IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL  APPEAL  NO. 2108  OF 2007

TAMIL NADU ELECTRICITY BOARD  ... APPELLANT(S)

:VERSUS:

HINDUSTAN CONSTRUCTION CO. LTD. AND ORS. ... RESPONDENT(S)

O R D E R

The appellant entrusted certain construction work to the first respondent.  

On  account  of  non-settlement  of  its  claims,  the  first  respondent  raised  some  

disputes which were referred to arbitration. Respondent Nos. 2 & 3  appointed as  

arbitrators,  entered upon the reference on 20.5.1992 and made an award dated  

19.6.1998. The arbitrators suo motu filed their award before the High Court on  

26.10.1999. It was registered as O.P No. 150/2000.  

2.  On receiving the notice of filing of the award the first respondent also  

made  an  application  (Appln.No.2731/2000)  in  O.P.No.  150/2000  for  making  the  

award, a rule of the court. On the other hand the appellant contended that the  

court should not take cognizance of the award, that unless the parties or either of  

them requested the arbitrators to file the award into court, or the court directed  

them to file the award, the arbitrators could not file the award in court, nor could  

the court receive the award. Reliance was placed reliance upon sub-sections (1) and  

(2) of Section 14 of the Arbitration Act, 1940(‘Act’ for short) in support of the said  

contention. Appellant also contended that under Article 119(a) of the Limitation

Act, 1963, the period of limitation to file an application under the Act, for filing the  

award in court, was 30 days from the date of service of notice of making of the  

award; and if such an application was not filed by a party under section 14(2) of the  

Act, within 30 days of service of notice, the award could not be filed thereafter,  

being barred under Article 119(a) of Limitation Act, 1963. A learned Single Judge  

of the Madras High Court, by the impugned order dated 15.6.2006, negatived the  

contentions of the appellant and held that the award could be filed suo motu by the  

Arbitrators and received by the court. The said order is challenged in this appeal  

by special leave.

3. Sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 14 of the Act, relevant for our purpose  

is extracted below:

14. Award to be signed and filed:

“1. When the arbitrators or umpire have made their award,  they shall sign it, and shall give notice in writing to the parties of the  making and signing thereof and of the amount of fees and charges  payable in respect of the arbitration and award.

2. The  arbitrators  or  umpire  shall,  at  the  request  or  any  party to the arbitration agreement or any persons claiming under  such party or if so directed by the Court and upon payment of the  fees and charges due in respect of the arbitration and award and of  the  costs  and charges  of  filing the  award,  cause the  award or  a  signed  copy  of  it,  together  with  any  depositions  and  documents  which may have been taken and proved before them, to be filed in  Court, and the Court shall thereupon give notice to the parties of  the filing of the award.”

xxxxx  xxxxxxx

4. This Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. M/s. Saith & Skeleton (P) Ltd. &  

Ors - AIR 1972 SC 1507, while interpreting Section 14 of the Act, held that it was  

not correct to say that the award could be filed only if the parties make a request to  

the  arbitrator  to  file  the  award  or  make  an  application  to  the  court  for  that  

purpose,  when there  is  no prohibition in the Act,  particularly,  in Section 14(2),  

against  the arbitrator suo motu filing an award in court.  In  Champalal v.  Mst.  

Samrathbai -  AIR 1960 SC 629 this  court,  while  considering Article  178 of  the  

Limitation Act, 1908 (corresponding to Article 119 (a) of the Limitation Act, 1963)  

held that the said article would apply only when an application is made by any of  

the parties for filing the award, and not when the arbitrator himself suo motu files  

the award into court. It is well settled that the act of arbitrator filing the award in  

court cannot be characterized as an application to the court under Article 14(2) of  

the Act which is referred to in Article 119(a) of the Limitation Act, 1963.  In the  

circumstances,  the  High  Court  was  right  in  rejecting  the  contentions  of  the  

appellant and receiving the award.

5. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the first respondent in  

its  application  (No.  2731/2000)  dated  13.7.2000  filed  in  O.P.  No.  150/2000,  had  

admitted that it had made a request to the arbitrators to file the award in court.  

Appellant contends that after the expiry of the period of limitation for filing an  

application  seeking  a  direction  to  the  arbitrators  to  file  the  award,  the  first  

respondent had requested the arbitrators to file the award into court, and this was  

an attempt by the first respondent to circumvent the provisions of section 14(2) of  

the Act and Article 119(a) of the Limitation Act, 1963.

6. Firstly there is nothing in the application to show when such a request was  

made by the respondent, to the arbitrators – whether within thirty day of receiving  

notice of making of the award, or after the expiry of thirty days. Secondly what was  

barred by limitation after thirty days, was making of an application to the court  

seeking a direction to the arbitrator to file the award. But even that was subject to  

condonation of  delay  by the court,  as  period of  limitation could be extended if  

sufficient cause was shown under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Thirdly,  

there was no bar to a party making a request to the arbitrators to file the award  

even after 30 days, or for the arbitrators acting on the request of the party, or suo

motu filing  the  award  into  court.  As  there  is  no  limitation  prescribed  for  the  

arbitrator to file an award, the court would entertain it, unless it was of the view  

that the period between the date of award and filing of the award was so huge as to  

attract the principle of denial of relief on the ground of delay and laches. In this  

case the delay was not of such magnitude, so as to invite refusal by court to receive  

it.   

7. We,  therefore,  find  no  reason  to  interfere  with  the  order  of  the  High  

Court. The appeal is dismissed.

..........................J (R.V. RAVEENDRAN)

..........................J   (HARJIT SINGH BEDI) NEW DELHI, APRIL 21, 2009.