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PETITIONER: T.V. VATHEESWARAN

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF TAMIL NADU

DATE OF JUDGMENT16/02/1983

BENCH: REDDY, O. CHINNAPPA (J) BENCH: REDDY, O. CHINNAPPA (J) MISRA, R.B. (J)

CITATION:  1983 AIR  361            1983 SCR  (2) 348  1983 SCC  (2)  68        1983 SCALE  (1)115

ACT:      Constitution of  India-Art.  21-Prisoner  sentenced  to death-Detcntion awaiting  execution-Detention excceding  two years violative  of guarantee  of Fair  procedure under Art. 21.

HEADNOTE:      The appellant  was sentenced  to death in January, 1975 on a  charge of  committing wicked  and diabolic murders and since  then   he  was   in  solitary   confinement.   Before conviction. he  had been  a ’prisoner  under remand’ for two years.      The appellant’s  contention was  that to  take away his life after keeping him in jail for ten years, eight of which in illegal  solitary confinement, would be violative of Art. 21.      Allowing the  appeal and  converting  the  sentence  of death to one of imprisonment for life, ^      HELD: The dehumanising factor of prolonged delay in the execution of  a sentence  of death  has  the  constitutional implication of  depriving a person of his life in an unjust, unfair  and   unreasonable  way   so  as   to   offend   the constitutional guarantee that no person shall be deprived of his life  or personal liberty except according. to procedure established by  law. Making all reasonable allowance for the time necessary.  for appeal and consideration of reprieve, a delay exceeding  two years in the execution of a sentence of death should  be considered sufficient to entitle the person under sentence  of death  to invoke  Art. 21  and demand the quashing of the sentence of death. [359 G-H, 360 D-E]      (i)  A  convict  is  entitled  to  the  precious  right guaranteed in  Art. 21.  The right  to  a  speedy  trill  is implicit in the right to a fair trial which has been held to be part  of the right to life and liberty guaranteed by this Article.                                      [357 D, 357 G-H, 358 A]      Bhuvan Mohan  Patnaik v. State of A.P., [1975] 2 S.C.R. 24; Sunil  Batra v.  Delhi Administration,  [1979] 1  S.C.R. 392; State of Maharashtra v. Prabhakar Pandurang Sanpzgiri & Anr.,  [1966]   1  S.C.R.  702;  State  of,  Maharashtra  v. Champalal, A.l.R.  [1981] S.C.  1675; Hussainara Khatoon (I)

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v. Home Secretary, [1980] 1 S.C.C. 81 and Hussainara Khatoon (IV) v. Home Secretary, [1980] 1 S.C.C. 98 referred to. 349      (ii) Tho  Sat of  Art. 21  is that  any procedure which deprives a  person of his life or liberty must be just, fair and ’reasonable.  It implies humane conditions of detention, preventive or  punitive. ’Procedure established by law’ does not end  with the pronouncement of sentence; it includes the carrying out  of sentence.  Prolonged detention to await the execution of  a sentence,  of death is an unjust, unfair and unreasonable procedure and the only way to undo the wrong is to quash the sentence of death [359 D-E, 359 G-H, 360 A]      Maneka Gandhi  v. Union  of India, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 621, Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 392 and Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. [1980]   S.C.    898 referred to.      (iii) Sentence of death is one thing; sentence of death followed by  lengthy  imprisonment  prior  to  execution  is another. A  period of anguish and suffering is an inevitable consequence of  sentence of  death, but a prolongation of it beyond the  time necessary  for appeal  and consideration of retrieve is  not. And,  it is  no answer to say that the man will  struggle   to  stay   alive.  In  truth,  it  is  this ineradicable, human  desire which makes prolongation inhuman and degrading  with its  anguish  of  alternating  hope  and despair, the  agony of  uncertainty and  the consequences of such  suffering   on  the  mental,  emotional  and  physical integrity and  health of  the individual.  Where, after  the sentence of  death is  given, the accused is made to undergo inhuman, and  degrading punishment or where the execution of the sentence is endlessly delayed and the accused is made to super the most excruciating agony and anguish, it is open to a court  of appeal  or a court exercising writ jurisdiction, in  an   appropriate  proceeding,   to  take   note  Of  the circumstance when  it is  brought to  its  notice  and  give relief where necessary. [352 E-G, 350 F, 360 E]      Noel Riley  & Ors.  v. The  Attorney  General  &  Anr., [1982] Crl.  Law Review  679; Piaradusadh Y. Emperor, A.I.R. 1944 F.C.  1; Ediga  Annamma v.  State  of  Andhra  Pradesh, [1974] 3  S.C.R. 329;  State of  U.P. v. Lalla Singh, A.I.R. [1978] S.C  168; Bhagwan  Baux Singh v. State of U.P., A.I R [1978] S.C.  34; Sadhu Singh v. State of U.P., A.I.R. [1978] S.C. 1506;  State of  U.P. v. Sahai, A.I.R. [1981] S.C. 1442 and Furman v. State of Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, referred to.

