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PETITIONER: T. V. V. NARASIMHAM AND OTHERS

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE STATE OF ORISSA

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 24/10/1962

BENCH: SUBBARAO, K. BENCH: SUBBARAO, K. DAS, S.K. AYYANGAR, N. RAJAGOPALA

CITATION:  1963 AIR 1227            1963 SCR  Supl. (1) 750

ACT: Estates  Abolition-Estates  recognised  by  the  Government- "Recognition",  meaning  of-Mere  inaction,  if  amounts  to recognition-Madras  Estates Land Act, 1908 (1 of  1908),  s. 3(2)(d).

HEADNOTE: The Government of Orissa, treating the villages in  question as estates, issued notifications under the provisions of the Orissa Estates Abolition Act, 1952, declaring that the  said estates   became   vested  in  the  State  free   from   all encumbrances from the dates specified therein.  The  inamdar of  the respective villages challenged the legality of  the, notifications  by  filing. petitions in the  High  Court  of Orissa  under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India  on  the ground  that  the  said inams were not  estates  within  the meaning  of  s., 3(2) (d) of the Madras  Estates  Land  Act, 1908, as they were excluded from the assets  751 of  the Jeypore Zamindari or Kotpad Paragana at the time  of the  settlements, that they were neither confirmed  nor  re- cognised  by  the British Government, and  that,  therefore, they  were  not  liable to be  abolished  under  the  Orissa Estates  Abolition  Act.  In respect of  the  villages  held within the geographical limits of the Jeypore Zamindari,  an enquiry was made by the Government as to whether they should be  enfranchised but, on objections raised by the  Zamindar, the Government passed an order on November 1, 1919, deciding not to take further action.  As regards the other  villages, there  was  no  evidence to show  that  the  Government  had directed  any enquiry into the titles of the said  inams  or did  any act dehors the enquiry to recognize  their  titles. The High Court took the view that mere inaction on the  part of  the Government amounted to recognition of the grants  in favour  of  the inamdars and that the villages  in  question were  recognized by the British Government within s.  3  (2) (d) of the Madras Estates Land Act. Held,that under s. 3 (2) (d) of the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908,   "recognition"  meant  an  acknowledgement   by   the Government  of the title of a grantee expressly or  by  some unequivocal act on its part.  Acquiescence in the context of

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certain surrounding circumstances may amount to recognition. but  it  must  be  such  as  to  lead  to  that   inevitable conclusion,    Mere   inaction   dehors   such    compelling circumstances  cannot  amount  to  recognition  within   the meaning of the section. Inam  Rules framed by the Government in 1859 providing  for an  enquiry and directing the confirmation of title  on  the basis  of  possession,  laid  down  only  a  procedure   for ascertaining  the titles and did not proprio  vigore  confer title on, or recognize the title of, any inamdar. Held,  further,  that  the order  of  the  Government  dated November 1, 1919, amounted to a recognition of the inamdar’s title, but that as regards the other inamdars in respect  of whom  no  enquiry  had been made, the High  Court  erred  in holding that the Government had recognized their inams. Secretary of State for India v. Bhavamurthy, (1912) 24  M.L. J. 538 and Sam v. Pamalinga Mudaliair, (1916) 1. L R 40 Mad. 664, approved. Observations   in   Mantravadi  Bhavanarayana   v.   Merugu, Venkatadu,  I. L. R. [1954] Mad. 116 and P. V. Narayana  Rao v. State of Orissa.  I. L. R. [1956] Cuttack 348, that  mere inaction  on  the part of the  Government  would  constitute recognition, disapproved, 752

