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PETITIONER: SYED YAKOOB

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: K.S.  RADHAKRISHNAN  & OTHERS

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 07/10/1963

BENCH: GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. BENCH: GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. SUBBARAO, K. WANCHOO, K.N. SHAH, J.C. DAYAL, RAGHUBAR

CITATION:  1964 AIR  477            1964 SCR  (5)  64  CITATOR INFO :  R          1965 SC 111  (15)  R          1969 SC 966  (5)  F          1971 SC1902  (20)  F          1975 SC2151  (23)  RF         1976 SC 232  (10)  R          1983 SC1102  (6)  F          1984 SC1447  (3)

ACT: Certiorari--Grounds   of  issue--Stage   carriage   permit-- -Tribunal’s  finding  that  applicant  had  no  workshop  at terminii---Absence reasons. If error of law apparent  of the face    of   the   Record---Writ   jurisdiction   of    High Court--Constitution of India, Art. 226---Motor vehicle  Act, 1939(4 of 1939), s 47.

HEADNOTE: The  State Transport Authority issued a  notification  under the  Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, calling for applications  for the grant of two stage carriage permits for the route Madras to  Chidambaram.  A  large  number  of  applications    were received.  The authority granted the first permit to one  of the  applicants  and for the second it decided to  call  for fresh  applications.   The appellant, as also  a  number  of other applicants, appealed to the State Transport  Appellate Tribunal.   The  Tribunal confirmed the grant of  the  first permit  and as regards the second it allowed the  appeal  of the appellant and directed that it should be granted to him. Respondent  No. 1 moved the High Court under Art.226 of  the Constitution  for the issue of a writ of certiorari and  the single  Judge who heard the matter held that  the  Appellate Tribunal had overlooked relevant considerations, and allowed irrelevant  considerations to prevail and so made  the  Rule absolute.   A  Letters Patent appeal was  preferred  by  the appellant.   The  Division Bench affirmed the order  of  the single  Judge on the ground that the Appellate Tribunal  had overlooked   material  considerations  in  favour   of   the respondent  No.  1 and dismissed the appeal   The  appellant came  to this Court by special leave and it was contended on

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his  behalf that in issuing the writ of certiorari the  High Court  exceeded  its  jurisdiction under  Art.  226  of  the Constitution.     Held:  (per Gajendragadkar,  Wanchoo,  Shah  and   Dayal JJ.).  The contention raised on behalf of the appellant  was well  founded and must prevail.     A writ of certiorari is issued for correcting errors  of jurisdiction  committed  by courts or  tribunals,  in  cases where they exceed their jurisdiction or fail to exercise  it or exercise it illegally or improperly, i.e. where an  order is passed without hearing the party sought to be affected by it  or where the procedure adopted is opposed to  principles of natural justice. The  jurisdiction  to  issue  a  writ  of  certiorari  is  a supervisory  one  and  in exercising it, the  court  is  not entitled  to  act as a court of  appeal.   That  necessarily means  that the findings of fact arrived at by the  inferior court or tribunal arc binding. 65     An error of law apparent on the face of the record  can, however,  be corrected by a writ of certiorari, but  not  an error of fact however grave it may appear to be.     A  writ of certiorari can also be issued if it is  shown that in recording a finding of fact, admissible and material evidence  has, not been admitted, or  inadmissible  evidence affecting the impugned finding has been admitted.  A finding of  fact based on no evidence would also be an error of  law and as Such amenable to such a writ.     But  a  finding of fact cannot be challenged in  such  a proceeding  on  the ground that the  relevant  and  material evidence was insufficient to sustain the finding.   Adequacy or  sufficiency  of evidence or an inference of fact  to  be drawn  from  the evidence or finding of  fact  are  entirely within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.     Hari  Vishnu  Kamath  v. Syed Ahmed  Ishaque,  [1955]  1 S.C.R. 1104, Nagendra Nath Bora v. The Commissioner of Hills Division   and  Appeals,  Assam,  [1958]  S.C.R.  1240   and Kaushalya Devi v. Bachittar Singh, A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 1168, relied on.     It  is  neither  possible nor  desirable  to  define  or describe all cases of errors which can be said to be  errors of  law apparent on the face of the record.  Whether or  not an  error  is such an error would depend on  the  facts  and circumstances  of each case and the nature and scope of  the law misconstrued or contravened.     It  was  not  open to a party on the  authority  of  the decision  of  this Court in K.M.  Shanmugam  v.S.R.V.S.  (P) Ltd.,  to come to the High Court under Art. 226 to have  all questions  of fact reconsidered so as to invoke the plea  of ’public interest’ under s. 47 of the Motor Vehicles Act.     K. M. Shamnugam v.  S.R.V.S. (P) Ltd., 1 [1964] 1 S.C.R. 809, held inapplicable.     In  the present case the controversy centered round  the fact  whether  the  respondent  No.  1  had  a  workshop  at Chidambaram,  one of the two terminii of the route and  that the  tribunal had failed to duly consider some  evidence  in that  connection.  That argument was an argument related  to appreciation of evidence and as such was outside the purview of  a proceeding for a writ of certiorari.  The  High  Court was therefore, in error in issuing the writ of certiorari.     In issuing a writ and in making it absolute, care should be taken to draw the order accurately.     Unless  allegations  are made against  them,  the  State Transport Authority or the Appellate Tribunal should not  be represented  through  lawyers.  Their position  in  ordinary

