http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 11  

PETITIONER: T. P. DAVER

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: LODGE VICTORIA NO. 363, S. C. BELGAUM

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 12/12/1962

BENCH: SUBBARAO, K. BENCH: SUBBARAO, K. IMAM, SYED JAFFER KAPUR, J.L. MUDHOLKAR, J.R.

CITATION:  1963 AIR 1144            1964 SCR  (1)   1

ACT: Domestic  Tribunal-Masonic  Lodge-Source of power  to  expel members-Contract by which they become members-Rules must  be strictly observed-Must act honestly and in good faith-Should not exceed its jurisdiction-Jurisdiction of Civil Courts.

HEADNOTE: There is a Scotish Masonic institution known as Grand  Lodge of  Scotland.   Under this institution  there  are  District Grand Lodges.  Under its superintendence there are  Daughter Lodges.   These  institutions  arc  governed  by  their  own constitutions  and laws.  Under those laws a member  against whom disciplinary action has been taken by a Daughter  Lodge can appeal to the District Grand Lodge and there is a  right of  second  appeal  to the Grand  Lodge  of  Scotland.   The appellant  was  a member of one of the  Daughter  Lodges  at Belgaum known as Lodge Victoria.  The second respondent made a  complaint  against  the appellant alleging  that  he  has committed  12 masonic offences.  A notice was issued to  the appellant  by the Secretary of the Victoria  Lodge  alleging the commission of these offences and requiring him to  reply within  14  days.   The appellant submitted  his  answer  in extenso  to the various charges.  A special meeting  of  the Lodge  was held at which each charge was read, members  gave their  comments and each charge was put to vote and  it  was unanimously  decided that the appellant was guilty  of  each charge.  By a resolution the appellant was expelled  subject to  the  confirmation  of the  District  Grand  Lodge.   The decision  was  communicated to the appellant  who  therefore filed  an  appeal  to the District Lodge  which  body  after giving  him  adjournment to appear in person  dismissed  the appeal  at the next meeting at which the appellant  absented himself.   A  further appeal was filed to  the  Grand  Lodge which was also dismissed.  Thereafter the appellant filed  a suit before the Civil judge, Belgaum for a declaration  that the resolution of the 2 Lodge  Victoria  expelling him was void and  that  he  still continued  to  be a member of that Lodge.  The  Civil  Judge dismissed  the suit.  Thereupon an appeal was  filed  before

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 11  

the  High  Court of Mysore.  The High  Court  dismissed  the appeal.   The  present  appeal is by way  of  a  certificate granted by the High Court. The  appellant  contended  that the Lodge  Victoria  had  no jurisdiction  to  try Masonic offences since  such  offences were  within the jurisdiction of the District  Grand  Lodge, Bombay. Secondly, it was contended that the disciplinary proceedings prescribed  by law 198 which governs such  proceedings  were not  strictly complied with.  It was further contended  that the  fourteen days to which he was entitled after  he  filed his  answer were not granted to him.  Lastly, it was  argued that the decision to expel him was wrong on merits. Held,  that the source of the power of  associations,  clubs and  Lodges  to expel their members is the contract  on  the basis of which they become members. Bonsor v. Musicians Union, [1956] A. C. 104, followed. A  member of a Masonic Lodge is bound to abide by the  rules of  the  Lodge; and if the rules provide for  expulsion,  he shall be expelled only in the manner provided by the rules. Maclean  v. The Workers’ Union [1929] 1 Ch. 602 and Ezra  v. Mahendra Nath Banerji, I. L.R. [1946] 2Cal. 88, approved. The  Lodge is bound to act strictly according to the  rules; whether a particular rule is mandatory or directory falls to be  decided in each case, having regard to the well  settled rules  of construction in that regard.  The jurisdiction  of the  Civil Court is rather limited; it cannot obviously  sit as  a court of appeal from the decision of such a  body,  it can set aside the order of such a body if the said body acts without jurisdiction or does not act in good faith or  act,, in violation of natural justice. Maclean v. The Workers Union, [1929] 1 Ch. 623 and  L.A.P.0’ Beilly  v. C. C. Gettens, A I.R. (1949) P. C. 313,  referred to. The  rules  governing tribunals cannot mutatis  mutandis  be applied to such bodies as Lodges.  One has to see broadly in the  circumstances of cacti case whether the  principles  of natural  justice has been applied.  In the circumstances  of this case, 3 particularly  when  it is found that the appellant  had  not raised any objection, it cannot be said that the  resolution passed  by  the  Lodge Victoria is  bad  for  violating  any principles of natural justice. Maclean v. The Workers Union, [1929] 1 Ch. 602, referred to. Law 198 expressly confers a jurisdiction on a Daughter Lodge to  try a member if he commits an offence, the  jurisdiction conferred  on  it cannot be excluded by Law 128 which  is  a general  law.  The word offence’ in the context of  Law  198 can  only  mean  the infringement of laws  of  the  Daughter Lodge. In  the present case the rules relating to the  disciplinary proceedings  have been strictly complied with.  With  regard to  the  contention that the additional  fourteen  days,  to which  he is entitled to file his case, were not granted  to him it is held that there was no prejudice caused to him  by this  failure  and  since he never made a  complaint  of  it before  any of the two appellate bodies, he has  waived  the requirement  of the rule.  From the facts and  circumstances of  the  case,  particularly  when  it  is  found  that  the appellant  did  not raise any objection, it cannot  be  said that the resolution passed by the Lodge Victoria is bad  for violating  natural  justice.   Since Civil  Courts  have  no jurisdiction to decide on the merits of a decision given  by a  domestic tribunal and since both courts below have  found

