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PETITIONER: TARA CHAND AND ANR.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: RAM PRASAD

DATE OF JUDGMENT03/05/1990

BENCH: RAMASWAMY, K. BENCH: RAMASWAMY, K. SAIKIA, K.N. (J)

CITATION:  1990 SCR  (3)   7        1990 SCC  (3) 526  JT 1990 (3)    17        1990 SCALE  (1)190

ACT:     Rajasthan  Premises (Control of Rent and  Eviction  Act, 1950:Section 13(1)--Tenancy rights--Whether heritable--Heirs of tenant-Whether entitled to enjoy protection of Act.

HEADNOTE:     Smt.  Anandi Bai wife of Appellant No. 1 and  mother  of Appellant  No.  2 had a lease of suit shop in Jaipur  for  a period  of 11 months beginning May 1, 1964 wherein  she  was carrying  on small kirana business. The  Respondent-landlord terminated the lease by a notice issued under section 106 of the  Transfer of Property Act at the end of the term of  the lease. However Anandi Bai continued to remain in  possession and  the landlord went on accepting the rent even after  the termination  of her tenancy and thus she became a  statutory tenant.  She  died sometime in September  1966.  Respondent- landlord  initiated  action for ejectment of  her  heirs-the appellants  herein from the demised shop on the ground  that on  the death of Anandi Bai the appellants have no right  to continue  in  occupation of the premises.  The  trial  court dismissed  the suit on the finding that Anandi Bai paid  and the respondent accepted the rent after the determination  of the  lease,  so she was holding over.  The  first  appellate court  confirmed  the decree of the trial  court  though  on different  grounds. Second appeal by  the  plaintifflandlord was  allowed by the High Court holding that since the  heirs of  the tenant had not carried on the business  with  Anandi Bai  during her life time as family business they  were  not entitled  to the benefits of the definition of  ’tenant’  as amended by Section 3(ii) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control) of Rent and Eviction) Amendment Act, 14 of 1976 and  accord- ingly  reversing the decrees of the courts below,  the  suit for  ejectment of the appellants from the demised  shop  was decreed.     Allowing  the appeal by special leave against the  Judg- ment and Decree of the High Court preferred by the heirs  of the tenant Anandi Bai, this Court,     HELD:  Under Hindu Succession Act the heirs of  the  de- ceased  tenant are entitled to succeed, not only to  his/her business  but also to his/her tenancy rights under the  Rent Act which protects the 7

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8 heirs  from  ejectment except in accordance with  that  Act. Therefore,  despite  the  termination of  the  tenancy,  the tenancy rights are heritable and the heirs of the tenant are entitled to enjoy the protection of the Act. [18A-B]     Admittedly Smt. Anandi Bai was inducted into  possession of  the demised property under a contract of  tenancy  which was determined by issuance of a notice under Section 106  of Transfer  of Property Act. Even thereafter she continued  to remain in possession as statutory tenant under the Act.  The finding  of the Trial Court as affirmed by the First  Appel- late Court is that the respondent landlord after termination of tenancy received the rent from her and thereby she became tenant holding over till the date of her death. [18F-G]     The  appellants by virtue of intestate succession  under Hindu Succession Act, being Class I heirs, succeeded to  the heritable  interest in the lease hold right of  the  demised premises  held  by Smt. Anandi Bai. They,  thereby,  stepped into  the shoes of the tenant. They continued to  remain  in possession as on the date of the suit as statutory  tenants. Thereby,  they are entitled to the protection of their  con- tinuance as a statutory tenant under the Act. [19B-C]     J.C. Chaterjee v. Sri Kishan, [1973] 1 SCR 850;  Damadi- lal & Ors. v. Parashram & Ors., [1976] Suppl. SCR 645; Anand Niwas (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Anandji Kalyanji Pedhi & Ors., [1964] 4 SCR 892; Smt. Gian Devi Anand v. Jeevan Kumar & Ors., [1985] Suppl. SCR 1; V. Dhanpal Chattiar v.  Yesodai Ammal,  [1980] 1  SCR  334’and Bhavarlal Labhchand v.  Kanaivalal  Nathalal Intawala, [1986] 1 SCC 571, referred to.