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cases  is  just  the  same  as  that  of  courts  and  other tribunals.      Per Subba Rao J.--Where the tribunal  ignores or  fails to investigate a material circumstance germane to a question of public 1 SCI/64--5 66 interest  under s. 47 of the Act put forward by  a  claimant for permit and gives a finding against him, that finding  is vitiated  by  an error of law apparent on the  face  of  the record and is liable to be quashed by a writ of certiorari. and  the Appellate Tribunal failed to consider the  specific claim  of  the  respondent  1 as to  the  existence  of  his workshop at Chidambaram and was, therefore, right in setting aside  their  orders.  The High Court could not be  said  to have  exceeded  its  jurisdiction  under  Art.  226  of  the Constitution.     This was a clear case where the Tribunal made a  finding that  was  based  on no evidence and  was  contrary  to  the specific  claim made before it.  Since the first  respondent had  secured  the highest number of marks,  this  claim,  if substantiated,  would tilt the balance in his favour.   This Court  would not interfere in such a matter in the  exercise of  its  extraordinary jurisdiction under Art.  136  of  the Constitution to set aside the High Court’s order.

JUDGMENT:     CIVIL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.  593  of 1963.     Appeal  by  special leave from the  judgment  and  order dated  December 19, 1962, of the Madras High Court  in  Writ Appeal No. 157 of 1961.     M.C. Setalvad, and R. Gopalakrishnan, for the appellant.     G.S.  Pathak, O.C. Mathur, J.B. Dadachanji and  Ravinder Narain, for respondent No. 1.      Ranganadham Chetty and A.V. Rangant, respondents Nos. 2 and 3.     The Judgment of P.B. Gajendragadkar,  K.N. Wanchoo, J.C. Shah, Ragubar Dayal JJ. was delivered by  Gajendragadkar  J. Subba Rao J. delivered a dissenting opinion.     GAJENDRAGADKAR J.---The short question which this appeal raises  for  our  decision  relates to  the  limits  of  the jurisdiction  of  the  High  Court  in  issuing  a  writ  of certiorari   while  dealing  with.  orders  passed  by   the appropriate  authorities  granting  or  refusing  to   grant permits under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (hereinafter called ’the Act’). 67     The  State  Transport  Authority,  Madras,  (hereinafter referred  to as Authority)issued a notification on  the  4th July,  1956,  under section 57(2)  of the  Act  calling  for applications for the grant of two stage carriage permits  to run   as  an  express  service  on  the  route   Madras   to Chidambaram.  107 applications were received in response  to the said notification; some of these were rejected as  time- barred or otherwise defective, and the others which were  in order were examined by the Authority.     On   the  8th  May,  1957,  the  Authority  found   that Provincial  Transport (Private) Ltd., Madras, was  the  most suitable  amongst the applicants and granted one  permit  to it.   As regards the second permit, the Authority held  that none  of  the  other applicants was  suitable,  and  so,  it refused  to  grant  the said permit  to  anyone  of  them:it

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decided  to call for applications afresh under s.  57(2)  of the Act.     Against  this  order,  appeals  were  preferred  by   18 claimants  for permits before the State Transport  Appellate Tribunal  (hereinafter  called  "the  Appellate   Tribunal); amongst  them was the appellant Syed Yakoob  and  respondent No.  1 K.S. Radhakrishnan. The Appellate Tribunal  confirmed the  grant of the first permit to the  Provincial  Transport (Pvt.)  Ltd: and so Car as the second permit was  concerned, it  allowed  the  appeal  preferred  by  the  appellant  and directed  that  the said second permit should be  issued  to him;  respondent  No.  1’s claim for  the  said  permit  was accordingly  rejected.   This order was passed  on  the  7th July, 1958.     The validity of this order was challenged by  respondent No. 1 by his writ petition No. 44 of 1959 11led in the  High Court of Madras.  Srinivasan J., who heard the writ petition held   that   th   e  Tribunal   had   overlooked   material considerations in deciding the question of the grant of  the second permit and allowed considerations not germane to  the question to vitiate its order.  That is why the rule  issued on  the  writ petition filed by respondent No.  1  was  made absolute. 68     This  order  was challenged by the  appellant  before  a Division Bench of the said High Court by an appeal preferred under  Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The  Division  Bench has  held  that the order passed by Srinivasan J.  could  be sustained  on  the ground that the  Appellate  Tribunal  had overlooked  material considerations in favour of  respondent No. 1, and so, ’it has affirmed the decision of the  learned single Judge on that ground alone.  In regard to the finding of   the   learned   single   Judge  that   an.   irrelevant consideration  had  vitiated the finding  of  the  Appellate Tribunal, the Division Bench held that the consideration  in question  was  not irrelevant, and so, it differed from  the view  taken  by  Srinivasan J.  In the  result,  the  appeal preferred  by  the appellant before the Division  Bench  was dismissed.  It  is against this order that the appellant has come to this Court by special leave and to his appeal he has impleaded respondent No.  1 and has added the Authority  and the Appellate Tribunal as respondents 2 and 3   Mr. Setalvad for  the  appellant  contends  that in  issuing  a  writ  of certiorari  in respect of the impugned order passed  by  the Appellate. Tribunal, the High Court has clearly exceeded its jurisdiction  under  Art. 226 of the Constitution.   In  our opinion.  this  contention  is  well-founded  and  must   be accepted. The  question about the limits of the jurisdiction  of  High Courts  in issuing a writ of certiorari under Art.  226  has been frequently considered by this Court and the true  legal position  in that behalf is no longer in doubt.  A  writ  of certiorari   can   be  issued  for  correcting   errors   of jurisdiction  committed  by inferior  courts  or  tribunals; these  are cases where orders are passed by inferior  courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or in excess of it, or as a  result of failure to exercise jurisdictions.  A writ  can similarly  be  issued  where  in  exercise  of  jurisdiction conferred  on  it, the Court or Tribunal acts  illegally  or improperly,  as for instance, it decides a question  without giving  an opportunity to be heard to the party affected  by the  order, or where the procedure adopted in  dealing  with the 69 dispute  is opposed to principles of natural justice.  There

