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PETITIONER: SWAMI MOTOR TRANSPORT (P) LTD.AND ANOTHER

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: SRI SANKARASWAMIGAL MUTTAND ANOTHER(And Connected Appeals)

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 26/09/1962

BENCH: SUBBARAO, K. BENCH: SUBBARAO, K. SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P.(CJ) IMAM, SYED JAFFER WANCHOO, K.N. SHAH, J.C. AYYANGAR, N. RAJAGOPALA

CITATION:  1963 AIR  864            1963 SCR  Supl. (1) 282  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1970 SC 564  (43,44)  MV         1975 SC1146  (62)  RF         1986 SC  63  (25)  RF         1987 SC1272  (10)

ACT: Landlord and Tenant-Tenant building on leased land Right  of purchase-Whether  property-Withdrawal of protection of  non- residential building to certain towns-Whether discriminatory or  a  restriction  right of  property-Meaning  of  Property Madras City Tenants’ Protestant Act, 1921(III of 1922), s.9, as amended by Act XIX of 1955 and Act XIII of 1960-Constitu- tion of India, Arts. 14, 19 and 31.

HEADNOTE: Each  of the appellants in the two appeals who were  tenants of  land  in Tanjore on which non-residential  premises  had been  constructed by them, applied to the Munsif under s.  9 of  the  Madras City Tenants Protection Act,  1921  (111  of 1922)  to have the respective sites conveyed to  them  after fixing  the sale price as contemplated by the Act.   Pending the   decision  of  he  applications  by  the  Munsif,   the protection   and  rights  given  to  the  tenants  who   had constructed buildings on leased and by the Principal Act was withdrawn by Act XIII of 1960, in respect of non-residential buildings  in  Tanjore  but with regard  to  the  cities  of Madras,  Salem, Madurai, Coimbatore and Tiruchirappalli  the protection   and  rights  were  retained  both  as   regards residential  buildings and non-residential  buildings.   The appellants applied under Art. 226 of the Constitution to the High  Court of Madras praying for a mandamus  directing  the Munsif  to  determine their applications under s. 9  of  the Principal  Act  as  extended  to  the  town  of  Tanjore  by Notification  and the Act of 1955 ignoring Act XIII of  1960 which  was impugned as offending Arts. 14, 19 and 31 of  the Constitution.  The High Court upheld the validity of the Act following the earlier decision of that Court. Held that confining the protection to residential  buildings

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only  in  the  town of Tanjore while  giving  protection  to tenants of both residential and non-residential buildings in the other 283 towns  was based upon real differences between  Tanjore  and the  other towns regarding the pressure  on  non-residential accommodation   and   other   relevant   factors   including population  and that the differentiation was related to  the object  namely protecting tenants of  residential  buildings principally  and also of nonresidential buildings where  the need was most felt. Shri  Ram  Krishna Dalmia v. Shri Justice  S.  R.  Tendolkar [1959]  S.C.R.  279,  Bhudan Choudhury v.  State  of  Bihar, [1955] 1 S.C.R. 1045 and The State of West Bengal. v. Anuwar Ali, [1952] S.C.R. 284, referred to. Held, further, that Art. 19(1) (f) guarantees both  abstract as well as concrete rights of property and that property has the same meaning in Art. 19(1) (f) and Art. 31 (1). State of West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal Bose [1954] S.C.R. 587, The  Commissioner Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v.  Sri Lakshmindra  Thirtha  Swamiar  of Sri  Shirur  Nutt,  [1954] S.C.R.  1005 and Chiranjit Lal Choudhury v. Union of  India, [1950] 869, referred to. Held,  further, that law’ under Art. 31 must be a valid  law and to be valid it must stand the test of other  fundamental rights including Art. 19(1) (f) of the Constitution. Kavalappara Kottarathil Kochuni v. State of Madras, [1960] 3 S.C.R., 887 referred to. Held, further, that the right to purchase property conferred by  a  Statute  is in its nature the same as  the  right  of purchase conferred by contract and in neither event could it amount to a right of property. Maharana  Shri  Jayvantsinghji Ranmalsinghji  etc.  v.  The, State of  Gujrat, [1662] Supp. 2 S. C. R. 41 1. Held, also that the principal Act did not confer a right  on the tenant to the superstructure and therefore, the impugned Act did riot take away any such right.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 228 and 229 of 1962. Appeals  from the judgment and order dated June 26, 1961  of the Madras High Court in W. P. Nos. 829 and 833 of 1960. A.   V. Viswanatha Sastri, G. Ramaswami, J.  B.  Dadachanji, O. C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for the appellants. 284 S.   Kothandarama  Nayanar  and M. S.  K,  Aiyanyar,for  the respondent No. 1. A.   Ranganadham Chetty and A. V. Rangam,for Intervener  No. 1 (iii both the appeals.) R.Thiagarajan, for Intervener No. 2 (in C. A. No. 228  of 1962). 1962.   September  26.   The  judgment  of  the  Court   was delivered by SUBBA  RAO, J.-These two appeals, on certificate  raise  the same points and arise out of a common order made by the High Court.  of judicature at ’Madras in Writ Petitions Nos.  829 and 830 of 1960.  Both of them may conveniently be  disposed of together. The  facts  in Civil Appeal No. 228 of 1962 are  briefly  as follows : The first appellant is a limited company  carrying on transport business.  The second appellant is its managing director.   The  first appellant took over the  business  of