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 11  

concurrently that the Daughter Lodge has acted in good faith and  since no exceptional circumstance has been shown,  this Court will not examine the merits of the decision.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 414 of 1960. Appeal  from  the judgment and decree  dated  September  25, 1958, of the Mysore High Court in Regular Appeal (B) No. 256 of 1956. Naraindas   C.  Malkani  and  G.  Gopalakrishnan,  for   the appellant. Bishan Narain and S. P. Verma, for the respondent No. 1. 1962.  December 12.  The judgment of the Court was delivered by SUBBA  RAO,  J.-This  appeal on certificate  relates  to  an internal dispute of the members of a 4 Masonic  Lodge called the "Lodge Victoria No. 363  S.C."  at Belgaum. There  is  a Scotish institution known as  "Grand  Lodge  of Ancient Free and Accepted Masons of Scotland" at  Edinburgh, hereinafter called the "Grand Lodge of Scotland".  Under its supervision  there arc Provincial or District  Grand  Lodges spread  throughout  the world.  There  are  Daughter  Lodges under the superintendence of the District Grand Lodges.  The Grand  Lodge  of  Scotland is governed by  its  own  written Constitution   and   Laws.   There  is   also   a   separate Constitution  and Laws for every District Grand Lodge.   One such  District Grand Lodge known as "The Grand Lodge of  All Scotish   Freemasonary  in  India  and  Pakistan"  has   its headquarters  at  Bombay.  The aforesaid daughter  Lodge  at Belgaum is directly under the said District Grand Lodge  and is governed by the Constitution and Laws of the latter. The  appellant  was a member of the lodge  Victoria,  having joined it in the year 1948.  On October 16, 1952, the second respondent  made  a complaint against the appellant  to  the Master,  Lodge  Victoria, alleging that  the  appellant  was guilty of 12 masonic offences.  It was alleged therein that, as  the appellant had committed masonic offences, he  should be  tried by the Lodge for the charges levelled against  him under  Law  198 of the Constitution.  On October  20,  1952, notice of the said complaint was issued to the appellant and he  was required to send to the Secretary of the  Lodge  his answers  to the charges within 14 days from the date of  the notice.   He  was also informed that he was entitled  to  be present  and to state his defence at the special meeting  to be held on November 8, 1952.  On the same day, the Secretary of  the Lodge sent notices to all the members of  the  Lodge asking them to attend the said special meeting convened  for considering and 5 passing  judgment  on the said complaint.   On  October  27, 1952,  the appellant submitted his answer in extenso to  the various  charges levelled against him in the  complaint;  in that  answer he requested that "my complete replies be  read in toto to the brethren assembled to decide this matter  and I  be informed of the total number of brethren  present  and the number of votes cast one way or the other." A perusal of that  reply  also shows that the appellant  under-stood  the charges levelled against him as relating to certain offences alleged  to  have  been  committed  by  him  and  his  reply proceeded  on that basis.  On November 8, 1952, the  special meeting  of the Lodge was held and the minutes show that  18

