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PETITIONER: T. DEEN DAYAL

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       10/09/1997

BENCH: A.S. ANAND, K. VENKATASWAMI

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:           THE 10TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 1997 PRESENT:                 Hon’ble Dr.Justice A.S.Anand                 Hon’ble Mr. Justice K.Venkataswami Appellant-in-person K.Ram Kumar,  T.V.S. Narasimbhachari and Ms. Asha Nair, Adv. for the Respondent                       J U D G M E N T      The following Judgement of the Court was delivered:                       J U D G M E N T K.venkataswami. j.      This appeal  under section  19 (1)(b) of the content of courts Act, 1971 (hereinafter called the ’Act’) is preferred against the judgement dated 15.7.89 of the Division Bench of the Andhra  Pradesh High Court punishing the appellant after finding  him   guilty  of  contempt  of  court  with  simple imprisonment for a period of three months.      The appellant  contested the biennial election to Raiya Sabha held  in the  year 1984.  In that connection, he filed an Election  Petition No.1/84  on the file of the High Court of Andhra  Pradesh.   That Election  Petition was  tried  by Mr.justice Upendralal  Waghray.   During the  hearing of the said Election Petition , the appellant filed a Miscellaneous Application being  S.R.No.16572/85  requesting  the  hon’ble Chief justice  of Andhra Pradesh High Court to withdrawn the said  Election  petition  from  the  Court  of  Mr.  Justice Upendralal waghray  and transfer  the  same  to  some  other learned Judge.   In  the said  Miscellaneous Application for transfer, the appellant made the following allegation:      "It is  alleged that  his  lordship      the Hon’ble  mr. Justice Upendralal      waghray is under the evil influence      of  Sri   N.T.  Rama   Rao,   Chief      Minister of Andhra Pradesh, because      of his  relative, Mr. Shravan Kumar      I.A.S.,  Chief   secretary  to  the      Chief Minister  Sri N.T.  Rama Rao,      since the  said Mr.Shravan Kumar is      behind the fraud in connection with      the   regisnation    of   the   1st      respondent,        viz.,        Mr.

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    P.Radhakrishna from  the membership      of   the    A.P.   Public   Service      Commission.           In      these      circumstances, I  submit  that  his      lordship the  Hon’ble  Mr.  Justice      Upendralal   Waghray    cannot   do      justice to me in the above election      petition  and   request  that   the      Hon’ble Chief  Justice, High  Court      of Andhra Pradesh, at Hyderabad may      be pleased to withdraw the election      petition  from   the  file  of  the      Hon’ble    Mr.  Justice  Upendralal      Waghray and  make it  over to  some      other judge....      On perusing  these allegations,  the learned judge felt that the allegations made against him were not only baseless but also  made recklessly  with a  view  to  scandalise  the Court.   Accordingly, the  learned Judge  passed an order on 16.4.85 holding  that the  allegation made  in the  Transfer Application ’amounts to interference with and obstruction to administration of  justice, amounting to ’criminal contempt’ as defined  in section  2(c) of the Act.  Hence, the learned judge proposed  initiation of  contempt proceedings  against the appellant  and issued  notice to  the appellant  to  put forward his defence and adjourned the matter to 25.4/85.  On the adjourned date, the learned judge directed the papers to be placed  before the  Hon’ble Chief Justice for placing the matter before  any  other  learned  Judge.    In  the  first instance,  the   matter   came   up   before   Mr.   Justice P.A.Choudhary, who  passed an  order directing the matter to be placed for hearing before a Division Bench, accepting the contention of the appellant that the matter being a criminal contempt was  required to  be dealt  with by Division Bench. The matter  was then heard by a Division Bench consisting of M.N. Rao.   It appears that the appellant was not regular in appearing before  Division Bench  and  the  Division  Bench, therefore, directed to issue a bailable warrant on 9.6.87 to secure the  presence of the appellant.  Thereafter, the case was listed  before a  Bench consisting of Mr. Justice Jeevan Reddy and  Mr. Justice Neeladri Rao.  Even before this Bench the appellant  did not appear at the time of hearing and the court was  compelled to  issue  a  non-bailable  warrant  to secure his  presence.  In the meanwhile, it is seen from the records that  the appellant  moved this  Court  in  Transfer Petition (criminal)  No.147/87 for  Transfer of the contempt case.   This court  requested the  Chief justice of the High Court to fix a Division Bench for hearing the case to ensure an early  disposal of  the matter.   He  also filed Criminal Miscellaneous petition  Nos. 2988-90  of 1988 in T.P. (Crl.) No. 147/87  for punishing  Respondents 1&3  therein for  not complying with  the Order  in T.P.  (CRl.) No. 147/87.  This Court again  directed the  High  Court  to  dispose  of  the contempt petition within six weeks from 22.7.88.  As noticed earlier, the  appellant without disclosing the laches on his part is  not appearing before the Court-bailable Warrants to secure his  presence, seems  to have  moved this  court  for early disposal  of the  contempt petition.    The  case  was ultimately heard  on 3rd  and 4th July, 1989 by the Division Bench.      It will  be relevant  to  mention  that  a  notice  for initiation of  proceedings under  the Act was issued calling upon the  appellant to show-cause.  He was filed the Counter Affidavit the  offence.   In the counter Affidavit in para 4 he has stated as under:

