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PETITIONER: SYED YOUSUF YARKHAN & ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: SYED MOHAMMED YARKHAN & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 04/01/1967

BENCH: BACHAWAT, R.S. BENCH: BACHAWAT, R.S. WANCHOO, K.N. SHELAT, J.M.

CITATION:  1967 AIR 1318            1967 SCR  (2) 318

ACT:     Part  B States (Laws) Act, 1951--Indian Limitation  Act, 1908  extended  to  Hyderabad--Hyderabad  Act  II  of  F1322 repealed--Possession  of  Muslim wakf property  situated  in Hyderabad   lost  in  1937--Suit  for  recovery   filed   in 1956--Suit   whether  filed  within  time--Indian   Act   or Hyderabad Act to apply--Effect of Indian Limitation Act,  s. 30.

HEADNOTE:     The Dargah Hazarat Habeeb Ali Shah Saheb, a muslim  wakf had   certain  property  in  Hyderabad  of  which   it   was dispossessed  in 1937.  The Hyderabad Limitation Act  II  of 1322F  did not apply to wakf properties ,and thus there  was no   limitation  under  it  for  a  suit  for  recovery   of such  .property.  On April 1, 1951 the Part B States  (Laws) Act, 1951 came into force and extended the Indian Limitation Act,,  1908  to  Hyderabad, :and the  corresponding  law  in Hyderabad  accordingly stood repealed.  By S. 30 the  Indian Act  laid  down  that  any suit  for  which  the  period  of limit ation  prescribed  under the Indian Act,  was  shorter than  that prescribed in the State Act could  be  instituted "within  the period of two years next after the coming  into force of this Act in that Part B State or within the  period prescribed   for  such  suit  by  such  corresponding   law, whichever  period expires first." In 1956 the  mutawalli  of the  aforesaid  Dargah land the Board of  Muslim  Endowments Hyderabad  filed the present suit for ’recovery of the  wakf property.  The trial court, on the footing that :the  Indian Limitation  Act applied, dismissed the suit as  time  barred under  Art.  142.   The High Court  however  held  that  the application  of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 to the  suit would bar and confiscate the ,,existing cause of action  for the  recovery  of the suit property, as the  Part  B  States (Laws)  Act  while extending the Indian  Limitation  Act  to Hyderabad did not allow a reasonable time to the  plaintiffs for enforcing ’the existing cause of action and consequently the Indian Limitation Act could not affect the suit and  the suit was governed by the Hyderabad Limitation Act.  Some  of the defendants appealed to this Court. HELD : The trial court had rightly held the suit to be time-

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barred. (i)  The  extension of the Indian Limitation  Act,  1908  to Hyderabad and the   consequential change in law  prescribing shorter period of limitation did   not    confiscate     the existing  cause  of  action  and  must  be  regarded  as  an alteration  in  the law of procedure  for  its  enforcement. Therefore  the  normal  rule  that  the  law  of  limitation applicable  to the suit is the ’law in force at the date  of the institution of the suit must apply. [321 C-D] The  period  of limitation for the suit  prescribed  by  the Indian Limitation Act was shorter than the period prescribed by  the  Hyderabad Act.. Therefore s. 30 of the  Indian  Act enabled the plaintiffs to institute the suit within a period of two years after April 1. 1951.  The suit not having  been instituted within that period the plaintiffs could not avail themselves of the benefit of s. 30. [321 D] (ii) The Board of Muslim Endowments was not an agent of  the State  Government by Virtue of any provision of  the  Muslim Wakf Act, 1954 :and a suit instituted by it for the recovery of wakf property was not a                             319 suit  by or on behalf of the State Government to which  Art. 149 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 was applicable.  [322 C] Tamlin v. Hannafored. (1949)2 A.E.R. 327, and State  Trading Corporation of India Ltd. v. Commercial Tax Officer,  A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 811, referred to. Since the passing of the Religious Endowments Act, 1963  the Mutawalli  cannot  be  regarded  as  a  procurator  of   the Government.  A suit by him for the recovery of wakf property cannot be regarded as a suit on its behalf. [322 E-F] Jewan  Doss Sahoo v. Shah Kubeer-ood-Deen, 2 Moo.  I.A.  390 Shaikh  Laul  Mahomed  v.  Lalla  Brij  Kishore,  17  Weekly Reporter (Sutherland) 430 and Behari Lal & Sons. v.  Muhamad Muttaki, I.L.R. 20 All. 482, referred to. On  his appointment the Mutawalli acquires no new  right  of suit and his appointment does not give him a fresh  starting point  of limitation for the recovery of the property.  [322 F-G] (iii)     The  contention  that as limitation  did  not  run under the Hyderabad Limitation Act, the date when the Indian limitation Act, 1908 came into force in Hyderabad should  be regarded  as the starting point of limitation has no  force. During   the  currency  of  the  Hyderabad  Limitation   Act limitation did not ’run, but the Act did not change the date of  dispossession.  That date was September 20,  1937.   For the purpose of Art., 142 of the Indian Limitation Act,  1908 under  which, the case fell, that date must be  regarded  as the starting point of limitation. [322 G-H; 323 A-B]