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 11  

members  attended the meeting, that each charge was read  at the  meeting, that comments of the members were invited  and that decision was taken on each of the charges.  Each of the charge  was put to vote and the members present  unanimously held  that  every one of the charges  levelled  against  the appellant  was  established.  In the result  they  passed  a resolution excluding the appellant from the Lodge until  the exclusion  was confirmed by the District Grand  Lodge  under Law 199 of the Constitution.  On November 15, 1952, the said decision was communicated to the appellant.  On November 24, 1952,  the appellant preferred an appeal against that  order to the District Grand Lodge.  On October 5, 1953, a  meeting of  the  District Grand Lodge was convened to  consider  the appeal  and the appeal was dismissed.  It was noted  in  the proceedings of the District Grand Lodge that though  earlier an  adjournment was given to enable the appellant to  appear in person at the meeting, he remained absent.  On a  further appeal  to  the  Grand Lodge of  Scotland,  the  said  Lodge considered  the sentence imposed on the appellant as one  of "suspension sine die" and recommended to the Lodge  Victoria to review the suspension after a period of 12 months if  the appellant applied for reinstatement.  It does not 6 appear that the appellant filed any application for  review. On September 7, 1954, the appellant instituted a suit in the Court  of the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Belgaum,  for  a declaration that the resolution of the Victoria Lodge  dated November 8, 1952, was illegal and void and that he continued to  be a member of the Lodge despite the resolution, for  an injunction to restrain the officers and servants of the said Lodge  from  preventing  him  from  exercising  his   rights therein, and for recovery of damages.  To that suit he  made the  Victoria Lodge, the first defendant ; the  complainant, the second defendant ; the Secretary of the Lodge, the third defendant ; and the District Grand Lodge, Bombay, the fourth defendant.  The defendants contested the suit.  The  learned Civil  judge  dismissed the suit.  The appeal filed  by  the appellant  to the High Court of Mysore was  also  dismissed. The present appeal has been filed on a certificate issued by the said High Court. Learned  counsel for the appellant raised before us all  the contentions  which his client had unsuccessfully  raised  in the courts below.  Before we advert to the said  contentions it  would  be convenient to notice briefly the  law  on  the subject relevant to the present enquiry. The  source  of  the power of associations  like  clubs  and lodges  to expel their members is the contract on the  basis of  which  they  become members.  This  principle  has  been restated by Lord Morton in Bonsor v. Musicians’ Union,  (1). There, one Bonsor, who became a member of a trade union, was expelled.  In that context Lord Morton observed :               "When  Mr. Bonsor applied to join the  respon-               dent union, and his application was  accepted,               a  contract  came into existence  between  Mr.               Bonsor and the respondent, whereby Mr.  Bonsor               agreed to abide by the rules of the (1)  [1956] A.C. 104,127. 7               respondent  union,  and  the  union  impliedly               agreed  that Mr. Bonsor would not be  excluded               by the union or its officers otherwise than in               accordance with the rules". This  contractual  origin of the rule of expulsion  has  its corollary in the cognate rule that in expelling a member the conditions laid down in the rules must be strictly complied-

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 11  

with.    In  Maclean  v.  The  Workers’  Union,   (1),   the contractual foundation of the power is described thus :               "In  such  a case as the  present,  where  the               tribunal  is  the result of rules  adopted  by               persons who have formed the association  known               as  a trade union, it seems to  me  reasonably               clear that the rights of the plaintiff against               the  defendants  must  depend  simply  on  the               contract,  and that the material terms of  the               contract must be found in the rules". Proceeding on that basis,the learned Judge observed:               "It  is  certain, therefore, that  a  domestic               tribunal is bound to act strictly according to               its  rules and is under an obligation  to  act               honestly and in good faith." The  same idea was expressed by the Calcutta High  Court  in Ezra v. Mahendra Nath Banerji (1) thus :               ".........  Where  the rule  provides  in  any               particular respect that some condition must be               fulfilled,   then  that  condition   must   be               strictly  complied  with, since the  power  of               expulsion is itself dependent on the terms  of               the rule." The  next  question  is  whether  the  doctrine  of   strict compliance   with  the  rules  implies  that  every   minute deviation from the rules, whether substantial or not,  would render  the  act of such a body void.  The  answer  to  this question will depend upon the (1) [1929] 1 Ch. 602, 623. (2) I.L.R. (1946) 2 Cal, 88, 109, 8 nature  of the rule infringed ; whether a rule is  mandatory or  directory depends upon each rule, the purpose for  which it  is made and the setting in which it appears.   We  shall consider  this aspect of the doctrine when we deal with  the argument of the learned counsel that in the present case the rules have not been complied with. The scope of the jurisdiction of a civil court vis-a-vis the decisions of tribunals is also well settled.  In Maclean  v. The Workers’ Union Maugham,J., observed:               "It  appears  to me that we have no  power  to               review the evidence any more than have a power               to  say whether the tribunal came to  a  right               conclusion." Much  to the same effect the judicial Committee observed  in L.A.P.0’ Beilly v. C.C. Gittens, (2).               "................  It is important to bear  in               mind that neither the learned.Judge nor  their               Lordships’  Board  is " entitled to sit  as  a               Court  of  appeal  from  the  decisions  of  a               domestic tribunal such as the Stewards of  the               Trinidad Turf Club". Later on the Privy Council stated:               "All  these matters, however, are  essentially               matters for the domestic tribunal to decide as               it  thinks right.  Provided that the  tribunal               does  not  exceed its  jurisdiction  and  acts               honestly  and in good faith, the Court  cannot               intervene  even if it thinks that the  penalty               is  severe or that a very strict standard  has               been applied". Another  aspect which may also be noticed is how far and  to what extent the doctrine of bias may be (1) [1929] 1 Ch, 602, 628. (2) A.I.R. (1949) P.C. 313, 316, 317.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 11  

