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PETITIONER: T. CAJEE

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: U.   JORMANIK SIEM AND ANOTHER.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 20/09/1960

BENCH: WANCHOO, K.N. BENCH: WANCHOO, K.N. SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P.(CJ) KAPUR, J.L. GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. SUBBARAO, K.

CITATION:  1961 AIR  276            1961 SCR  (1) 750  CITATOR INFO :  R          1964 SC 787  (10)  D          1965 SC1818  (20)  R          1966 SC1942  (6)  F          1967 SC1910  (8)  F          1968 SC 800  (3)  D          1970 SC 140  (5)  R          1970 SC1494  (8)  RF         1972 SC 223  (11)  R          1972 SC1193  (10)  R          1978 SC 327  (5)  R          1982 SC 917  (21)  RF         1986 SC2166  (6)

ACT: Assam  Tribal  Areas, administration  of-Removal  of  tribal Chief-Whether  Permissible by administrative action  without making  of law-District Council-Executive Committee,  Powers of-Interim suspension of Chief-Constitution of India,  Sixth Schedule.

HEADNOTE: The respondent was Siem of Mylliem siemship in United  Khasi and  jaintia  Hills District in the Tribal Areas  of  Assam, having been elected as such by the Myntri electors according to  custom in 1951.  In June, 1952, a District  Council  was constituted for the District under the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution  and  the siemship was brought under  it.   The rules  in the Sixth Schedule empowered the District  Council to  make laws with respect to various matters regarding  the administration of the District including the appointment  or succession   of  Chiefs  and  Headmen.   No  law  was   made regulating  the  appointment and succession  of  Chiefs  and Headmen.   The  Chief  Executive  Member  of  the  Executive Committee of the District Council served on the respondent a notice  to show cause why he should not be removed from  his office  and  suspended him.  The respondent  challenged  the action  on the grounds: (i) that he could not be removed  by administrative orders but only by making a law, (ii)   that the  Executive Committee could not take any action  in  this

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case,  and  (iii)  that the order of  suspension  was  ultra vires.  Held, that the District Council had the power to appoint or remove  administrative personnel under the general power  of administration  vested  in it by the  Sixth  Schedule.   The District  Council  was  both an  administration  well  as  a legislative body.  After a law was made with respect to  the appointment  or  removal  of  administrative  personnel  the authority  would  be bound to follow it; but until  then  it could exercise its administrative powers.  Since the  United Khasi-jaintia  Hills  Autonomous District  (Appointment  and Succession  of Chiefs and Headmen) Act, 1959, had  now  come into force further action should be taken in accordance with that Act. The  Executive Committee could, under r. 3o(a) of the  Assam Autonomous  Districts  (Constitution of  District  Councils) Rules, 1951, act on behalf of the District Council in  cases of  emergency and it was not for the courts to go  into  the question  whether there was an emergency or not.   In  these circumstances  the action taken by the  Executive  Committee could not be challenged. An order of interim suspension could be passed against the                             751 respondent  while inquiry was pending into his conduct  even though there was no specific provision to that effect in his terms   of  appointment.   But  he  was  entitled   to   his remuneration  for  the period of his interim  suspension  as there  was no statute or rule existing under which it  could be withheld. The  Management of Hotel Imperial v. Hotel  Workers’  Union, [1960] 1 S.C.R. 476, applied. Per  Subba  Rao, J.-It is very doubtful  whether,  when  the Constitution  confers on an authority power to make laws  in respect  of  a specific subject matter, that  authority  can deal with the same subject matter without making such a  law in its administrative capacity.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 394 of 1960. Appeal from the judgment and order dated April 19, 1960,  of the Assam High Court in Civil Rule No. 69/1959. C.K.   Daphtary,  Solicitor-General  of  India,   A.   V. Viswanatha Sastri, Narendra Kumar Lahiri and R.   Gopalakrishnan, for the appellant. N.C.  Chatterjee and D. N. Mukherjee, for respondent  No. 1. Naunit Lal, for respondent No. 2. 1960.   September 20.  The Judgment of Sinha, C. J.,  Kapur, Gajendragadkar  and Wanchoo, JJ., was delivered by  Wanchoo, J. Subba Rao, J., delivered a separate Judgment. WANCHOO J.-This appeal, on a certificate granted under  Art. 132 (1) of the Constitution by the Assam High Court,  raises questions regarding the interpretation of certain provisions of the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution.  A writ  petition was  filed  by  U. Jormanik  Siem  (hereinafter  called  the respondent)  in  the  Assam High  Court  against  the  Chief Executive Member of the District Council (hereinafter called the  appellant).   United Khasi and Jaintia  Hills  District (hereinafter   called  the  District).   The  case  of   the respondent  was that he was Siem of Mylliem siemship in  the District  and  was elected as such by the Myntries  and  the people according to custom in 1951.  After the  constitution of the District Council for the District, in