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is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a  writ of  certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and  the  Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate  Court. This  limitation  necessarily means that  findings  of  fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as a result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ  proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on  the face  of the record can be corrected by a writ, but  not  an error of tact, however grave it may appear to be.  In regard to  a  finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a  writ  of certiorari  can be issued if it is shown that  in  recording the said finding, the. Tribunal had. erroneously refused  to admit  admissible and material evidence, or had  erroneously admitted  inadmissible  evidence which  has  influenced  the impugned  finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is  based on  no evidence, that would be regarded as an error  of  law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari.  In  dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal  cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground  that  the  relevant and  material  evidence  adduced before  the  Tribunal  was’ insufficient  or  inadequate  to sustain  the impugned finding.  The adequacy or  sufficiency of  evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to  be drawn  from  the  said  finding  are  within  the  exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot  be agitated before a writ court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Art. 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately  exercised (vide  Hari   Vishnu  Kamath  v.   Syed  Ahmed   Ishaque(1), Nagendra Nath Bora v. The Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals, Assam(2), and Kaushalya Devi v. Bachittar Singh(3).     It  is,  of  course, not easy to  define  or  adequately describe what an error of law apparent on the face of (1) [1955] 1 S.C.R. 1104.           (2) [1958] S.C.R. 1240.                 (3) A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 1168. 70 the record means.  What can be corrected by a writ has to be an error of law; but it must be such an error of law as  can be  regarded  as one which is apparent on the  face  of  the record.   Where it is manliest or clear that the  conclusion of law recorded by an inferior Court or Tribunal is based on an  obvious  mis-interpretation of  the  relevant  statutory provision, or sometimes in ignorance of it, or may be,  even in disregard of it, or is expressly rounded on reasons which are wrong in law, the said conclusion can be corrected by  a writ  of  certiorari.   In all  these  cases,  the  impugned conclusion  should  be  so  plainly  inconsistent  with  the relevant   statutory  provision   that  no   difficulty   is experienced by the High Court in holding that the said error of  law is apparent on the face of the record.  It may  also be that in some cases. the impugned error of law may not  be obvious or patent on the face of the record as such and  the Court  may need an argument to discover the said error;  but there  can be no doubt that what can be corrected by a  writ of certiorari is an error of law and the said error must, on the whole, be of such a character as would satisfy the  test that  it  is  an error of law apparent on the  face  of  the record.   If a statutory provision is reasonably capable  of two  constructions and one construction has been adopted  by the  inferior  Court or Tribunal, its  conclusion   may  not necessarily  or  always be open to correction by a  writ  of certiorari.  In  our  opinion, it is  neither  possible  nor desirable  to  attempt  either  to  define  or  to  describe adequately  all cases of errors which can  be  appropriately

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described  as  errors  of law apparent on the  face  of  the record.  Whether or not an impugned error is an error of law and  an  error of law which is apparent on the face  of  the record, must always depend upon the facts and  circumstances of  each  case and upon the nature and scope  of  the  legal provision  which  is alleged to have  been  misconstrued  or contravened.     In  the  present  case,  the  question  raised  by   the appellant presents no difficulty whatever.  The point  which was raised before the High Court by respondent 71 No. 1 lies within a very narrow compass; it is a very  short and  simple  question of fact.  It appears that  in  dealing with the rival claims of the appellant and respondent No.  1 for  the  second  permit  on  the  route  in  question,  the Appellate  Tribunal  was ultimately influenced by  the  fact that  the  appellant had a workshop at Madras which  is  one terminus of the route in question, whereas respondent No.  1 had  a  workshop and a place of business only  at  Cuddalore which  is an intermediate station on the route and  did  not possess  a workshop at either of the terminii of the  route; the other terminus being Chidambaram.  In fact, that appears to be the effect of the finding made by the Authority  also. Respondent No. 1 urged before the High Court that in  coming to  the conclusion that he had no workshop  at  Chidambaram, the  Appellate  Tribunal  had failed  to  consider  material evidence adduced by him.  It is on this narrow ground that a writ  has  been issued in favour of respondent  No.  1.  Mr. Setalvad contends that the question as to whether respondent No.  1 had a workshop at Chidambaram is a pure  question  of fact  and  the High Court had no jurisdiction  to  interfere with the finding recorded by the Appellate Tribunal and seek to  correct  it by issuing a writ of  certiorari.   In  this connection,  he relies on the fact that both  the  Authority and  the Appellate Tribunal have, in substance,  found  that respondent  No.  1  had no workshop at  either  of  the  two terminii  on  the route and the fact that  no  reasons  have been given in support of the said finding would not  justify the interference of the High Court in its jurisdiction under Art.  226.    It  may be conceded that it  would  have  been better  if  the  Appellate Tribunal  had  indicated  why  it rejected  the  case  of respondent No. 1 in  regard  to  his alleged  workshop at Chadambaram, but we do not  think  that the  failure of the Appellate Tribunal to give a  reason  in that  behalf,  or  to refer  specifically  to  the  evidence adduced  by respondent No.1, would,  by  itself,  constitute such  an error in its decision as to justify the issue of  a writ  of certiorari under Art. 226.  In this connection,  we ought to add that it has not been suggested by 72 respondent  No.  1  that in dealing with  his  claim  for  a permit,  admissible evidence which he wanted to  adduce  had been  excluded by the Tribunal from the record;the  argument that some evidence was not duly considered  by the Tribunal, would  normally pertain to the realm of the appreciation  of evidence  and would, as such, be outside the purview  of  an enquiry in proceedings  for a writ of certiorari under  Art. 226.     It  appears that when respondent No. 1 applied  for  the permit, he sent a letter dated 11th July, 1956, in which  he had stated that he had a workshop at Chidambaram and that he was running it in order to maintain the service  efficiently and without any breakdown whatsoever.  The argument is  that this  letter  has not been challenged by any  party  to  the proceedings and has been completely ignored by the Authority