9 invoked in the case of domestic tribunals like those of clubs.   The observations of Maugham J. in Maclean’s case(1) in this context may be noticed. The learned judge observed in that case thus:               "A person who joins an association governed by               rules     under     which    he     may     be               expelled  ........................ has  in  my               judgment  no legal right of redress if  he  be               expelled according to the rules however unfair               and  unjust  the rules or the  action  of  the               expelling  tribunal  may be provided  that  it               acts  in good faith  .........................               The   phrase,  "the  principles   of   natural               justice," can only mean in this connection the               principles  of fair play so deeply  rooted  in               the   minds  of  modern  Englishmen   that   a               provision  for an inquiry necessarily  imports               that the accused should be given his chance of               defence and explanation.  On that point  there               is no difficulty.  Nor do I doubt that in most               cases  it is a reasonable inference  from  the               rules that if there is anything of the  nature               of a lis between two persons, neither of  them               should sit on the tribunal." Another   difficulty   that  one  is  confronted   with   in proceedings  held by committees constituted by clubs  is  to demarcate  precisely  the line between  the  prosecutor  and the,Judge.  Maugham, J. noticed this difficulty and observed in Maclean’s case (1) at p. 626 thus :               "In  many  cases the tribunal  is  necessarily               entrusted with the duty of appearing to act as               prosecutors  as  well as that of  judges;  for               there  is  no  one  else  to  prosecute.   For               example, in a case where a council is  charged               with  the duty of considering the  conduct  of               any  member whose conduct is disgracefull  and               of  expelling him if found guilty of  such  an               offence, it constantly occurs that the  matter               is brought to the (1)  [1929] 1 Ch. 602, 628. 10               attention of the council by a report of  legal               proceedings  in  the  press.   The  member  is               summoned  to appear before the  council.   The               council’s  duty is to cause him to appear  and               to explain his conduct.  It may be that in  so               acting  the council are the  prosecutors.   In               one  sense  they are; but if  the  regulations               show  that  the council is bound to act  as  I               have  mentioned and to that extent to  act  as               prosecutors,  it  seems to be clear  that  the               council  is not disqualified from  taking  the               further steps which-the rules require." Though  it is advisable for a club to frame rules  to  avoid conflict of duties, if the rules sanction such a  procedure, the  party,  who has bound himself by  those  rules,  cannot complain,  unless  the enquiry held pursuant to  such  rules discloses malafides or unfair treatment. The  following  principles may be gathered  from  the  above discussion.  (1)  A member of a masonic lodge  is  bound  to abide  by the rules of the lodge; and if the  rules  provide for  expulsion,  he  shall be expelled only  in  the  manner provided  by  the  rules.  (2) The lodge  is  bound  to  act strictly  according to the rules, whether a particular  rule

