,         must prevail over and outweigh the statement of objects  and         reasons of the Amend-  Act of 1954.            The  Resolution of 10th August 1964 did not supersede  or         modify  the  Resolution  dated 24-2-52.   According  to  the         appellants  own  case as  urged  before the High  Court  and         accepted by it, the resolution is void.  It can,  therefore,         be  of no effect. No levy was actually imposed in  pursuance         of that resolution, Further, even according to that  resolu-         tion, the tax on factory buildings was         313         not to be raised.  The bills served on the appellant and the         demand  made  from it, is according to the  levy  under  the         resolution of 24-2-1952.         The  appellant’s contention in this respect  is,  therefore,         untenable.

JUDGMENT:         CIVIL    APPELLATE    JURISDICTION:   Civil    Appeal    No.         2238  of 1969.           (From the Judgment and order dated 8-9-1969 of the  Bombay         High Court in Special Civil Application No. 1270/69).            M.C.  Bhandare, J.B. Dadachanji, O.C. Mathur,  K.J.  John         and Shri Narain for the Appellant.         B.D. Bal, M.S. Narasimhan and R.B. Ds, tar for the  Respond-         ent.             RAY,  C.J.--This  appeal  by certificate  turns  on  the         meaning  of the expression "house" as used in section 89  of         the  Bombay  Village. Panchayat Act, 1933  (hereinafter  re-

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 9 of 14  

       ferred to as the Act).             The respondent is a village Panchayat constituted  under         the provisions of the Act.   In exercise of powers conferred         on it for imposition of taxes on houses under section 89  of         the .Act, the respondent by a resolution dated 24  February,         1952  imposed tax on houses within its  jurisdiction.    The         resolution   of 24 February, 1952 decided to levy a  tax  on         house  at  the rate of Annas -/4/- for every  Rs.  100.  The         resolution further decided that the basis for valuation  for         a  room  of old house would be Rs. 100/-, for a room of  new         house Rs. 125/and for Verandah (Padvi) Rs. 25/-.             By  another  resolution   dated  10  August,   1964  the         respondent  revised the tax on house at the rate of  40  nP.         for  Rs.  100/-  The resolution further said that for facto-         ries as a concession the tax would be 25 nP for Rs. 100/- on         capital value.             The appellant has factory buildings.  The respondent  by         a  notice dated 10 January, 1969 made a  demand of taxes  on         the factory building of the appellant for the years  1967-68         and 1968-69. The respondent charged at the rate of 25 nP for         Rs.  100/-. The respondent did not charge the  appellant  at         the rate of 40 nP for Rs. 100/- which was the increased rate         pursuant  to the resolution dated 10 August, 1964.  The  re-         spondent  thereafter made a demand in the year 1969-70.  The         aggregate   tax  involved  in  this  appeal  comes  to   Rs.         1,34,763/- for the years 1967-68, 1968-69 and 1969-70.               The appellant contended that in 1952 when the  resolu-         tion  was passed by the respondent levying taxes  on  houses         the respondent was not empowered to tax factory   buildings.         The  principal reason advanced by the appellant is that only         in  1954  the word "building" was substituted for  the  word         "house", and, therefore, the respondent would have no  power         to impose taxes on the factory buildings by me resolution in         1952.             The other contention on behalf of the appellant is  that         if  the  resolution dated 24 February, 1952 be  held  to  be         valid  levying a tax on factory  praises the resolution  was         replaced  by the resolution of 10 August, 1964.    Here  the         contention  of the appellant is that the resolution of  1964         is not valid because it was not passed in accordance with         314         the Act and the Rules.   The appellant, therefore,  contends         that  the resolution in 1964 is void the resolution in  1952         would not be operative to support the tax.         The  provisions  contained in section 89 of the Act  are  as         follows:--         "Levy of taxes and fees by Panchayat: (1)  Every   Panchayat         shall  levy in such manner and at such rates as may be  pre-         scribed  such of the taxes or fees specified in  sub-section         (2)  as  may be necessary for the proper  discharge  by  the         Panchayat of its duties under this Act.         (2)  Taxes or fees which are leviable by a  Panchayat  under         sub-section (1) are:--            (i)  a  tax upon the owners or occupiers  of  houses  and         lands within the limits of the village;         (ii) a pilgrim tax;         (iii) a tax on fairs and festivals,         (iv)  a tax on sales of goods;         (v) octroi;         (vi)   a tax on marriages, adoptions and feasts;         (vii)   any  other tax which may have been approved  by  the         district local board and sanctioned by Government."              Section 89 of the Act was amended by Amendment Act No.         of 1939 as follows :--         ("a) For sub-section (1) the following shall be substituted,

