REPORTABLE  

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL  APPEAL NO. 1757 OF 2002

TAMIL  NADU  HOUSING  BOARD,  CHENNAI

— APPELLANT (S)

VERSUS

M. MEIYAPPAN & ORS. — RESPONDENT (S)

J U D G M E N T

D.K. JAIN, J.:

1. This appeal arises out of the judgment and order dated 18th April 2001,  

delivered by a Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Madras,  

affirming the judgment of a Single Judge of the High Court in W.P. No.  

108  of  1998,  setting  aside  Notification  G.O.M.  No.311  Housing  and  

Urban Development Department dated 17th February 1979, published in  

the Tamil Nadu Gazette dated 7th March 1979, being a notification under  

Section  4(1)  of  the  Land  Acquisition  Act,  1894  (for  short  “the  Act)  

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relating to lands of the respondents comprised in Survey No. 12/2 and  

12/3 in Ponmeni village, Madurai.

2. Respondent Nos.1 to 17 are contesting land owners, and are represented  

by respondent No.17 whereas respondent Nos.18 and 19 are the proforma  

respondents, viz. the State of Tamil of Nadu and the Special Tehsildar,  

Ellis Nagar Development Scheme.

3. The material facts, giving rise to the present appeal, may be stated thus:

The Government of Tamil Nadu, vide G.O.M. No.1358 Housing and  

Urban  Development  Department  dated  20th September  1978,  approved  

several  schemes for providing housing facilities to people of low income  

group for which purpose acquisition of lands was necessary.  One of such  

schemes  was  the  Ellis  Nagar  Development  Scheme,  Madurai,  for  which  

about  220  acres  of  lands  in  West  Madurai,  Ponmein,  and  Madakulam  

villages was proposed to be acquired.

4. On 17th February 1979, the Government in their G.O.M. No. 311 Housing  

and  Urban  Development  Department  approved  the  notification  under  

Section  4(1)  of  the  Act.   As  stated  above,  the  said  notification  was  

published in the official gazette on 7th March 1979.

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5. After the publication of the afore-mentioned notification, enquiry under  

Section 5A of the Act was conducted,  and thereafter,  a declaration in  

terms of Section 6 of the Act was made and requisite direction under  

Section  7  of  the  Act  was  issued  by  the  Government  as  per  G.O.M.  

No.735  Housing  and  Urban  Development  Department  dated  2nd June  

1980.

6. On 15th March 1982, notices under Section 9(1) and 10 of the Act were  

issued? Notices under Section 9(3) and 10 of the Act were served on the  

owners of the lands and the interested persons.  Enquiry, as envisaged  

under Section 11 of the Act, was conducted on 16th April 1982, 20th April  

1982,  21st April  1982 and 22nd April  1982.  Land owners  of  the  land,  

subject matter in this appeal, were represented by their authorised agent,  

one Mr. A.R. Rathinam Chettiar.

7. The Award in relation to the said lands was made on 28th April 1982, and  

the  compensation  was  awarded  to  O.M.SP.L.M.  Meyyappa  Chettiar,  

Subramanian  Chettiar,  Arunachalam  Chettiar,  Alagappa  Chettiar  and  

Lakshmanan  Chettiar.   According  to  the  appellant,  after  taking  

possession of the lands in question, on 4th December 1982, these were  

handed  over  to  the  Tamil  Nadu  Housing  Board,  which  fact  is  now  

disputed by the contesting respondents.  The matter rested there.

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8. However, in December 1997, respondents Nos.1 - 17 herein preferred a  

writ  petition  being  W.P.  No.  108  of  1998  before  the  High  Court  of  

Madras, challenging the acquisition of their lands, which was contested  

by the appellant.  One of the objections in the counter affidavit filed on  

behalf of the appellant in this appeal was as follows:

“It is submitted that the possession of the lands in action has  been taken over and handed over to Tamil Nadu Housing Board  on  4.12.82  among  other  lands  acquired  for  using  them  to  scheme purpose.  After a lapse of 15 years the writ petition has  been filed against the acquisition and the same is bad on the  ground  of  “Laches”  (sic).   The  Land  is  in  possession  and  enjoyment of the Tamil Nadu Housing Board since the date of  handing  over  on  4.12.82.   Taking  undue  advantage  of  the  interim injunction, the writ petitioners (sic) are trying to convert  the  lands  into  the  house  sites  flats  by  planting  stones  and  forming mud roads illegally (sic).”