JUDGMENT:      CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 75 of 1983.      Appeal by  Special leave  from the  Judgment and  order dated the  20th December,  1976 of. the Madras High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 182 of 1975 and Referred Trial No. 11 of 1975.      R.K Garg and R. Satish for the Appellant/Petitioner.      A.V. Rangam for the Respondent.      The order of the Court was delivered by 350      CHINNAPPA REDDY,  J. A prisoner condemned to death over eight years  ago claims  that it  is not  lawful to hang him now. Let  us put  the worst  against him  first. He  was the principal accused  in the  case and,  so to  say, the  arch- villian of  a villainous  piece. He  was the  brain behind a cruel conspiracy to impersonate Customs officers’ pretend to question unsuspecting visitors to the city of Madras, abduct

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them  on  the  pretext  of  interrogating  them,  administer sleeping pills  to the unsuspecting victims steal their cash and jewels and finally murder them. The plan was ingeniously fiendish and  the appellant  was the  architect. There is no question  that  the  learned  Sessions  Judge  very  rightly sentenced him  to death  But that was in January 1975. Since then  he  has  been  kept  in  solitary  confinement,  quite contrary to  our ruling  in Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administra- tion(1). Before  that he  was a  ’prisoner under remand’ for two years.  So, the  prisoner claims  that to  take away his life after keeping him in jail for ten years, eight of which in illegal  solitary confinement, is a gross violation o the Fundamental Right guaranteed by Art. 21 af the Constitution. Let us  examine his  claim. First  let us  get  rid  of  the cobwebs of  prejudice Sure,  the  murders  were  wicked  and diabolic. The  appellant and  his friends showed no mercy to their victims.  Why should  any mercy be shown to them? But, gently, we  must remind  ourselves it is not Shylock’s pound of flesh  that are seek, nor a chilling of the human spirit. It is  justice to  the killer too and not justice untempered by mercy  that we  dispense. Of  course, we cannot refuse to pass the  sentence of  death where the circumstances cry for it. But,  the question  is whether in a case where after the sentence of  death is  given, the  accused person is made to undergo  inhuman  and  degrading  punishment  or  where  the execution of  the sentence  is  endlessly  delayed  and  the accused is  made to  suffer the  most excruciating agony and anguish, is  it not  open to  a court  of appeal  or a court exercising writ  jurisdiction, in an appropriate proceeding, to take  note of  the circumstance when it is brought to its notice and give relief where necessary?      Before adverting  to the constitutional implications of prolong ed  delay in  the execution  of a sentence of death, let us  refer to the judicial attitude towards such delay in India and elsewhere.      In Piaradusadh  v. Emperor(2),  the  Federal  Court  of India took  into consideration  the  circumstance  that  the appellant had been 351 awaiting the execution of the death sentence for over a year to alter the sentence to one of transportation for life.      In Ediga Annamma v. State af Andhra Pradesh(l), Krishna Iyer and Sarkaria, JJ observed that "the ’brooding horror of hanging’  which  has  been  haunting  the  prisoner  in  her condemned cell  for over  two years"  had  an  "ameliorative impact" and  was "a  factor of  humane significance  in  the sentencing context".      In State  of U.P. v. Lalla Singh(2) Gupta and Kailasam, JJ, were  dealing with  a case  of gruesome  murder of three persons, the  head of  one of  whom was severed. The learned judges, while  of the  view  that  the  Sessions  Judge  was perfectly in  order  in  imposing  the  sentence  of  death, thought that  as the  offences had  been committed More than six years  ago, the  ends of  justice did  not  require  the sentence of death to be confirmed.      In Bhagwan Baux Singh v. State of U.P.(3), the sentence of death  was commuted  to imprisonment  for life by Murtaza Fazal Ali  and Kailasam, JJ, having particular regard to the fact that  the sentence  of death had been imposed more than two and a half years ago.      In Sadhu  Singh v. State of U.P.(4), Sarkaria, Sen, JJ, and one  of us  (Chinnappa Reddy,  JJ took  into account the circumstance that  the appellant  was under  spectre of  the sentence of  death for  over three years and seven months to alter the sentence of death to one of imprisonment for life.