JUDGMENT:     CIVIL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 5052  of 1985.     From the Judgment and Order dated 5.7.1989 of the Rajas- than  High Court in Regular Civil Second Appeal No.  240  of 1978. B.D. Sharma for the Appellants. D. Bhandari for the Respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by K. RAMASWAMY, J.  1. The appellants had leave under 9 Article 136 to appeal against the judgment and decree of the High Court of Rajasthan at Jaipur Bench in Second Appeal No. 240 of 1978 dated July 5, 1985 reversing the decrees of  the Courts  below  and decreeing the suit for ejectment  of  the appellants from the demised shop in Jaipur. The facts lie in a short compass: that Smt. Anandi, wife of the first  appel- lant  and the mother of the second appellant,  Nand  Kishore had lease of the demised premises for 11 months from May  1, 1964  on payment of monthly rent of Rs. 18 which expired  on March 31, 1965. The respondent landlord terminated the lease by  a notice under section 106 of Transfer of  Property  Act but  she  remained in possession and enjoyment of  the  shop carrying  on small kirana business. She died  in  September, 1966.  The  demised premises are governed by  the  Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (Act 26 of 1950   for   short the  ’Act’).   Section   13(1)   thereof, postulates  that "notwithstanding anything contained in  any law  or a contract, no court shall pass any decree  or  make any order in favour of the landlord, whether in execution of a  decree or otherwise evicting the tenant so long as he  is ready  and  willing to pay rent thereof to the  full  extent allowable  by  the Act" unless the landlord  proves  to  the

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satisfaction of the court any one of the grounds  enumerated in Clauses ’a’ to ’k’ thereof. The action for ejectment  was initiated by the respondent on the premise that on the death of  the tenant, the appellants have no right to continue  in occupation of the demised premises. The findings recorded by all  the  courts are that Smt. Anandi was  the  tenant.  The appellants  during  her life time, had not  carried  on  the business  with her till date of her death. The  Trial  Court dismissed  the suit on the ground that Smt. Anandi paid  and the respondent accepted the rent after determination of  the lease. So she was a tenant holding over. During the pendency of  the appeal, the Act was amended through Rajasthan  Prem- ises  (Control  of Rent and Eviction) Ordinance 26  of  1975 which was replaced by Act 14 of 1976 (for short the  ’Amend- ment  Act’). Therein the definition of ’Tenant’ was  amended by Section 3(ii) of the Amendment Act introducing to Section 3 Clause (vii), thus: "(vii) "tenant" means--       (a)  The person by whom or on whose account or  behalf rent is, or, but for a contract express or implied, would be payable  for  any  premises to his  landlord  including  the person who is continuing in its possession after the  termi- nation  of his tenancy otherwise than by a decree for  evic- tion passed under the provisions of this Act; and 10       (b) In the event of death of the person as is referred to  in sub-clause (a), his surviving spouse,  son,  daughter and other heir in accordance with the personal law  applica- ble to him who had been, in the case of premises leased  out for  residential  purposes, ordinarily residing and  in  the case  of  premises  leased out for  commercial  or  business purposes,  ordinarily carrying on business with him in  such premises as member of his family upto his death."     Consequently, the appellants amended the written  state- ment  adding  therein paragraphs Nos. 16 and  17  contending that they have been jointly carrying on the business in  the demised premises alongwith Smt. Anandi Bai, therefore,  they are  entitled to the continuance of the tenancy. The  amend- ment was allowed by the Appellate Court and it called for  a finding from the Trial Court in that regard. After giving an opportunity  to both the parties to adduce  evidence  afresh the  Court  recorded  the finding in the  negative.  On  its receipt  and consideration thereof the appellate  court  af- firmed  the  finding but confirmed the decree of  the  Trial Court  on  other grounds. The High Court held  that..as  the appellants  had not carried on the business with the  tenant during her life time as family business they were not  enti- tled to the benefit of the amended definition of the tenant. Accordingly decreed the suit.     (2) The contention of the learned counsel for the appel- lants  is that the lease hold right is an  heritable  estate and  on death of the tenant in September, 1966, the  succes- sion  thereto was opened and the appellants, being  Class  I heirs  under  the Hindu Succession Act,  1956  inherited  by intestate  succession the lease hold estate in  the  tenancy rights held by Smt. Anandi. The said right received  express recognition under the Amendment Act which is not in  deroga- tion to the personal law. The High Court, thereby, committed manifest error of law. Shri Dalveer Bhandari, learned  coun- sel for the respondent, on thorough preparation of the case, has  vehemently resisted the contention. He also  circulated written arguments. According to him preceding the  Amendment Act the commercial or business tenancy was not heritable  as held  in J.C. Chaterjee v. Sri Kishan. [1973] 1 SCR  850  by the High Courts of Rajasthan, Punjab and Haryana and  Delhi.