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 147 to 157 of 1962. Appeals from the judgment and order dated  January 3,  1957, of the Orissa High Court in O.I. C. Nos. 71, 95, 75, 68, 69, 72, 74, 108, 70, 66 and 67 of 1954 respectively. A.V.  Visuanatha  Sastri  and M. S.  K.,Sastri,  for  the appellants. H.N. Sanyal, Additional Solicitor-General of India, J. C. Naik,  B.  R.  G.  K.  Achar and  R.  N.  Schthey,  for  the respondents. 1962.  October 24.  The judgment of the Court was  delivered by SUBBA  RAO, J.-These appeals raise the same  point,  namely, the true interpretation of the expression "recognised" in s. 3(2)(d)  of  the  Madras  Estates  Land  Act  (1  of  1908), hereinafter called the Madras Act, and they can be  disposed of together. The  facts  giving rise to the said appeals may  be  briefly stated.   The  Government of Orissa treating  the  villages, which are the subject-matter of these appeals, as  "estates" issued notifications declaring that the said estates  became vested  in  the State free from all  encumbrances  from  the dates  specified  therein. The inamdars  of  the  respective villages  filed petitions in the High Court of Orissa  under Art. 226 of the Constitution for the issue of an appropriate writ  for  canceling the said notifications and  for  orders prohibit-Inc,, the State from taking possession of the  said villages. The said villages can be placed in three groups, namely, (i) villages covered by Appeals Nos. 150, 151 and 155 which  are admittedly   within  the  geographical  limits  of   jeypore Zamindari which was settled in the year 1803 ; (ii) villages covered  by Appeals Nos. 149, 154 and 157 which  are  within the geographical  753 limits  of Kotpad Paragana as settled in 1863, but the  ten= whereof  were  subsequently  modified  in  1901-the   Kotpad

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Paragana,  though it had separate existence at the  time  of the  permanent settlement of the jeypore Zamindari in  1803, had become part of the said Zamindari by subsequent  events, the details whereof do not concern us at this stage ;  (iii) villages covered by Appeals Nos. 147, 148, 152, 153 and  156 of 1962 in regard to which there is a dispute whether  these villages  formed part of Kotpad Paragana or of  the  Jeypore Zamindari as originally settled in 1803. The case of the appellants is that the said villages.  which formed  part  of the original jeypore  Zamindari,  are  pre- settlement  inams  which were excluded  from  the  permanent settlement  ;  and,  as  they  were  neither  confirmed  nor recognized   by  the  British  Government,  they  were   not "estates"  within the meaning of s. 3(2)(d) of  the  Madras Act  and  there,fore not liable to be  abolished  under  the Orissa  Estates Abolition Act, 1952, hereinafter called  the Orissa  Act.  Their contention in regard  to  the  villages forming  part of Kotpad Paragana is the same,  namely,  that the  villages forming part of the said Paragana were  grants made  before  the said Paragana was permanently  settled  in 1863,  and, as they were not confirmed or recognized by  the British Government, they were also not "’estates" within the meaning  of  the said section.  The State pleaded  that  the said  villages,  whether they formed part  of  the  original jeypore  Zamindari or of Kotpad Paragana, were  included  in the  assets  of the said Zamindari or the, Paragana  at  the time  of their respective settlements and,, therefore,  they were  "’estates" within the meaning of either s. 3(2)(a)  or 3(2)(e) of the Madras Act and were rightly abolished by  the State.   They  further  contended that the  third  group  of villages formed part of the original jeypore Zamindari,  and that if the said villages formed part of Kotpad Paragana  it would not make any difference in the legal position, 754 as  the permanent settlement of that Paragana was  not  made under  Regulation  XXV  of 1802, and as  such  no  land  was excluded from its assets at the time of the settlement.   To put it differently, their case is that in the settlement  of Kotpad  Paragana,  the said villages were  included  in  its assets. The High Court did not give the decision ’on disputed  facts but  assumed  the  correctness  of  ,the  appellants’  case, namely,  that  the  first  group.  of  villages  were   pre- settlement  inams within the geographical limits of  jeypore Zamindari,  as  originally  settled in 1803,  and  that  the second  and  third groups of  villages  were  pre-settlement inams  situated in Kotpad Paragana as settled in  1863,  and held  that,  as  the said villages were  recognized  by  the British  Government within the meaning of s. 3(2)(d) of  the Madras  Act,  they were "’estates" liable  to  be  abolished under  the  Orissa  Act.  On that  finding  the  High  Court dismissed the petitions filed by the appellants.  Hence  the appeals. Section 3(2) of the Madras Act reads "Estate" means-               (d)   any inam village of which the grant  has               been  made,  confirmed or  recognised  by  the               British   Government,   notwithstanding   that               subsequent to the grant, the village has  been               partitioned among the grantees on the  succes-               sors in title of the grantee or grantees. Mr.  A.  V.  Viswanatha  Sastri,  learned  counsel  for  the appellants, contends that the expression "confirmed" in  the said  cl.  (d) of s. 3(2) refers to those inams  which  were confirmed  by the Inam Commissioner, after investigation  of