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Swami  Motor Service Company, of which the second  appellant was  the  Managing  Partner.  In his  capacity  as  Managing Partner  of  the said company, the second appellant  took  a lease of a vacant site, being survey No. 2770, belonging  to the  first respondent.  After the first appellant took  over the business of the said partnership company’ including  its leasehold  interest in the said site, the  first  respondent recognized  him  ;is his tenant and was receiving  the  rent from  him.   It is alleged that the  appellants  constructed many  valuable  structures  on the  said  site.   The  first responder  i.e.,’  Sri  Sankaraswamigal  Mutt,  through  its trustee,  filed a suit, O. S. No. 103 of 1953, in the  court of the District Munsif, Tanjore. for evicting the  appellant company  from the site; and on July 30, 1954  a  compromise- decree for eviction was made therein giving six month’s time for  the appellant-company to vacate the site.  The  decree- holder filed an execution petition  285 in the. said court against the first appellant for executing the decree.  Pending the execution petition, Madras Act  XIX of 1955 was passed empowering the State Government to extend the Madras City Tenants’ Protection Act, 1921 (III of 1922), hereinafter  called  the "Principal Act", to  any  municipal town  by  notification in the Fort St. George  Gazette.   In exercise  of the powers confer-red by Act XIX of  1955,  the Government  made an order notifying the Town of  Tanjore  to have  come within the purview of the Principal  Act.   Under the  provisions of the Principal Act, the  appellants  filed Original  Petition No. 39 of 1956 in the said court  for  an order  directing the execution of a conveyance of  the  said site  in  favour of the company on payment of a price  fixed by  the  court.  Those proceedings took  a  tortuous  course mainly,  it  is alleged, on account of  obstructive  tactics adopted by the respondents in anticipation of ,-an  expected legislation withdrawing the benefits conferred on tenants of non-residential  buildings  in  the  Town  of  Tanjore.   As anticipated  the State Legislature passed Act XIII of  1960, amending the Principal Act : the effect of the amendment was to  withdraw  the protection given to tenants  of  non-resi- dential  buildings  in  the municipal town  of  Tanjore  and certain  other towns.  Under the provisions of the  impugned Act,  proceedings  instituted under the  provisions  of  the Principal   Act   relating  to   non-residential   buildings ’situated in towns other than those ,preferred would  abate. The  appellants  filed  a petition under  Art.  226  of  the Constitution  in the High Court of judicature at Madras  for the  issue  of  a writ of mandamus  directing  the  District Munsif  to  dispose of the petition in accordance  with  the provisions of s. 9 of the Principal Act, as it stood  before its amendment by Act XIII of 1960. In  Civil  Appeal No. 229 of 1962 the subject  matter  is a site,  being survey No. 74, Railway Road, Tanjore  belonging to the first respondent to this 286 appeal.   The  appellant’s father executed a lease  deed  in favour  of the first respondent in respect of some parts  of the  said site; the lease deed contained a clause giving  an option to the tenant to renew the lease for a further period of 10 years.  It is alleged that the appellant’s father  had erected  substantial  structures at heavy cost on  the  site even  before the said lease as he was in possessions of  the said  site  as a tenant under the predecessor of  the  first respondent.   After the expiry of 10 years, the  appellant’s father.  exercised  the  option  and  continued  to  be   in possession of the property as tenant.  The first  respondent

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filed  a suit (O.  S. No. 315 of 1950) in the Court  of  the District  Munsif, Tanjore, for evicting the  appellant  from the property, and obtained a compromise decree dated January 10,  1952.   Under  the compromise decree  the  tenancy  was extended  to  12 years from January 1, 1952  and  after  the expiry  of that period the first respondent was entitled  to execute  the  decree and take possession of the  site  after removing  the  superstructures.   Subsequently  as   already noticed,  the provisions of the Principal Act were  extended to  the Town of Tanjore.  Thereupon the  appellant’s  father filed  O.  P. No. 43 of 1956 in the Court  of  the  District Munsif, Tanjore, for an order directing the first respondent to convey the site in his favour on payment of the price  to be  fixed by the court.  As in the first case, in this  case also  the  proceedings dragged on till the Act of  1955  was passed.   The appellant filed a petition under Art.  226  of the  Constitution in the High Court of judicature at  Madras for  the issue of a writ of mandamus directing the  District Munsif, Tanjore, to dispose of the application in accordance with  the  provisions  of the Principal  Act  prior  to  its amendment by Act XIII of 1960. In   both   the  petitions  the  appellants   attacked   the constitutional  validity  of  Act XIII of  1960.   The  High Court, by a common order, upheld the 287 constitutional  validity  of  the  said  Act  following  the decision  of  a,  division  Bench  of  the  same  Court,  in Suaminathan   v.  Sundara  (1).   These  two   appeals,   as aforesaid, have been preferred on certificate issued by  the High Court. Mr.  A.  V.  Viswanatha  Sastri,  learned  counsel  for  the appellants  in  both  the  appeals,  raised  before  us  the following points: (1) The 1960 Act infringes the fundamental right  of the appellants under Art. 14 of  the  Constitution for  two reasons, namely, (i) while the object  of  enacting the  1960  Act was for safeguarding’ tenants  from  eviction from  residential  buildings,  its  provisions  introduce  a classification   between   non-residential   buildings    in different  municipal  areas and gives relief to  tenants  of non-residential buildings in some towns and refuses to  give the  same  relief to similar tenants of  such  buildings  in other towns in the State and such a classification has abso- lutely  no relevance to the object sought to be achieved  by the  Act; and (ii) the 1960 Act makes a distinction  between non-residential   buildings  in  Madras,   Salem,   Madurai, Coimbatore and Tiruchirappalli on the one hand and those  in other  towns,  including  Tanjore, on the  other  and  gives protection  to the tenants of such buildings in  the  former group and denies the same to tenants of similar buildings in the latter group, though the alleged differences between the two  sets of localities have no reasonable relation  to  the object  sought  to be achieved, namely,  the  protection  of tenants who have built substantial structures from eviction. (2)  The 1960 Act also offends Arts. 19 (1)(f) and 31(1)  of the  Constitution as it is not a reasonable  restriction  in the  interest  of  the  public  on  the  proprietary  rights acquired  by  the appellants under the earlier  Act  XIX  of 1955. Mr. Nayanar, appearing for the first respondents in both the appeals,  contends  that ss. 3 and 9 of  the  Principal  Act could  not be invoked by the appellants, as the lease  deeds executed by them contain a (1)  I. L. R. 1961 Mad. 976. 288 clear  covenant that they would vacate their lands within  a