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    "His  Lordship   the  Hon’ble   mr.      Justice Upendralal  Waghray in  his      order  dated   16.4.85,   initiated      contempt  proceedings  against  me,      quite in violation of Section 13 of      the Contempt  of Courts  Act, 1971,      allegedly because  Sri.P.  Upendra,      M.P. (3rd  respondent  in  Election      Petition No.  1/84) paid a bride of      Rs.       2       Lakhs,       vide      Crl.M.P.No.2988/88   in    Transfer      Petition  (Criminal)   No.   147/87      ordered  by   the  Hon’ble  Supreme      Court  of   India,  New  Delhi,  On      22.7.1988."      Before the  High Court  the appellant argued person and the learned  Advocate General  Appeared for  prosecuting the case.   The learned  Advocate General  submitted before  the High Court that having regard to the fact that the Contemnor made baseless  allegations against  the learned Judge in the Transfer Application and adding scurrilous allegation in the Counter Affidavit  in the  Contempt Application  aggravating the offence, he should be dealt with severely.      The appellant appearing in person before the High Court challenged  the   jurisdiction  of   the  learned  Judge  to indicates proceedings  under the Act as, accordingly to him, the learned  Judge was  acting only  as an  ’ authority’  as contemplated by Article 329(b) of the Constitution of India. He further  contended that  the initiation of proceedings by the learned  Judge was in violation of section 13 of the Ac. His third  contention was  that by reason of the order dated 1.7.86 passed  by P.A. Chaudary, J., the order dated 16.4.85 passed by  Upendralal Waghray , J., "was defeated".  He next contended that  the proceedings  were barred  by  limitation provides in Section 20 of the Act.  His fifth contention was that the  learned Judge  while making  an order  of  16.4.85 partially denied  the  allegations  and  thereby  indirectly admitted the order part of allegation made by him.  The last contention was  that while  passing the order on 25.4.85 the learned judge has discharged him and thereafter the question of continuing the contempt proceedings will not arise.      The High  Court rejecting  the  first  contention  held Article 329(b)  cannot  be  constructed  as  precluding  the parliament  from  conferring  the  jurisdiction  to  try  an election petition,  upon a  court of  a High  Court and  the expression ’authority’ is not defined either in Articles 366 of the Constitution on in the General Clauses Act, 1897.  On that basis  the learned judges rejected the first contention and held  that it  was permissible  for  the  Parliament  to designate a  Court, namely,  the High Court, to try election petitions.  On the second contention based on paragraph 4 of the Counter  Affidavit, the  learned Judges, after observing that  the   averment  in   that  paragraph   was   extremely scandalous, and  compound the  gravity of  the  allegations, held that  the contention was neither a legal contention nor a factual  one against  the  charge  levelled  against  him. Likewise, dealing with the third contention it was held that the order  dated 1.7.86  passed by Mr.Justice P.A. Choudhary referring the  contempt case  to be heard by Division Bench, will not  defeated the  order dated  16.4.85 of  Mr. Justice Upendralal Waghray.   On  the point  of limitation  based on Section 20  of the Act, the learned Judges held that Section 20 provides  for limitation  for  initiation,  but  not  for conclusion of  contempt proceedings.   While  rejecting  the fifth  contention   as  irrelevant   which  could   not   be