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICATION : Civil Appeal No.760 of 1964. Appeal  by special leave from the judgment and decree  dated December 12, 1962 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in  C.C.C Appeal No. 5 of 1960. R.V. Pillai and M. M. Kshatriya, for the appellants. Daniel A. Latifi and M. I Khowaja, for the respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Bachawat,  J.  This  appeal arises out of  a  suit  for  the recovery of possession of the house known as Sama Khana  and five  tiled  rooms  inside  the  compound  of  a  dargah  at Katalamandi,  Hyderabad.   The property  belongs  to  Dargah Hazarat  Habbeeb  Ali  Shah  Saheb.   The  dargah  while  in

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possession   of  the  property  was  dispossessed   by   the defendants  long ago.  Counsel for the  plaintiffs  conceded before  us that the dargah was dispossessed of the  property on  or about September 20, 1937, when the  defendants  filed objections   in  the  course  of  certain  proceedings   for enrolment  of  the property as endowed  property  under  the Hyderabad   Endowment  Regulations.   While  the   Hyderabad Limitation Act II of 1322 F was in force in Hyderabad, there was  no  limitation  for  a suit  for  recovery  of  a  wakf property.   Section  29(c)  of  the  Act  applied  to  suits relating  to  wakf.   By  virtue of s.  29(c),  a  suit  for recovery  of a wakf property was outside the Act.  On  April 1, 1951, 320 the  Part  B States (Laws) Act.- 1951, came into  force  and extended  the Indian Limitation Act 1908 to  Hyderabad,  and the corresponding law in force in Hyderabad stood  repealed. On  February  3, 1956, the mutawalli of the dargah  and  the Board  of  Muslim  Endowments,  Hyderabad,  instituted   the present   suit  for  recovery  of  the  property  from   the defendants.  The suit was substantially a suit on behalf  of the  wakf who while in possession of the property  had  been dispossessed.  On the assumption that the Indian  Limitation Act, 1908 applies to the suit, prima facie the suit would be governed  by  art. 142 of that Act and would  be  barred  by limitation.   The  trial  court dismissed the  suit  on  the ground that it was so barred.  On appeal, the High Court  of Andhra  Pradesh  held  that the suit  was  governed  by  the Hyderabad  Limitation Act and was not barred by  limitation. On  this finding the High Court decreed the suit.   Some  of the defendants now appeal to this Court by special leave. The  High  Court  held that the application  of  the  Indian Limitation Act 1908 to the suit would bar and confiscate the existing  cause  of  action for the  recovery  of  the  suit property,  as the Part B States (Laws) Act  while  extending the  Indian  Limitation  Act to Hyderabad did  not  allow  a reasonable time to the plaintiffs for enforcing the existing cause  of action and consequently the Indian Limitation  Act could  not affect the suit and the suit was governed by  the Hyderabad Limitation Act.  Now, the Part B States (Laws) Act 1951  was  passed on February 22, 1951.  The Act  came  into force  on April 1, 1951 by virtue of a notification  of  the Central Government dated March 7, 1951 and published in  the gazette on March 10, 1915.  It extended to the Part B States the Indian Limitation Act 1908 as amended with the  addition of s. 30 which is in these terms:                "30.   Provision  for States  for  which  the               period   prescribed  is  shorter   than   that               prescribed by any law previously in force  in.               a  Part  B  State.   Notwithstanding  anything               herein  contained,  any  suit  for  which  the               period of limitation prescribed by this Act is               shorter   than   the  period   of   limitation               prescribed  by any law corresponding  to  this               Act  in  force  in a Part  B  State  which  is               repealed  by  the Part B  States  (Laws)  Act,               1951,  may be instituted within the period  of               two years next after the coming into force  of               this  Act in that Part B States or within  the               period  prescribed  for  such  suit  by   such               corresponding  law, whichever  period  expires               first." Section 30 should be construed liberally considering that it is  intended  to  alleviate hardship  consequential  on  the introduction’  of a shorter period of limitation.  Ex-facie,