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For the first time the right to succession has been  created under  the  Amendment Act. The finding recorded by  all  the courts  is  that during the life time and till the  date  of death  of  the tenant, Smt. Anandi, the appellants  did  not carry on business with her as family business in the 11 demised premises. On determination of tenancy the appellants became  trespassers. Thereby the appellants became  disenti- tled to remain in possession of the demised premises. It  is seen  that  Section 13(1) of the Act engrafts  non  obstenti clause,  namely, "notwithstanding anything contained in  any law  or contract no court shall pass any decree of  eviction against the tenant so long as the tenant is ready and  will- ing  to pay rent therefore to the full extent  allowable  by the Act" unless one or other ground or grounds specified  in Clauses  ’a’  to ’k’ of sub-section (1) of  Section  13  are established. Admittedly, the settled legal position  preced- ing the amendment act, prevailing in the State of  Rajasthan was that the lease hold rights of the tenanted premises  for commercial  or business purposes governed by the Act is  not heritable.  It is a personal right to the tenant. A  reading of the amendment to the definition of ’tenant’ in Section  3 Sub-Clause  (vii)(b) makes the legislative  intent  manifest that from the date of the Amendment Act came into force,  on the death of the tenant, his surviving spouse, son, daughter and other heir, in accordance with personal law as  applica- ble to him, who had been, in the case of the premises leased out  for residential purposes, ordinarily residing  and,  in the  case of premises leased out for commercial or  business purposes,  ordinarily  had been carrying  on  business  with him/her  in such premises as members of his/her family  upto his/  her death. Therefore, under the amended definition  of tenant, if one seeks to make avail of the benefit of  statu- tory tenancy under the Act, he must establish to the  satis- faction  of  the  court that the surviving  spouse,  son  or daughter  and other heir, in case of  residential  purposes, he/she/they--ordinarily  had been residing in  the  premises along  with the tenant and continued to do so till  date  of death  of  the  tenant. Similarly, in  respect  of  premises leased  out for commercial or business purposes it  must  be established that the surviving spouse or son or daughter and the heir as the case may be ordinarily had been carrying  on the  business during the life time of the tenant as  members of  the family in the demised premises and continued  to  do the business till date of the death of the tenant. In  other words  to  avail  of  the  statutory  right  under   section 3(viii)(b)  there  must  continue to subsist  the  unity  of action  and continuity of membership of the  family  between the deceased tenant and the spouse etc. The break in  either of the links snaps off the right denuding the continuity  of the statutory tenancy.     (3)  Every  tenancy is rounded, initially, upon  a  con- tract.  The contractual tenant has an estate or property  in the lease-hold interest of the tenancy and his  heritability is  an incidence of the tenancy. Despite termination of  the tenancy this Court ecologised the resultant consequences  in Damadilal & Ors. v. Parashram & Ors., [1976] Suppl. 12 SCR 645 in which three Judges Bench held that: "It cannot be assumed, however, that with the  determination of the tenancy the estate must necessarily disappear and the statute  can only preserve his status of irremovability  and not the estate he had in the premises in his occupation."     The facts in that case were that the tenancy of business premises  was governed by the Madhya  Pradesh  Accommodation