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titles, giving up the reversionary rights of the  Government and  issuing free-hold title deeds to the inamdars; and  the expression  "  recognized", to those cases  of  inams  whose tides were investigated by the Government but the  755 Government, for one reason or other, did not choose to issue title deeds but recognised the titles by some overt act.  In other words, the expression "recognised" would only apply to such  an  inam the grantees’ titles  or  possession  whereof could be traced to some act of the Government done  pursuant to the inam inquiry held in respect of the said titles. Learned  counsel for the State Mr. Sanyal, agrees  with  Mr. Viswanatha  Sastri  in  regard to the meaning  of  the  word "’confirmed". but advances the contention that in regard  to pre-settlement  inams, even the inaction of  the  Government under certain circumstances amounts to "recognition" of  the said inams. A  brief historical account of classes of inams  covered  by cl.  (d)  of  s. 3(2) of the Madras Act  may  be  useful  in appreciating   its  scope.   The  British   Government   was confronted  with three classes of grants, namely, (i)  those grants  made  by  Hindu  or  Muslim  Kings  or  under  their authority, (ii) grants made by British Government, and (iii) unauthorised  alienations, i.e., those made by  persons  who had no authority to make grants.  For the purpose of  ascer- taining  the title of unauthorised alienees Regulation  XXXI of   1802  was  passed  whereunder  rules  were   made   for investigating  into  the  titles of such  alienees  and  for fixing   the  assessment  thereon.   The  preamble  to   the Regulation  expressly recognized the Badshahi  grants  i.e., grants  made  by kings.  Section 2 of  the  said  Regulation exempted from its operation grants made in certain districts before  specified  dates.   The  Regulation  authorised  the Collectors  to take suitable steps for resuming such  lands, but,  for one reason or other, the said Regulation  was  not implemented in the manner conceived by its authors.  In 1859 another serious attempt was made by the Government by  issu- ing  Inam  Rules  for investigating the  titles  of  various inamdars.   Under  these  rules  an  Inam  commissioner  was appointed who made an investigation in regard to the 756 various inams in the State and issued title deeds.’ But some areas  were  not covered by the enquiry and no  enquiry  was made  in  regard to the inams in these areas ; even  in  the areas covered by the enquiry though titles were ascertained, the Government did not enfranchise some inams, but indicated its intention to continue them.  A lucid and precise exposi- tion of this history is found in the valuable commentary  of Vedantachari on the Madras Estates.  Land Act, at p. 51. It would be seen from the history that when the Act of  1908 was  passed there were five classes of grants of whole  inam villages,  namely,  (i)  villages  granted  by  the  British Government; (ii) villages granted by the previous rulers  or persons  under  their  authority;  (iii)  villages  in   the possession  of unauthorized alienees whose titles  had  been ascertained  and confirmed by the British  Government;  (iv) villages  in the possession of unauthorised  alienees  whose titles  were  recognized by the said Government  ;  and  (v) villages  in the possession of unauthorized  alienees  whose titles were not recognized by the British Government  either because  no inquiry in regard to titles was made or  because even  if  such an inquiry was made the Government,  for  one reason or other, did not choose to recognize them. In  this context what is the appropriate connotation of  the word  "recognized"  in s. 3(2)(d) of the  Madras  Act.   The