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S.  30 applies to a suit for which the period of  limitation prescribed by the Indian Limitation Act 1908 is shorter than the period of limitation prescribed                             321 by the corresponding law in force in the Part B State.  Now, the  Hyderabad  Limitation Act did not apply to a  suit  for recovery  of possession of a wakf property.  The result  was that  under  the corresponding law in  force  in  Hyderabad, there  was no limitation for such a suit.  In  other  words, the  period  of limitation prescribed for the  suit  by  the corresponding  law  in Hyderabad was  an  unlimited  period. Article  142 of the Indian Limitation Act 1908 applies to  a suit for recovery of possession of the wakf property.  As it prescribes   a   shorter  period  of  limitation   for   the institution  of  the suit, s. 30 enabled the  plaintiffs  to institute the suit within a period of two years after  April 1, 1951.  The Part B States (Laws) Act 1951 while  extending the Indian Limitation Act 1908 to Hyderabad thus allowed the plaintiffs  reasonable  time  to  institute  the  suit   for recovery  of  the  property.  The extension  of  the  Indian Limitation  Act  1908  to Hyderabad  and  the  consequential change in law prescribing a shorter period of limitation did not  confiscate  the existing cause of action  and  must  be regarded  as an alteration in the law of procedure  for  its enforcement.  We must, therefore, apply the normal rule that the  law of limitation applicable to the suit is the law  in force at the date of the institution of the suit.  The  suit is,  therefore, governed by the Indian Limitation Act  1908. The  plaintiffs did not institute the suit within two  years after April 1, 1951.  They cannot therefore avail themselves of the benefit of s. 30. Counsel submitted that the present suit was a suit by or  on behalf of the State Government and was therefore governed by art.  149 of the Indian Limitation Act 1908.   He  submitted that  the  Board  of  Muslim  Endowments,  Hyderabad,  which according  to him was the Board of Wakfs  constituted  under the  Muslim  Wakfs  Act 1954, was an agent  of  the  Central Government.   By s. 9(2) of the Muslim Wakfs Act, 1954,  the Board of Wakfs is a body corporate and by s. 15 of this Act, the   Board   is   vested  with   the   right   of   general superintendence  of wakfs and is empowered to take  measures for  the recovery of the lost properties of any wakf and  to initiate and defend suits and proceedings relating to wakfs. Counsel submitted that a corporation may be an agent of  the State  Government, and in support of this contention  relied upon  Halsbury’s  Laws of England, 3rd Ed., Vol. 9,  p.  10- Tamlin v. Hannaford(1), and the observations of Shah, J.  in State Trading Corporation of India Limited v. The Commercial Tax Officer(2).  He submitted that the State Government  has delegated its functions of superintendence over wakfs to the Board of Wakfs and the Board should therefore be regarded as an  agent of the State Government.  We are unable to  accept this contention.  By the Religious Endowments Act 1863,  the Government   divested   itself   of   the   management   and superintendence of religious endowments which was vested in (1)  [1949] 2 All E. R. 327. (2)  A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 811, 849, 850, paras. 115-117. M1Sup.  C. 1167-7 322 it  under  Reg. 19 of 1810 and Regulation 7  of  1817.   The Board  of Wakfs though subject to the control of  the  State Government,  is a statutory corporation and is  vested  with statutory powers, functions and duties.  The Board has power to  hold property and is in control of the wakf fund (ss.  9 and  48).   The  State Government has no  concern  with  the

