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PETITIONER: SYED ASADULLAH KAZMI

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE ADDL. DISTRICT JUDGE, ALLAHABAD AND OTHERS

DATE OF JUDGMENT23/07/1981

BENCH: PATHAK, R.S. BENCH: PATHAK, R.S. KOSHAL, A.D.

CITATION:  1981 AIR 1724            1982 SCR  (1)  77  1981 SCC  (3) 483        1981 SCALE  (3)1092  CITATOR INFO :  D          1988 SC  30  (5)

ACT:      Landlord and  tenant-Prescribed authority  allowing the landlord to recover his building tenanted, but the appellate authority modifying  the order of part recovery only and the said order  becomes final  due  to  successive  failures  in appeal by  the tenant  including in  the  Supreme  Court-Any application to re-open the issue due to the subsequent event i.e. the death of the landlord is not maintainable.

HEADNOTE:      In February  1965, Bungalow No. 16-D, Beli Road (now 26 B.K.  Banerjee   Road),  Allahabad   was  allotted   to  the appellant.  On   an  application  made  in  April  1975  the prescribed  authority   allowed,  on  24th  May,  1976,  the application directing  the release  of the  bungalow to  the landlord. On  appeal the  appellate authority  by its  order dated 25th  March, 1977 modified the order by releasing only a portion of the building and by permitting the appellant to continue in  the remaining  portion with  a direction to the prescribed authority to divide the bungalow accordingly. The said order  dated 25th  March, 1977  became final, since the writ petition  challenging the  said order was dismissed. On the death  of the  landlord  the  appellant  filed  a  fresh application before  the prescribed  authority not to proceed with the  partition scheme.  Since the  prescribed authority refused to take note of this subsequent event, the issue has come up before this Court by way of special leave.      Dismissing the appeal, the Court ^      HELD: 1.  The order  dated  25th  March,  1977  of  the appellate authority  releasing a  portion of the premises in favour of  the third  respondent and  leaving the  remaining portion in  the tenancy  of the  appellant acquired finality when the  proceedings taken  against  it  by  the  appellant failed. The prescribed authority was bound to give effect to that final order and was not acting outside its jurisdiction or contrary to law. [79 C-D]      2. It is true that subsequent events must be taken into account by  a statutory  authority or court when considering proceeding  arising   out  of   a  landlord’s  petition  for

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ejectment of  a tenant  on  the  ground  of  the  landlord’s personal need. But in the present case the order for release of a  portion of  the accommodation acquired finality before the death  of the  landlord and the controversy concluded by it could not be reopened now. [79 E-F]      3. The  present appeal  being limited  to the  question which  arose   before  the   prescribed  authority   on  the application of  the  appellant  after  the  proceedings  for release had  acquired finality,  it is  not open even to the Supreme Court,  to reopen the proceeding for release. [79 G- H] 78

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1440 of 1979.      Appeal by  special leave  from the  judgment and  order dated the 15th November, 1978 of the Allahabad High Court in Civil Misc. Writ No. 8736 of 1978.      R.K. Garg,  Manoj Swarup  and Miss Lalita Kohli for the Appellant.      Yogeshwar  Prasad,   and  Mrs  Rani  Chhabra,  for  the Respondent.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      PATHAK, J.  The appeal  by special  leave  is  directed against a  judgment of the Allahabad High Court dismissing a tenant’s  writ   petition   arising   out   of   proceedings consequential upon an order of ejectment.      The bungalow,  16-D, Beli Road, Allahabad, was owned by Raj Kumar  Sinha, father  of the  third respondent,  Kailash Shanker Sinha.  In February  1965, the bungalow was allotted to  the   appellant,  Syed   Asadullah  Kazmi,  and  he  was accordingly treated  as the  tenant of  the premises. At the time, Raj  Kumar Sinha, with his family, including the third respondent, occupied  another  house  at  14-D,  Beli  Road, Allahabad. In October 1973, the third respondent applied for the release  of the bungalow 16-D, Beli Road, Allahabad, now described as  26, B.K. Banerjee Road, Allahabad. The attempt failed. A  fresh application was made in April, 1975. It was allowed by  the Prescribed Authority on 24th May, 1976 after overruling  an   objection  filed   by  the  appellant.  The appellant appealed  and the appellate authority by its order dated 25th  March, 1977 modified the order of the Prescribed Authority inasmuch  as a  portion only  of the  building was released in favour of the third respondent and the appellant was permitted  to continue in the remaining portion, and the Prescribed Authority  was directed  to divide  the  bungalow accordingly. The appellant filed a writ petition in the High Court against  the order of the Appellate Authority, but the writ  petition  was  dismissed.  Against  its  dismissal  he applied in this Court for special leave to appeal and on 3rd January, 1978, that petition was also dismissed.      To give  effect  to  the  direction  of  the  Appellate Authority,  the  Prescribed  Authority  meanwhile  initiated proceedings for demar- 79 cation of  the premises and a partition scheme was prepared. During the  preparation of  the partition  scheme, Raj Kumar Sinha,  the   third  respondent’s   father,  died.  On  22nd September, 1978,  the appellant  filed an application before the Prescribed  Authority bringing the fact of this death to its notice  and praying that the partition scheme should not be  prepared.   The  Prescribed   Authority   rejected   the

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application. Appeal  by the  appellant was  dismissed by the Appellate Authority  on the ground that the order dated 25th March, 1977  directing a division of the premises had become final and  the  controversy  could  not  be  re-opened.  The appellant then  filed a writ petition before the High Court, and the  High Court  has maintained  the view  taken by  the Appellate Authority  and dismissed  the writ petition by its judgment dated 25th November, 1978.      We are  of  opinion  that  the  High  Court  is  right. Plainly, the  order dated  25th March, 1977 of the Appellate Authority releasing  a portion  of the premises in favour of the third  respondent and  leaving the  remaining portion in the tenancy  of the  appellant acquired  finality  when  the proceeding taken  against it  by the  appellant failed.  The order having  become final,  the  Prescribed  Authority  was bound to  give effect  to it.  In doing  so, the  Prescribed Authority  was   not  acting  outside  its  jurisdiction  or contrary to  law. The  application moved  by  the  appellant before the  Prescribed Authority  requesting it to take into account the  death of  Raj  Kumar  Sinha  was  misconceived, because it  did not  lie with  the Prescribed  Authority  to reopen proceedings which had been taken to the highest Court and had become final. It is true that subsequent events must be taken into account by a statutory authority or court when considering proceedings  arising out  of landlord’s petition for ejectment  of a  tenant on  the ground of the landlord’s personal need.  But in  the  present  case,  the  order  for release of  a portion of the accommodation required finality before the  death of  Raj Kumar  Sinha and  the  controversy concluded by it could not be reopened,      The appellant  has  vehemently  urged  that  being  the highest court  of the  land it  is open  to us to reopen the proceeding for release initiated by the third respondent. We do not  think we  can. The  present appeal is limited to the question which  arose before the Prescribed Authority on the application of  the  appellant  after  the  proceedings  for release had acquired finality and we must be confined to the consideration of  that question alone. We cannot reopen that which has  become  final  after  this  court  dismissed  the special leave  petition of  the appellant.  We may point out that we have been referred to s. 24 of the U.P. Urban 80 Building Act,  1972 in  support of  the contention  that the Prescribed  Authority   retains   control   over   ejectment proceedings, but we are not impressed by that contention.      The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. S. R.                                      Appeal dismissed. 81