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 11  

is mandatory or directory falls to be decided in each  case, having  regard to the well settled rules of construction  in that regard. (3) The jurisdiction of a civil court is rather limited;  it cannot obviously sit as a court of appeal  from decisions of such a body; it can set aside the order of such a  body, if the said body acts without jurisdiction or  does not act in good faith or acts in violation of the principles of  natural  justice  as explained in  the  decisions  cited supra. Bearing the said principles in mind, we shall now proceed to consider the arguments of learned counsel for the appellant.  11 The   first  contention  is  that  Lodge  Victoria  has   no jurisdiction  to  decide on the question  whether  a  member committed a masonic offence, for, it is said, such  offences are  within  the  jurisdiction of a  District  Grand  Lodge, Bombay.  The question falls to be decided on a  construction of the relevant Laws of the Lodge : The said Laws read:               Law  198.   Every  Daughter  Lodge  shall   be               entitled  to  try any member  accused  of  any               offence.   A complaint, in writing,  shall  be               served  on the accused brother, by  registered               letter  posted  to  his  last  known  address,               specifying the offence of which he is charged,               which  he  shall  be  entitled  to  answer  in               writing  within fourteen days of the  date  of               posting  of  the  complaint,  or  within  such               longer  time  as  may  be  specified  in   the               complaint.  On the answer being lodged, or  on               the  expiry  of  the time for  doing  so,  the               matter  of  the  complaint  shall  be  brought               before   the  Lodge  for   consideration   and               judgment,  either at a special meeting  called               for  that purpose, or at a regular meeting  of               the  Lodge.  The meeting at which it is to  be               considered must be called by circular sent  by               the Secretary, which shall state the fact that               the  complaint, and answer, if any, are to  be               brought before the Lodge for consideration and               judgment.   In the case of a Lodge which  does               not  convene  its meetings  by  circular,  the               meeting shall be called in such manner as  may               be  ordered  by Grand Committee, or  by  Grand               Secretary  on  its  behalf.   Notice  of   the               meeting  shall be sent to the accused  brother               by registered letter posted to his last  known               address at least fourteen clear days prior  to               the day of the meeting and that whether he has               lodged  a written answer or not, and he  shall               be entitled 12               to appear at the. meeting and any  adjournment               thereof and state his defence.  After the case               has been considered, the Lodge shall give  its               decision.  Such decision shall be by votes  of               a  majority  of the qualified  members  voting               thereon and only those present throughout  the               hearing of the case shall be entitled to vote.               If the complaint be sustained, the Lodge shall               pronounce such admonition or sentence as shall               be  decided  by  the  majority  of  votes   as               aforesaid.  A Daughter Lodge may not, however,               pronounce a sentence of expulsion as power  to               expel is vested in Grand Lodge alone; but,  if

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 8 of 11  

             the  circumstances  are deemed  of  sufficient               gravity,  a  Daughter Lodge may  recommend  to               Grand  Lodge that a brother be  expelled  from               the  craft.  The judgment pronounced shall  be               intimated  forthwith in writing by  registered               letter to the said brother, who shall  therein               be  apprised  that it shall ’be  final  unless               appealed against to the Provincial or District               Grand Lodge, or to Grand Lodge in the case  of               a  Daughter Lodge not within the  jurisdiction               of  a  Province or District within  one  month               after the date of posting the said intimation.               In  special  circumstances,  Grand  Committee,               through Grand Secretary, may extend the period               within which an appeal may be made.               Law 128: A Provincial or District Grand  Lodge               shall hear and determine all subjects of maso-               nic   complaint,   dispute,   or    difference               initiated before or appealed or remitted to it               respecting Daughter Lodges or brethren of  the               Scotish Craft within the Province or District,               and  may admonish, or pronounce a sentence  of               suspension,  and, in the case of a Lodge,  may               suspend  its  Charter.  The procedure  in  all               such   subjects  of  complaint,  dispute,   or               difference shall be re- 13               gulated  mutatis mutandis by Laws 104  to  III               inclusive.               Law  56:  The Grand Lodge shall hear  and  de-               termine, through its Grand Committee as  here-               inbefore  provided,  all subjects  of  Masonic               complaint or irregularity respecting Lodges or               Brethren  within  the  jurisdiction,  and  may               proceed  to admonish, or fine, or suspend,  or               expel. Under Law 198, every Daughter Lodge will be entitled to  try any  member  accused  of  an  offence;  under  Law  128,   a Provincial or District Grand Lodge shall hear and  determine all  subjects  of masonic dispute  or  difference  initiated before it respecting the brethren of the Scotish Craft;  and Law  56  provides  that  the Grand  Lodge  shall  hear  such complaints  and  inflict  suitable  punishments  in  respect thereof  It will be seen that two different expressions  are used:  the expression "’offence" is used in Law  198,  while the  expression "masonic complaint" is used in Law 128.   It is, therefore, said that, as in the complaint the  appellant is  alleged to have committed masonic offences,  the  proper forum  is  the  District Grand Lodge and  not  the  Daughter Lodge.  It is common case that the expressions "offence" and "masonic  complaint" have not been defined in the Laws.   In its  legal significance an offence means an act or  omission made punishable by any law for the time being in force.  The expression  "masonic complaint" is a comprehensive term;  it may mean any complaint pertaining to masonic matters.  It is not  necessary  to decide whether  the  expression  "masonic complaint" is wide enough to take in an "offence".  But  Law 198 expressly confers a jurisdiction on a Daughter Lodge  to try  a  member if he commits an  offence;  the  jurisdiction conferred  on it cannot be excluded by law 128, which  is  a general   law.   The  question  therefore  is  whether   the allegations   made   against   the   appellant   constituted "offences" within the meaning of law 198. 14 The word "’offence" in the context of that Law can only mean