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decisions  cited at the Bar throw some light on the  meaning of  the  said  word.  In Secretary of  State  for  India  v. Bhanamurthy  (1), a division Bench of the Madras High  Court had  to consider the scope of the word "continued" in s.  17 of  the  Madras  Act II of 1894.   Under  that  section  the Government  had the right of resumption of a Karnam  Service Inam if the said inam was granted or continued by the State. Though  the word ,,recognized" was not in the section,  some of the (1)  (1912) 24 M.L.J. 538, 540.                             757 observations  in the judgment can usefully be extracted.  In 1860 when the inam inquiry was held, though the village  was confirmed,  to  the  Agraharamdar, the  Government  did  not interfere with the rights of the persons holding the  Karnam Service  Inams  situated  in that  Agraharam.   The  Special Assistant stated in his, report that the Government did  not interfere  with the subordinate tenures though the right  of the holder to them was unquestionable and must be  respected by the Agraharamdar, but he did not consider it necessary to decide  that question.  Sundara Aiyar, J., speaking for  the Court, observed :               "The  result  is that in 1860  the  Government               merely left the rights of the Karnams, if they               had  any,  undisturbed.  We cannot  hold  that               there  was  any act done by  Government  which               could be relied on by the Karnams as a  recog-               nition or confirmation of their rights".               Later on, the learned judge proceeded to state               "The  principle  adopted appears to me  to  be               that  in  order that Government may  have  the               right  of  resumption, the right to  the  land               must   either  have  in  the  first   instance               emanated from Government or the continuance of               the.  right  must have been due to an  act  of               Government.  At any rate there must have  been               recognition  by Government of the right  which               could  be set up by the holder in  support  of               his possession." This  decision  is an authority for the position  that  mere inactivity  or  even leaving open the  question  for  future decision  by Government does not amount to a recognition  of the  right  of  an  inamdar  to  hold  possession.   Another division Bench of the Madras High Court in Sam v.  Ramalinga Mudaliar   (1),   though   it   was   concerned   with   the interpretation  of the expression ire unsettled jaghirs"  in s.  3(2)(c) of the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908, made  some useful   observations   on   the   meaning   of   the   word "’recognized". (1)[1916] I.L.R. 40 Mad. 664,670. 758 Srinivasa Ayyangar, J., observed:               "It  is difficult to assign a precise  meaning               to   the  word  "recognized"’   whether   mere               acquiescence  is enough or  whether  something               more  is required is not clear.  I  should  be               inclined  to  think that  recognition  implies               something   more   than   mere   acquiescence,               something  done  by the  Government,  as,  for               instance,  by  acceptance  of  service,  jodi,               etc." This  decision  also  insists  upon  an  overt  act  by  the Government  in  recognition  of  an  inamdar’s  title.   The decision  in  Pitchaya v. Secretary of State  (1)  does  not support  the contention of the respondent.  That was also  a

