REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1149 OF 2001

Syed Peda Aowlia  …Appellant

Versus

The Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P.  Hyderabad  …Respondent

J U D G M E N T

Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J

1. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of a Division

Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court allowing the appeal

filed  by  the  State  so  far  as  present  appellant  is  concerned

while upholding the acquittal of other accused persons.  The

learned  IV  Additional  Sessions  Judge,  Guntur  had  directed

acquittal  of all the five accused persons who faced trial for

commission  of  offence  punishable  under  Section  302  and

Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code,

1860 (in short  the  ‘IPC’).   The  trial  Court  on analyzing  the

evidence had found that the prosecution has not been able to

establish its  accusations  and accordingly  directed  acquittal.

The State filed an appeal in terms   of Section 378 (1) and (3)

of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short the ‘Code’).

The High Court by the impugned order allowed the appeal so

far as the present appellant is concerned while dismissing the

appeal  of the State so far as the other accused persons are

concerned.  

2. Learned  counsel  for  the  appellant  submitted  that  the

High Court has not discussed the evidence of the witnesses

and has come to abrupt conclusions about the acceptability of

the evidence.  

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3. Learned counsel  for the respondent-State on the other

hand submitted that though the High Court has not analysed

the evidence in detail, its conclusions are not erroneous.  

4. It is not necessary to go into the factual position in detail

as we find that the appeal filed by the State has been disposed

of in perfunctory manner.  

5. There is no embargo on the appellate Court reviewing the

evidence  upon  which  an  order  of  acquittal  is  based.

Generally, the order of acquittal shall  not be interfered with

because  the  presumption  of  innocence  of  the  accused  is

further  strengthened  by acquittal.  The  golden  thread  which

runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal

cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced

in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the

other to his  innocence,  the view which is  favourable  to the

accused should be adopted. The paramount consideration of

the Court is to ensure that miscarriage of justice is prevented.

A miscarriage of justice which may arise from acquittal of the

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guilty is no less than from the conviction of an innocent. In a

case where admissible evidence is ignored, a duty is cast upon

the appellate  Court  to re-appreciate  the evidence  where the

accused has been acquitted, for the purpose of ascertaining as

to whether any of the accused really committed any offence or

not. [See Bhagwan Singh and Ors. v. State of Madhya Pradesh

(2002  (2)  Supreme  567)].  The  principle  to  be  followed  by

appellate Court considering the appeal against the judgment

of acquittal is to interfere only when there are compelling and

substantial reasons for doing so. If the impugned judgment is

clearly  unreasonable  and relevant  and convincing  materials

have  been  unjustifiably  eliminated  in  the  process,  it  is  a

compelling  reason  for  interference.  These  aspects  were

highlighted by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade and Anr.

v. State of Maharashtra (AIR 1973  SC 2622), Ramesh Babulal

Doshi v.  State  of  Gujarat (1996 (4)  Supreme 167),  Jaswant

Singh v. State of Haryana (2000 (3) Supreme 320), Raj Kishore

Jha v. State of Bihar and Ors. (2003 (7) Supreme 152),  State

of Punjab v.  Karnail Singh (2003 (5)  Supreme 508,  State of

Punjab v.  Pohla Singh and Anr. (2003 (7) Supreme 17) and

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V.N. Ratheesh v. State of Kerala (2006 (10) SCC 617).  

6. The conclusions of the High Court read as follows:

“It is true that there is some delay in reaching a copy of FIR to the residence of the Magistrate, but it  cannot  be  said  that  it  is  inordinate  delay. According  to  the  version  of  PW-1  and  also  the version of PWs 14 and 15 the first information was given  by  PW-1  at  about  10.30  a.m.  and  on  the strength of which PW-14 registered the case against the accused. The evidence of PW-15 shows that he got a copy of FIR at about 1.30 p.m. but he did not note down the timing on the copy of FIR on  receipt of the same. But, it has been a positive case of PW- 15 that he received copy of FIR at 1.30 p.m. Once this version is accepted,  then the defence  version that  the  FIR  was  given  at  8.30  p.m.  has  to  be rejected.  

Mr.  Movva  Chandra  Sekhar  Rao,  learned counsel appearing for the appellants relied upon a ruling  reported  in Meharaj  Singh v.  State  of  U.P. (1994 (5) SCC 188), in which  the Apex court had laid  down that  inordinate  delay  in  filing  the  first information  has  to  be  explained.  We  have  no hesitation in accepting the above said proposition. We  have  come  to  the  conclusion  that  PW-1  had given  the  first  information  report  at  the  Police Station  at  about  10.30  a.m.,  immediately  after removing the injured to the Hospital at Guntur. If there is some delay in sending the copy of FIR to the  Magistrate,  then  straight  away  a  conclusion cannot be drawn that the FIR was not laid at the time as spoken to by PW-1.  

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It is not the case of the defence that there is political rivalry between the accused party and the deceased  party.  Therefore,  this  Court  finds  no reason  for  PWs  1  to  3  and  5  to  concoct  a  story against A.1. Under these circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the prosecution was able to prove that A-1 was responsible  for causing the death of the deceased and he is guilty of the offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code.

The role attributed to A-2 to A-5 in this case by  the  prosecution  witnesses  is  very  minor.  Only their presence was secured through their evidence. They  had not  participated  in  killing  the  deceased and, therefore,  this  Court  is  of  a  considered  view that  A-2  to  A-5  cannot  be  held  responsible  for causing  the  death  of  the  deceased.  Under  these circumstances, we pass the following order:

The appeal filed by the State is allowed as far as A-1 is concerned. A-1 is convicted  and  sentenced  to  suffer imprisonment for life  and he is directed to  surrender  the  learned  IV  Additional Sessions  Judge,  Guntur,  forthwith.  The appeal filed by the State against A-2 to A- 5 stands dismissed.”

7. We find that the High Court has not applied its mind to

the  various  aspects  and  the  position  in  law  as  highlighted

above relating to the scope for interference in appeal against

an order of acquittal.  In the circumstances, we set aside the

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impugned order and remit the matter to the High Court for

fresh consideration in accordance with law only in respect of

appellant. State has not questioned, it is to be noted, the High

Court’s order upholding acquittal of A2 to A5 as was done by

the trial Court.   

8. The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent.  

……………………………J. (Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT)

……………………………J. (P.P. NAOLEKAR)

New Delhi, June 13, 2008     

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