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PETITIONER: TAHERAKHATOON (D) BY LRS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: SALAMBIN MOHAMMAD

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       26/02/1999

BENCH: S.B. MAJMUDAR. & M. JAGANNADHA RAO.

JUDGMENT:

M.JAGANNADHA RAO,J.

             This   appeal  has  been   preferred  by   the          plaintiff  in  the  suit against the  judgment  and          decree  of  the Bombay High Court in S.A.No.543  of          1979  dated 19.1.1987.  By that judgment the Second          Appeal was allowed, the judgment dated 16.3.1979 of          the  lower appellate court decreeing the plaintiff-          appellant’s  suit was set aside and the judgment of          the  trial  court  in Civil Suit No.  151  of  1975          passed  by  the  Third Joint  Civil  Judge,  Junior          Division,  Aurangabad dated 23.2.1977 was restored.          The   dispute   between  the   parties,   who   are          neighbours,  covers  an  extent of 25’ x  11’  upon          which  the  defendant constructed two  rooms.   The          appellant’s  case is that the above extent is  part          of the appellant’s property and that the defendant-          respondent  has encroached upon it and has made the          construction  of  the two rooms.  The suit  is  for          possession  of  the  area  of 25’  x  11’  and  for          directing  removal of the two rooms.  Pending these          proceedings,  the plaintiff-appellant died and  her          legal representatives were brought on record.

              The brief facts of the case are as follows:

             The  plaintiff-appellant purchased open  space          75’  x 25’ from the common-owner, one Mohd.  Ali on          14.1.1966  for Rs.700 under a registered sale  deed          in   Mohalla   Shahabazar   in   Aurangabad   town.          According  to  the Plaintiff, she  constructed  two          rooms  on  Western  side of the  purchased  portion          leaving  some  open space on the eastern  side  and          long  thereafter, the defendant purchased land from          the  same vendor, Mohd.  Ali on the eastern side on          13.12.1967 and allegedly occupied the disputed area          of   25’   x  11’  in   question   on   30.12.1967.          Subsequently,  defendant is said to have  illegally          constructed  those  two rooms on this area  without          the  permission  of  the  Municipality.   Plaintiff          alleges  she  complained to the Town  Surveyor  who          came  to  survey  the  properties but  he  did  not          consider her claim but advised her to go to a Civil          Court.   The  plaintiff issued notice on  14.6.1974

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        and  the defendant sent reply refusing to vacate or          remove  the construction.  The suit was, therefore,          laid  on 14.2.1975 for possession of the land,  for          mandatory  injunction for removal of the two  rooms          and for damages for 3 years, at Rs.600 in all.

             The  defendant-respondent contended that prior          to  his purchase under sale deed dated  13.12.1967,          he  had  entered into an agreement of  purchase  on          10.2.1962  for an extent of land of 53’ x 23  yards          2’  which included the disputed portion and that he          had   constructed  the  two   shops   long   before          14.1.1966,  when the plaintiff purchased the vacant          piece  of land by the side of the land which he had          purchased  under the agreement.  According to  him,          there  was  no  question  of  any  encroachment  on          30.12.1967.

             On  these  pleadings, the trial  Court  framed          various  issues  and held that the evidence of  the          witnesses  produced  by  the   plaintiff  was   not          acceptable  and that plaintiff had failed to  prove          her    ownership   over     the   disputed    site.          Consequently,  the plaintiff must be deemed to have          failed  in  proving encroachment by defendant  from          30.12.1967.   The  defendant had examined DW2,  the          attestor  of  the  agreement   of  purchase   dated          10.2.1962  who  was also the mason who was  engaged          for  construction of the rooms.  DW3 was one of the          attestors  of the defendant’s sale deed.  The trial          Court  held  that in view of the agreement of  sale          and  possession  under  the agreement  of  sale  of          10.2.1962,  the  defendant  was   entitled  to  the          protection  of  section  53-A of  the  Transfer  of          Property Act.  The suit was, therefore, dismissed.