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    In State  of  U.P.  v.  Sahai(5),  Murtaza  Fazal  Ali, Baharul Islam  and Varadarajan,  JJ, while  holding that the murders were  ’extremely gruesome,  brutal  and  dastardly’, nonetheless declined  to pass  the sentence  of death on the ground that  more than  eight years  had elapsed  since  the occurrence.      In Furman  v.  State  of  Georgia(6),  Justice  Brennan observed,  "The  prospect  of  pending  execution  exacts  a frightful toll during the 352 inevitable long  wait between the imposition of sentence and the actual infliction of death".      In Noel  Riley and  Ors. v.  The Attorney  General  and Another(1)  the  majority  of  the  Lords  of  the  Judicial Committee of  the Privy  Council expressed no opinion on the question whether  the delayed  execution of  a  sentence  of death by hanging could be described as "inhuman or degrading punishment". But  Lord Scarman  and Lord  Brightman who gave the  minority  opinion,  after  referring.  to  the  British practice and Furman v. State of Georgia, People v. Chessman, People v. Anderson, Ediga Anamma v. State of Andhra Pradesh, Rajendra Prasad  v.  State  of  U.P.  and  Tyrer  v.  United Kingdom, said:           "It is no exaggeration, therefore, to say that the      jurisprudence of  the civilised world, much of which is      derived from  common law principles and the prohibition      against cruel  and unusual  punishment in  the  English      Bill of  Rights, has  recognised and  acknowledged that      prolonged delay  in executing  a sentence  of death can      make  the   punishment  when   it  comes   inhuman  and      degrading. As the Supreme Court of California commented      in  Anderson’s  case  (supra),  it  is  cruel  and  has      dehumanising effects.  Sentence of  death is one thing:      sentence of  death  followed  by  lengthy  imprisonment      prior to execution is another.           "It is of course true that a period of anguish and      suffering is  an inevitable  consequence of sentence of      death.  But  a  prolongation  of  it  beyond  the  time      necessary for  appeal and  consideration of reprieve is      not. And  it is  no answer  to say  that the  man  will      struggle  to   stay  alive.   In  truth,   it  is  this      ineradicable  human  desire  which  makes  prolongation      inhuman and  degrading. The anguish of alternating hope      and despair, the agony of uncertainty, the consequences      of  such   suffering  on  the  mental,  emotional,  and      physical integrity  and health  of the  individual  are      vividly described  in the evidence of the effect of the      delay in the circumstances of these five cases. We need      not rehearse the facts, which are not in dispute. We do      not doubt  that the  appellants have  proved that  they      have  been   subjected  to  a  cruel  and  dehumanising      experience ........................................... 353           "Prolonged  delay  when  it  arises  from  factors      outside the  control of  the condemned man can render a      decision to  carry out the sentence of death an inhuman      and degrading  punishment. It  is, of  course, for  the      applicant for  constitutional protection  to show  that      the delay was inordinate, arose from no act of his, and      was likely  to cause  such  acute  suffering  that  the      infliction  of  the  death  penalty  would  be  in  the      circumstances which  had arisen  inhuman or  degrading.      Such a case has been established, in our view, by these      appellants."      While we  entirely agree  with Lord  Scarman  and  Lord