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 10 of 14  

       namely:--         (1)  Every  panchayat shall levy a tax upon  the  owners  or         occupiers  of  houses  and lands which are  not  subject  to         payment of agricultural assessment within the  limits of the         village  in  such manner and at such rates as  may  be  pre-         scribed. The rules made for the levy of such tax may provide         that  the payment of such tax may be made either in cash  or         by the rendering of work and labour."         Sub-section (2) was amended as follows :.         "It shall be competent t0 a panchayat to, levy all or any of         the taxes or fees at such rates and in such manner as may be         prescribed, namely, clause (i) shall be deleted."         In 1945 section 89 was amended as follows:         Sub-section (1) of section 89 was substituted by the follow-         ing         ’(1)  Every panchayat, other than a panchayat, in  the  dis-         tricts  of  Kolaba, Ratnagiri and Canara, shall levy  a  tax         upon the owners or occupiers  of houses .and lands which are         not  subject to payment of agricultural  assessment   within         the limits of the village m such manner and at such rates as         may be prescribed.         315         (1A)  Every panchayat in the districts of Kolaba,  Ratnagiri         and Kanara shall levy a tax upon the owners or occupiers  of         houses  including farm buildings  whether or not subject  t0         payment  of agricultural assessment and of lands  which  are         not  subject to payment of agricultural  assessment,  within         the  limits of the village in such manner and at such  rates         as may be prescribed.         (1B)  The rules made for .the levy of the, tax specified  in         subsection  (1  )and (1 A) may provide that the  payment  of         such  tax may be made either in cash or by the rendering  of         work and labour."         In 1947 section 89 was amended as follows :--         "(1)  Every  panchayat shall levy a tax upon the  owners  or         occupiers of houses including farm buildings Whether or  not         subject to payment of agricultural assessment  and  of  land         which are not subject to payment of agriculural  assessment,         within  the limits of the village, in such manner,  at  such         rates and subject to such exemptions as may be prescribed.         (1A) Where an owner of a house or land has left the  village         or cannot otherwise be found, any person to whom  such house         or  land  has been transferred shall be liable for  the  tax         leviable under sub-section (1 ) from such owner.          (lB)  The rules made for the levy of the tax  specified  in         sub-section (1) may provide that the payment of such tax may         be made either in cash or by rendering of work and labour."         Again,  in  1947 in sub-section (2) after  clause  (vi)  the         following new clause was inserted:         "(vi) (a) a tax on shops and hotels".         In 1952 section 89(2)(vi)(b) was amended as follows :--         "a  tax  on premises where machinery is run by  steam,  oil,         electric  power or manual labour for any trade or  busineess         and not for an agricultural or domestic purpose."             In 1954 section 89 was amended and the word  "buildings"         was substituted for the words "houses including farm  build-         ings" in subsection (1) thereof.   Again in sub-section (IA)         of section 89 for the word "house" wherever it occurred  the         word  "building"  was  substituted.  In  subsection  (2)  of         section  89  for clauses  (vi) (a)  and  (b)  the  following         clause was substituted :--         "(vi)  (a) subject to the provisions of Article 276  of  the         Constitution, a tax on the following professions, trades and         calling, namely :-         (a) shop keeping and hotel keeping;