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case  under s. 17 of the Madras Proprietary Estates  Village Services Act (2 of 1894).  There, lands at the inception  of the  grant  were  village  service inams.   Under  s.  4  of Regulation XXV of 1802 they were excluded from the assets of the   zamindari  at  the  time  of   permanent   settlement. Regulation  XXIX  of 1802 enabled the Government  to  obtain directly  the services from the karnams who were  previously under  the control of the zamindars.  Act 2 of 1894  enabled the  Government  to  fix  wages for  the  said  office.   As salaries  were  fixed for the kamams who were  enjoying  the land in lieu of their services, the Government directed  the enfranchisement  of the said lands.  On the said  facts  the Court  held that as the Government continued the said  inams within  the  meaning of s. 17, it  could  enfranchise  them. Strong  reliance was placed upon the following  observations made  by the learned judges in considering the  decision  in Secretary of State v. Chinnapragada Bhanumurty (2) :               "He  (Sundara  Aiyar, J.) seems to  have  been               inclined to the view that some overt act  must               be  shown to have been done by the  Government               continuing the land in enjoyment of the office               holder   as   remuneration  for   doing   the;               services. " (1)  A.I.R. 1920 Mad. 748, 479. (2) (1912) 24 M.L.J. 538,  540.  759 Then the learned judges proceeded to state               "If  the  learned judge intended to  lay  down               that  the facts that the land  was  originally               service  inam, that it was excluded  from  the               assets  of  the  zamindar in  1802,  and  that               subsequently the Government took service  from               the  karnam and allowed him to  the  property,               would  not enable a Court one law to draw  the               inference that there has been a continuance of               the  grant within s. 17 of Act 2 of  1894,  we               are unable to agree with him." It  will be seen that this case did not lay down  that  mere inaction would amount to recognition or continuance; but  on the facts, as there was a clear overt act on the part of the Government  in  accepting the services of the  karnams,  the learned  judges held that there was such a continuance.   In Ramalinga Mudati v. Ramaswami Ayyar (1), a division Bench of the  same  High Court held that a particular  inam  must  be taken  to have been recognized by the Government in view  of Regulation 31 of 1802.  Venkatasubba Rao J., observed at  p. 543 that the grant was not a grant made by a previous zamin- dar but was a royal or badshahi grant and that by the pream- ble  to Madras Regulation 31. of 1802 all royal grants  must be deemed to have been recognized.  A perusal of that pream- ble clearly shows that such grants were expressly recognized by  the Government.  This is a case where there was  an  ex- press statutory recognitions In that case apart from any inaction there was an  admission made  by a Committee appointed by the State of the  holders’ title  to  the  inam, but the court preferred  to  base  its decision  on the Madras Regulation 31 of 1802.  We have  not been  able  to  discover, nor the learned  counsel  for  the respondent  has been able to point out, any observations  in the judgments of either of the two learned judges either (1) A.I. R. 1929 Mad. 529. 760 expressly stating or even indicating their preference to the view that mere inaction would amount to recognition.  A full Bench of the Madras High Court had to consider in Mantravadi

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Bhavanarayana   v.  Merugu  Venkatadu  (1)   an   altogether different  question, namely, whether the existence of  minor inams already granted before the grant of the village  would make it anytheless of a grant of the whole village.  In  the course   of  the  Judgment,  one  of  the  learned   judges, Venkatarama Ayyar, J., incidentally observed :               "It  will be noticed that for purposes of  the               section, recognition of the grant of an entire               village inam stands on the same footing as its               confirmation; and there is authority that some               recognition could be implied from conduct  and               even  from inaction: vide Ramalinga Mudali  v.               Ramaswami Ayyar (2)". But, as we have pointed out, this passage does not find  any support  in that judgment.  A division Bench of  the  Orissa High Court in P. V. Narayana Rao v. State of Orissa (3),  on a  consideration of the case law on the subject came to  the conclusion that mere inaction or acquiescence on the part of the  Government  would  constitute  recognition  within  the meaning of s. 3 (2) (d) of the Madras Act.  But the facts of that case disclose that the Government expressly  recognized the  title  of the inamdar.  Indeed, this  Court  in  appeal against  that  judgment based its conclusion on  that  fact. The  said judgment of this Court was given in Civil  Appeals Nos.  47 and 48 of 1960 on November 20,1961.   Therein  this Court observed               "it   cannot however   be   disputed   that               confirmation by the Inam Commissioner and  the               issue  of an inam title-deed is not  the               only method by which a pre-British grant would               be (1) I L. R. 1954 Mad 116,152  (2) A. 1. R, 1929 Mad. 529. (3) I. L. R. [ 1956] Cuttack  348. 761               "confirmed"  or "recognised".  In the  present               case  the  reason for the  exclusion  of  this               village from the scope of the Inam enquiry  is               apparent  from the records produced.   At  the               time  of the inam settlement there appears  to               have  been  a controversy as  to  whether  the               reversionary  right  in  regard  to  the  inam               vested  in the Government or in the  zamindar,               and   Government  specifically  directed   the               exclusion  of  this  village  from  the   inam               enquiry,  passing  an order in the  course  of               which they stated :               "That  they  resolved  to  instruct  the  Inam               Commissioner  not  to  interfere  with   these               villages  and to waive their claim to them  on               the ground of expediency and grace,"-the right               which  they  waived being  their  reversionary               right to the inam."               "We  consider this a sufficient  "recognition"               of  the grant as to bring this village  within               the definition of an "estate" within s.3(2)(d)               of the Estates Land Act." It  would be seen from the said passage that the  Government initiated  an  Inam enquiry in respect of the title  of  the inamdar, but, in view of the dispute raised by the zamindar, clearly waived its right to the said reversion; by so doing, it  expressly  recognized the title of the Inamdar  to  hold under  the  zamindar.   This  Court in  that  case  has  not expressed  any opinion on the wide proposition  accepted  by the High Court, but has preferred to base its judgment on an express  recognition of the title of the  Inamdar.   Another