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 9 of 11  

the infringement of the Laws of the Daughter Lodge.  As  all the  Laws  have not been placed before us, we are not  in  a position  to  hold  whether  the  allegations  amounted   to "offence"   or  not  in  the  aforesaid  sense.    But   the complainant,  the  appellant and the members of  the  Lodge, including its officebearers, proceeded on the basis that the appellant committed "’offences".  The complaint discloses as many  as 12 charges.  The appellant answered them  seriatim. Indeed, in his answer he specifically stated:               "Further if my accuser and others of his  mind               have  thought this alleged  "offence"  serious               enough  to be included in this complaint,  why               did  they  not take any action in  the  matter               immediately  instead  of taking  it  up  after               sleeping over it for no less than 3-4 years ?" This  shows that even the appellant proceeded on  the  basis that  the  allegations,  if  established,  would  amount  to "offences"  within  the  meaning of the said  law.   In  the special  meeting of the Lodge it was held that  the  charges have  been  established; and on that  basis  punishment  was imposed  on the appellant.  The appellant did not  take  any objection  either  that the allegations did  not  amount  to "offences"  within the meaning of law 198 or that the  Lodge had  no  jurisdiction  to decide whether  he  committed  the offences.   It is, therefore, manifest that all the  parties concerned  in the matter accepted the position that  if  the acts  alleged to have been committed by tile appellant  were established,  he would have committed "offences"  under  the laws.  If the allegations against the appellant amounted  to ""offences"  Law 198 is immediately attracted.  If  that  be so,  neither  Law  128  nor Law  56,  which  deal  with  the jurisdiction  of  a  District  Grand  Lodge  in  respect  of "masonic  complaints", can just the  jurisdiction  expressly conferred on the 15 Daughter Lodge.  We, therefore, hold that the Daughter Lodge had jurisdiction to entertain the complaint filed by the 2nd respondent against the appellant and decide it on merits. The  next  question is, whether Law 198  has  been  strictly complied with.  Relevant part of Law 198 reads :               "On the answer being lodged, or on the  expiry               of  the time for doing so, the matter  of  the               complaint  shall be brought before  the  Lodge               for  consideration and judgment, either  at  a               special meeting called for that purpose, or at               a  regular meeting of the Lodge.  The  meeting               at which it is to be considered must be called               by circular sent by the Secretary, which shall               state the fact that the complaint, and answer,               if any, are to be brought before the lodge for               consideration and judgment." As  we  have already indicated in the  narration  of  facts, notice  was  issued to the members fixing the  date  of  the special  meeting  along  with  the  notice  issued  to   the appellant i.e., the notice was issued to the members  before the appellant filed his answer in respect of the allegations made  against  him  in the  complaint.   It  is,  therefore, contended  that the notice of the special meeting issued  to the members was not in strict compliance with the said  Law. We  do not see any contravention of the Law.  The  Law  does not  say  that notice to the members should be  issued  only after  the  answer was lodged by the person against  whom  a complaint was made.  But what it says is that the matter  of the  complaint  shall  be  brought  before  the  Lodge   for consideration  after the answer was lodged or on the  expiry