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and the Appellate Tribunal when they reached the  conclusion that  respondent  No.  1  did  not  possess  a  workshop  at Chidambaram.   As we have already pointed out,  neither  the Authority  nor the Appellate Tribunal has given  reasons  in support of the findings of fact recorded by it; but the said fact alone does not, in our opinion, justify the  conclusion of  the High Court that the letter in question had not  been considered  by the said Authorities, and so, the High  Court was not right in issuing a writ of certiorari on that  basis alone.     But  apart  from this aspect of the matter,  the  record shows  that the assertion of respondent No. 1 that he had  a workshop  at  Chidambaram  was contradicted by  one  of  the claimants for a permit and is entirely inconsistent with the reports  submitted  to  the  Authority  and  the   Appellate Tribunal  by the department. D. Kanniah Pillai, one  of  the applicants  for the permit, had specifically averred in  his application   that   the  other  applicants   amongst   whom respondent  No. 1 was included, were all for away  from  the Headquarters  having no workshop at Chidambaram.   Thus,  it would  not  be  right  to assume  that  the  claim  made  by respondent  No. 1 that he had a workshop at Chidambaram  was not disputed by any other competitor. 73 What is more significant, however, is the evidence  supplied by the report made by the Regional Transport Officer,  South Arcot.  This report is made under different columns.  Column 4  speaks  about  the possession of workshop  or  repair  or maintenance facilities and its location.  The report is made in  respect  of each one of the applicants.   In  regard  to respondent  No. 1 under column 4, the report shows  that  he was  maintaining  a  workshop as  per  Government  Order  at Cuddalore,  and  column 5 speaks about the location  of  his residence  or  place  of business as  Cuddalore.  A  similar report has been submitted about the appellant and that shows that  the  appellant had workshop facilities at  Madras  and that  he  had  a  residence and place  of  business  at  the terminus.     When  the  present  dispute went  before  the  Appellate Tribunal,  a fresh report appears to have  been called  for, and this report which has been made by the Secretary,  State Transport Authority, also shows that respondent No. 1 had  a workshop  at Cuddalore on the route, whereas  the  appellant had  a workshop at Madras.  It would thus be clear  that  on the  question as to whether respondent No. 1 had a  workshop at Chidambaram, there was his own assertion stating that  he had such a workshop. and there were the two reports made  by the   Transport   Officers  which  contradicted   the   said assertion; the said  assertion was also challenged by one of the  applicants."  On this state of the record, it  was,  we think,  not permissible to the High Court to consider  these questions  of fact and to hold that the finding recorded  by the  Appellate Tribunal was a finding without any  evidence. To  say  that material considerations were  ignored  by  the Appellate Tribunal in holding that respondent No. 1 did  not own a workshop a.t Chidambaram would be plainly unreasonable when  it is remembered that the evidence disclosed  a  sharp conflict  between  the  versions of  the  parties,  and  the version  of  respondent  No. 1  was  inconsistent  with  the reports made by the Transport Officers which must have  been treated as more reliable by the Appellate Tribunal.  There 74 can  be  little doubt that if respondent No. 1 had  owned  a workshop  at  Chidambaram, it would have been  mentioned  in col.  4,  because the said column is obviously  intended  to