             The  plaintiff appealed before the Joint Judge          at  Aurangabad who reversed the judgment and decree          of  the  trial Court holding, inter-alia, that  the          suit  site formed part of the land conveyed to  the          plaintiff  under the sale deed dated 14.1.1966  and          that if that be so, the same vendor had no right to          convey  the disputed area by including the same  in          the  sale  deed dated 13.12.1967 along  with  other          land   sold  in  favour  of  the  defendant.    The          agreement of purchase dated 10.2.1962 set up by the          defendant  was written up in Urdu on a small  piece          of  white paper (with a revenue stamp annexed)  and          was  not  a genuine document but was  obviously  an          ante-dated one.  If the agreement was not true, the          defendant  could  not have come into possession  of          this  overlapping  part in 1962 nor could  he  have          constructed  the  two  rooms before the  sale  deed          dated 13.12.1967 was executed in his favour.  There          were  also various other circumstances which proved          that  the  agreement  of sale could  not  be  true,          namely  that  while  the   consideration  for   the          agreement was Rs.300, only Rs.50/- was paid in 1962          and the balance of Rs.250/- remained payable at the          time  of  registration  of the regular  sale  deed.          There  was  undue  delay between the  date  of  the          agreement of 1962 and the date of sale-deed in 1967          and  this circumstance improbablised the agreement.          The  defendant never gave any notice to his  vendor

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        for  5  1/2 years seeking execution of  sale  deed.          The   recitals  in  the   latter  sale-deed   dated          13.12.1967  showed  that  defendant  was  aware  of          plaintiff’s  sale-deed  dated 14.1.1966.  The  plea          that  defendant  constructed two rooms long  before          plaintiff’s   sale  deed  of   14.1.1966  was   not          acceptable  inasmuch  as the plaintiff  would  have          objected  if the vendor was selling land over which          the   defendant  had  already   built  two   rooms.          Further,  the  signature of Mohd.  Ali, the  vendor          was  not on the revenue stamp.  What was quite  un-          understandable was that the boundary description of          the  plot in the so called agreement of 1962 showed          the  name  of  the plaintiff as the  owner  of  the          property  on  the  west, even though  by  10.2.1962          plaintiff  had not purchased the land on the  West.          The  Appellate Court observed that though the  name          of  the  plaintiff  was   found  mentioned  in  the          agreement  of 1962, it appeared to have been struck          off later.  All these circumstances showed that the          agreement  was not true.  Even if the agreement was          true,  it  would not create any title in favour  of          the   defendant   unless   a  suit   for   specific          performance was filed and a sale deed was obtained.          Inasmuch  as the plaintiff had proved title and the          defendant  had encroached, the suit for  possession          was  required to be decreed and the two rooms  were          liable   to  be  removed.    Mesne   profits   were          accordingly allowed at one rupee per month, in all,          Rs.36  for  3 years.  In the result, the  suit  was          decreed as stated above.

             In Second Appeal by the defendant, the learned          Single  Judge  of  the   High  Court  reversed  the          appellate  decree, in a brief judgment stating that          the  "reasons given for not believing the agreement          by  the  learned (Appellate) Judge, are not  cogent          and  convincing".  The learned Judge observed  that          it  was  common  knowledge that at the time  of  an          agreement,  the  entire consideration would not  be          paid.  The fact that the vendor’s signature was not          found  on the revenue stamp was not relevant.   The          first  appellate  court was wrong in thinking  that          plaintiff’s  name  was found in the 1962  agreement          and  was scored off.  This was factually incorrect.          On  these  grounds, the learned Single  Judge  held          that  the  lower  appellate   court  erred  in  not          accepting  the genuineness of the agreement of 1962          set  up by the defendant.  The agreement was  true.          Therefore  the defendant must succeed.  The  Second          Appeal  was  accordingly allowed and the  suit  was          dismissed.

             In  this  appeal  by  special  leave,  learned          counsel  for  the   appellant-plaintiff   contended          before  us  that the High Court did not  frame  any          substantial  question of law and that it could  not          have gone into the correctness of a finding of fact          and  that the finding regarding the genuineness  of          the agreement of 1962 was binding in Second Appeal.

             On  the  otherhand,  learned counsel  for  the

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        respondent-defendant  contended that even  assuming          that  the  agreement  was not true,  the  plaintiff          having  purchased  the property on  14.1.1966  came          forward  with  a plea in the plaint that  she  knew          that  the  defendant  trespassed into the  site  on          30.12.1967  but  she did not issue any  notice  for          removal  of the two rooms till 14.6.1974.  She  was          the  next door neighbour.  Notice dated 14.6.74 was          also  belated and even then, she did not allege any          forcible  trespass by the defendant, as now  stated          in  the  plaint.   The  suit   was  filed  only  on          14.2.1975.   The  plaintiff  should not  have  kept          quiet  when  the construction was going on  if,  as          alleged  in  the plaint, she was conscious  of  the          trespass  by the defendant.  It was contended  that          inasmuch  as  the  plaintiff   stood  by  when  the          construction  was  being  made   bonafide  by   the          defendant,   this  Court,  in   exercise   of   its          discretion  under Article 136, which discretion  is          available  even  after grant of leave - should  not          interfere  and the plaintiff should not be  granted          possession  coupled with a right to have the  rooms          removed.   This Court has also power under  Article          136 to mould the relief and grant compensation.  In          any  event, this Court could invoke Article 142  of          the  Constitution  of  India, in the  interests  of          justice.