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prescribed  period  and as they had put up  their  buildings subsequent to the execution of the lease deeds.  He sustains the  constitutional validity of the 1960 Act on  the  ground that  it  neither  offends  Art.  14  nor  Art.  19  of  the Constitution. Mr.  A.  Ranganadham  Chetty, appearing  for  the  State  of Madras,  to  which notice was given, elaborates  the  second contention  advanced by learned counsel for the  respondents by placing before us some statistical data which,  according So  him, affords a reasonable basis for the  classification. As regards the contention based on Art. 19, he contends that the rights conferred under Act XIX of 1955, namely, right to compensation on eviction under s. 3 of the said Act and  the right  to  obtain a sale deed under s. 9 thereof,  are  only analogous  to  a  right  to sue or a  right  to  purchase  a property  and  they could not in any sense of  the  term  be equated with property rights. Before we consider the arguments, it would be convenient  to notice the scope of the relevant provisions of the Principal Act,  Act XIX of 1955 and Act XIII of 1960.   The  Principal Act,  as  amended by Act XIX of 1955, was  enacted,  as  its preamble  shows,  to give protection to certain  classes  of tenants  who in municipal towns and adjoining areas  in  the State of Madras have constructed buildings on others’  lands in  the hope that they would not be evicted so long as  they paid  a  fair rent for the land.  The gist of  the  relevant provisions  of the Principal Act, as amended by Act  XIX  of 1955,  may be stated thus: The Act applies to  any  building whether it is residential or non-residential.  Every  tenant shall  on ejectment be entitled to be paid  as  compensation the  value of any building, which may have been  erected  by him and also the value of trees which may have been  planted by  him; in a suit for ejectment the court  shall  ascertain the amount of compensation payable  289 by  the landlord to the tenant and the decree  shall  direct that  the  landlord shall be put in possession of  the  land only  on  payment  of the said amount in  court  within  the prescribed  time; if the landlord is unable or unwilling  to pay  the  compensation within the prescribed  time,  he  may apply for fixing a reasonable rent for the occupation of the land   by  the  tenant;  a  tenant,  who  is   entitled   to compensation and against whom a suit for ejectment has  been instituted, may apply for an order that the landlord may  be directed to sell the land to him for a price to be fixed  by the  court, and thereupon the court shall fix the  price  in the manner prescribed in s. 9 and direct the said amount  to be  paid to the landlord by the tenant within  a  particular time  and in default his application shall stand  dismissed. Nothing  contained in the Act shall affect any  stipulations made by the tenant in writing registered as to the  erection of buildings, in so far as they relate to buildings  erected after  the date of the contract : the provisions of the  Act apply to suits for ejectment which are pending and in  which decrees  for  ejectment have been passed but have  not  been executed  before the coming into force of the Act: vide  ss. 2(1),  2(1-A),  3,  4,  6, 9 and 12  of  the  Act.   It  is, therefore, clear that under the Principal Act tenants in the Madras City acquired valuable rights which they did not have before the said Act was passed.  Prior to the Principal  Act a  tenant of a land over which he had put up  buildings  for residential  or  non-residential purposes was liable  to  be evicted  in  accordance with law and his only right  was  to remove  the superstructure put up by him on the land  before delivering vacant possession.  But after the Principal  Act,

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a  tenant similarly situated has an option to  claim  either compensation  for  the superstructure put up by  him  or  to apply  to  the  court to have the land sold  to  him  for  a consideration to be fixed by it. The Principal Act was amended by the Madras Act XIX of  1955 empowering the State Government 290 to  extend,  by notification in the  Official  Gazette,  the protection given by the Principal Act to tenants       of any other municipal town in the State of Madras   and    any specified village within five miles of the City of Madras or such  municipal  towns  who have  constructed  buildings  in others’  lands with the hope that they would not be  evicted so long as they paid fair rent.  In exercise of the power so conferred, the State Government issued on March 28, 1956,  a notification  extending the Principal Act to  the  municipal town  of Tanjore.  The result of the notification  was  that tenants  like the appellants who were tenants of  land  over which  they had put up non-residential buildings acquired  a right  to ask for compensation for the buildings so  erected on  ejectment  or  to  apply  to  court  for  directing  the decree-holder. to sell the land to the tenants after  fixing the price in the manner prescribed in the Act.  This Act was also   extended  to  various  other  towns   like   Madurai, Coimbatore, Salem and Tiruchirappalli. The  Legislature again changed its mind and passed Act  XIII of 1960.  By s. 3 of that Act the following amendments  were made in s. 2 of the Principal Act:               "(i)  for  clause (1),  the  following  clause               shall be               substituted, namely:-               (1)   ’Building’  means any building,  hut  or               other  structure, whether of masonry,  bricks,               wood,   mud,  metal  or  any  other   material               whatsoever- used-               (i)for    residential    or    non-residential               purposes,  in  the  City  of  Madras,  in  the               municipal towns of Coimbatore, Madurai,  Salem               and  Tiruchirappalli and in any village  within               five  miles  of the City of Madras or  of  the               municipal towns aforesaid and               291               (ii)  for  residential purposes only,  in  any               other  area,  and  includes  the  appurtenance               thereto."               Section 9. Every proceeding pending before any               Court, other than a proceeding relating to any               property situated in-               (i)the City of Madras,               (ii)the   municipal   towns   of   Coimbatore,               Madurai, Salem and Tiruchirappalli, and               (iii)any  village  within five miles  of  the               City  of  Madras  or of  the  municipal  towns               aforesaid,               on the date of the publication of this Act  in               the  Fort St. George Gazette,  and  instituted               under  the  provisions of the  Principal  Act,               shall in so far as such proceeding relates  to               non-residential  buildings,  abate,  and   all               rights  and privileges which may have  accrued               immediately before such date to any person  in               respect  of any property situated in any  area               other  than  the areas referred  to  above  by               virtue of the Principal Act, shall, in so  far               as  they relate to non-residential  buildings,