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indicate all places where the  claimant owns a workshop  and possesses repair facilities.      It  appears that before Srinivasan J.  the  appellant’s learned  counsel  conceded  that  the  allegation  made   by respondent No. 1 that he owned a workshop at Chidambaram had not  been challenged before the Transport  Authorities,  and naturally  Srinivasan J. was considerably impressed  by  the said  concession; but as the Division Bench which heard  the Letters  Patent Appeal has pointed out, the said  concession was not correctly made; in fact, the record distinctly shows that  the claim made by respondent No. 1 was  challenged  by one   of   the  applicants  for  permit  and   was   plainly inconsistent  with  the  reports  to  which  we  have   just referred.  Therefore, the concession on which Srinivasan J., relied has been properly left out of account by the Division Bench  in  dealing  with the  appeal.   The  Division  Bench thought  that apart from the said concession, it did  appear that  the Appellate  Tribunal had overlooked the claim  made by  respondent No. 1 in his letter of the 11 th July,  1956. As  we  have  already indicated, we  find  it  difficult  to sustain  this finding.  In our opinion, apart from the  fact that  the  plea  raised by respondent No.  1  could  not  be validly  raised under Art. 226, even on the merits the  said plea is not well-founded.  The question on which  respondent No.  1 sought for the intervention of the High  Court  under Art. 226 was a simple question of fact, and we are satisfied that  on that question of fact, the Appellate  Tribunal  was justified in coming to the conclusion that the claim made by respondent  No.  1  about the existence  of  a  workshop  at Chidambaram  was  not  well-founded; but even  if  the  said finding did not appear to the High Court to be satisfactory, that  would be no reason for issuing a writ under Art.  226. There  was  evidence  in  support  of  the  finding  of  the Appellate Tribunal and it is not a 75 case  where the finding is based on no evidence at all.   We ought  also  to  add  that though  the  Division  Bench  was satisfied  that  the  concession  on  which  Srinivasan  J., substantially  acted had been wrongly made before  him,  its attention does not appear to have been drawn to the  reports made  by  the  Transport  Officers to  which  we  have  just referred.   We have no doubt that if the Division Bench  had taken into account those reports, it would have hesitated to confirm the finding made by Srinivasan J.     It appears that Srinivasan J.,  was inclined to take the view  that  the  decision  of  the  Appellate  Tribunal  was vitiated  by  the  fact that it took  into  account  certain irrelevant considerations.  The Division Bench has held that the  said  considerations cannot be said to  be  irrelevant. These considerations centre round the question as to whether preference  should be given to an applicant for  permit  who has his headquarters at the terminus as against another  who has only a branch office at the said terminus.  The practice usually  followed by the Tribunals under the Act appears  to be  to give one mark under col. 3 to the applicant  who  has his  headquarters at the terminus and give only 1/2 mark  to an  applicant who has only a branch office at the  terminus. Having  held that the consideration on which marks are  thus allotted cannot be said to be irrelevant, the Division Bench has  indicated that the policy underlying the said  practice may  be open to doubt.  In our opinion, it would  have  been better  if the Division Bench had not expressed any  opinion on  this aspect of the matter, particularly when it came  to the  conclusion that the said matter was primarily  for  the decision of the Appellate Tribunal.

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   Mr.  Pathak for respondent No. 1 has relied on a  recent decision of this Court in K.M. Shanmugam v. The S.R.V.S. (P) Ltd.(1)  in  support  of  his  contention  that  the   error committed  by  the Appellate Tribunal really amounted  to  a contravention  of  s.  47 of the Act.  He  argues  that  the Appellate Tribunal was (1)   [1964] 1 S.C.R. 809. 76 under  an obligation, in considering the question about  the grant  of  a permit, to take into account the  interests  of public  generally  under  s.  47(a)  and  inasmuch  as   the Appellate Tribunal has ignored the fact that ’respondent No. 1 owns a workshop at Chidambaram and thereby has refused his application  for  a  permit,  the  interests  of  the,public generally  have been sacrificed. This argument  prima  facie appears to be far-fetched and fanciful; but Mr. Pathak urges that the observations made by this Court in the case of K.M. Shanmugum  are  in  his favour. In  our  opinion,  the  said decision  does  not  lend any  assistance  to  Mr.  Pathak’s contention.   In  that case, this Court was  satisfied  that "the Tribunal made a clear error of law inasmuch as it  held that in the case of the first respondent, as it had a branch at  Kumbakonam,  its other branch at  Manmargudi  should  be ignored."  The judgment shows that this Court took the  view that it was obviously an untenable proposition to hold  that even  if a company has a well-equipped office on a route  in respect  of  which  a permit is applied  for,  it  shall  be ignored  if  the  company has some  other  branch  somewhere unconnected  with that route, and it was observed  that  was precisely  what  the Appellate Tribunal had held  and  that, according to the Court, clearly was an error apparent on the face of the record. It is in that connection that this Court referred  to the mandatory provisions of s. 47.  We  do  not think  that this decision can be legitimately  pressed  into service by Mr. Pathak in the present case.  It is only after it  is  proved  that  respondent No. 1  had  a  workshop  at Chidambaram   that   any   subsequent  question  about   the interests  of the public generally can possibly arise.   If, as in the present case, the Appellate Tribunal has held that respondent  No. 1 did not own a workshop at Chidambaram,  no consideration  of public interests can arise at all, and  it is with this question that the present writ proceedings  are concerned.  We ought to add that the decision in the case of K.M. Shanmugam cannot justify a party whose application  for permit  has been rejected by the authorities under the  Act, to move the High 77 Court under Art. 226 and invite it to consider all questions of fact on the plea that the decision on the said  questions of  fact may assist him to invoke the provisions of  s.  47. That clearly is not the effect of the said decision.     Mr.  Pathak has also urged that even if we come  to  the conclusion that the High Court was  not competent to issue a writ in the present proceedings, having regard to the nature of  the questions raised before it by respondent No.  1,  we should not reverse the decision of the High Court under Art. 136  of  the Constitution.  The jurisdiction of  this  Court under Art. 136, though very wide, is exercised by the  Court in  its  discretion, says Mr. Pathak, and he  contends  that where  the order under appeal furthers the ends of  justice, we  should not reverse the said order on technical  grounds. We are not impressed by this plea.  It may be conceded  that in  a  proper  case this Court may refuse  to  exercise  its jurisdiction  under Art. 136 where the interests of  justice patently  indicate  the  desirability  of  adopting  such  a