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Control Act, 1961. The contracted tenancy was determined and a suit for eviction from a shop was laid in the Civil  Court against  the  tenant. During its pendency he  died  and  his legal  representatives were sought to come on  record  which was resisted. The word ’tenant’ had been defined under  sec- tion 2(1) of that Act, thus: "a person by whom or on whose account or behalf the rent  of any  accommodation  is, or, but for a  contract  express  or implied would be payable for any accommodation and  includes any  person occupying the accommodation as a  subtenant  and also any person continuing in possession after the  termina- tion of his tenancy whether before or after the commencement of  this Act; but shall not include any person against  whom any order or decree for eviction has been made"     he definition is the same as in the present case on hand under Clause (a) of Sec. 3(vii) of the Rajasthan Act. It was contended  that  the  tenancy came to a  terminus  with  its determination  by  issuance of notice under section  106  of Transfer  of Property Act and the legal  representatives  do not  succeed to the estate of the deceased tenant so  as  to prosecute the proceedings. While repelling that  contention, noticing  the  definition  referred  to  above,  Gupta,   J. speaking for the court held that: "The  definition  makes a person  continuing  in  possession after  the  determination of his tenancy a tenant  unless  a decree or order for eviction has been made against him, thus putting  him on par with a person whose contractual  tenancy still subsists. The incidents of such tenancy and a contrac- tual-tenancy must, therefore, be the same unless any  provi- sion  of the Act conveyed a contrary intention.  That  under this Act such a tenant retains an interest in the 13 premises,  and  not merely a personal right  of  occupation, will  also appear from section 14 which contains  provisions restricting the tenant’s power of subletting  ...... There is nothing to suggest that this section does not apply to  all  tenants as defined in Section 2(i).  A  contractual tenant  has an estate or interest in premises from which  he carves out what he gives to the sub-tenant. Section 14  read with section 2(i) makes it clear that the so-called statuto- ry tenant has the right to sub-let in common with a contrac- tual  tenant and this is because he also has an interest  in the premises occupied by him."     Accordingly  it  was held that they succeeded  as  legal representatives to the lease-hold interest of the commercial premises.     (4)  How  to resolve the controversy between  the  ratio therein  and  that of majority contra view  taken  in  Anand Niwas (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Anandji Kalvanji Pedhi & Ors., [1964] 4 SCR 892 and Jagdish Chander Chaterjee & Ors. v. Sri Kishan & Anr.,  (supra), the later case on which heavy  reliance  was placed by Mr. Dalveer Bhandari that arose directly under the Rajasthan  Rent  Control Act, referred to  the  Constitution Bench  in  Smt.  Gian Devi Anand v. Jeevan  Kurnar  &  Ors., [1985] Suppl. SCR 1. The facts therein were that the defini- tion  of tenant under the unamended Delhi Rent Control  Act, similar to Section 3(vii)(a) of the Act was in vogue in  the Delhi  Rent  Control  Act, 1958. The  premises  in  question therein  was commercial premises. The definition  of  tenant was amended with retrospective effect. The contention raised was that the amended Act accords heritability to residential tenancy while omitting the benefit to commercial or business tenancy.  The legal representatives of the deceased  tenant, did not acquire heritable interest in the commercial tenancy under  that Act. A.N. Sen, J. speaking for the  Constitution