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judgment  of a division Bench of the Orissa High  Court  has been  brought  to our notice and it is said  that  the  said decision  expressed a contrary view, but the later  decision had not even adverted to it.  In that case the only evidence in support of the 762 contention  of  recognition adduced was that  the  Collector realized  cess from the zamindar in respect of the inams  in question;  there  was no other evidence in support  of  that "recognition".  The Court held that there was absolutely  no evidence  to show that the main grant was recognised by  the British  Government.   This  decision,  though  it  did  not expressly say that inaction could not amount to  recognition lmpliedly  it did not accept such a contention or  otherwise it  would have held- that there was recognition of the  inam by the Government within the meaning of that section.   This decision does not carry the matter further. The   foregoing  discussion  leads  us  to   the   following conclusion;   recognition  signifies  an  admission  or   an acknowledgment  of something existing before.  To  recognize is  to take congnizance of a fact.  It implies an overt  act on   the  part  of  the  person  taking   such   cognizance. "Recognition"  is,  therefore,  an  acknowledgment  by   the Government  of the title of a grantee expressly or  by  some unequevocal act on its part.  Acquiescence in the context of certain surrounding circumstances may amount to recognition, but  it  must  be  such  as  to  lead  to  that   inevitable conclusion.    Mere   inaction   dehors   such    compelling circumstances  cannot  amount  to  recognition  within   the meaning of th e section. Now  coming to the merits of the case, we shall  first  deal with  the  group  of villages admittedly  lying  within  the geographical  limits of jeypore zamindari,  Inam  Commission appointed. by the Government in 1862 called for and obtained from  the zamindar a statement of pre-settlement  and  post- settlement  inams  within  the geographical  limits  of  the zamindari;  but  it  did  not make  any  inquiry  in  regard thereto.   But  in they car 1907 the  Government  of  Madras directed an inquiry of the inams in the jeypore zamindari by  763 a Special Deputy Collector by name Meenakshisundaram Pillai. In the inquiry held by him the zamindar did not put  forward his claim.  His report was not full or complete as it should be and it was simply recorded by the Government in its order dated February 25, 1910.’ The Government again by its  order dated  November  16, 1910, directed  another  officer  named Burkitt to make a further or detailed inquiry into the inams of  jeypore  zamindari, and he submitted his report  to  the Government  which was recorded by it in its order dated  May 19,  1914.  On the basis of the said report  the  Government gave notice to the Maharaja of jeypore to show cause why the said  villages found to be pre-settlement inams  by  Burkitt should  not  be enfranchised.  The  Maharaja  submitted  his objections  claiming that all the said villages formed  part of  his  zamindari  and  the  Government  had  no  right  of reversion  therein.  On  November 1,  1919,  the  Government issued the following order No. 2489:               "The  Board  of Revenue is informed  that  the               Government have on re-consideration decided to               take no further action in connection with  the               question  of the settlement of  pre-settlement               inams in the jeypore Zamindary." In this context the relevant records, namely the reports  of Meenakshisundaram  Pillai  and Burkitt  and  the  objections filed by the Maharaja were not filed in the High Court.   If