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 11 of 14  

             (b)  any  trade or calling  (other   than  agriculture         which is carried on with the help of machinery run by steam,         oil, electric power or manual labour."             In  1959  the  Act was repealed.    The  Bombay  Village         Panchayats  Act, 1958 being Act No. III of 1959   came  into         existence.   The         316         relevant  section of the 1959 Act necessary for the  purpose         of the present appeal is section 186(8) which is as  follows         :--                  "186.  Notwithstanding the repeal of the said  laws                  and the foregoing provisions of this Act:                  (8)  any appointment, notification,   notice,  tax,                  fee, order, scheme, licence, permission, rule,  by-                  law,  or form  made, issued, imposed, or granted in                  respect  of the said villages and in force  on  the                  date  of the commencement of this Act shall  in  so                  far as they are not inconsistent be deemed to  have                  been  made, issued, imposed or granted  under  this                  Act in respect of the village and shall continue in                  force  until  it is superseded or modified  by  any                  appointment, notification, notice, tax, fee, order,                  scheme, licence, permission, rule, by-law  or  form                  made, issued, imposed or granted under this Act".             There  is  no dispute that the resolution  of  1952  was         validly  passed in exercise of powers conferred on  the  re-         spondent by section 89(1) of the Act.  The principal conten-         tion of the appellant is that the word "house" means  dwell-         ing house.   The appellant relied on the decision in Wimble-         don  Urban  District Council v. Hastings(1) and   Lewin   v.         End(2)  in support of the proposition that  the   expression         "house"  means  a dwelling house.  The appellant  sought  to         support  the  contention by reference to the fact  that  the         word  "house"  which occurred in section 89 of the  Act  was         substituted  by the word "building" in 195, indicating  that         factory  buildings  would not be within the meaning  of  the         word "house".             The word "house" is not defined in the Act.  This  Court         in  Ramavtar v. Assistant Sales Tax Officer, Akola(a)   said         that  the correct approach is to construe the word  in  that         sense  which people conversant with the subject matter  with         which the statute is dealing would attribute to it.  Counsel         for  the respondent rightly contended that the word  "house"         would  in its ordinary sense include any building  irrespec-         tive  of  its  user. To ascertain the meaning  of  the  word         "house" one must understand the subject matter with  respect         to which it is used in order to arrive at the sense in which         it  is employed in a statute.  Formerly, houses  were  built         that each house occupied a separate site. In modern times  a         practice  has grown up of putting separate houses one  above         the other. They are built in separate flats or storeys.  For         legal  and ordinary purposes they are separate houses.  Each         is  separately let and separately occupied. One has no  con-         nection  with those above or below, except in so far  as  it         may  derive  support from those below instead  of  from  the         ground  as  in the case of ordinary  houses  (See  Yorkshire         Insurance v Clayton(4) and Grant v. Langston(5).             It  may be stated generally that the word "house"  is  a         structure  of  a  permanent character.  It  is  structurally         severed  from  other tenements. It is not necessary  that  a         house if adapted for residential purposes should be actually         dwelt in [See Daniel  v.  Coulsting(6)].  A  building  in         (1) 87 Law Times Reports 118.        (2) [1906] A.C. 299.         (3) [1962] 1 S.C.R. 279.                  (4) 8 Q.B.D. 424.         (5) [1900] A.C. 383.                     (6) 14 L.J.C.P. 70.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 12 of 14  

       317         Convent  Garden had formerly been a dwelling house  but  was         converted into a fruit store warehouse and offices in  which         no one slept and was held to be a "house" as regards assess-         ment  to  the  rector’s rate within the  provisions  of  the         relevant statute.             The  idea of the varieties of meanings can be  had  from         the subject matter of the statute.  A consecrated church was         treated as a house as regard the Building Line which a local         authority  has  a  right to prescribe.  [See  Folkestone  v.         Woodward(2)]. Under the Public Health Act, 1875 "house"  was         not limited to an ordinary dwelling house and included a day         school having no boarders and where none of the staff resid-         ed. See Wimbledon v. Hastings (supra). Under the  compulsory         Purchase  Act, 1965 "house" has been extended to a  building         which is used for business purposes and is not restricted to         mere  dwelling  houses (See Ravenseft Properties  v.  London         Borough of Hillingdon(2).             The weight of judicial opinion is conclusively in favour         of  the  view that the word "house" extends  to  a  building         which is used for business and should not be restricted to a         mere  dwelling house (See Land Law, Cases and  Materials  by         R.H. Mandsley and E.H. Burn Third Edition, p. 832).         In Corpus Juris Secundum Vol. 41 page 364 it is said that in         a  legal sense, the word "house" is more comprehensive,  but         it is not limited to a structure designed for human  habita-         tion, and may  mean a building or shed intended or used as a         habitation or shelter for animals of any kind, a building in         the  ordinary sense or any building, edifice,  or  structure         inclosed  with walls and covered, regardless of the fact  of         human  habitation.  Again in Corpus Juris Secundum  Vol.  41         page   365 it is said that under  particular  circumstances,         the term has been held equivalent to and interchangeable  or         synonymous with "building", "dwelling" and "dwelling  house"         and sometimes "premises".             The 1952 resolution of the Gram Panchayat in the present         case is to be understood in the background of the provisions         contained  in  section 89 of the Act and  the  rules  framed         under section 108 of the Act.  The rules were placed  before         the legislature for approval.  The rules framed in 2934 used         the words "lands and buildings" instead of the words  "lands         and houses".  The rules are a legitimate aid to construction         of  the  statute as Contemporanea Expositio (See  Craies  on         Statute Law 6th Edition p. 157).             The rules flamed in 1943 defined "house" as any building         or set of buildings within the same enclosure. In the Amend-         ing  Act  of  1945  the  expressions  "farm  buildings"  and         "houses"  are  used  without distinction. The  Act  in  1933         conferred  power upon the Panchayat to levy tax upon  owners         or  occupiers of houses and lands. This  expression  "houses         and  lands"  continued unchanged till the year 1952.  It  is         significant that the tax is not on houses alone but on lands         as well.  It is unsound to hold that a land which is  admit-         tedly taxable would be intended to be exempt when a building         housing a. factory is built upon it. The Act as initially         (1) L.R. 15 Eq. 159.          (2) [19691 20 P & C.R. 483.         318         enacted  conferred power upon the Panchayat to levy any  one         of  the  taxes enumerated in sub-section (2). The  first  of         these  was tax on houses and lands.  Section 89 (1)  of  the         Act  as  it stood did not mention any particular  tax.   The         1939 Amendment changed the scheme.  Section 89(1) of the Act         made  it obligatory on Panchayats to levy tax on houses  and         lands.  In 1933 section 89(1) of the Act conferred  optional         power on Panchayats to levy taxes.  In 1939 section 89(1) of