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course;  but we do not see how a plea of such a kind can  be entertained  where  it is clearly shown  that  the  impugned orders  passed by the High. Court are without  jurisdiction. If Mr. Pathak’s argument were to be accepted, in a  majority of cases if the High Court interfered with questions of fact in  issuing  writs of certiorari against  the  decisions  of special Tribunals, it may always be urged that what the High Courts  have  done is in the interests of justice  and  this Court  should not interfere with the decisions of  the  High Courts.  In the circumstances of the present case, we do not see  how  considerations of justice can really  arise.   The Tribunals of fact have found that respondent No. 1 does  not own a workshop at Chidambaram and having regard to the other relevant circumstances which the Tribunals have  considered, the fact that he does not own a workshop at Chidambaram  has ultimately  proved decisive against respondent No. 1 and  in favour of the appellant.  If that be so, a decision based on facts found by the 78 Tribunal  cannot  be reopened on the plausible plea  that  a further  enquiry should be made because that would be  just. If  findings  of fact were allowed to be disturbed  by  High Courts  in  such  writ  proceedings, that  may  lead  to  an interminable search for correct findings and would virtually convert  the High Courts into Appellate Courts competent  to deal  with  questions  of fact.  That is why  we  think,  in entertaining  petitions  for  writs  of  certiorari,  it  is necessary  to  remember that findings of  fact  recorded  by special Tribunals which have been clothed with  jurisdiction to  deal with them, should be treated as final  between  the parties,  unless, of course, it is shown that  the  impugned finding  is  based on no evidence.  Therefore,   we  do  not think  the plea made by Mr. Pathak that in the interests  of justice we should refrain from setting aside the order under appeal, can be upheld.     There is one more point to which reference must be made. It appears that in the writ petition filed by respondent No. 1 he claimed that the orders passed by the Authority and the Appellate  Tribunal  should  be set aside, and  a  rule  was issued  in  terms of the prayer made in the  said  petition. Ultimately,  the  said rule has been made absolute.   It  is obvious that in the writ petition, respondent No. 1 did  not challenge  the  grant  of  the  permit  to  the’  Provincial Transport (Pvt.) Ltd., but  unfortunately, having regard  to the  prayer made by respondent No. 1 in his  writ  petition, the  orders ultimately passed in the said proceedings  ,may, if  technically  construed,  mean that  the  orders  of  the Authority  as well as the Appellate Tribunal have  been  set aside  and that clearly was not and could not have been  the intention of the High Court in issuing the writ.  It  would, we think, be better if in issuing a writ on a writ  petition and  in  making  it  absolute  in  case  the  writ  petition succeeds, care is taken to draw the order more accurately.     The  result is, the appeal is allowed, the order  passed by the High Court is set aside and the writ 79 petition filed by respondent No. 1 is dismissed;  Respondent 1 to pay the cost of the appellant in this Court.     Mr. Ranganathan Cherry who appears for respondents 2 and 3 has asked for his costs. We do not think this request  can be  accepted.    It  may be that in  such  proceedings,  the Authority   and  the  Appellate  Tribunal  are  proper   and necessary  parties, but unless allegations are made  against them  which need a reply from them, it is not usual for  the authorities  to  be  represented by lawyers  in  Court.   In

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ordinary  cases,  their position is like that of  courts  or other Tribunals against whose decisions writ proceedings are filed; they are not interested in the merits of the  dispute in  any  sense, and so, their representation by  lawyers  in such   proceedings   is   wholly   unnecessary   and    even inappropriate.  That is why we direct that respondents 2 and 3 should bear their own costs.     SUBBA  RAO J.--I have had the advantage of perusing  the judgment  of my learned brother, Gajendragadkar J. I  cannot agree.  The  facts lie in a small compass and  they  are  as follows:The  State Transport Authority, Madras,  called  for applications for the grant of two stage carriage permits  on the  route  Madras  to Chidambaram.  107  applications  were received by the said Authority. The appellant and the  first respondent  are  two  of the  said  applicants.   The  State Transport   Authority  gave  one  of  the  permits  to   the Provincial Transport (Private) Limited, Madras:  we are  not concerned  with this permit. As regards the  second  permit, the  said  Authority found none of the  applicants  suitable and, therefore, refused to grant the same to any one of them and  directed fresh applications to be called  for.  Against the  said order, the appellant, first respondent and  others preferred appeals to the State Transport Appellate Tribunal. The appellant herein was respondent 16 and respondent herein was  appellant  7 before the said Appellate  Tribunal.   The first  respondent  secured the highest  total  marks,  viz., 71/2-,  under  columns 1 to 5 under the  scheme  of  marking sanctioned by the State Government.  The appellant got  only 41/2 marks.  Ignoring the highest total of 80 marks  secured  by  the  first  respondent,  the   Appellate Tribunal  rejected his claim on the ground that he  had  his workshop and place of business en route at Cuddalore and not at either of the terminii of the route.  Excluding the first respondent,   the  Appellate  Tribunal,  for   the   reasons mentioned  in  the  order,  preferred  the  appellant  in  a competition   between  him  and  appellant  14  before   the Tribunal.   The  main  ground of  preference  was  that  the appellant  had  got  his workshop  in  the  headquarters  at Madras.  In file result, the Appellate Tribunal rejected the application  of the first respondent and gave the permit  to the  appellant.  The first respondent filed a writ  petition under  Art.  226  of  the Constitution  in  the  High  Court Judicature  at Madras for the issue of a writ of  certiorari for  quashing  the  order of the said  Tribunal.   The  said petition  was  heard by  Srinivasan J., and he  quashed  the order  of the Appellate Tribunal mainly on the  ground  that the Tribunal did not take into consideration a material  and relevant circumstance to the enquiry before it, namely, that the  petitioner  had the necessary  repair  and  maintenance facilities at Chidambaram, one of the terminii of the  route in  question.   In that view the learned Judge  quashed  the order of the Appellate Tribunal.  On Letters Patent  Appeal, a   Division  Bench  of  the  High  Court,   consisting   of Ramachandra  Iyer C.J., and Venkataraman J., held  that  the learned  Judge  should  not  have given  a  finding  on  the question  whether  the first respondent had the  above  said facilities  at  Chidambaram, but agreed with  him  that  the Appellate  Tribunal  had overlooked the claim  made  by  the first  respondent to the effect that he had such  facilities at Chidambaram.  Hence the appeal.     Mr.   Setalvad,  learned  counsel  appearing   for   the appellant, contended that the Appellate Tribunal had held on the material placed before it that the, first respondent had no such facilities at the terminal and that, therefore,  the