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Bench  surveyed the case law in extenso and upheld the  view in Darnadilal’s case. It was held at p. 24 to 25 thus: "For  an  appreciation of the question it  is  necessary  to understand  the  kind  of protection that is  sought  to  be afforded  to  a tenant under the Rent Acts  and  his  status after  the termination of the contractual tenancy under  the Rent Acts. It is not in dispute that so long as the contrac- tual  tenancy  remains  subsisting,  the  contractual tenan- cy creates heritable rights; and, on the death of a 14 contractual tenant, the Heirs and legal representatives step into the position of the contractual tenant, and in the same way on the death of a landlord the heirs and legal represen- tatives of a landlord become entitled to all the rights  and privileges  of the contractual tenancy and also  come  under all the obligations under the contractual tenancy. The  Rent Acts  seek  to preserve social harmony  and  promote  social justice by safeguarding the interests of the tenants  mainly and at the same time protecting the legitimate interests  of the  landlords. Though the purpose of the various Rent  Acts appear to be the same, namely, to promote social justice  by affording protection to tenants against undue harassment and exploitation  by landlords, providing at the same  time  for adequate  safeguards  of  the legitimate  interests  of  the landlords, the Rent Acts undoubtedly lean more in favour  of the tenants, for whose benefit the Rent Acts are essentially passed.  It may also be noted that various  amendments  have been  introduced to the various Rent Acts from time to  time as  and when situation so required for the purpose of  miti- gating the hardship of tenants  .....  Though provisions  of all  the  Rent Control Legislation is-  that  a  contractual tenant  on the termination of the contractual tenancy is  by virtue  of the provisions of the Rent Acts not liable to  be evicted as a matter of course under the ordinary law of  the land  and he is entitled to remain in possession even  after determination  of  the contractual tenancy and no  order  or decree  for eviction will be passed against a tenant  unless any  ground which entitles the landlord to get an  order  or decree  for possession specified in the Act is  established. In other words, the common feature of every Rent Control Act is that if affords protection to every tenant against  evic- tion despite termination of tenancy except on grounds recog- nised  by the Act and no order or decree for eviction  shall be  passed  against  the tenant unless any  such  ground  is established to the satisfaction of the Court  ......  " (5)  The  seven Judges Bench of this Court  reported  in  V. Dhanpal  Chettiar v. Yesodai Ammal. [1980] 1 SCR  334  while considering  the effect of termination of the tenancy  under Section  106 of Transfer of Property Act vis-a-vis right  of the tenant under T.N. Buildings (Lease & Rent) Control  Act, 1960 held that ’various State Rent Control Acts make serious encroachment in the field of freedom of 15 contract. It does not permit the landlord to snap his  rela- tionship  with  the tenant merely by his act  of  serving  a notice to quit on him. In spite of the notice, the law  says that he continues to be a tenant and he does so enjoying all the rights of a lessee and at the same time is deemed to  be under  all the liabilities such as payment of rent etc.,  in accordance  with law. Similarly while considering  the  lan- guage of Section 10(1) of the A.P. Building (Lease, Rent and Eviction Control) Act, 1960 similar to Section 13(1) of  the Act,  whether  the statutory lease is to  be  terminated  by issuance  of  notice under Section 106 of  the  Transfer  of Property  Act, it was further held at p. 352 B that "even  a

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special provision is provided by way of abundant  precaution only  that  without this a tenant continuing  in  possession after  the termination of the contractual tenancy and  until an  eviction order is passed against him, continues  on  the same terms and conditions as before and he cannot be evicted unless  a ground is made out for his eviction  according  to the State Rent Act". In Gian Devi Anand’s case the Constitu- tion Bench further held at p. 32 F that: "The  termination of the contractual tenancy in view of  the definition  of  tenant in the Act does not bring  about  any change  in  the  status and legal position  of  the  tenant, unless  there  are contrary provisions in the Act;  and  the tenant  no  with standing the termination  of  tenancy  does enjoy  an estate or interest in the tenanted premises.  This interest  or estate which the tenant under the Act,  despite termination  of the contractual tenancy, continues to  enjoy creates a heritable interest in the absence of any provision to the contrary  ...... at p. 33E to G it was held that: As the status and rights of a contractual tenant even  after determination  of  his tenancy when the tenant is  at  times described  as the statutory tenant, are fully  protected  by the  Act  and the heirs of such tenants become  entitled  by virtue  of the provisions of the Act to inherit  the  status and  position  of  the Statutory tenant on  his  death,  the LegislatUre which has created this right has thought it  fit in  the case of residential premises to limit the rights  of the  heirs in the manner and to the extent provided in  Sec- tion  2(1)  (iii). It appears that the Legislature  has  not thought  it fit to put any such restrictions with regard  to tenants in respect of commercial premises in this Act." 16 at p. 35D to G, it was observed that: So  long as the contractual tenancy of a tenant who  carries on  the business continues, there can be no question of  the heirs of the deceased tenant not only inheriting the tenancy but  also inheriting the business and they are  entitled  to run  and  enjoy  the same. We have earlier  held  that  mere termination of the contractual tenancy does not bring  about any  change  in the status of the tenant and the  tenant  by virtue of the definition of the ’Tenant’ in the Act and  the other Rent Acts continue to enjoy the same status and  posi- tion  unless there be any provisions in the Rent Acts  which indicate  to the contrary. The mere fact that in the Act  no provision has been made with regard to the heirs of  tenants in  respect  of  commercial tenancies on the  death  of  the tenant after termination of the tenancy, as has been done in the  case of heirs of the tenants of  residential  premises, does  not  indicate that the legislature intended  that  the heirs  of the tenants of commercial premises will  cease  to enjoy  the  protection  afforded to  the  tenant  under  the Act  ..... at p. 36 B to 37 A it was concluded that: We  are of the opinion that in case of  commercial  premises governed  by the Delhi Act, the Legislature has not  thought it  fit in the light of the situation at Delhi to place  any kind of restriction on the ordinary law of inheritance  with regard  to succession. It may also be borne in mind that  in case of commercial premises the heirs of the deceased tenant not  only succeed to the tenancy rights in the premises  but they succeed to the business as a whole. It might have  been open  to the Legislature to limit or restrict the  right  of inheritance  with regard to the tenancy as  the  Legislature had  done  in the case of the tenancies with regard  to  the residential  houses but it would not have been open  to  the