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752 June  1952,  the  siemship  was brought  under  it  and  the respondent  continued  to discharge the  administrative  and judicial functions, for which be was remunerated  by a share of  the  gross  income  of  the  siemship.   The  Siem  once appointed  could  not  be removed  from  his  office  except through a referendum of the people according to custom until such  custom  was  changed  by  legislation  passed  by  the District  Council with the concurrence of the Governor.   No such  legislation  had  however been passed  till  the  writ petition  was  made  on July 8, 1959.   But  on  account  of political  differences between the respondent and  the  then Chief Executive Member an attempt was made after the General Elections  of 1957 to harm the respondent.   In  consequence certain  charges were levelled against the respondent and  a Durbar was called by the appellant for July 6, 1959, and the respondent  was asked to be present at the Durbar to  defend himself.   It  is not clear whether the Durbar was  held  or Dot,  but  an  order  was issued on July  7,  1959,  by  the appellant in which it was said that the charges against  the respondent  had been forwarded to him and he had been  given an opportunity to show cause on or before July 17, 1959, why he  should  not be removed from his office and that  he  had failed to appear before the appellant on July 7 as  ordered. Therefore, the respondent was suspended from his office from July  8, 1959, and was required to make over charge  to  the acting  Siem on the same day.  The respondent however  filed the  writ petition on July 8, 1959, which was  admitted  the same  day  and notice was issued to the  appellant  to  show cause  why the writ should not be granted.  The  High  Court also  passed an order staying the operation of the order  of the appellant dated July 7, 1959.  The respondent  contended that be could not be removed from his office or suspended by the Executive Committee of the District Council and that the order of the appellant suspending him was illegal and  ultra vires  being  against  custom and  usage  relating  to  that matter.   Further  the order of the  appellant  was  without jurisdiction  as it was passed without the approval  of  the District Council and there was no emergency                             753 justifying the order.  The order was also mala fide and  was due  to political animosity between the respondent  and  the Executive Committee. The petition was opposed on behalf of the appellant, and its main  contention  was  that the Siem  was  nominated  by  an electoral  college  consisting  of  the  representatives  of several  , clans and that the people in general had  nothing to  do  with it and that the nomination of the Siem  by  the electoral college was subject to approval of the Government. In accordance with that custom, the respondent’s  nomination by  the  Myntri-electors  to the  siemship  of  Mylliem  was approved  by  the  Government and he was  appointed  to  the office  of  Siem  subject to confirmation  by  the  District Council  when  that  body came into  existence.   After  the District  Council was constituted in 1952, it  approved  the provisional appointment made by the Government and confirmed it on certain terms mentioned in the letter of April 9,1953. Later  these terms were modified by the District Council  in certain particulars by letter dated August 9, 1955, and  the respondent  had  been  working as Siem  by  virtue  of  this confirmation  by the District Council on the terms  conveyed to  him  in the two letters mentioned above.  There  was  no custom which required a referendum of the people before  the Siem of Mylliem could be removed from office.  On the  other hand,  the Siem being appointed by the  Government  formerly