9. Ignoring the said objection to the maintainability of the writ petition, vide  

order dated 21st April 1998, the learned Single Judge allowed the writ  

petition of the respondents by a short order, which reads as under:

“It  is  not  in dispute that facts  of this case is  covered by the  judgment in W.P. No.2244 of 1991 (sic.) dated 21.4.97.  Hence  the writ petition is allowed as prayed for appreciating the said  judgment.   Consequently,  the  connected W.M.Ps.  are closed.  No costs.”

10.Aggrieved by the said order, the appellant herein, preferred intra-court  

appeal before the Division Bench of the High Court. It appears from the  

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record  that  along  with  the  appeal,  an  application  seeking  stay  of  the  

operation of the judgment delivered by the learned Single Judge, was also  

filed, wherein it was stated that upon delivery of the said judgment, the  

land  owners  were  taking  hectic  steps  to  enter  into  possession  of  the  

subject lands.  The Division Bench again without examining the question  

of delay and laches, by the impugned judgment, dismissed the appeal of  

the appellant observing that:

“The  learned  single  judge,  taking  into  consideration,  all  the  materials  available  on record,  found that  the  case in  hand is  fully covered by the order of this Court in W.P.No. 2244 of  1991  as  above.  We do  not  find  any  good  ground  to  take  a  different view to that of the order of the learned single Judge.  That  apart,  we find no error  or  illegality  in the  order  of  the  learned Single judge warranting our interference.”

11.Hence, the present civil appeal.

12.Mr. T. Harish Kumar, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, while  

assailing the impugned judgment, strenuously urged that in light of the  

decision of this Court in  Yunus (Baboobhai) A. Hamid Padvekar  Vs.   

State  of  Maharashtra through its  Secretary  & Ors.1, the  High Court  

committed a serious illegality in entertaining a writ petition which badly  

suffered from delay and laches, having been filed after a lapse of 16 years  

of the date of Award, without any explanation for the delay.  Learned  

1 (2009) 3 SCC 281

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counsel argued that the High Court also failed to examine the stand of the  

appellant herein that the earlier decision of the High Court in W.P. No.  

2244 of 1991, was clearly distinguishable on facts and thus, its ratio was  

not applicable to the facts at hand  

13.Per contra,  Mr. M.L. Varma, learned senior counsel appearing for the  

respondents contended that the judgment in W.P. No. 2244 of 1991 was  

based on the decision in W.P. No. 1326 of 1982, and the latter judgment  

operated in rem and not in personam, and therefore, each land owner was  

not required to challenge the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act  

individually.  Commending us to the decisions of the Punjab and Haryana  

High Court in M/s. Trilok Singh Mohan Singh Vs. State of Haryana &  

Ors.2 and  Mohinder  Singh Sharma & Ors.  Vs.  State  of  Haryana &  

Ors.3, learned counsel contended that in cases when the compensation is  

not  granted or the possession is  not  taken over for a long period,  the  

acquisition becomes bad and since in the instant case, possession has not  

been  taken  over  by  the  Government  so  far,  the  acquisition  must  be  

declared null and void and appeal should be dismissed.  

14.At the outset, we must state that on the facts of this case, the High Court  

was not justified in entertaining the writ petition.  In our opinion, the writ  

2 (1994-2) 107 P.L.R. 144 3 1988 PLJ 525

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petition must fail on the short ground that the writ petition had been filed  

16 years after the award was announced by the Collector.  It is trite law  

that  delay  and laches  is  one  of  the  important  factors  which  the  High  

Court  must  bear  in  mind  while  exercising  discretionary  power  under  

Article 226 of the Constitution.  If there is such negligence or omission  

on the part of the petitioner to assert his right which, taken in conjunction  

with the lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the  

opposite party, the High Court must refuse to invoke its extra-ordinary  

jurisdiction and grant relief to the writ petitioner.