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they  had been produced, as they should have been, the  High Court and this Court would have been in a better position to appreciate  the  situation.  But the  aforesaid  facts  were given in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the  State in O.J.C. No. 68 of 1954 and the correctness of those  facts are  not disputed before us.  From the foregoing  narration, the factual and legal position was this : The inamdars  were holding  the  ’said inams under grants made by  the  jeypore Maharaja prior to 1803. 764 The  Government claimed reversionary rights therein  on  the basis  that these were pre-settlement inams not included  in the  assets  of the zamindari at the time of  the  permanent settlement.   The  Maharaja claimed that the  said  villages were  part of his zamindari i.e., they were included in  the assets  of  the  zamindari  at the  time  of  the  permanent settlement.   The Government presumably accepted that  claim by  deciding not to take further action in  connection  with the  settlement of the pre-settlement inams of  the  Jeypore zamindari.  It is not possible to accept the contention that there was only inaction on the part of the Government in the aforesaid  circumstances.  As there were conflicting  claims between the Maharaja and the Government, and by  withdrawing further  action,  the Government accepted the claim  of  the Maharaja,  namely, that the Inamdars were holding the  inams as  under-tenure  holders under the zamindar.   This  was  a clear  recognition of the Inamdars’ title to hold under  the zamindar.  We agree with the High Court that the  Government "recognized"  the said grants within the meaning of s.  3(2) of the Madras Act.    As   regards the second and the third group  of  villages there   is  nothing  on  the  record  which  discloses   any recognition by the Government of the grants of the said inam villages.   It  does  not appear  that  the  Government  had directed  any inquiry into the titles of the said  inams  or did any act dehors the inquiry to recognize the said  title. We  find it very dimrult to agree with the High  Court  that mere  inaction  on  the part of the  Government  amounts  to recognition  of the grants in favour of the  Inamdars.   But the  learned Additional Solicitor-General contends that  the Inam  Rules  framed  by  the  Government  providing  for  an inquiry,   and   particularly   the   rule   directing   the confirmation  of  title on the basis  of  possession,  would amount to recognition within the meaning of s.3(2)(d) of the Madras  Act.  We cannot accept this contention.  Inam  Rules were framed by the Government  765 in  1859  for  investigating  into  the  titles  of  various inamdars  and for enfranchising inams.  These rules  proprio vigore  did not confer title on, or recognize title of,  any inamdar.   They lay down only a procedure  for  ascertaining the titles in those areas where an inquiry was held for  the purposes   of  investigation  of  titles  and   confirmation thereof.  In this case no such inquiry appears to have  been held  in  respect of Korpad Paragana.  These  rules  do  not therefore  help the State.  In our view the High Court  went wrong in holding that the British Government recognized  the said inams. Lastly  the learned Additional Solicitior-General  contended that  a grant of pre-settlement inam villages which did  not fall  within the definition of an "estate" in s. 3(2)(d)  of the Madras Act would be an ’estate’ within the definition of that  expression in s. 2(g) of the Orissa Act and  therefore the  Government Validity issued the notifications  under  s. 3(1) of the Orissa Act abolishing the aforesaid villages not

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recognized  by  the Government.  This  contention  has  been raised for the first time before us.  The contention  raised is not a pure question of law, but depends upon the proof of the  conditions laid down in the said cl.(g) of s.2  of  the Orissa  Act.  We do not think we are justified  in  allowing the respondent to raise a plea of mixed question of fact and law for the first time before us.  There must have been very good  reasons  for  the  State  not  raising  this   extreme contention  in the High Court.  We should not be  understood to  have expressed our opinion one way or the other on  this question. In  the  result  the  Appeals Nos.  150,  151  and  155  are dismissed  with costs, (one hearing fee); but  unfortunately the rest of the appeals cannot now be finally disposed of as we  have already indicated, the High Court did not give  any findings  on  disputed  questions of fact.   We  cannot  but observe that these 766 appeals  belong to that class of cases where the High  Court should  have given definite findings on all the issues,  for that  would have prevented the unnecessary  prolongation  of this litigation and would have also enabled us to dispose of these  appeals finally and more satisfactorily.  But in  the events that have happened we have no option but to set aside the  judgment of the High Court and remand the said  appeals to  it for disposal on the other questions of fact  and  law raised  therein.  Costs of the said appeals will  abide  the result of the proceedings in the High Court. Appeals  Nos. 147 to 149, 152 to 154, 156 and 157  remanded. Appeals Nos. 150, 151 and 155 dismissed.