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and now by the District Council was liable to removal and or suspension  by the appointing authority in case he  did  not act in accordance with the terms of his appointment and  was guilty  of  oppression, misconduct or dereliction  of  duty. The  charge  of political animosity against the  then  Chief Executive  Member was denied and attention was drawn to  the respondent’s  conduct in the discharge of his  duties  which showed  that  he  was  unfit to hold  the  office  of  Siem; consequently an order was passed on July 7, 1959, suspending him and the order was legal, intra vires and in keeping with custom  and  usage of the land and it was not  necessary  to obtain  the approval of the District Council to the  passing of that order which was in accordance with 754 the  terms  of appointment of the respondent.   Further  the Executive  Committee, considering all the  circumstances  of the  case,  was  of  the opinion  that  the  matter  was  of emergency  and  therefore took action  without  getting  the order approved by the District Council. The  High Court did not go into the question  whether  there was any custom by which the Siem could be removed only by  a referendum.  It held that after the coming into force of the Constitution,  the  Khasi  States  lost  all  existence   as separate  entities  except in so far as their  existence  or authority  was preserved by the Constitution.  It also  held that  the respondent was appointed to the office of Siem  by the Deputy Commissioner on behalf of the Government with due regard  to  the nomination made by the  Myntri-electors  and this appointment was subject to confirmation by the District Council when that body was constituted and that in fact  the District Council confirmed the appointment on April 9, 1953, on  certain terms which were revised in 1955.  It also  held that  the  administration  of the  District  vested  in  the District   Council;  but  it  was  of  the  view  that   the appointment and succession of Sims were never intended to be its  administrative  function  and  therefore  the  District Council could only act in this matter by making law with the assent of the Governor and not by passing orders in exercise of  its  administrative functions.  Therefore the  power  to appoint, even if it included the power to dismiss, could  be exercised  by the District Council only by means  of  proper legislation.   In  the result, the High  Court  allowed  the petition and directed that the order of July 7, 1959, should not  be  given  effect to as it was not  supported  by  law. Thereupon   the  appellant  applied  for  and   obtained   a certificate  from  the  High Court under  Art.  132  of  the Constitution; and that is how the matter has come up  before us. Before we deal with the main point on the basis of which the writ  filed  by  the  respondent  in  the  High  Court   has succeeded,  it will be useful to consider what the  position of the Chiefs in the former Khasi States was before 1947 and how that position was affected                             755 by  the coming into force of the Constitution in  1950.   It appears that before 1947 there were twenty-five such  Chiefs who had however very limited powers.  In some of the States, the succession appears to have been hereditary; but in  most of them the Chief by whatever name he was known was  elected either by what was equivalent to an electoral college or  by the  people  generally,  the election in  many  cases  being confined to members of certain families known as the Chief’s families.  But whether the succession was hereditary or  the Chief was elected by the electoral college or by the people, the recognition of the British Government through the  Crown

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representative was necessary before the Chief could exercise any  powers and this was conveyed by means of sands  granted to  the Chief.  It further appears that the British  Govern- ment  through the Crown representative as  paramount  power, reserved to itself the right to remove the Chief in case  of oppression, misconduct or dereliction of duty, though before taking  such action the prevalent custom in  the  particular State  regarding  the  ascertainment of the  wishes  of  the electoral  college or the people was followed.   The  Chiefs were  also under the control of the Deputy  Commissioner  of the  district.   This  was the position  upto  the  15th  of August, 1947, when India became a Dominion.  Thereafter  the paramountly of the British Government lapsed and it  appears that  the  twenty-five  Chiefs  established  a   Federation. Thereafter a new relationship was established between  these twenty-five  Chiefs and the Government of India by means  of an  Instrument  of  Accession  which  was  accepted  by  the Governor-General  of  India  on August 17,  1948.   By  this Instrument, the Chiefs individually as well as  collectively as  members  of the Federation acceded to  the  Dominion  of India  by  which all  existing  administrative  arrangements between  the Government of India and the State of  Assam  on the  one  hand  and the Khasi States on the  other  were  to continue  in force until new or modified  arrangements  were made  subject  to  certain exceptions  as  to  judicial  and administrative powers.  It is not necessary to set out these exceptions 756 except that so far as administrative powers were  concerned, only excise, forests, land and water rights and the  revenue derived  therefrom  were  excepted  and  all  the  remaining functions  were  to  be common with  the  Central  or  State Government.   Further  in  the matter  of  legislation,  the Dominion Legislature and the Assam Legislature had the power to pass laws concerning subjects of common interest with the proviso   that   some  machinery  should  be   devised   for representation in the Assam legislature. This  position  continued till the  Constitution  came  into force.  There was no merger as such of the twenty-five Khasi States   in  India  before  January  26,  1950.    But   the Constitution, by the First Schedule in which the territories of the State of Assam were defined, merged the Khasi  States into the State of Assam, as that State was to consist of the territories which immediately before the commencement of the Constitution  were comprised in the Province of  Assam,  the Khasi  States and the Assam Tribal Areas but  excluding  the territories   specified  in  the  Schedule  to   the   Assam (Alteration   of  Boundaries)  Act,  1951.   Thus   by   the Constitution  the Khasi States were merged in the  State  of Assam  and any power of the Chiefs so far as  administration was   concerned  came  to  end.   By  Art.  244(2)  of   the Constitution,  however, special provisions contained in  the Sixth  Schedule thereof were to apply to the  administration of  the  Tribal Areas in the State of Assam.   The  position therefore  after the Coming into force of  the  Constitution was  that the Chiefs lost whatever ruling or  administrative powers they had by the merger of these twenty-five States in Assam  and the governance of these States was to be  carried on according to the provisions of the Sixth Schedule. This  brings  us  to the Sixth Schedule, and  we  may  refer briefly to the provisions contained therein with respect  to the administration of the tribal areas in Assam.  By  paras. 1  and 20 the whole tribal area is divided  into  autonomous districts and two other areas.  Autonomous districts can  in turn be divided into autonomous regions.  Paragraphs 2 to 17