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Brightman about  the dehumanising  effect of prolonged delay after the  sentence of  death, we enter a little caveat, but only that  we may go further. We think that the cause of the delay is immaterial when the sentence is death. Be the cause for  the   delay,  the   time  necessary   for  appeal   and consideration of  reprieve or some other cause for which the accused himself  may be  responsible, it would not alter the dehumanising character of the delay.      What  are   the  constitutional   implications  of  the dehumanising factor of prolonged delay in the execution of a sentence of  death? Let  us turn  at once  to Art. 21 of the Constitution, for,  it is to that article that we must first look for  protection whenever life or liberty is threatened. Art. 21  says: "No  person shall  be deprived of his life or personal liberty  except according  to procedure established by law."  The dimensions  of  Art.  21  which  at  one  time appeared to  be constricted  by A.R.  Gopalan  v.  State  of Madras(1) have been truly expanded by Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India(2) and Sunil Batra etc. v. Delhi Administration.(3)      In Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India(2), it was held that the various  articles of  the Constitution  in  Chapter  III (Fundamental  Rights)  were  not  several,  isolated  walled fortresses, each  not reacting  on the  other, but,  on  the other hand,  were parts  of a great scheme to secure certain basic rights  to the  citizens of  the country, each article designed to  expand but  never to curtail the content of the right secured  by  the  other  article.  No  article  was  a complete code in 354 itself and  several of  the Fundamental Rights guaranteed by Chapter Ill of the Constitution overlapped each other. So, a law satisfying  the requirements of Art. 21 would still have to meet  the challenge  of  Art.  14  and  Art.  19  of  the Constitution. In  regard to Art. 21 itself, it was held that the procedure  contemplated by  the article  had to be fair, just and  reasonable, and  not some  semblance of procedure, fanciful, oppressive  or arbitrary.  Chandrachud. J,  (as he then was) said:           "But  the   mere  prescription  of  some  kind  of      procedure cannot  ever meet the mandate of Art. 21. The      procedure prescribed  by law  has to  be fair, just and      reasonable, not fanciful, oppressive or arbitrary." Chandrachud,  J.   expressed  his   total   agreement   with Bhagawati, J’s following observations:           "The law  must, therefore, now be taken to be well      settled that article 21 does not exclude article 19 and      that even if there is a law prescribing a procedure for      depriving a  person of  ’personal liberty’ and there is      consequently no  infringement of  the fundamental right      conferred by  article 21,  such law,  in so  far as  it      abridges or  takes away  any  fundamental  right  under      article 19  would have  to meet  the challenge  of that      article.’ Bhagwati, J. further observed:           "But apart  altogether from  these observations in      A.K Gopalan’s  case, which  have great  weight, we find      that even  on principle  the concept  of reasonableness      must be projected in the procedure contemplated by Art.      21, having regard to the impact of Art. 14 on Art. 21." Again he said:           "The principle of reasonableness, which legally as      well as  philosophically, is  an essential  element  of      equality or  non-arbitrariness pervades  Art. 14 like a      brooding omnipresence and the procedure contemplated by      Art. 21 must answer the test of reasonableness in order

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    to be in conformity with Art. 14. It must be "right and      just  and   fair"  and   pot  arbitrary,   fanciful  or      oppressive; otherwise, it would be 355      no procedure  at all  and the  requirement of  Art.  21      would A not be satisfied."      In Sunil  Batra  v.  Delhi  Administration(1),  Krishna Iyer, J.  while dealing  with the  question whether solitary confinement could  be indicted  on a  person awaiting  death sentence, observed: B           "True our Constitution has no ’due process’ clause      or the  VIII Amendment;  but, in  this branch  of  law,      after Cooper  and Maneka Gandhi, the consequence is the      same. For what is punitively outrageous, scandalizingly      unusual  or   cruel   and   rehabilitatively   counter-      productive, is  unarguably unreasonable  and  arbitrary      and is  shot down by " Arts. 14 and 19 and if inflicted      with procedural unfairness, falls foul of Art. 21. Part      III of  the Constitution does not part company with the      prisoner at  the gates, and judicial oversight protects      the prisoner’s shrunken fundamental rights, if flouted,      frowned upon  or frozen by the prison D authority. Is a      person under death sentence or under trial unilaterally      dubbed dangerous  liable to  suffer extra  torment  too      deep for  tears? Emphatically  no, lest social justice,      dignity of  the individual,  equality before  the  law,      procedure established  by law  and the  seven lamps  of      freedom  (Art.  19)  become  chimerical  constitutional      claptrap." In the same case, Desai, J. said:           "The  word  "law"  in  the  expression  "procedure      established by  law" in Art. 21 has been interpreted to      mean in  Maneka Gandhi’s case (supra) that the law must      be right, just and fair, and not arbitrary, fanciful or      oppressive. otherwise  it would  be no procedure at all      and the  requirement of Art. 21 would not be satisfied.      If it is arbitrary it would be violative of Art. 14."      In Bachun  Singh v.  State of  Punjab(2)  Sarkaria,  J. summarised the effect of Maneka Gandhi in these words: 356           "In Maneka  Gandhi’s case, which was a decision by      a Bench  of  seven  learned  Judges,  it  was  held  by      Bhagwati,  J.     his  concurring  judgment,  that  the      expression ’personal  liberty’ in  Art. 21  is  of  the      widest amplitude  and it  covers a  variety  of  rights      which go  to constitute the personal liberty of man and      some of them have been raised to the status of distinct      fundamental  rights  under  Art.  19.  It  was  further      observed that  Arts. 14,  19  and  21  are  not  to  be      interpreted   in    water-tight    compartments,    and      consequently, a  law depriving  a  person  of  personal      liberty and  prescribing a  procedure for  that purpose      within the  meaning of Art. 21 has to stand the test of      one or  more of  the fundamental rights conferred under      Art. 19  which may  be applicable in a given situation,      ex-hypothesi it  must also  be liable to be tested with      reference to  Art. 14.  The principle of reasonableness      pervades all  the three articles, with the result, that      the procedure  contemplated by  Art. 21  must be ’right      and just  and fair’  and not  ’arbitrary,  fanciful  or      oppressive’ otherwise  it should be no procedure at all      and the requirement of Art. 21 would not be satisfied". The learned judge then referred to Art. 21 and said,           "If this  article is  expanded in  accordance with      the  interpretative   principle  indicated   in  Maneka