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property  vested  in  the Board save during  the  period  of supersession  of  the Board under s. 64.  Nor is  the  State Government liable for any expenditure incurred by the  Board in connection with the administration under the Act (S. 54). The  Board  of  Wakfs  is  not  discharging  a  governmental function.  The Act nowhere says that the Board would act  as the agent of the State Government.  It rather indicates that the  Board  is  not  the agent of  the  Government  and  the Government  is  not  responsible for  its  acts.   We  must, therefore,  hold that the Board of Wakfs is not an agent  of the  State  Government and a suit instituted by it  for  the recovery of a wakf property is not a suit by or on behalf of the State Government. Counsel  next submitted that the mutawalli is the  agent  of the  State Government and that in any event  the  limitation for  a  suit  by the mutawalli starts on  the  date  of  his appointment.   In support of this contention counsel  relied upon  the decision in Jewun Doss Sahoo v. Shah Kubeer-ood  _ Deen,(1)  where  the Privy Council held that under  the  law then  in force it was the duty of the Government to  protect endowments and the mutawalli in that case was the procurator of  the Government and his right to sue arose on  his  being appointed  mutawalli.  This ruling of the Privy Council  was given under Regulation 19 of 1810.  Since the passing of the Religious  Endowments  Act  1863, the  mutawalli  cannot  be regarded  as  a  procurator of the Government.   He  is  not appointed  by  the  Government,  nor  does  he  manage   the endowment  on its behalf and a suit by him for the  recovery of the wakf property cannot now be regarded as a suit on its behalf,  see Shaikh Laul Mahomed v. Lalla Brij  Kishore  (2) and  Behari Lal & Ors. v. Muhammad Muttaki(3).  If the  wakf while in possession of its property is dispossessed, it  has an  immediate right to sue for recovery of the property  and the  limitation  for  the  suit  begins  to  run.   On   his appointment, the mutawalli acquires no new right of suit and his appointment does not give him a fresh starting point  of limitation  for  the recovery of the  property.   The  suit, therefore,  is not by or on behalf of the  State  Government and  art. 149 has no application.  The suit is  governed  by art.  142.   The date of dispossession of the  wakf  is  the starting  point  of limitation under this article.   It  was suggested that as limitation did not run under the Hyderabad Limitation Act, the date when the Indian Limitation Act 1908 came  into  force  in Hyderabad should be  regarded  as  the starting point of limitation.  This suggestion has no force. During the currency of the Hydera- (1)  2  Moo.1.A.  390  at  p.222 (2) 17 Weekly Reporter (Sutherland) 430. (3).      I.L.R 20 All 482, 488.                             323 bad  Limitation Act, limitation did not run but the Act  did not  change  the  date  of  dispossession.   That  date  was September  20,  1937.  For the purposes of art. 142  of  the Indian  Limitation Act 1908, that date must be  regarded  as the starting point of limitation. We may now briefly notice two contentions based on ss.14 and 15 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 On August 13, 1941 the defendants  instituted  a suit for a  declaration  of  there title to the property and obtained an injunction restraining the enrolment of the property in the Book of Endowment.   On March  10, 1942, the suit was dismissed.  On May  18,  1942, the property was enrolled in the Book of Endowment.  On  May 21,  1942,  summary  proceedings  for the  recovery  of  the property  by  the  dargah were started under s.  14  of  the Hyderabad  Endowment  Regulation  before  the  Addl.   Chief

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Judge, City Civil.  Court, Hyderabad at the instance of  the Director,  Ecclesiastical  Department of the  Government  of Hyderabad.   On June 20, 1942, the defendants filed  in  the High  Court an appeal from the decree dismissing their  suit and   obtained  an  interim  injunction  restraining   their eviction  from the property. On July 25, 1942,  the  interim injunction  was made absolute.  By an order  dated  February 14,  1942, the Addl.  Chief Judge consigned the  records  of the  proceeding under s. 14 to the record room and  directed that action would be taken after the disposal of the case in the High Court.  On October 15, 1945 the High Court  allowed the  appeal  and remanded the suit to the  trial  court  for disposal  according  to law, On August 28, 1948,  the  trial court dismissed the suit.  On September 21, 1955, an  appeal filed  by the defendants from this decree was  dismissed  On these facts, it was contended before the High Court that  in view  of  s.  15  of the  Indian  Limitation  Act  1908,  in computing the period of limitation prescribed for the  suit, the  plaintiffs were entitled to exclude the period of  time during which   ejectment of the defendants in the proceeding under  s. 14 of the Hyderabad Endowment Regulation had  been stayed  by the order of injunction.  The High Court  rightly pointed  out  that there was no injunction  restraining  the institution of the present suit, and the plaintiffs were not entitled  to  any  exclusion  of time  under  s.  15.   This contention is no longer pressed.  In this Court however  for the  first time counsel sought to argue that under s. 14  of the Indian Limitation Act 1908 the plaintiffs were  entitled to  the  exclusion of the entire period from  May  21,  1942 during  which  the summary proceeding  under  the  Hyderabad Endowment  Regulation was pending.  The contention based  on s.  14 raises mixed questions of law and fact.  It  was  not raised  in  the courts below.  There is no mention  of  this contention even in the petition for special leave to  appeal or  in the statement of case.  We think that the  plaintiffs ought  not  to be allowed to raise this contention  in  this Court  for  the  first time.   Counsel  submitted  that  the plaintiffs   are  entitled  to  revive  and   continue   the proceeding under s. 14 of the Hyderabad 324 Endowment Regulation.  We do not know whether that procceed- ing  is still pending.  The question whether the  plaintiffs are  entitled to revive and continue that  proceeding  under the  laws now in force does not arise for  consideration  in this case and we express no opinion on it.  All we need  say is  that  our decision in this appeal will  not  affect  the right, if any, of the plaintiffs to. revive and continue the proceeding. As the suit was instituted more than 12 years after the date of  dispossession,. it is barred by limitation and  must  be dismissed.  The trial court rightly dismissed the suit.  The High Court was in error in reversing this decree. In the result the appeal is allowed.  The decree of the High Court  is  set aside and the decree of the  trial  court  is restored.  The suit is dismissed.  There will be no order as the costs of this appeal. G.C. Appeal allowed. 325