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deal                             757 with   the  administration  of  autonomous   districts   and autonomous   regions,  while  para.  18  provides  for   the application by the Governor of the provisions of paras. 2 to 17  to the other two areas specified in para. 20.  Paragraph 19 deals with transitional provisions and para. 21 with  the amendment  of  the Schedule.  It may be mentioned  that  the United  Khasi and Jaintia Hills District with which  we  are concerned in this case is to comprise the territories  which before  the commencement of the Constitution were  known  as the Khasi States and the Khasi and Jaintia Hills  Districts, excluding   certain   areas  within   the   cantonment   and municipality  of Shillong.  District Councils  and  Regional Councils  are  to  be  constituted under  para.  2  and  the Governor  is  given  power  to  make  rules  for  the  first constitution  of District Councils and Regional Councils  in consultation  with  the existing tribal councils  and  other representative tribal organisations within the districts  or regions  concerned  and  the rules are to  provide  for  the composition of the councils, the delimitation of territorial constituencies,  the qualifications for voting at  elections and  the preparation of electoral rolls, the  qualifications for being elected as members of councils, the term of office of the members and any other matter relating to or connected with   elections  or  nominations  to  such  councils,   the procedure  and conduct of business in the councils, and  the appointment  of officers and staff of the  councils.   These very  powers  were  conferred on the  District  or  Regional Council  after it came into being along with  certain  other powers  for  the formation of local Councils or  Boards  and their  procedure and the conduct of business, and  generally all   matters  relating  to  the  transaction  of   business pertaining to the administration of the district or  region, as  the case may be.  Further para. 2(4) provides  that  the administration of autonomous district shall, in so far as it is  not vested under this Schedule in any  Regional  Council within such district, be vested in the District Council  for such district and the administration of an autonomous region shall be vested in the 97 758 Regional  Council for such region.  Paragraph 3 gives  power to  the  District and Regional Councils to  make  laws  with respect  to  various matters including the   appointment  or succession of Chiefs or Headmen, subject to such laws  being submitted to the Governor without whose assent they are  not to   come  into  force.   Paragraphs  4  and  5  deal   with administration of justice.  Paragraph 6 gives powers to  the District  Council to establish, construct or manage  primary schools,  dispensaries,  markets,  cattle  pounds,  ferries, fisheries, roads and waterways.  Paragraphs 7, 8 and 9  deal with  financial  matters.  Paragraph 10 gives power  to  the District  Councils  to make regulations for the  control  of money  lending and trading by nontribals, which are to  come into  force  on the assent of the  Governor.   Paragraph  11 provides for publication of laws, rules and regulations made under the Schedule.  Paragraph 12 deals with the application of  Acts of Parliament and the Legislature of the  State  to autonomous  districts and autonomous regions.  Paragraph  13 deals  with  the  budget while para.  14  provides  for  the appointment  of a commission by the Governor at any time  to inquire into and report on the administration of  autonomous districts and autonomous regions.  Paragraph 15 gives  power to the Governor to annul or suspend any Act or regulation of

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District  and Regional Councils under certain  contingencies and  also gives him power to suspend the Council and  assume all  or any of its powers to himself subject to  such  order being  placed  before the Assam legislature.   Paragraph  16 gives  power  to  the Governor to  dissolve  a  District  or Regional  Council  on the recommendation of  the  Commission appointed  under para. 14 and order a fresh election and  in the  meantime  to assume the administration of the  area  to himself  subject  to  the previous  approval  of  the  Assam legislature.   Paragraph  17  deals  with  the  forming   of constituencies for the Assam Legislative Assembly.  Then  we come  to para. 19, which deals with transitional  provisions and   lays  down  that  as  soon  as  possible   after   the commencement  of the Constitution, the Governor  shall  take steps for the constitution of                             759 a District Council for each autonomous district in the State under  the  Schedule  and until a  District  Council  is  so constituted  for an autonomous district, the  administration of  such district shall be vested in the Governor.  It  also provides  that  no  Act  of  Parliament  or  of  the   Assam legislature  shall apply to any area unless the Governor  by Public  notification so directs and the Governor  in  giving such  direction with respect to any Act may direct that  the Act shall in its application to the area or to any specified part  thereof,  have effect subject to  such  exceptions  or modifications as he thinks fit.  The Governor is also  given power to make regulations for the peace and good  government of  any area and any regulation so made may repeal or  amend any  Act  of Parliament or of the Assam legislature  or  any existing law which is for the time being applicable to  such area.   The  power  to make regulations is  subject  to  the assent by the President. It  will thus be seen from the scheme of the Sixth  Schedule that the District Council is both an administrative as  well as  a legislative body.  Further all the administrative  and Legislative  powers were vested in the Governor by para.  19 till  the District Councils were constituted.  The  Governor framed  Rules  under para. 2 (6) in 1951  called  the  Assam Autonomous  Districts  (Constitution of  District  Councils) Rules, 1951.  The Rules provide inter alia for an  Executive Committee  with the Chief Executive Member as the  head  and two other members to exercise the executive functions of the District Council.  The Rules also specify the matters  which are  excepted from the purview of the  Executive  Committee, though  in an emergency, the Executive Committee of some  of the  autonomous districts is authorised to take such  action with respect to excepted matters as might be necessary ; but every  such case has to be laid before the District  Council at  its  next  session.  In pursuance of  these  Rules,  the District Council for the District came into being from  June 1952. We  have already observed that the administrative powers  of the Chiefs as they existed before January 760 26,  1950, came to an end with the coming into force of  the Constitution   and  during  the  transitional   period   all administrative powers vested in the Governor which could  be exercised  by those appointed by him under his powers  under para.  19 of the Sixth Schedule.  It is in  this  background that we have to consider the notification of March 6,  1951. That  notification notified for the general  information  of the  subjects  of  Mylliem Siemship  that  Government  after careful consideration of the nomination made by the  Myntri- electors  of  the successor to the Siemship of  Mylliem  and