15.  In Durga Prashad Vs. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports4, this  

Court had held that it is well-settled that the relief under Article 226 is  

discretionary, and one ground for refusing relief under Article 226 is that  

the  petitioner  has  filed  the  petition  after  delay  for  which  there  is  no  

satisfactory explanation. It was noted that:  

“4. Gajendragadkar, C.J., speaking for the Constitution Bench,  in Smt Narayani Devi Khaitan v. The State of Bihar5 observed:

“It is well-settled that under Article 226, the power of the High  Court to issue an appropriate writ is discretionary. There can be  no doubt that if a citizen moves the High Court under Article  226  and  contends  that  his  fundamental  rights  have  been  contravened  by  any  executive  action,  the  High  Court  would  naturally like to give relief to him; but even in such a case, if  the  petitioner  has  been  guilty  of  laches,  and  there  are  other  

4 (1969) 1 SCC 185 5 C.A. No. 140 of 1964, judgment dated 22nd September 1964

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relevant  circumstances  which  indicate  that  it  would  be  inappropriate for the High Court to exercise its high prerogative  jurisdiction  in  favour  of  the  petitioner,  ends  of  justice  may  require that the High Court should refuse to issue a writ. There  can be little doubt that if it is shown that a party moving the  High  Court  under  Article  226  for  a  writ  is,  in  substance,  claiming a relief which under the law of limitation was barred  at  the time when the writ  petition was filed,  the High Court  would refuse to grant any relief in its writ jurisdiction. No hard  and fast rule can be laid down as to when the High Court should  refuse  to  exercise  its  jurisdiction  in  favour  of  a  party  who  moves  it  after  considerable  delay  and  is  otherwise  guilty  of  laches. That is a matter which must be left to the discretion of  the High Court and like all matters left to the discretion of the  Court,  in  this  matter  too  discretion  must  be  exercised  judiciously and reasonably.”

16.In  Rabindranath  Bose  &  Ors.  Vs.  The Union  of  India  &  Ors.6,  a  

Constitution Bench of this Court, dealing with the same issue in relation  

to Article 32 of the Constitution, had observed that:-

“We are of the view that no relief should be given to petitioners  who, without any reasonable explanation, approach this Court  under Article 32 of the Constitution after inordinate delay. The  highest Court in this land has been given original jurisdiction to  entertain petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution. It could  not have been the intention that this Court would go into stale  demands after a lapse of years. It is said that Article 32 is itself  a guaranteed right. So it is, but it does not follow from this that  it was the intention of the Constitution-makers that this Court  should discard all principles and grant relief in petitions filed  after inordinate delay.”

17.Though the afore-extracted observations in  Rabindranath Bose  (supra)  

relate to Article 32 of the Constitution,  a fortiori,  they would apply to  

6 (1970) 1 SCC 84

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writ petitions filed under Article 226 of the Constitution as well. (See:  

Yunus (Baboobhai) A. Hamid Padvekar (supra)).

18.Similarly, in Tridip Kumar Dingal & Ors. Vs. State of West Bengal &  

Ors.7, (to which one of us (D.K. Jain, J.) was a party), this Court had  

observed as under:   

“56. We are unable to uphold the contention. It is no doubt true  that  there  can be  no waiver  of  fundamental  right.  But  while  exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Articles 32, 226, 227  or 136 of the Constitution, this Court takes into account certain  factors and one of such considerations is delay and laches on  the part of the applicant in approaching a writ court. It is well  settled that power to issue a writ is discretionary. One of the  grounds  for  refusing  reliefs  under  Article  32  or  226  of  the  Constitution is that the petitioner is guilty of delay and laches.

57. If the petitioner wants to invoke jurisdiction of a writ court,  he should come to the Court at the earliest reasonably possible  opportunity. Inordinate delay in making the motion for a writ  will  indeed  be  a  good  ground  for  refusing  to  exercise  such  discretionary  jurisdiction.  The  underlying  object  of  this  principle  is  not  to  encourage  agitation  of  stale  claims  and  exhume matters which have already been disposed of or settled  or  where  the  rights  of  third  parties  have  accrued  in  the  meantime” (See also:  P.S. Sadasivaswamy Vs.  State of Tamil   Nadu8.)