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             cease   and   determine  and  shall   not   be               enforceable: Provided  that  nothing contained in this section  shall  be deemed  to  invalidate any suit or proceeding in  which  the decree  or  order passed has been executed or  satisfied  in full before the date mentioned in this section. The  result  of  this  amending  Act  in  respect  of   non- residential  buildings  in  places other than  the  City  of Madras  and the other specified municipal towns is that  all proceedings pending in courts in respect of those  buildings abated and the rights acquired by tenants under the 1955 Act in  respect  of the said buildings  are  extinguished.   The rights,  so far relevant to the present enquiry,  which  the tenants 292 had acquired under the 1955 Act were: (i) they were entitled on  ejectment  to be paid as compensation the value  of  the buildings  erected  by them or by  their  predecessorsin-in- terest, (ii) the court before issuing a decree for  eviction should  ascertain the amount due to a tenant and the  decree for  eviction. should be made conditional on the payment  of the decree amount, (iii) in suits where decree for ejectment had  been  passed  before the 1955 Act came  into  force,  a tenant  could file an application for ascertainment  of  the compensation  due in execution and for a fresh decree to  be passed  in  accordance with s. 4 of the Principal  Act,  and (iv) he had also a right, at his option, to apply within the prescribed  time  to the court for an  order  directing  the landlord  to sell the land to him for a price fixed  by  the court,  whether a decree for ejectment had or had  not  been passed.  The tenants of non-residential buildings in  places other  than the City of Madras and the  specified  municipal towns  lost  the said rights after the 1960  Act  came  into force. The first question is whether the 1960 Act, in so far as  it withdrew  the  rights  conferred upon the  tenants  of  non- residential  buildings  in Tanjore, offends Art. 14  of  the Constitution, or whether it can be justified on the doctrine of  classification.   The  law on the  subject  is  so  well settled that it does not call for an extensive restatement : it  would  be  enough if the relevant  propositions  in  the judgment  of this Court in Shri Ram Krishna, Dalmia v.  Shri Justice S. R. Tendolkar(1) are noticed, and they are :               "(1)  there is always a presumption in  favour               of  the constitutionality of an enactment  and               the burden is upon him who attacks it to  show               that  there has been a clear transgression  of               the constitutional principles               2     it must be presumed that the legislature               understands and correctly appreciates the need               (1) [1959] S. C. R. 279, 297-298.               293.               of its own people, that its laws arc  directed               to  problems made manifest by  experience  and               that its discrimination are based on  adequate               grounds ;               (3)   in  order to sustain the presumption  of               constitutionality the court may take into con-               sideration   matters  of   common   knowledge,               matters  of common report, the history of  the               times  and  may assume every  state  of  facts               which can be conceived existing at the time of               legislation ; and               (4)   while  good faith and knowledge  of  the               existing   conditions   on  the  part   of   a

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             legislature  are to be presumed, if  there  is               nothing  on  the  face  of  the  law  or   the               surrounding   circumstances  brought  to   the               notice    of   the   court   on   which    the               classification  may reasonably be regarded  as               based,  the presumption  of  constitutionality               cannot  be  carried to the  extent  of  always               holding  that there must be  some  undisclosed               and  unknown  reasons for  subjecting  certain               individuals  or  corporations  to  hostile  or               discriminating legislation." All the said propositions are subject to the main  principle of  classification,  namely,  that  classification  must  be founded  on intelligible differential and  the  differential must  have  a rational relation to the object sought  to  be achieved  by  the  statute  in  question  ;  and  that   the classification  may be founded on different bases, such  as, geographical, or according to objects or occupations or  the like : see Budhan Chaudhry v. The State of Bihar(1) and  The State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar.  (2) Bearing the said well settled principles in mind, let us now proceed  to consider them in relation to the facts  of  this case.  The first contention is that the object of the Act is to  safeguard  the tenants from  eviction  from  residential quarters, but it affords (1) [1955] 1 S. C. R. 1045.  (2) [1952] S. C. R. 284. 294 protection  to tenants of non-residential buildings  in  the City  of  Madras,  in  the  municipal  towns  of  Coimbatore Madurai, Salem and Tiruchirappalli and in any village within five  miles of the aforesaid City and municipal  towns,  and there   is   no   rational   relation   between   the   said classification and the object of the Act.  The object of the Act,  the  argument proceeds, is to protect the  tenants  of residential  buildings,  whereas the Act protects  also  the tenants  of non-residential buildings in the aforesaid  City and  municipal towns.  So stated the argument appears to  be plausible, but a closer scrutiny reveals that the object  of the  Act  is  to protect not  only  tenants  of  residential buildings  but also of other buildings, though it is  mainly conceived  to protect the tenants of residential  buildings. The  following  is  the statement  of  objects  and  reasons attached to Act XIII of 1960:               "’The  Madras  City Tenants’  Protection  Act,               1921,  was  enacted with the  main  object  of               safeguarding  the tenants from  eviction  from               residential  quarters.   In  consistence  with               this  object  it is proposed to  restrict  the               application   of  the  Madras  City   Tenants’               Protection Act, 1921 (Madras Act III of  1922)               to residential buildings only." It  will be noticed from the above that the main  object  of the  Act  is  to  safeguard  ’the  tenants  of   residential buildings  from  eviction but it is not the sole  object  of that legislation.  The objects of the 1960 Act only refer to the  objects of the Principal Act.  The objects and  reasons of  the  Principal  Act are given in  the  Fort  St.  George Gazette dated July 26, 1921, at p. 1491.  The relevant  part of the objects reads thus :               "In many parts of the City of Madras  dwelling               houses and other buildings have, from time  to               time,   been  erected  by  tenants   on   land               belonging  to others in full expectation  that               subject to