             The points that arise for consideration in the          appeal are:

             (1)   Whether  the  High   Court  could   have          interfered with the finding of fact relating to the          genuineness  of  the agreement of sale  deed  dated          10.2.1962   and   that  too   without   framing   a          substantial question of law?

             (2)  Whether the discretionary power available          to this Court at the time of grant of special leave          continues  with  the  Court  even  after  grant  of          special leave and when the appeal is being heard on          merits  and  whether, this Court could declare  the          law  and  yet  not  interfere or  could  mould  the          relief?  Or whether, once the law is declared, this          Court   is  bound  to   grant  possession  and  the          mandatory injunction?

             (3)  Whether  it  is necessary to  invoke  the          powers of this Court under Article 142?

        (4)   To what relief?

        Point 1:

             At the outset, it must be stated that the High          Court  erred in not framing a substantial  question          of  law as required by section 100 CPC.  In view of          the  Judgments  of this Court in  Kshitish  Chandra          Purkait  vs.  Santosh Kumar Purkait & Others  [1997          (5)  SCC  438] and Sheel Chand vs.   Prakash  Chand          [1998  (6)  SCC  683] the High  Court  should  have          framed  a substantial question of law and then only          disposed  of the Second Appeal.  Again it could not          have interfered with pure finding of fact.  We have          earlier  set  out the basis of the finding  of  the

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        appellate  court  in this behalf.  The  finding  is          based upon a rejection of the oral evidence adduced          in  the  case.  It is true that one of the  reasons          given  by the first appellate Court namely that the          agreement  of  1962  contained a reference  to  the          plaintiff’s name (who came into the picture only in          1966)  is not factually correct and the High  Court          was  right  in  pointing out this error.   But  the          finding  of the first appellate Court is not  based          only  on  the said fact.  The finding was based  on          the  rejection  of the evidence of the attestor  of          the  agreement and the evidence of the defendant in          relation to the said agreement.  Other facts relied          upon  are  the long gap of 5 1/2 years between  the          date  of  the  alleged agreement of  sale  and  the          defendant’s  sale  deed and that the  agreement  is          written up on a small piece of paper with a revenue          stamp  affixed  thereon and not upon  regular  non-          judicial stamp papers.  These circumstances are all          relevant  in  considering  the genuineness  of  the          agreement.   As long as there is some material  for          the rejection of the document, the Second appellate          Court  ought  not  to   have  interfered  with  the          abovesaid  finding of fact.  For the above reasons,          we are constrained to set aside the said finding of          the High Court.  Point 1 is decided accordingly.

        Points 2 and 3:

             These  points  relate  to   the  plea  of  the          defendant that on the facts of this case this Court          should   not,  in  exercise   of  its   discretion,          interfere under Article 136 even if this is a stage          long  after the grant of special leave.  Point also          is whether it is necessary to invoke Article 142.

             It   will  be  noticed   that  the   plaintiff          purchased  the  land by sale deed  dated  14.1.1966          while   the   defendant’s  sale   deed   is   dated          13.12.1967.   The  plaint says that  the  defendant          forcibly  trespassed  into  this piece of  land  on          30.12.1967  with  the help of anti social  elements          and  that the plaintiff protested.  That means that          plaintiff  was  conscious of the trespass  even  on          30.12.1967.  Though the plaintiff was the next door          neighbour  the fact remains that the plaintiff  did          not seek to intervene immediately either by issuing          a  notice  or  by  filing   a  suit  for  permanent          injunction   with  an   application  for  temporary          injunction.    On  the   otherhand,  the  plaintiff          allowed  the defendant to construct the two  rooms.          In the cross-examination, the plaintiff admitted as          follows:

             "I cannot tell the day pertaining to this               encroachment,  but the  encroachment  was               committed during night hours.  We did not               tell any body on the very next day  about               this  encroachment.  Thereafter  also  we               did   not  tell  anybody.......We   being               government  servants,  we did  not  lodge               complaint   with  the  police   in   this               respect.   It  is true that I  am  not  a               government servant."

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             The   evidence  of  plaintiff   who  was   the          immediate  neighbour proceeds on the basis that she          knew  about  the trespass in December 1967  itself,          though she filed the suit in 1975.  The explanation          was  that inasmuch as the plaintiff’s husband was a          government   servant,  they  did   not   make   any          complaint.