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also of the objections to this nomination, had appointed the respondent as Siem of Mylliem in place of late U. Sati  Raja subject  to confirmation by the District Council  when  that body  was  constituted.   It  was  also  notified  that  the respondent had taken over charge of the Siemship with effect from  March  5, 1951.  It is clear from what  we  have  said above that the Myntri electors in this particular case  used to  elect  a  person  and  their  election  amounted  to   a nomination  of that person for the approval of the  Governor to the Siemship of Mylliem; but until the Governor  approved of  the nomination and appointed the person so nominated  to the  Siemship he could not hold office as Siem of  Alylliem. The  position therefore just after the coming into force  of the Constitution was that the Governor was charged with  the administration of the autonomous districts till the District Councils  came into existence and that carried with  it  the power  to appoint officers to carry on  the  administration. The  appointment  therefore  of the respondent  as  Siem  of Mylliem  was  made by virtue of the Governor’s  power  under para.  19 and the respondent derived his power as Siem  from that appointment and could not claim any power outside  that appointment.  The Governor of course made it clear that  the appointment  was  subject to confirmation  of  the  District Council  when it came into being, for the Governor’s  powers at  the time of the appointment were derived from  para.  19 and  "are transitional only.  That is why it was  said  that the appointment was subject to confirmation by the  District Council.  Therefore when the ]District Council                             761 came  into  existence in June 1952, it, in  due  course,  in exercise  of  its administrative powers under para.  2  (4), considered  the question of confirmation of the  appointment made by the Governor in 1951 and confirmed the  respondent’s appointment  as Siem of Mylliem and communicated it  to  him along  with  the terms on which the confirmation  was  made. Besides  the  financial clauses, one of the  terms  provided that  the  Siem  shall  be subject to  the  control  of  the District  Council and shall carry out all the orders  issued to  him  from time to time by the District  Council  or  its officers  acting for and on behalf of the District  Council. It was also provided that the Siem shall conduct himself  in accordance with the established customs and usages  approved by  the District Council and in accordance with  the  rules, laws  and  regulations that the District Council  may  issue from time to time.  Another term provided that the Siem  and others shall be liable to removal from their offices by  the order  of  the District Council if that body  was  satisfied that  any of them did not discharge his duties  properly  or had  been acting in a manner prejudicial to the interest  of the Siomship or the District Council in general or had  been conducting himself with indecorum; and such order passed  by the  District  Council  would be  final.   Therefore,  after April, 1953, the respondent continued in the office of  Siem by virtue of this confirmation by the District Council. In 1955, there was some modification of the terms which  was communicated  to  the  respondent  on  August  9,1955.   The respondent  was informed that he would continue as  Siem  as long as he was not removed from the Siemship by the order of the  District Council for any lapse on his part; he  was  to submit to the directions of the District Council and to obey all  orders  issued  by the Chief Executive  Member  or  any officer  of the District Council empowered to act on  behalf of the Chief Executive Member; the respondent was to conduct the  affairs of the Elaka according to the existing  customs and  customary laws as approved by the District Council  and