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entertained the  learned Judges held that a contemnor cannot expect as  learned Judge  of the Court to reply to every one of his reckless allegations.  As regards the last contention based on  the order  dated 25.4.85  of  the  learned  single judge, the  High Court  found that contention was based on a misreading of  the order dated 25.4.85 and from the material placed before the Court it was clear that the respondent was put on  clear notice  of the  charge he has to meet and that the proceedings  were not  proceedings under section 14, but under Section 15 of the Act.      The High  Court in  its detailed  judgement  considered each and  every one  of the  contention raised before it and ultimately came to the conclusion as under:      "We are  of the  opinion, that  the      allegations made  in the affidavit.      Which     we     have     extracted      hereinabove, do  constitute a clear      case of  criminal  contempt.    The      respondent wanted to scandalise the      learned judge and thereby lower the      authority of  the Court  within the      meaning of Sub-clause (i) of clause      (c)in  Section   2.      the   said      statement  also   attracts     sub-      clauses (ii)  and  (iii)  as  well,      since they  interfere with  the due      course of  a  judicial  proceedings      and the  administration of justice.      At no  stage,  has  the  respondent      offered any  apology, or  expressed      regret.   On the other hand, he was      made  graver   allegations  in  his      counter, saying  that  the  learned      Judge has received a bride of Rs. 2      lakhs.     It  is  clear  that  the      respondent     is     a     totally      irresponsible person.   Who  has no      respect for  Court and,  he is bent      upon  scandalising  the  Court  and      brow beating  its Judges.    It  is      evident that  when his petition for      additional issues was dismissed, he      resorted  to  the  said  scandalous      allegations with  a view  to  stall      the trial of the election petition.      His attitude  as exhibited  in  his      counter-affidavit and  his argument      before us,  indicate that  he is an      incorrigible person  who has  to be      dealt  with   severely.     We  are      equally satisfied that the contempt      is of  such a  nature that  it  has      substantially interfered  with  the      due course of justice.  The parties      cannot be allowed to resort to such      strategems, either  with a  view to      get an  adjournment or  to obtain a      change of the Judge.      For the  above reasons, we hold the      respondent,  Sri.  T.  Deen  Dayal,      guilty of  contempt of  Court.   We      are  of   the  opinion   that   the      deserves  no   leniency  and   that      substantial  punishment  should  be      imposed  him.     Accordingly,   we

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    punish him with simple imprisonment      for a  period of three months.  The      sentence  shall   be  carried   out      forthwith."      The learned  Judges after pronouncing judgement holding the appellant guilty of contempt of court, at the request of the appellant, suspended the order to enable him to approach this Court by way of appeal for a period of two weeks.      The appellant  has thereafter  filed this appeal.  When the appellant opened the case, we asked him whether he would take the  legal assistance.   He  challenged the order under appeal contending  that inasmuch  as this  Court’s orders in Transfer  Petition   (Clr.)  No.147/87   and  Criminal  M.P. No.2989/88 in  Transfer Petition  No. 147/87 having not been complied with  within the  specified time,  the order  under appeal must  be set  aside on  that ground.  We not find any substance in  this argument  as the  orders of  this  Court, directed the  High Court to dispose of the contempt Petition at an  early date  giving specific  time.   We find from the order under  appeal, the  delay  was  on  the  part  of  the appellant also  in not  appearing before  the Court  on  the dates of  hearing, necessitating  the High  Court  to  issue initially bailable warrant and later on non-bailable warrant to secure  his presence.   Therefore, it does not lie in the mouth of  the appellant  to make  any complaint  against the delay in  the disposal  of the Contempt Petition by the High Court.      The appellant  next argued  that the  Chief justice  of High Court  has not  authorised  the  Division  Bench  which delivered the  order  under  appeal  to  hear  the  Contempt Application.   We are  at a  loss to know on what basis this argument was  advanced.   It is  a known fact that the Chief Justice constitutes  the Benches  for disposal  of cases and without  the   orders  of   Chief  Justice,   the   Contempt Application would  not have been posted before the Bench for disposal.  This contention also, therefore, rejected.      The appellant  then argued  that under Article 329-A of the Constitution,  the disputes  arising  out  of  electoral matters are  to be  decided by ’an authority’ provided under any law  made by  the appropriate  legislature.   Therefore, notwithstanding Section 80 A of the Representation of People Act, 1951  investing the High Court with the jurisdiction to try an  election petition.   It must be deemed that the High Court is  functioning as  an ’authority’  only and  not as a court and,  therefore, has no jurisdiction to issue suo moto notice under  the contempt  of Courts  Act.  Here again, the High Court has dealt with this point in detail and expressed its opinion as under:      "80-A. High Court to try election      Petitions:-      (1) The  court having  jurisdiction      to try  an election  petition shall      be the High Court.      (2) Such  jurisdiction    shall  be      exercised ordinarily  by  a  single      judge of  the High  Court  and  the      Chief Justice  shall, from  time to      time, assign one or more judges for      that purpose;      Provides that  where the High Court      consists  only  of  one  Judge,  he      shall try  all  election  petitions      presented to that Court.      (3)   The   High   Court   in   its      discretion may, in the interests of