19.Moreover,  in  relation  to  the  land  acquisition  proceedings,  the  Court  

should be loathe to encourage stale litigation as the same might hinder  

projects  of  public  importance.   The  Courts  are  expected  to  be  very  

7 (2009) 1 SCC 768 8 (1975) 1 SCC 152

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cautious and circumspect about exercising their discretionary jurisdiction  

under  Article  226 or  Article  32  of  the  Constitution  if  there  has  been  

inordinate unexplained delay in questioning the validity of acquisition of  

land. In this regard, it will be useful to advert to the observations made in  

P. Chinnanna & Ors. Vs. State of A.P. & Ors.9, wherein this Court had  

observed thus:-  

“In  fact,  in  relation  to  acquisition  proceeding  involving  acquisition  of  land  for  public  purposes,  the  court  concerned  must  be  averse  to  entertain  writ  petitions  involving  the  challenge to such acquisition where there is avoidable delay or  laches  since  such  acquisition,  if  set  aside,  would  not  only  involve enormous loss of public money but also cause undue  delay in carrying out projects meant for general public good.”  (See also: Hari Singh & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.10.)

20.We may, however, note that in Dayal Singh & Ors. Vs. Union of India  

& Ors11,  a three Judge bench of this Court, while dealing with a case of  

land acquisition, had observed that:

“Primarily a question of delay and laches is a matter which is  required to be considered by the writ court. Once the writ court  has exercised its  jurisdiction  despite delay and laches on the  part of the respondents, it is not for us at this stage to set aside  the order of the High Court on that ground alone particularly  when  we  find  that  the  impugned  judgment  is  legally  sustainable.”

9 (1994) 5 SCC 486 10 (1984) 2 SCC 624 11 (2003) 2 SCC 593

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21.We feel that the view echoed in Dayal Singh (supra) is not in consonance  

with  the  decision  of  the  Constitution  Bench  in  Rabindranath  Bose  

(supra), which was not noticed in the said judgment. It is also pertinent to  

note that subsequently in  Printers (Mysore) Ltd.  Vs.  M.A. Rasheed &  

Ors.12, another three Judge Bench of this Court, had observed as follows:-

“Furthermore,  the  writ  petition  should  not  have  been  entertained keeping in view the fact that it was filed about three  years after making of the allotment and execution of the deed of  sale. The High Court should have dismissed the writ petition on  the  ground  of  delay  and  laches  on  the  part  of  the  first  respondent.  The Division Bench of the High Court also does  not appear to have considered the plea taken by the appellant  herein to the effect that the first respondent had been set up by  certain interested persons.”

22.In the present case, as already stated, the respondents did not furnish any  

explanation as to why it took them 16 years to challenge the acquisition  

of their  lands,  when admittedly they were aware of  the acquisition of  

their lands and had in fact participated in these proceedings before the  

Land Acquisition Collector.  We have no hesitation in holding that the  

High  Court  ought  not  to  have  entertained  the  writ  petition  of  the  

respondents after 16 years of the passing of the award. The High Court  

should have dismissed the writ petition at the threshold on the ground of  

delay and laches on the part of respondent Nos.1 to 17, notwithstanding  

12 (2004) 4 SCC 460

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its earlier decision in W.P. No.2244 of 1991, which decision, according  

to the appellant, was otherwise distinguishable.

23.In  light  of  the  view  we  have  expressed,  we  deem  it  unnecessary  to  

evaluate the merits of other submissions canvassed by learned counsel for  

both the parties.

24.For the reasons aforesaid, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained.  

Accordingly, the appeal is allowed; the impugned judgment is set aside  

and the writ  petition, filed by respondent Nos. 1 to 17 in this  appeal,  

stands dismissed.

25.Parties to bear their own costs.  

.……………………………………J.            (D.K. JAIN)  

                             .…………………………………….J.           (T.S. THAKUR)

NEW DELHI; OCTOBER 29,  2010.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

12

CIVIL  APPEAL NO. 1757 OF 2002

TAMIL  NADU  HOUSING  BOARD,  CHENNAI

— APPELLANT (S)

VERSUS

M. MEIYAPPAN & ORS. — RESPONDENT (S)

O R D E R

In  the  judgment  pronounced  on  29th  

October, 2010, in line Nos. 9-10, paragraph 6,  

the words, “On 15th March 1982, notices under  

Section 9(1) and 10 of the Act were issued?  

shall be read as  “On 15  th   March 1982, notices    

under  Section  9(1)  and  10  of  the  Act  were  

issued.”

                             ...................J. [ D.K. JAIN ]

                             ...................J.       [ T.S. THAKUR ]

      NEW DELHI;        NOVEMBER 10, 2010.

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