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 13 of 14  

       the  Act  made it compulsory for Panchayats to levy  tax  on         owners  or occupiers of houses and lands which are not  sub-         ject  to payment of agricultural assessment. The  six  other         taxes  mentioned in section 89 (2) of the Act starting  from         clauses (ii) to (vii) namely, a pilgrim tax, a tax on  fairs         and  festivals;  a tax on sales of goods, octroi; a  tax  on         marriages, adoptions and feasts; and any other tax which may         have  been  approved by the district local board  and  sanc-         tioned  by Government were made optional. A tax upon  owners         or occupiers on houses and lands which figures in clause (i)         of  section 89(2) of the Act was deleted, by  the  Amendment         Act  of 1939 inasmuch as taxes on houses and lands became  a         compulsory  power of taxation under section 89( 1 )  of  the         Act.             Reference may be made to the addition of clause  (vi)(a)         in section 89(2) of the Act which was introduced in 1947  as         conferring  power  on Panchayats to levy tax  on  shops  and         hotels.  This indicates that the tax was on the business  of         shops  and  the business of hotel.  The tax was not  on  the         houses where such business was run. Section 124 of the  1959         Act which came in place of section 89 of the Act shows  that         "shop  keeping"  and "hotel keeping" are  considered  to  be         trades and callings.             The  amendment  of the year 1945 shows that  a  separate         provision  was made for taxing farm buildings in three  dis-         tricts of Colaba, Ratnagin and Kanara, where farm  buildings         were constructed on agricultural land. The idea was to bring         such farm buildings within the province of assessment.             The  amendment  in 1952 added a tax  on  premises  where         machinery  is  run by steam, oil, electric power  or  manual         labour  in  trade or business and not  for  agricultural  or         domestic  purposes.  This  addition of clause  (vi)  (b)  to         section  89(2)  of the Act illustrates one  more   kind   of         optional tax as different from obligatory tax on houses  and         lands within section 89 ( 1 ) of the Act.             The  amendment  of 1954 where the  word  "building"  was         substituted for the word "house" does not help the appellant         to  suggest  that  factories will be  included  only  within         buildings  and not within houses. The appellant referred  to         statement of objects and reasons which said that the village         panchayat could not levy a tax on buildings, and, therefore,         the word "buildings" was substituted for the word  "houses".         The statement of objects and reasons is ordinarily not  used         as  aid to construction of a statute. A statement  is  some-         times  referred to for the limited purposes of  finding  the         object of the legislature in enacting the statute where  all         other methods of interpretation fail.             The  words "houses and lands" as used in section  89  of         the  Act mean all buildings, and factory buildings would  be         included  within  that meaning. The use  of  the  expression         "buildings"  in  place of the words "houses  including  farm         buildings" made explicit what was, implicit in the statute.         319         Having regard to the nature of the word "houses" as used  in         taxing legislations and municipal legislation and the nature         and purposes of the statute in the present case it is  mani-         fest that the legislature used the word "house" so that  the         village  panchayat would be in a position to levy  taxes  on         all buildings situated in the village.  The rule makers made         no distinction between the dwelling houses and buildings.             The second contention of the appellant is  unacceptable.         The  resolution  of  10 August, 1964 did  not  supersede  or         modify  the  resolution of 24 February, 1952.  No  levy  was         actually  imposed pursuant to the resolution of  10  August,         1964.  Further the bills served on the appellant were pursu-

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 14 of 14  

       ant to the levies imposed under the resolution of 24  Febru-         ary 1952. In 1964 a tax on factory buildings was not raised.         The tax on houses was raised.  Even if the resolution of  10         August,  1964 be invalid the demands made by the  respondent         under  the 1952 resolution are valid and legal for two  rea-         sons.   First, the resolution of 1952 has never been  super-         seded; and second, section  186(8) of the 1959 Act indicates         that any tax imposed shall in so far as they are not  incon-         sistent be deemed to have been made under the 1959 Act shall         continue  in  force until they are superseded  or  modified.         There  is nothing to show that the tax is inconsistent  with         the 1959 Act, nor was it argued to be so.             For these reasons the contentions of the appellant fail.         The appeal is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.         V.P.S.                                         Appeal   dis-         missed.         320