             It   is  in  the   background  of  the   above          circumstances  that we have to consider the plea of          the  respondent defendant based upon Article 136 of          the  Constitution of India.  We should not, in this          connection,  be understood as deciding any question          of estoppel for there is no plea of estoppel in the          written  statement  nor any argument in the  Courts          below.  Our discussion is confined only to exercise          of discretion under Article 136.

             It  is  now well settled that  though  special          leave  is  granted, the discretionary  power  which          vested  in  the Court at the stage of  the  special          leave  petition continues to remain with the  Court          even  at  the  stage when the appeal comes  up  for          hearing  and when both sides are heard on merits in          the  appeal.   This principle is applicable to  all          kinds  of  appeals admitted by special leave  under          Article  136,  irrespective  of the nature  of  the          subject  matter.   It  was  so   laid  down  by   a          Constitution  Bench of five learned Judges of  this          Court  in  Pritam  Singh vs.  The State  [1950  SCR          453].   In  that  case,  it   was  argued  for  the          appellant  that once special leave was granted  and          the  matter  was registered as an appeal, the  case          should  be disposed of on merits on all points  and          that the discretionary power available at the stage          of  grant  of special leave was not available  when          the appeal was being heard on merits.

             This  Court  rejected the said contention  and          referred  to  the  following  dicta  of  the  Privy          Council in Ibrahim vs.  Rex [AIR 1914 A.C.  615]:

              "........   the  Board  has   repeatedly               treated applications for leave to  appeal               and  the hearing of criminal  appeals  as               being upon the same footing: Riel’s  Case               [1885-10  A.C. 675 : 55 L.J.  p.628];  Ex               parte  Deeming [1892 AC 422].  The  Board               cannot  give  leave to appeal  where  the               grounds  suggested could not sustain  the               appeal itself; and conversely, it  cannot               allow an appeal on grounds that would not               have sufficed for the grant of permission               to bring it."

             This Court observed that the rule laid down by          the  Privy Council is based on sound principle  and          only  those  points  could be urged  at  the  final          hearing of the appeal which were fit to be urged at          the  preliminary  stage  when leave to  appeal  was          asked  for  and  it  would be  illogical  to  adopt          different  standards at two different stages of the

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        same  case.  This Court observed (para 8) that,  so          far  as  Article  136 was concerned, it was  to  be          noted  firstly that it was very general and was not          confined  merely  to criminal cases, and that  (see          para  9),  the wide discretionary power with  which          the Court was concerned/was applicable to all types          of cases.  The power under Article 136 according to          this Court,

              "is  to  be exercised sparingly  and  in               exceptional  cases  only, and as  far  as               possible, a more or less uniform standard               should  be  adopted in  granting  special               leave in the wide range of matters  which               can come up before it under this Article.               By  virtue of this Article, we can  grant               special   leave   in  civil   cases,   in               criminal  cases, in income tax cases,  in               cases  which  come  up  before  different               kinds  of tribunals and in a  variety  of               other cases."

         This Court emphasised:

              "The  only uniform standard which in our               opinion   can   be  laid  down   in   the               circumstances is that Court should  grant               special  leave to appeal in  those  cases               where special circumstances are shown  to               exist."

         This Court then concluded:

              "Generally speaking, this Court will not               grant  special leave, unless it is  shown               that     exceptional     and      special               circumstances exist, that substantial and               grave  injustice has been done  and  that               the case in question present features  of               sufficient gravity to warrant a review of               the decision appealed against."

             The   above  principles   were  followed   and          reiterated  by  a three Judge Bench in Hem Raj  vs.          State  of Ajmer [1954 SCR 1133], holding that  that          even after the appeal is admitted and special leave          is   granted,   the  appellant   must   show   that          exceptional  and  special circumstances exist,  and          that,  if there is no interference, substantial and          grave  injustice will result and that the case  has          features  of sufficient gravity to warrant a review          of  the decision appealed against, on merits.  Only          then  would  this  Court  exercise  its  overriding          powers under Article 136.