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Legislature to alter under the Rent Act, the Law of  Succes- sion  regarding the business which is a  valuable  heritable right and which must necessarily devolve on all the heirs in accordance with law. The absence of any provision  restrict- ing  the heritability of the commercial  tenancies  notwith- standing the determination of the contractual tenancies will devolve  on the heirs in accordance with law and  the  heirs who  step  into  the position of the  deceased  tenant  will continue to 17 enjoy  the protection afforded by the Act and they can  only be  evicted  in accordance with the provisions of  the  Act. There  is another’ significant consideration which,  in  our opinion,  lends  support  to the view that  we  are  taking. Commercial premises are let out not only to individuals  but also  to  Companies,. Corporation or anybody  with  juristic personality,  question of the death of the tenant  will  not arise.  Despite the termination of the tenancy, the  Company or the Corporation or such juristic personalities,  however, will  go on enjoying the protection afforded to  the  tenant under the Act. It can hardly be conceived that the  Legisla- ture  Would intend to deny to one class of tenants,  namely, individuals  the  protection which will be  enjoyed  by  the other  class,  namely, the Corporations  and  Companies  and other bodies with juristic personality under the Act. If  it be  held that commercial tenancies after the termination  of the  contractual tenancy of the tenant are not heritable  on the death of the tenant and the heirs of the tenant are  not entitled to enjoy the protection under the Act, an irrepara- ble mischief which the Legislature would never have intended is likely to be caused."     (6) On the facts of the case it was held that the tenant who continues to remain in possession even after the  termi- nation of the contractual tenancy till a decree for eviction against him is passed, continues to have an estate or inter- est  in the tenanted premises and tenancy rights in  respect of commercial premises are heritable. There is no  provision in  the Act regulating the rights of its heirs  to  inherits the  tenancy rights of the tenanted commercial  or  business premises. The tenancy rights devolved on the heirs under the ordinary law of succession. Accordingly it was held that the tenancy  rights  of Wasti Ram devolved on all the  heirs  of Wasti  Ram on his death. The ratio with equal force  applies to the facts of this case.     The unamended definition of tenant under section  3(vii) of the Act reads thus: "tenant" means the person by whom the rent is, or but for  a contract express or implied would be, payable for any  prem- ises and includes any person holding or occupying the  prem- ises as a sub-tenant, or any person continuing in possession after  the termination of a tenancy in his favour  otherwise than under the provisions of the Act." 18     This  definition  is mutatis mutandis same  as  the  one defined  under  Madhya Pradesh Act and also the  Delhi  Rent Act. Equally it would be tile same under the amended  clause ’a’  of section 3(vii) with slight elongation.  Under  Hindu Succession Act the heirs of the deceased tenant are entitled to succeed, not only to his business, but also to his tenan- cy  rights under the Rent Act which protects the heirs  from ejectment  except  in accordance with that  Act.  Therefore, despite  the termination of the tenancy, the tenancy  rights are  heritable and the heirs of the tenant are  entitled  to enjoy the protection of the Act.     (7) The ratio in Bhavarlal Labhchand Shah v.  Kanaiyalal