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              295               payment  of  fair ground rent, they  would  be              left undisturbed in possession, notwithstanding               the absence of any specific contract as to the               duration  of the lease or the terms  on  which               the  buildings were to be  erected.   Recently               attempts made or steps taken to evict a  large               number  of such tenants, have shown that  such               expectations     are     likely     to      be               defeated........................... The  Bill  provides for the payment of compensation  to  the tenant  in case of ejectment for the value of any  buildings which   may   have   been  erected  by   him   or   by   his predecessors-in-intercst.   It also provides for  settlement of fair rent at the instance of the landlord." The  object of the said Act was to protect the  tenants  not only  of dwelling houses in the City of Madras but  also  of other  buildings  in  that  City.   The  provisions  of  the Principal  Act  also,  it is not  disputed,  apply  both  to residential and non-residential buildings.  So too the  1955 Act.  Therefore, when in the " objects and reasons" attached to  Act XIII of 1960 the authors of that Act stated that  it was enacted with the main object of safeguarding the tenants from  eviction  from residential quarters,  they  were  only emphasizing upon the main object but were not excluding  the operation  of that Act to non-residential buildings.  So  it is  not correct to state that the object of the Act is  only to protect the tenants of residential buildings.  There  are no merits in this contention. The  more  serious contention is that there is  no  rational basis   for  classifying  the  tenants  of   non-residential buildings  in the City of Madras and the municipal towns  of Madurai,  Goimbatore Salem and Tiruchirappalli and those  of similar  buildings in other towns like Tanjore.  It is  said that  if  protection is necessary for the  tenants  of  non- residential  buildings in the said City and towns, the  same protection  is  equally  necessary for  tenants  of  similar buildings 296 in  Tanjore and other towns.  To state it  differently,  the argument  is  that  there are  no  intelligible  differences between the non-residential buildings located in the City of Madras and the municipal towns of Madurai, Coimbatore, Salem and Tiruchirappalli and those situated in other towns.   The learned  judges of the High Court in Swaminathan v.  Sundara (1),which  was followed in’ the present case,  adverting  to this argument observed at p. 987 :               "It  is  apparent that having  regard  to  the               large  population in the first five areas  and               the large scale commercial activities in these               areas,  the Legislature thought fit that  non-               residential  quarters occupied by  tenants  on               lands  belonging  to  others  should  also  be               offered  relief from being  evicted  summarily               and arbitrarily." This  passage  was  criticized by learned  counsel  for  the appellants and it was asked, what was the relevancy  between the  population  of  the different towns in  the  matter  of eviction  of  tenants from non-residential buildings  ?  The population  of a town is not a relevant circumstance  though its density may be : the pressure on the buildings or on the sites suitable for building purposes does not depend  solely upon population without reference to the area available  for building  purposes,  so  the  argument  proceeds.   Mr.   A. Ranganadhm  Chetty,  appearing  for  the  state  of  Madras,

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attempted  to place before us statistics to  establish  that towns   preferred  under.  the  Act  are  highly   populated industrial  and commercial centers of the State compared  to other  towns  like  Tanjore  and,  therefore,  there   would necessarily be high pressure on non residential buildings in the  said localities and consequently a spate of  evictions. Before looking into the statistics it would be convenient to notice the allegations made in the affidavits.  On behalf of the State of Madras, J. Sivanandam, Secretary to Government, has filed an affidavit, wherein he says in paragraph 8 : (1)  1. L. R. 1961 Mad. 976.  297               "’On  facts  the position is that  these  four               towns  of Madurai, Tiruchirappalli, Salem  and               Coimbatore  ranked the first four next to  the               City  of  Madras  in  population,  income  and               commercial activities and a very large  number               of  tenants had been enjoying  the  protection               afforded  by  the then existing  provision  of               this  Act, in respect of residential and  non-               residential   buildings  as  well.    It   was               therefore thought that it would not be  proper               to deprive these tenants of the protection  in               respect of non-residential buildings. It  may at once be noticed that the industrial potential  of the  preferred towns is not specifically mentioned.  But  it appears to us that the expression "commercial activities" is used  in a comprehensive sense so as to take  in  industrial activities.  This statement is sought to be supported in the affidavit by the proceedings of relevant authorities and the correspondence  that passed between the State and the  Union Governments.    The  following  extract  from   the   Select Committee’s proceedings throws further light on the  subject :               "................ on the reports received from               Collectors,  the Act was extended  to  certain               Municipalities.   But it was found  that  such               extension   caused  inconvenience  to   public               bodies and other institutions which owned  the               lands  inasmuch as they were not able  to  get               sufficient  returns  from these  to  carry  on               their      activities      under       present               conditions...........................  However               it was represented that in the case of  Madras               City   such   a   restriction   would    cause               considerable  hardship to the large number  of               small   business   establishments   and    the               privilege and concession enjoyed by them  over               such  a long period should not  be  interfered               with.    While   the   Government   felt   the               reasonableness of this demand that in the City               non-residential   buildings  should   not   be               excluded from the protection afforded by the               298               Act, they were of the view that in place where               the provisions were being extended they should               apply only to residential buildings."               "............  having regard to the wishes  of               certain Hon. members that not only in the City               but in other municipalities also there  should               be no distinction between residential and non-               residential   buildings,  he  (the   Chairman)               proposed  to  add the four  municipalities  of               Madurai,     Tiruchirappalli,    Salem     and               Coimbatore, in sub-clause (1) of the  proposed