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High Court had n0 jurisdiction to interfere with the finding of fact arrived at by the Appellate Tribunal. 81     Mr.  Pathak, learned counsel for the  first  respondent, argued  that though the first respondent clearly  stated  in his  letter dated July 11, 1956, to the Transport  Authority that  he had such facilities, the State Transport  Authority as  well  as  the State  Transport  Appellate  Tribunal  had ignored that material circumstance which was germane to  the question  of  public  interest  under s.  47  of  the  Motor Vehicles  Act,  1939,  and, therefore, the  High  Court  had rightly   quashed   that  order  under  Art.  226   of   the Constitution  and  directed the Tribunal to dispose  of  the appeal  on  merits. Alternatively he contended  that  though there  might be some material for the Appellate Tribunal  to come to the conclusion that the first respondent had no such facilities,  three learned Judges of the High Court, on  the admissions  made and the material placed before  them,  have held that the Tribunal did not decide that question and that they  only  gave  a further  opportunity  to  the  Appellate Tribunal  to  decide the appeal on merits and  that  in  the circumstances  it  is  not  a fit case  for  this  Court  to interfere under Art. 136 of the Constitution.     The first respondent has a fundamental right to carry on business  in  transport.  The Motor Vehicles Act  is  a  law imposing reasonable restrictions in public interests on such right.   Under s. 47 of the said Act the Regional  Transport Authority  shall in considering an application for  a  stage carriage  permit, have regard, inter alia, to the  interests of the public generally.  The fact that the first respondent has  a  separate workshop or at any rate has  the  necessary repair and maintenance facilities at one of the terminii  of the   route,   viz.,   at  Chidambaram,   is   certainly   a consideration  germane to the question of  public  interest. Indeed,  the  scheme  of marking  system  suggested  by  the Government also recognizes the importance of such facilities at  either  of  the terminii of the  route.   If  the  first respondent  had placed before the authorities concerned  the said  circumstance in support of his claim for a permit  and if  that  was ignored or not investigated into by  the  said authorities, the High Court would certainly 1 SCI/64--5 82 have  jurisdiction  under Art. 226 of  the  Constitution  to quash  the  order  of the authorities  and  direct  them  to ascertain  whether  the claim of the  first  respondent  was true,  and if it was true, to take that  into  consideration before  issuing the permit to one or other of the  claimants before  them.  In such an event the High Court would not  be interfering  with  the  finding  fact  arrived  at  by   the Appellate  Tribunal based on the material placed before  it, but  would only be quashing the order on the ground that  an important  and  material  circumstance was  ignored  or  not investigated into by the Tribunal.  If a Tribunal ignores or fails   to   investigate   a   material   circumstance   put forward by a claimant and gives a finding  against him,  the said  finding  can certainly be said to be  vitiated  by  an error of law apparent on the face of the record.    In  the present case, the State Transport  Authority  was considering  the  competing claims of 107. persons  for  two permits.   The  said Authority gave its decision on  May  8, 1957.   The  first respondent filed his  application  for  a permit  on  July 11, 1956.  On the same day he  addressed  a letter to the said Authority to the following effect:                        "Chidambaram  is one of the  terminii

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             of this     proposed route.  A separate office               and  workshop  are located at  Chidambaram  in               order to maintain the service efficiently  and               without any breakdown or whatsoever."               None  of  the innumerable  applicants  in  his               application  denied specifically the c|aim  of               the  first respondent that he had  a  separate               office and workshop at Chidambaram.  This fact               was conceded before  Srinivasan J., though the               learned  judge  put  the  concession  somewhat               higher  than was actually made.  Nor  did  the               learned  counsel for the appellant go back  on               the  limited  concession before  the  Division               Bench.   But  one  Kanniah  Pillai,  who   was               applicant No. 43-D), stated in his application               thus:               "The applicant Nos. 43, 57, 69, 78 and 81  are               residents of Chidambaram but No. 57 is a fleet               83               owner.   Nos. 69 and 78 have no workshop.  No.               81  is  a new entrant.  The rest all  are  far               away from the headquarters having no  workshop               at Chidambaram." Except  this  vague and implied denial  by  Kanniah  Pillai, there  is  nothing on the record to suggest that  any  other applicant  denied  the claim of the first  respondent.   The fact remains that the appellant did not at any stage of  the proceedings refute the claim of the first respondent.     With  this background let me first look at the order  of the  State  Transport Authority,.  The  said  Authority  has ignored the said letter of the first respondent claiming  to have a workshop at Chidambaram, but it stated in an  omnibus clause  that  the  first respondent and some  of  the  other applicants  were residents either in the middle or  off  the route and they were not so well situated as an applicant who had  facilities  at  one  end of  the  route  with  all  the necessary  facilities.   It may be stated that  this  is  an implied  finding  against  the  first  respondent,  but  the complaint  of  the first respondent is that it  is  made  in utter  disregard  of  his  claim.   So  too,  the  Appellate Tribunal  observed in its order disposing of the 18  appeals before  it  that the first respondent, who had  secured  the highest  number of marks,  including those column 1  of  the mark list, ’had his workshop and place of business en  route at Cuddalore and not at either of the terminii of the route. This  observation  was also made in utter disregard  of  the claim  made by the first respondent that he had  a  workshop Chidambaram,  one of the terminii of the route,  and  though the  other applicants, except one, had not denied  the  said fact.   The  High Court, therefore, found  on  the  material placed  before  it that the said Authority as  well  as  the Tribunal  had failed to consider the specific claim made  by the.  first  respondent  in  regard  to  his  work.shop   at Chidambaram  and, therefore, rightly set aside the order  of the Appellate Tribunal so that the Appellate Tribunal  might consider the claim made by the first respondent.  I 84 do not see any flaw in the reasoning of the High Court.  Nor can  I say that it has exceeded its jurisdiction under  Art. 226 of the Constitution.      But,  Mr.  Setalvad. contended that there  was  material before  the Tribunal and that the Tribunal gave its  finding on  the basis of that material.  He relied upon  an  extract from  the report of the Regional Transport Authority,  South Arcot,  dated January 31, 1957.  That was a report  sent  by