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    Gandhi, it will read as follows:           "No person  shall  be  deprived  of  his  life  or      personal liberty  except according  to fair,  just  and      reasonable procedure  established by valid law". In the      converse positive  form, the expanded Article will read      as below:           "A person  may be deprived of his life or personal      liberty in  accordance with  fair, just  and reasonable      procedure established by valid law".           "Thus  expanded   and  read   for   interpretative      purposes, Art.  21 clearly  brings out the implication,      that the  Founding Fathers  recognised the right of the      State to  deprive a  person of  his  life  or  personal      liberty in  accordance with  fair, just  and reasonable      procedure established by valid law". 357      The question whether a prisoner under a lawful sentence of A’.  death or imprisonment could claim Fundamental Rights was considered  in Bhuvan Mohan Patnaik v. State of A.P.(l). Chandrachud, J. (as he then was) declared:           "Convicts  are   not,  by   mere  reason   of  the      conviction. denuded of all the Fundamental Rights which      they  other-wise   possess.  A   compulsion  under  the      authority of  law, following upon a conviction, to live      in a  prison house  entails to  by its  own  force  the      deprivation of  fundamental freedoms  like the right to      move freely  throughout the  territory of  India or the      right to  "practise" a  profession. A man of profession      would  thus   stand  stripped  of  his  right  to  hold      consultations while  serving out  his sentence. But the      Constitution guarantees  other freedoms  like the right      to acquire,  hold  and  dispose  of  property  for  the      exercise of  which incarceration  can be no impediment.      Likewise, even  convict is  entitled  to  the  precious      right guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution that      he shall  not be  deprived  of  his  life  or  personal      liberty except  according to  procedure established  by      law".      The declaration  of  Chadrachud,  I.  in  Bhuvan  Mohan Patniak’s case  was quoted with approval and accepted by the Constitution Bench in Sunil Batra v. Administration (supra).      We may  also refer  here to  State  of  Maharashtra  v. Prabhakar  Pandurang     Sangzgiri   and  Anr’(2)   where  a Constitution Bench  repelled the  argument that  the  Bombay Conditions of  Detention order 1951 conferred privileges but not rights on the detenu with the p observation:           "If this  argument were  to be  accepted, it would      mean that the detenu could be starved to death if there      was no  condition providing  for  giving  food  to  the      detenu".      The Court  has also  recognised that  the right to life and liberty  guaranteed  by  Art.  21  of  the  Constitution includes the  right to a speedy trial. The right to a speedy trial may  not be  an  expressly  guaranteed  constitutional right in India, but it is implicit in the 358 right to  a fair trial which has been held to be part of the right to  life and  liberty  guaranteed  by  Art.21  of  the Constitution. After referring to situations where an accused person may  be seriously  jeopardised in  the conduct of his defence with  the passage of time, it was observed by one of us in State of Maharashtra v. Champalal(l):           "Such situations,  in appropriate  cases,  we  may      readily infer  an infringement of the right to life and      liberty guaranteed  by Art.  21  of  the  Constitution.