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in  accordance  with  the rules and  regulations  which  the District Council had 762 enforced  or  might enforce in future.  Provision  was  also made for the judicial powers of the Siem in accordance  with the   United   Khasi-Jaintia   Hills   Autonomous   District (Administration  of  Justice) Rules, 1953.   Besides,  there were certain other terms with respect to financial  matters. The  consequence of these orders was that  the  respondent’s term  as Siem was to continue as long as he was not  removed from  that office for any lapse on his part.   The  position therefore  that  emerges  on a consideration  of  the  three orders  of  1951, 1953 and 1955 is that the  respondent  was holding  the office of Siem by virtue of his appointment  in the   first   instance  by  the  Governor  and   its   later confirmation by the District Council on terms which had been communicated   to  him  and  was  thus  no  more   than   an administrative officer appointed by the District Council  by virtue  of its powers under para. 2 (4) of the Schedule  and working under its control. This position apparently continued till 1959 when we come to the incidents which culminated in the order of July 7, 1959. We  are not Concerned in this appeal with the merits of  the action  taken against the respondent; nor are  we  concerned with the question whether there were sufficient reasons  for the  Executive  Committee to take the action  which  it  did against  the  respondent.  We are only  concerned  with  the power of the Executive Committee of the District Council  to take  any  action at all in the matter of  the  respondent’s removal  from the office of Siem.  The High Court has  taken the  view that the appointment and succession of a Siem  was not  an administrative function of the District Council  and that  the  District Council could only act by making  a  law with  the assent of the Governor so far as  the  appointment and  removal of a Siem was concerned.  In  this  connection, the  High  Court relied on para. 3(1)(g)  of  the  Schedule, which  lays  down that the District Council shall  have  the power  to  make  laws with respect to  the  appointment  and succession  of Chiefs and Headmen.  The High Court seems  to be of the view that until such a law is made there could  be no  power  of  appointment  of a  Chief  or  Siem  like  the respondent and in                             763 consequence there would be no power of removal either.  With respect,  it  seems to us that the High Court has  read  far more  into para. 3(1)(g) than is justified by its  language. Paragraph 3(1) is in fact something like a legislative  list and enumerates the subjects on which the District Council is competent to make laws.  Under para. 3(1)(g) it has power to make  laws with respect to the appointment or succession  of Chiefs or Headmen and this would naturally include the power to  remove them.  But it does not follow from this that  the appointment  or removal of a Chief is a legislative  act  or that  no  appointment or removal can be made  without  there being first a law to that effect.  The High Court also seems to have thought that as there was no provision in the  Sixth Schedule  in terms of Arts. 73 and 162 of the  Constitution, the  administrative power of the District Council would  not extend to the subjects enumerated in para. 3(1).  Now  para. 2(4)  provides  that  the administration  of  an  autonomous district shall vest in the District Council and this in  our opinion   is  comprehensive  enough  to  include  all   such executive  powers as are necessary to be exercised  for  the purposes of the administration of the district.  It is  true that  where  executive  power impinges upon  the  rights  of

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citizens  it will have to be backed by an  appropriate  law; but  where  executive  power  is  concerned  only  with  the personnel  of  the administration it is  not  necessary-even though it may be desirable-that there must be laws, rules or regulations  governing  the appointment of those  who  would carry  on  the  administration  under  the  control  of  the District   Council.    The   Sixth   Schedule   vested   the administration  of the autonomous districts in the  Governor during  the  transitional  period  and  thereafter  in   the District Council.  The administration could only be  carried on by officers like the Siem or Chief and others below  him, and it seems to us quite clear, if the administration was to be  carried on, as it must, that the Governor in  the  first instance  and  the District Councils after  they  came  into existence, would have power by virtue of the  administration being vested in them to appoint officers and others to carry 764 on   the   administration.   Further  once  the   power   of appointment falls within the power of administration of  the district  the power of removal of officers and  ,,others  so appointed  would  necessarily follow as  a  corollary.   The Constitution could not have intended that all administration in  the autonomous districts should come to a stop till  the Governor  made regulations under para. 19(1)(b) or till  the District  Council  passed  laws under  para.  3(1)(g).   The Governor  in  the first instance and the  District  Councils thereafter  were  vested  with the power  to  carry  on  the administration and that in our opinion included the power to appoint  and  remove  the  personnel  for  carrying  on  the administration.   Doubtless when regulations are made  under para.  19(1)(b)  or laws are passed under  para.  3(1)  with respect  to the appointment or removal of the  personnel  of the administration, the administrative authorities would  be bound  to  follow  the regulations so made or  the  laws  so passed.   But  from this it does not follow  that  till  the regulations  were made or the laws were passed, there  could be  no  appointment  or dismissal of the  personnel  of  the administration.   In our opinion, the authorities  concerned would  at  all relevant times have the power to  appoint  or remove  administrative personnel under the general power  of administration  vested in them by the Sixth  Schedule.   The view  therefore taken by the High Court that there could  be no appointment or removal by the District Council without  a law  having  been first passed in that  behalf  under  para. 3(1)(g) cannot be sustained. In  this  case, the District Council when it  confirmed  the appointment  of  the respondent laid down certain  terms  by virtue  of  its power of administration and so  far  as  the respondent  is  concerned  those  terms  would  govern   the relations between him and the District Council in respect of all  matters including his removal from the office of  Siem. As pointed out by this Court in Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. The Union  of  India  (1),  the  conditions  of  service  of   a Government servant appointed to a post are regulated by  the terms of the (1)  [1958] S.C.R. 828,841. 765 contract  of  employment, express or  implied,  and  subject thereto,  by  the  rules applicable to the  members  of  the particular  service.  In the absence of such general  rules, the particular terms offered to a particular officer on  his appointment  would  govern  the  relationship  between   the appointing  authority  and  the  person  appointed  in  that particular  case.  It would therefore be wrong to hold  that the  respondent could not be removed from his  office  after