             M/s  Bengal  Chemical &  Pharmaceutical  Works          Ltd.  vs.  Their Workmen [1959 Suppl.  (2) SCR 136]          was an appeal by special leave against the Judgment          of  the Industrial Tribunal.  It was held that  the          power  under  Article  136  was  discretionary  and          though  the said Article 136 was couched in  widest          terms,  it was necessary for this Court to exercise

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        the  discretionary jurisdiction only in cases where          awards  were  passed in violation of principles  of          natural   justice,   and   substantial  and   grave          injustice  was caused to parties or the case raised          an  important principle of industrial law requiring          elucidation  and  final decision by this  Court  or          disclosed   such  other   exceptional  or   special          circumstances.  Subba Rao,J.  (as he then was) gave          two  important  reasons for the said principle  and          they are set out in the following passage:

              "The   limits  to the  exercise  of  the               power under Article 136 cannot be made to               depend   upon  the  appellant   obtaining               special  leave  of this  Court,  for  two               reasons,  viz.,  (i) at  that  stage  the               Court  may not be in full  possession  of               all material circumstances to make up its               mind  and  (ii) the order is only  an  ex               parte  one  made in the  absence  of  the               respondent. .... It would be illogical to               apply  two  different  standards  at  two               different stages of the same case."

             We  may  in  this  connection  also  refer  to          Municipal Board, Pratapgarh & Another vs.  Mahendra          Singh  Chawla & Others [1982 (3) SCC 331],  wherein          it was observed that in such cases, after declaring          the  correct legal position, this Court might still          say that it would not exercise discretion to decide          the  case on merits and that it would decide on the          basis  of  equitable  considerations  in  the  fact          situation of the case and "mould the final order"

             In view of the above decisions, even though we          are  now  dealing  with the appeal after  grant  of          special  leave, we are not bound to go into  merits          and  even if we do so and declare the law or  point          out  the error - still we may not interfere if  the          justice  of  the  case on facts  does  not  require          interference or if we feel that the relief could be          moulded  in a different fashion.  We have  already,          referred  to the various circumstances of the  case          which   show  that  the   plaintiff,  on  her   own          admission,  had  knowledge  of   the  trespass   in          December  1967  and did not raise any objection  to          the  construction  of the two rooms though she  was          the adjacent neighbour.  She gave notice only after          7  years in 1974 and she filed suit in 1975.  These          two  rooms  have been there for the last 30  years.          In  those  circumstances,  we declare  the  law  by          holding  that  the High Court while dealing with  a          Second  Appeal  under Section 100 CPC erred in  not          framing  a substantial question of law and that  it          also  erred in interfering with a pure question  of          fact  relating to the genuineness of the agreement.          We  declare  that this was not permissible in  law.          Even  while  so  declaring,  we hold  that  in  the          peculiar  circumstances referred to above, this  is          not  a  fit  case  for  interference  and  that  in          exercise  of  our discretion under Article 136,  -a          discretion  which continues with us even after  the          grant  of special leave, - the decree passed by the          High  Court dismissing the suit for possession need

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        not  be interfered with and the two rooms need  not          be  demolished.  The plaintiff could be  adequately          compensated  by way of damages.  Point 2 is decided          accordingly.   Point  3 regarding Article 142  need          not therefore be decided.

        Point 4:

             We  had adjourned the case to find out if  the          parties  could agree in regard to the value of  the          land  so that some equitable order could be  passed          directing the respondent to pay for the land of the          appellant  under  his occupation.  But, in view  of          the  affidavit  of the respondent  dated  20.2.1999          circulated  through  the Court on 22.2.1999, it  is          clear  that  there is no agreement in this  behalf.          According  to the respondent, the present value  of          the  land  is Rs.275/- per sq.ft.  Respondent  says          that he is still carrying on as a rickshaw puller.

             In  the circumstances, we are of the view that          the  judgment  of the High Court setting aside  the          judgment of the lower appellate Court and restoring          the judgment of the trial court should be confirmed          with  a modification.  We modify the decree of  the          High  Court  by  directing   that  the  respondent-          defendant  pay for the value of the suit extent  of          land in his possession and that the value should be          as  on  19.1.1987, the date on which  the  impugned          judgment  in Second Appeal was granted in favour of          the respondent-defendant.  The said value has to be          worked  out  by taking evidence.  For this  limited          purpose we remit the matter to the trial Court, the          Court  of  the  3rd Joint Judge,  Junior  Division,          Aurangabad,  State of Maharashtra for deciding  the          value  of  the suit land as on 19.1.1987.   Parties          are  at  liberty  to adduce evidence in  the  trial          Court in this behalf.  The value as may be fixed by          the  trial Court shall be paid by the respondent to          the  appellant within such time as may be fixed  by          the trial Court.  If such amount is not paid by the          respondent-defendant,   the  plaintiff   shall   be          entitled  to recover the said amount as if it is  a          money  decree  for the said amount.  The appeal  is          dismissed subject to the above modification.  There          will be no order as to costs.