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             clause (1)." These passages disclose not only the legislative objects but also the political pressures for certain amendments.  But we are  not  concerned  with  the  political  aspects  of   the legislation   but  only  with  its  objects.   The   special treatment  given  to  the  City  of  Madras  and  the  other specified  town  is  based upon the fact that  there  are  a number of small business establishments in Madras and  other specified towns implying thereby that there are not so  many such  establishments  in other  towns.   The  correspondence between the Government of India and the Government of Madras throws light on this question.  It is stated therein               "Most  of  the  tenancies  of  non-residential               buildings   which  enjoyed   protection   from               eviction  are  in the City of Madras  and  the               Municipal towns of Madurai, Coimbatore’  Salem               and Tiruchirappalli which have been classed as               Special     Grade    or    Selection     Grade               municipalities  on  the basis  of  income  and               population ;               "This   concession  is  considered   necessary               because in the City of Madras and in the  said               four Municipal towns there are a large  number               of   such  tenants  to  whom  denial  of   the               protection  will cause great  hardship.   They               have  been enjoying this protection  for  some               time past and they have invested large sums of               money in the hope                299               that they will not be evicted so long as  they               pay the rent due." This again emphasizes the fact that the preferred towns  are of special importance and that comparatively a large  number of  non-residential buildings are situated in the said  City and  towns.  G. O. No. 331, L. A., dated February 18,  1953, passed  by  the  Government of Madras also  shows  the  com- parative importance of the said towns.  It is stated therein :               "They (Government) consider, however, that  in                             view  of the size and importance of  the  thre e               municipalities  (Tiruchirappalli,   Coimbatore               and Vijayawada) referred to above and also  of               those  of  the Salem  Municipality,  the  four               municipalities stand distinctly apart from the               other first grade municipalities, excluding of               course Madurai Municipality which stands in  a               class  by itself.  The Government  accordingly               direct  that  with effect  from  1-4-1953  the               municipalities   of  Coimbatore,   Salem   and               Tiruchirappalli  And Vijayawada be  classified               as               selection               grade               municipalities........................ ". In  the reply affidavit many of the factual assertions  made in  the counter-affidavit have been denied.  It  is  alleged that the number of tenants of non-residential buildings  who enjoyed  the  benefit  of  the  provisions  of  the  Act  in municipal  towns like Tanjore, Vellore and Connors  is  also large.  It is denied that the preferred towns other than the City of Madras have been enjoying the protection for a  long time,  for the amending Act itself was passed only in  1955. It  is pointed out that the population of a town is  irrele- vant but density of population matters and that the  density of  population in Tanjore, Coimbatore, Madurai and Salem  is the  same.  Out of the allegations  and  counter-allegations

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the  following  facts emerge (1) Madras is a city  of  large population and 300 commercial  importance;  (2)  Madurai  is  classified  as  a special   grade  municipality  and  the  municipalities   of Coimbatore,  Salem  and Tiruchirappalli as  selection  grade municipalities on account of their size and importance: they have   comparatively   larger  population   and   commercial potentialities;  (3)  in the said towns there  are  a  large number of nonresidential buildings; and (4) except for  some vague  averments  made  in the  reply  affidavit,  there  is nothing  on  record  to establish that the  number  of  non- residential  buildings  in Tanjore compares  favorably  with that  in  the  preferred towns.  These facts  are,  to  some extent,  supported by the statistical data furnished  before us  from  authorized Government publications.   In  ",Madras District Gazetteers, Madurai" it is stated at p. 172:               "Madurai  is one of the very few districts  in               this  State  in which  a  comparatively  large               portion of the population, about 37 per cent.,               lives   by   industries,   trade   and   other               avocations.  I This is no wonder, seeing  that               it  has  never  had, in  spite  of  irrigation               works,   any  facilities  like   Tanjore   for               absorbing the great bulk of its population  in               agriculture.   In fact it stands next  to  the               Coimbatore    district   in    possessing    a               considerable    proportion   of    the    non-               agricultural population". Though the statement refers to the districts as a whole,  it is  well known that most of the industries are  concentrated in  the  municipal  towns of  Madurai  and  Coimbatore.   In "India,  1962" the following figures of population  in  some Towns of Madras State are given: Madurai       ..        4,24,975 Coimbatore              2,85,263 Tiruchirappalli.....    2,49,933 Salem                   2,49,084 Tuticorin               1,24,273 Vellore...              1,13,580 301 Tanjore ... ... 1,10,968 Nagercoil ... ..1,06,497 It is not necessary to pursue the matter further. it is true that   population   alone  cannot  be  a   basis   for   the classification  made  under the Act,  but  concentration  of large  population  is generally found only  in  towns  where there  are commerce and industries.  Though it  is  possible that a smaller town with a lesser population may also  ’have heavy  industries  and  commercial activities,  that  is  an exception  rather  than  the rule.  But  in  this  case  the Gazetteer  supports  the averment made by the State  in  the affidavit that the municipal towns selected for preferential treatment are more advanced commercially than other towns in the State.  Though the Government, at the earlier stages ’of this litigation or even before the 1960 Act was passed,  did not  bring out these differences based upon  commercial  and industry  as  prominently  as its counsel now  seeks  to  do before  us,  we  cannot  brush  aside  the  argument  as  an afterthought.  That apart, the Government of Madras was  not a  party in the High Court and it had no opportunity to  put forward  its  case before that Court.  On the basis  of  the allegations  made  in the affidavit filed on behalf  of  the State of Madras, supported as it is by the statistical  data furnished before us, we hold that there are real differences