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    justice  or   convenience,  try  an      election   petition,    wholly   or      partly, at  a place  other than the      place of seat of the High Court".      This section  expressly  says  that      "the court  having jurisdiction  to      try an  election petition  shall be      the High  Court."   It says further      such    jurisdiction    shall    be      exercised ordinarily  by  a  single      Judge  of  the  High  Court.    The      jurisdiction  to  try  an  election      petition  is   thus  given   to   a      ’Court’, viz.,  the High Court.  In      such a situation, the argument that      the  judge   trying  the   election      petition should  be deemed to be an      ’authority’ and  not a  ’Court’, is      contrary to the express language in      the enactment.  We see no substance      in  the   contention  that  because      clause (b) in Articles 329, employs      the  expression   ’authority’,  the      parliament  was  not  competent  to      confer the  said jurisdiction  on a      court, or  that the Court empowered      by  the   parliamentary  enactment,      should  still   be  treated  as  an      ’authority’.   We do  not find  any      such limitation  in Article 329(b).      It   cannot    be   construed    as      precluding  the   parliament   from      conferring the  jurisdiction to try      an election  petition, upon a Court      or a  High Court.   The  expression      ’authority’ is  not defined  either      in    Articles     366    of    the      Constitution,  or  in  the  General      Clauses Act,  1897.   Having regard      to  the  context  and  the  purpose      underlying Article  329(b), we  are      inclined  to   hold  that   it  was      permissible for  the parliament  to      designate a  Court, viz.,  the High      Court, to  try election  petitions.      The     first     objection     is,      accordingly.      We agree  with the  above view  expresses by  the  High Court and  also ass that the authority designated being High Court, it  has jurisdiction  to take  action for contempt of court  as  a  ’court  record’  under  Articles  215  of  the Constitution.  While trying an election petition.      After inviting  our attention  to  Section  98  of  the Representation of People Act,1951, the appellant argued that the High Court while exercising the power can pass orders as contemplated in  that Section  and nothing and nothing more. This argument also lacks substance.  As pointed out earlier, the  High   Court  has   jurisdiction  under   Article   215 additionally to initiate proceedings for contempt of court.      Lastly, it  was argued  that the petition was barred by time under Section 20 of the Act.  As rightly pointed out by the High  Court Section  20 of  the Act  merely provides for limitation to  initiate the  proceedings  and  not  for  the conclusion of  contempt proceedings.   The  proceedings were initiated by  Order dated  16.4.85 whereas  the  allegations

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constituting contempt  were contained  in an affidavit filed on 27.3.1985.  Therefore, the time taken for disposal beyond one year  partly on  account of  the appellant  himself,  as pointed out  earlier, cannot  be  permitted  to  argue  that application was barred by limitation.      Having regard  to the passage of time since the date of initiation of  contempt proceedings,  we  thought  that  the appellant would  take a  reasonable stand.    To  our  Utter dismay, the  appellant reiterated  the allegations with same vehemence, refusing to express any repentance of regret.      We have  extracted  the  allegations  constituting  the contempt in  the beginning  if this order.  We are satisfied they are ex facie contumacious and the scurrilous attack was intended to  scandalise the  court  within  the  meaning  of criminal    contempt  under Section  2(c) of  the Act.  Such attack as  seen above  , is  punishable as  contempt for the reason that  it tends to create distrust in the popular mind and impairs  confidence of  the people  in courts  which are prime importance to the litigants in the protection of their rights and  liberties.   This Court In RE S. Mulgaokar’(1978 (3) SCC 339) observed as follows:-      "The sixth  consideration is  that,      after evaluating  the  totality  of      factors, if the court considers the      attack  on   the  Judge  of  Judges      scurrilous, offensive, intimidatory      or  malicious   beyond   condonable      limits, the  strong arm  of the law      must,  in   the  name   of   public      interests   and   public   justice,      strike a blow on him who challenges      the supremacy of the rule of law by      fouling its source and stream."      on the  facts of this case, we are of the view that the above test  squarely applies and therefore, the order of the High Court  should be confirmed.  Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.  Appellant shall be taken into custody to undergo the sentence  imposed by  the Division  Bench  of  the  High Court.  However, there will be no order as to costs.