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    Denial of  a speedy  trial may with or without proof of      something more  lead  to  an  inevitable  inference  of      prejudice and  denial of  justice. It is prejudice to a      man to  be detained without trial. It is prejudice to a      man to  be denied  a fair trial. A fair trial implies a      speedy trial."      Earlier in Hussainara Khatoon (I) v. Home Secretary(2), it was observed by Bhagwati. J.:           "If a  person is  deprived of his liberty under a-      procedure which is not "reasonable, fair or just", such      deprivation would be violative of his fundamental right      under Art.  21 and he would be entitled to enforce such      fundamental right and secure his release. Now obviously      procedure prescribed  by law  for depriving a person of      his liberty cannot be ’reasonable, fair or just’ unless      that procedure ensures a speedy trial for determination      of the  guilt of  such person.  No procedure which does      not ensure  a reasonably quick trial can be regarded as      ’reasonable, fair  or just’  and it  would fall foul of      Art. 21.  There can, therefore, be no doubt that speedy      trial,  and   by  speedy   trial  we   mean  reasonably      expeditious trial, is an integral and essential part of      the fundamental  right to life and liberty enshrined in      Art. 21."      In Hussainara  Khatoon (IV)  v. Home  Secretary(3), the principle was re-affirmed and Bhagwati, J. added:           "Speedy trial  is, as  held by  us in  our earlier      judgment  dated   February  26,   1979,  an   essential      ingredient of ’reason- 359      able, fair  and just’  procedure guaranteed  by Art. 21      and it is the constitutional obligation of the State to      devise such a procedure as would ensure speedy trial to      the accused." In the  same case, it was further observed that the right to free legal  services was implicit in Art. 21 as no procedure could be  said to be reasonable, fair and just which did not provide for legal service to those who could not secure them themselves. That  free legal  services to  the poor  and the needy was  an essential  element of any reasonable, fair and just procedure had already been decided in M:H. Hoskot v. State of Maharashtra(l).      So, what  do we  have now?  Arts. 14, 19 and 21 are not mutually exclusive.  They sustain,  strengthen  and  nourish each other.  They are available to prisoners as well as free men. Prison  walls do  not keep  out Fundamental  Rights.  A person under  sentence of  death may  also claim Fundamental Rights. The  fiat of  Art. 21,  as explained,  is  that  any procedure which  deprives a  person of  his life  or liberty must be just, fair and reasonable. Just, fair and reasonable procedure implies  a right  to free  legal services where he cannot avail  them. It implies a right to a speedy trial. It implies  humane   conditions  of  detection,  preventive  or punitive. ’Procedure  established by  law’ does not end with the pronouncement  of sentence; it includes tho carrying out of sentence. That is as far as we have gone so far. It seems to us  but a  short step, but a step in the right direction, to hold that prolonged detention to await the execution of a sentence of  death is  an unjust,  unfair  and  unreasonable procedure and the only way to undo the wrong is to quash the sentence of death. In the United States of America where the right to  a speedy  trial is  a constitutionally  guaranteed right, the denial of a speedy trial has been held to entitle an accused  person to the dismissal of the indictment or the vacation of  the sentence  (vide Strunk v. United States(2).

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Analogy of American Law is not permissible, but interpreting our Constitution sui generis, as we are bound to do, we find no impediment  in holding  that the  dehumanising factor  of prolonged delay  in the execution of a sentence of death has the constitutional  implication of depriving a person of his life in  an unjust, unfair and unreasonable way as to offend the  constitutional   guarantee  that  no  person  shall  be deprived of his life or personal liberty except 360 according to  procedure established  by law. The appropriate relief in such a case ii tn vacate the sentence of death.      What may be considered prolonged delay so as to attract the  constitutional   protection  of  Art.  21  against  the execution of  a sentence of death is a ticklish question. In Ediga Annamma’s case, two years was considered sufficient to justify interference  with the sentence of death. In Bhagwan Baux’s case, two and a half years and in Sadhu Singh’s case, three and  a half  years were taken as sufficient to justify altering the  sentence of death into one of imprisonment for life.  The  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure  provides  that  a sentence of  death imposed  by a  court of  Session must  be confirmed by the High Court. The practice, to our knowledge, has always  been to give top priority to the hearing of such cases by  the High Courts. So, also in this Court. There are provisions in  the Constitution  (Arts. 72  and  161)  which invest the President and the Governor with power to suspend, remit or  commute a sentence of death. Making all reasonable allowance for  the time  necessary for appeal and considered of reprieve,  we think that delay exceeding two years in the execution of  a  sentence  of  death  should  be  considered sufficient to  entitle the person under sentence of death to invoke Art.  21 and  demand the  quashing of the sentence of death. We therefore accept the special leave petition, allow the appeal  as also the Writ Petition and quash the sentence of death.  In  the  place  of  the  sentence  of  death,  we substitute the sentence of imprisonment for life. H.L.C.                                       Appeal allowed. 361