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between  non-residential buildings in the towns of  Madurai, Coimbatore,  Salem  and Tiruchirappalli and those  in  other towns of the Madras State which have reasonable nexus to the object sought to be achieved by the Act. The  more difficult point is the impact of Arts. 19 (1)  (f) and 31 (1) of the Constitution on the impugned provisions of the  Act.   The relevant Articles of the  Constitution  read thus:               Article  19 (1) (f).  All citizens shall  have               the  right  to acquire, hold  and  dispose  of               property.               302               Article 31. (1).  No person shall be  deprived               of his property save by authority of law. To  seek the protection of either of these Articles it  must be established that the tenants of residential buildings  in Tanjore  had acquired a right to property, for  unless  they had  acquired  such  a right, the 1960 Act  could  not  have deprived  them of such a right or imposed  any  restrictions thereon.   The  question, therefore, is whether  the  rights created by the 1955 Act by extending the provisions of ss. 3 and 9 of the Principal Act to such tenants had given them  a right to property.  The argument of learned counsel for  the State of Madras may be summarized thus: Art. 19(1) (f) deals with  abstract  rights of property, while Art. 31  (1)  with concrete  rights; under Art.31(1) there is no limitation  on the  power  of  the appropriate Legislature to  make  a  law depriving a person of his property; the only restriction  in the  case of deprivation of property by a State is  that  it can  be  done  only  by  a statutory  law;  if  so,  on  the assumption  that the Act of 1955 conferred a concrete  right of  property  on  the appellants,  they  have  been  validly deprived   of  it  by  the  1960  Act  and,  therefore,   no fundamental  right of the appellant had been infringed;  if, on  the other hand, the argument proceeds, Arts. 19 (1)  (f) and  31(1)  are both held to relate to  concrete  rights  of property,  it would lead to two anomalies, namely, (i)  Art. 31(1)  would  become  otiose, and  (ii)  as  deprivation  of property  cannot possibly be a restriction on the  right  to hold property, every law depriving a person of his  property would  invariably infringe Art.19 and, therefore,  would  be void.   In  support of his contentions he  relies  upon  the observations of Patanjali Sastri, C. J., and Das, J., as  he then  was,  in  The State of West  Bengal  v.  Subodh  Gopal Bose(1).   In  that case Patanjali Sastri, C. J.,  made  the following observations:               "’I  have  no doubt that the  framers  of  our               Constitution  drew  the same  distinction  and               classed               (1)...[1954] S. C. R. 587. 597.                303               the  natural  right or capacity of  a  citizen               "’to  acquire  hold and dispose  of  property"               with;   other  natural  rights  and   freedoms               inherent  in the status of a free citizen  and               embodies  them  in article 19(1),  while  they               provided for the protection of concrete rights               of property owned by a person in article 31." These  observations  no  doubt  support  learned   counsel’s contention,  but  this  Court in a  later  decision  in  The Commissioner,  Hindu  Religious Endowment’3, Madras  v.  Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt(1) considered the said observations and remarked:               "This,  it may be noted, was an expression  of               ,Opinion  by the learned Chief  justice  alone

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             and it was not the decision of the court;  for               out  of  the  other four  learned  judges  who               together  with the Chief  justice  constituted               the  Bench, two did not definitely agree  with               this  view,  while the remaining two  did  not               express  any  opinion one way  or  the  other.               This  point  was not raised before us  by  the               Advocate-General  for Madras, who appeared  in               support  of  the appeal., nor by  any  of  the               other  counsel  appearing in this  case.   The               learned   Attorney-General   himself    stated               candidly that he was not prepared to  support               the  view taken by the late Chief  justice  as               mentioned  above and he only raised the  point               to get an authoritative pronouncement upon  it               by the court.  In our opinion, it would not be               proper  to express any final opinion upon  the               point in the present case-when we had not  the               advantage  of  any arguments addressed  to  us               upon it.  We would prefer to proceed, as  this               court has proceeded all along, in dealing with               similar cases in the past, on the footing that               article 19 (1) (f) applies equally to concrete               as well as abstract rights of property."               (1)   [1954] S. C. R. 1005, 1020.               304               Though  this Court has not  finally  expressed               its  opinion  on the question raised,  it  has               pointed out that it has proceeded all  through               on  the basis that Art. 19(1) applies  equally               to  concrete  as well as  abstract  rights  of               property.   In Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri v.  The               Union of India(1), Mukherjea,  J., as he  then               was,  held  that the right  to  hold  property               under  Art.  19  (1)  (f)meant  the  right  to               possess  as  well as enjoy  all  the  benefits               which were ordinarily attached to ownership of               property. jagannadhadas, J., in The State  of               West  Bengal v. Subodh Gopal Bose(2).  dealing               with this point observed at pp. 668-669:               "To  me, it appears, that article  19(1)  (f),               while probably meant to relate to the  natural               rights of the citizen, comprehends within  its               scope also concrete property rights.  That,  I               believe,   is  how  it  has   been   generally               understood  without question in various  cases               these  nearly four years in this Court and  in               the High Courts". The  phraseology  used in Art. 19(1)(f) is  wide  and  prima facie  it  takes  in its sweep both  abstract  and  concrete rights  of property.  To suggest that abstract rights  of  a citizen in property cannot be infringed by the State but his concrete  rights can be, is to deprive Art. 19(1)(f) of  its real content.  It would mean that the State could not make a law declaring generally that a citizen cannot acquire,  hold and dispose of property, but it could make a law taking away the property acquired or held by him and preventing him from disposing  it of It would mean that the  Constitution-makers declared  platitudes  in the Constitution  while  they  gave unrestricted  liberty to the Legislature to  interfere  with impunity with property rights of citizens.  If this  meaning was  given to Art. 19(1)(f), the same meaning would have  to be given to other clauses of Art. 19(1) with the result that the  Legislature  cannot  make a  law  preventing  generally citizens from expressing their views, assembling peacefully,