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his appointment in accordance with the terms on which he was appointed.   On the view taken by the High Court,  even  the appointment of the respondent would be illegal for there was no  law  to support that appointment at the  relevant  time. But  as  we  have said above, the  Governor  and  later  the District  Councils being vested with the  administration  of the  autonomous  districts  would  be  entitled  to  appoint personnel  for carrying on the administration and the  power to  appoint  would  include  from  its  very  nature,  being inherent  in it, the power of removal, for it can hardly  be contended  that  though the appointment might be  made,  the authority  making  the appointment would have  no  power  to remove  a  person once appointed.  In this  particular  case there  can  be  no difficulty whatsoever  because  when  the District Council confirmed the appointment of the respondent it laid down the terms on which the appointment will be held as  well’  as  the terms on which the  respondent  could  be removed  from, the office, in which he was being  continued. Nor can it be said that the appointment in this case was  by the  Governor and therefore the Governor could alone  remove him,  for the notification of March 1951 made it clear  that the  appointment  by the Governor was  provisional  and  was subject to confirmation by the District Council when it came into existence.  The District Council in fact confirmed  the appointment  of the respondent in April 1953 and so  in  law the  appointment  of  the respondent  was  by  the  District Council and therefore it would have the power to remove him. Besides,  if, as the High Court thought, the appointment  of the respondent was invalid, it 98 766 would  inevitably follow that he had no right to ask  for  a writ under Art. 226 ; if the appointment was bad, he had  no legal  right and he cannot complain against his  suspension. We  are  therefore of opinion that the respondent  being  an officer  appointed  to carry on the  administration  by  the District  Council could be removed by it in accordance  with the terms and conditions of his appointment. The  next  question  that arises is  whether  the  Executive Committee  could take the action which it did in this  case. Ordinarily,  the  appointment  being made  by  the  District Council, the removal could only be by it. The contention  on behalf  of  the  respondent is that  even  if  the  District Council had the power to remove in accordance with the terms and  conditions of the respondent’s appointment  that  power could  only be exercised by the District Council and not  by the Executive Committee.  In this connection, rr. 28, 29 and 30  of  the  Assam  Autonomous  Districts  (Constitution  of District Councils) Rules, 1951, are relevant.  Rule 28 vests the  executive  functions  of the District  Council  in  the Executive  Committee.   Rule  29  (1)  gives  power  to  the Executive Committee to dispose of all matters falling within its  purview subject to certain exceptions mentioned  in  r. 29(2).   One  of  these exceptions is with  respect  to  all important appointments.  Assuming that the office of seem is an important appointment, the Executive Committee could  not normally deal with it in view of the exceptions in r. 29(2). But  r.  30(a)  lays down that  where  immediate  action  in respect  of  any of the excepted matters is  necessary,  the Executive Committee of a District Council other than that of the  Mikhir Hills or the North Cachar Hills, may  take  such action  thereon as the emergency appears to it to require  ; but  every  such  case  shall have to  be  laid  before  the District Council at its next session.  The order of July  7, 1959,  shows that the Executive Committee took action  under