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 10 of 11  

of  the time for doing so.  It also does not prescribe  that the  answer should be communicated to the members, but  only indicates that the notice shall state the fact that 16 the complaint and the answer, if any, will be brought before the  Lodge  for consideration and judgment.  To  put  it  in other  words,  the gist of the relevant part of the  law  is that in the special meeting convened for the purpose or at a regular  meeting of the Lodge, the matter of  the  complaint shall  be  brought for consideration and judgment.   In  the present  case it is not disputed that the prescribed  notice was given to the members and at the meeting all of them  had considered the complaint as well as the answer lodged by the appellant.   Therefore,  the  law in this  regard  has  been strictly complied with. The next contention relates to the following part of Law 198 :  "Notice  of  the meeting shall be  sent  to  the  accused brother  by  registered  letter posted  to  his  last  known address at least fourteen clear days prior to the day of the meeting  and that whether he has lodged a written answer  or not,  and he shall be entitled to appear at the meeting  and any  adjournment  thereof  and state  his  defence."  It  is contended  that under the said part of the Law, the  accused is  entitled  to  have another 14 days after  he  filed  his answer  to enable him to file his case before the Lodge  and that in the instant case no such additional period was given to  him.  That is so.  The position, therefore, is that  the appellant was given notice of the hearing as required by the law,  but  he  was not given the  entire  period  prescribed thereunder.   The  question  is whether this  error  in  the procedure   vitiated  the  trial.It  is  obvious  that   the appellant wag not prejudiced.  He never made a complaint  of it. Indeed in his answer he made it clear that he would  not be  present at the inquiry.  The Law itself enabled  him  to apply for further time, but he did not ask for it, as he did not  want to appear at the meeting.  He did not  raise  this objection  either  in the appeal before the  District  Grand Lodge  or  in the second appeal before the  Grand  Lodge  of Scotland.  Before the said appellate Lodges he took 17 the   decision  on  merits.   Indeed,  by  his  answer   and subsequent conduct he clearly waived the said requirement of the Law.  Can he now be allowed to rely upon a breach of the procedural rule to invalidate the proceeding ? In our  view, he  cannot  do  so.   There is  a  distinction  between  the jurisdiction of a Lodge and the irregular exercise of it  in the matter of the taking of procedural steps.  A party to  a dispute  can certainly waive his objections to some  defects in procedure.  In this case, the appellant could have  taken objection  for  his being given a shorter period  of  notice than prescribed under the Law for his appearance before  the meeting of the Lodge.  He did not do so.  The appellant has, by his aforesaid conduct, clearly waived his right under the said  Law.   Having  waived it, he  is  now  precluded  from relying  upon the said defect.  We, therefore, hold that  it is  not open to the appellant to rely upon the  said  defect for invalidating the proceeding. The  lie argument that the  members of the Lodge  were  both the prosecutors and the judges, and therefore the principles of natural justice have been violated has not much force  in the  context of the present enquiry.  We are dealing with  a case of a Lodge and not with that of a tribunal or a  court. It  is true that the earlier resolution, Ex.  II  4-,  shows that 11 members of the Lodge were not well disposed  towards the appellant; but here we are concerned with the  complaint

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 11 of 11  

filed  by the 2nd respondent.  Notice of the  complaint  was given to all the members of the Lodge.  It may be that  some of  them did not like the appellant, and one of them is  the complainant  himself  But 22 members of the  Lodge  met  and unanimously  held-, after considering the complaint and  the answer  given by the appellant, that he was guilty.  If  the appellant  had any objection for one or some of the  members taking  part  in  the  meeting,  he  could  have  raised  an objection, but he did not do so.  The rules 18 governing  tribunals and courts cannot mutatis  mutandis  be applied to such bodies as Lodges.  We have to see broadly in the  circumstances  of each case whether the  principles  of natural justice have been applied.  In the circumstances  of this case, particularly when we find that the appellant  had not raised any objection, we cannot say that the  resolution passed  by  the  Lodge Victoria is  bad  for  violating  any principles of natural justice. Lastly  an attempt was made to persuade us to  resurvey  the entire material to ascertain the correctness or otherwise of the decision of the Lodge.  As we have pointed out  earlier, civil courts have no jurisdiction to decide on the merits of a  decision  given by a private association  like  a  Lodge. Both the courts below have held that the Daughter Lodge  has acted  in good faith in the matter of the complaint  against the appellant.  That is a concurrent finding of fact; and it is  the practice of this Court not to  interfere  ordinarily with concurrent findings of fact.  There are no  exceptional circumstances for our departing from the said practice. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed.  No costs.                              19