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forming associations, and moving (1) [1950] s. C. R. 869. (2) [1954] S. C. R. 587, 597.  305 freely  throughout the country, but can make a  law  curbing their  activities  when  they are speaking,  when  they  are assembling  and when they are moving freely in the  country. Such   an   intention  shall  not  be  attributed   to   the Constituent-Assembly,  unless the Article is clear  to  that effect.    Indeed,  the  words,  as  we  have  stated,   are comprehensive and take in both the rights.  Though there  is no  final  expression  of  opinion by  this  Court  on  this question,  as has been pointed out, this Court and the  High Courts  all  through since the date of promulgation  of  the Constitution  proceeded  on  the  assumption  that  Art.  19 applied  to both the rights.  We hold that Art.  19  applies both to concrete as well as to abstract rights of property. It  is  said  that if this construction  be  given  to  Art. 19(1)(f), Art. 31(1) would become otiose.  We do not see how it  becomes  an  unnecessary provision.   Article  31(1)  is couched in a negative form.  It says that no person shall be deprived  of  his  property save by authority  of  law.   In effect  it declares a fundamental right against  deprivation of  property  by executive action ; but it does  not  either expressly  or by necessary implication take the law  out  of the limitations imp limit in Art. 19(1)(f) of the  Constitu- tion.  The law in Art. 31(1) must be a valid law and to be a valid  law  it  must stand the  test  of  other  fundamental rights.   All  the  other points urged  in  support  of  the contention have been considered by this Court in Kavalappara Kottarathil Kochuni v. The State of Madra’s(1), where it was held that a law depriving a person of his property must be a valid law and, therefore, it should not infringe Art. 19  of the Constitution.  We have no reason to differ from the view expressed  therein.  Indeed that view has been  followed  in later decisions.  We, therefore, hold that a law depriving a person  of his property would be bad unless it amounts to  a reasonable restriction in the (1)  [1960] 3 S. C. R. 887. 306 interest of the general public or for the protection of  the interests of Scheduled Tribes. We  now come to the last question, namely, whether the  1960 Act deprived the appellants of their right in property.   To state it differently, the question is whether a tenant of  a non-residential building in Tanjore had acquired a right  of property  under the 1955 Act and whether he was deprived  of that right or otherwise restricted in the enjoyment  thereof by the 1960 Act.  The 1955 Act, as we have already  noticed, conferred  two  rights on such a tenant, namely,  (i)  every tenant  on  ejectment  would  be  entitled  to  be  paid  as compensation  the value of any building erected by him,  and (ii) such a tenant against whom a suit in ejectment has been instituted has an option to apply to the court for an  order directing  the landlord to sell the land to him for a  price to  be fixed by the court.  We are not concerned  here  with the  rights conferred under s. 3 of the Act, for the  simple reason  that  neither  of the  appellants  claimed  a  right thereunder.  Both of them have taken proceedings only  under s. 9 of the Act and they have approached the High Court  for a  writ of mandamus that the petition should be disposed  of under  the  provisions  of s. 9 of the  Act.   This  Court’s opinion  on the question of the constitutional  validity  of the  Act  in so far as it deprived the appellants  of  their right  under s. 3 of the Principal Act is not called  for  :

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that  will have to be decided in an appropriate  case.   The question  that falls to be considered is whether the  second right,  namely, the right of a tenant to apply to the  court for an order directing the landlord to sell the land to  him for  a price to be fixed by it, under s. 9 of the  Principal Act  is  a  right to property.  The law of  India  does  not recognize  equitable ’estates.  No authority has been  cited in  support  of  the contention that a  statutory  right  to purchase  land  is, or confers, an interest or  a  right  in property.  The fact that the right is created not by  307 contract  but by a statute cannot make a difference  in  the content or the incidents of the right: that depends upon the nature  and  the scope of the right  conferred.   The  right conferred  is  a right to purchase land.  If  such  a  right conferred  under a contract is not a right of property,  the fact that such a right stems from a statute cannot obviously expand its content or make it any the less a non-proprietary right.   In  our view, a statutory right to  apply  for  the purchase land is not a right of property.  It is settled law that  a contract to purchase a property does not  create  an interest in immovable property.  Different consideration may arise  when  a statutory sale has been  effected  and  title passed  to a tenant : that was the basis of the judgment  of this  Court  in Jayvantsinghji v. State  of  Gujarat(1),  on which  Mr.  Viswanatha  Sastri  relied.   But  we  are   not concerned  here with such a situation. It is said  that  the appellants have acquired a right under the 1955 Act to  hold and enjoy the buildings erected by them by exercising  their right  to purchase the site of the said buildings  and  that the impugned Act indirectly deprived them of their right  to hold  the  said  buildings.   This  argument  mixes  up  two concepts,  namely, (i) the scope and content of  the  right, and  (ii) the effect and consequences of the deprivation  of that  right  on  the other  properties  of  the  appellants. Section  9 of the Principal Act, extended by the  1955  Act, only  confers a right in respect of the land and not of  the superstructure.  If that Act held the field, the  appellants could have purchased the land, but by reason of the 1960 Act they could no longer do so.  Neither the 1955 Act  conferred any  right  as  to  the superstructure under  s.  9  of  the Principal Act nor did the 1960 Act take that right away. If this distinction between the land and the superstructure  is borne in mind the untenability of the argument would  become obvious.   The  1960  Act does not in  any  way  affect  the appellants’ fundamental right.  Therefore, their prayer that the District Munsif should be directed to proceed with the (1)..[1962] Supp. 2 S. C. R. 41 1. 308 disposal of the applications filed by them under s. 9 of the Principal Act could not be granted. In  this view it is not necessary to express our opinion  on the  question  whether  the appellants., by  reason  of  the specific  stipulation  in their lease deeds,  would  not  be entitled  to  any relief even under the 1955  Act.   In  the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed with costs.   One hearing fee. Appeals dismissed.