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r. 30(a) as it considered the matter to be one of emergency. It  is  not for the courts to go into the  question  whether there was emergency or not with respect to excepted  matters and in the circumstances                             767 the  action  taken  by the  Executive  Committee  cannot  be challenged on the ground that it is beyond its power. The  last point that has been urged is that in any case  the Executive  Committee could not suspend the  respondent,  and reliance  in this connection is placed on The Management  of Hotel  Imperial v. Hotel Workers’ Union This Court  held  in that case as under:- "It  was now well settled that the power to suspend, in  the sense  of  a right to forbid a servant to work,  is  not  an implied  term  in an ordinary contract  between  master  and servant,  and  that such a power can only  be  the  creature either of a statute governing the contract, or of an express term  in  the contract itself.  Ordinarily,  therefore,  the absence  of  such  power either as an express  term  in  the contract  or  in the rules framed under some  statute  would mean  that  the  master would have no  power  to  suspend  a workman and even if he does so in the sense that he  forbids the  employee to work, he will have to pay wages during  the so-called  period of suspension.  Where, however,  there  is power to suspend either in the contract of, employment or in the  statute or the rules framed thereunder, the  suspension has  the  effect of temporarily suspending the  relation  of master and servant with the consequence that the servant  is not  bound to render service and the master is not bound  to pay." It is urged on the basis of these observations that in any case the respondent could not be suspended.   Suspension is of two kinds.  In the first place, suspension may be as a punishment,  but the present is not a case of this  kind  of suspension  ; in the second place interim suspension may  be made pending inquiry into a case where removal is the result sought.   It was this type of interim suspension  which  was dealt  with  in the case of Hotel Imperial (1)  and  it  was pointed out that without an express term in the contract  or without some provision of a statute or the rules there could not be interim suspension in the sense that the master could withhold the wages of the servant.  But (1)  [1960] 1 S.C.R. 476. 768 that case did not lay down that the master could not  forbid the  servant  from working while he was inquiring  into  his conduct  with a view to removing him from  service.  It  was specifically said there that if the master does so,  namely, forbids the servant to work and thus in fact suspends him as an interim measure he will have to pay the wages during  the period  of interim suspension.  These wages or  payment  for the work done or emoluments of the office held could not  be withheld  in whole or in part Unless there is power to  make an  order  of interim suspension either in the  contract  of employment or in the statute or the rules framed thereunder. The  effect of that decision is that in the absence of  such power the master can pass an order of interim suspension but he  will have to pay the servant according to the  terms  of contract  between  them. ID the present case the  terms  and conditions communicated to the respondent do not indicate an express term giving power to the District Council to make an order of interim suspension while inquiring into the conduct of  the respondent with a view to his ultimate removal.   No statute or rules framed thereunder have been brought to  our notice which authorised interim suspension having the effect of  withholding  remuneration in whole or in part.   In  the

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circumstances   therefore   though  an  order   of   interim suspension  could  be  made  against  the  respondent  while inquiry into his conduct with a view to his ultimate removal is  going  on, his remuneration according to the  terms  and conditions  communicated  to him cannot be  withheld  unless there is some statute or rules framed thereunder which would justify  the  withholding  of  the  whole  or  part  of  the remuneration.   So far therefore as there is no  statute  or rule  thereunder the remuneration can. not be withheld  from the  respondent even though an order of interim  suspension, in  the sense he is told not to do the work of  his  office, may  be made against him.  The order of  interim  suspension therefore  passed  in this case on July 7,  1959,  would  be valid  subject  of course to the respondent being  paid  the full   remuneration   unless  the   District   Council   can legitimately  withhold  the whole or part of it  under  some statute or                             769 rules framed thereunder, there being undoubtedly DO  express contract to that effect in this case. Before  we part with this case we should like to  point  out that  a law has now been passed, namely, The  United  Khasi- Jaintia   Hills   Autonomous   District   (Appointment   and Succession  of  Chiefs  and Headmen) Act, 1959  (No.  11  of 1959), which came into force in October 1959.  It deals with the  appointment  of  Chiefs and Headmen as  well  as  their removal and suspension (as a punishment).  The word "  Chief " includes a Siem, a Lyngdoh, etc. and the respondent  would therefore  be  a chief within the meaning of  this  Act  and further action may be taken accordingly. We  therefore  allow the appeal with costs,  set  aside  the order  of the High Court and direct that further  action  be taken in the manner indicated by us above. SUBBA  RAO  J.-I  agree with the  conclusion.   But  1  have considerable  and  serious doubts on the  question  whether, when the Constitution confers on an authority power to  make laws  in  respect  of a specific  subject-matter,  the  said authority  can  deal with the  same  subject-matter  without making such a law in its administrative capacity.  I  would, therefore,  prefer  not  to  express  my  opinion  on   this question.   But I agree with the other two reasons given  by my   learned  brother,  namely,  (1)  if  the   respondents’ contentions were to prevail, the order of appointment  would itself be bad, with the result that, the Siem would Dot have any  right to the office; (2) on October 16, 1959,  an  Act, known as the United Khasi-Jaintia Hills Autonomous  District (Appointment and Succession of Chiefs and Headmen) Act  (No. 11 of 1959), was passed and, therefore, there is now a valid law  empowering the District Council to remove a Siem;  and, as the enquiry in question is only at its initial stage,  it can  hereafter be validly conducted under the provisions  of the said Act. Appeal allowed, 770