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Nathalal  Intawala, [1986] 1 SCC 571 does not help  the  re- spondent. The facts therein was that the tenant by testimen- tary  disposition "will" bequeathed his occupancy rights  in the tenanted property in favour of the stranger legatee. The question  was  whether  such a legatee is  entitled  to  the benefit of continuance of tenancy under Bombay Rents,  Hotel and Lodging House Rules Control Act. 1947. It was held  that since  the  bequest was in favour of the  third  party,  the testator thereby, cannot confer rights under the  provisions the  Rent  Act on the stranger who was not a member  of  the family.  The  march of law culminated in Gian  Devi  Anand’s case knocked of the bottom of A.C. Chaterjee’s ratio.  Simi- larly  the foundation in Sita Ram v. Govind,  [1969]  Weekly Law  Notes  p. 108; Balkesh and another v. Shanti  Devi  and others,  reported in 1972 Rent Control Tribunal p.  285  and Mohan Lal v. Jaipur Hosiery MIlls Pvt. Ltd. reported in 1974 Rent  Control Journal p. 240 has been shaken and  no  longer remain to be good law.     (8) Admittedly Smt. Anandi was inducted into  possession of  the demised property under a contract of  tenancy  which was  determined by issuance of notice under Section  106  of Transfer  of Property Act. Even thereafter she continued  to remain in possession as statutory tenant under the Act.  The finding  of Trial Court as affirmed by the  first  appellate court  is that the respondent landlord after termination  of tenancy  received the rent from her and thereby  she  became tenant holding over till date of her death.     Smt. Anandi enjoyed the status as a statutory tenant  of the  premises even after the determination of  the  tenancy. Notwithstanding  the termination of the contractual  tenancy the  jural relationship of the landlord and  tenant  between the respondent and Smt. Anandi under the Act was not snapped off.  The heritable property or interest in the  lease  hold right  in  the tenancy continued to subsist  in  the  tenant Anandi. 19     On  her death, the rights to succession to an estate  of the deceased owner vested immediately on his/her than  near- est  heirs  and  cannot be held in abeyance  except  when  a nearer heir is then in the womb. The vested right can not be divested except by a retrospective valid law. The appellants by  virtue  of intestate succession under  Hindu  Succession Act, being Class I heirs, succeeded to the heritable  inter- est  in the lease hold right of a demised premises  held  by Smt.  Anandi. They, thereby, stepped into the shoes  of  the tenant.  They  continued to remain in possession as  on  the date  of  the suit as statutory tenants. Thereby,  they  are entitled to the protection of their continuance as a  statu- tory tenant under the Act. The succession having been opened to  the appellants and succeeded in September, 1966  to  the estate  of the tenant without any hiatus and restriction  on the  heritable interest in the lease-hold right held by  the tenant  Smt.  Anandi,  the Amendment  Act  being  admittedly prospective in operation, does not apply to the facts of the case and does not have the effect of divesting their  vested rights in the lease-hold held by the tenant. They are  enti- tled to enjoy the tenancy rights without any restrictions or hedge  put by the Amendment Act. We, thereby, hold that  the Amending  Act does not apply to the facts of this case.  But the  appellants succeeded to the heritable interest  in  the lease-hold right in the demised premises governed by the Act subject  to the rights and limitations prescribed under  the Act and also subject to the rights in favour of the respond- ent created under section 13(1) (a) to (k) and other  provi- sions of the Act.

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   (9) Accordingly, we have no hesitation to hold that  the appellants  are  entitled  to remain in  possession  of  the demised shop in question till the appellants are duly evict- ed  in accordance with the provisions of the Act as  amended from time to time. The appeal is accordingly allowed and the decree  and judgment of the High Court is reversed and  that of  the  Trial  Court is restored.  The  suit,  accordingly, stands  dismissed  but in the circumstances, each  party  is directed to bear their own costs throughout- R.N.J.                                          Appeal  dis- missed. 20