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the  said  Authority  to  the  State  Transport   Authority. Against  the name of the first respondent in column 4  under the heading "possession of workshop or repair or maintenance facilities  and its location" it is stated,  "maintaining  a workshop  at  per G.O. at Cuddalore".  Again in  the  report sent by the State Transport Authority to the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, against the name of the first respondent in  column  8  under  the heading  "Place  of  residence  or principal  place of business and the nearest  distance"  the entry  is "Cuddalore-on the route".  This information  given by  the Transport Authority is presumably gathered from  the earlier   report  of  the.  Regional  Transport   Authority. Reliance  is  placed upon a letter dated January  10,  1957, written  by  the first respondent to  the  Secretary,  State Transport Authority, in support of the contention that  even the  first respondent, though on July 111, 1956, he  claimed to  have had a workshop at Chidambaram, did not  mention  it therein.  But  a perusal of that letter shows  that  he  did mention that he had the sector and terminal  qualifications. Basing the argument on the said documents, it was  contended that  there  was material on which  the  Appellate  Tribunal could have come to the finding which it did, viz., that  the first  respondent had no workshop at either of the  terminii of  the route. Firstly, these documents were  not  expressly relied  upon  by  the Tribunal for holding  that  the  first respondent had no workshop at Chidambaram.  Secondly,  these documents  were  not  relied upon by  the  appellant  either before  Srinivasan J., or before the Division Bench  to  the effect  that  the Appellate Tribunal gave a finding  on  the basis of the 85 said  material.  Thirdly, one of the said  documents,  viz., the  letter  of the first respondent, does not  support  the contention.   The  other two reports did not  say  that  the first  respondent  had  no  workshop  at  Chidambaram.   The officers  who  made the report did not make any  enquiry  as regards the fact whether the first respondent had a workshop at Chidambaram on the basis of the claim made by him.  There is,  therefore,  absolutely no evidence  to  controvert  the first  respondent’s  claim and that is the  reason  why  the appellant  did not place the said documents before the  High Court  in support of his contention that there was  material before the State Transport Authority and the State Transport Appellate Tribunal for holding that the first respondent had no  workshop  at Chidambaram. A perusal of  the  two  orders shows   that   presumably  in  view   of   the   innumerable applications, the specific claim of the first respondent was completely  missed  by  the  Transport  Authority  and   the Appellate  Tribunal. This is, therefore, a clear case  of  a finding made by the Tribunal without any evidence to support it  and by ignoring a specific claim made before it.  I  am, therefore, of opinion that the High Court rightly set  aside the order of the Appellate Tribunal.     The  next  question is whether this is a  fit  case  for interference under Art. 136 of the Constitution in  exercise of  this  Court’s  extraordinary  jurisdiction   thereunder. Srinivasan  J.,  and, on appeal, the Division Bench  on  the basis of the material placed and the concession made  before them, came to the conclusion that the Appellate Tribunal had ignored  the specific claim set up by the first  respondent. The  first  respondent  had secured the  highest  number  of marks.   His claim, if substantiated, would  certainly  tilt the  balance in his favour.  The material placed  before  us was not relied upon by the appellant before the High  Court. The  High Court gave a further opportunity to the  Appellate

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Tribunal  to  consider the claim of  the  first  respondent. Though the High Court quashed the order of the Tribunal, the observation in the judgment clearly shows that the Tribunal 86 could  reconsider the matter.  Indeed, learned  counsel  for the  first  respondent conceded that  fact.   The  appellant would  have  every opportunity to establish that  the  first respondent  has  no  workshop at  Chidambaram.   Instead  of following  the  straight course, he is trying  to  shut  out further   enquiry   to  arrive  at  the   truth.    In   the circumstances I am of the view that this is not a case which calls  for  the  exercise  of  this  Court’s   extraordinary jurisdiction to set aside the order of the High Court.     In  the result, the appeal fails and is  dismissed  with costs of the first respondent. ORDER BY COURT     In  accordance  with  the opinion of  the  majority  the appeal is allowed and the Writ Petition filed by  Respondent No.  1 is dismissed.  Respondent No. 1 to pay the  costs  of the  appellant in this Court.  Respondents 2 and 3  to  bear their own costs.