REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.     6423        OF 2010 (Arising out of SLP (C) NO. 4216 OF 2008)

SUSHIL KUMAR SINGHAL …Appellant

Versus

THE REGIONAL MANAGER,  PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK      …Respondent

J U D G M E N T   

Dr. B. S. CHAUHAN, J.

1. Leave granted.   

2. This  appeal  has  been  preferred  against  the  Judgment  

and Order dated 10.09.2007 passed by High Court of Punjab  

& Haryana in Civil Writ Petition 14014 of 2007, by which the  

High Court had dismissed the writ petition for quashing the  

award  dated  3rd  January,  2007,  passed  by  the  Central  

Government  Industrial  Tribunal-cum-Labour  Court-II  at  

Chandigarh (hereinafter  called as,  “Tribunal”),  by which the  

Tribunal  had  upheld  the  dismissal  of  the  appellant  from

service on the ground of conviction of the appellant in criminal  

case involving moral turpitude.   

3. Facts and circumstances giving rise to the present case  

are  that  the  appellant  was  appointed  as  a  Peon  in  the  

respondent-Bank,  Kaithal Branch, on 01.12.1971 and stood  

confirmed on the said post vide order dated 28.12.1977.  The  

appellant was handed over cash of Rs.5000/-, to deposit the  

same  as  dues  for  the  Telephone  Bill  in  the  Post  Office.  

However, it was not deposited by the appellant, therefore, the  

bank lodged FIR No. 171 under Section 409 of Indian Penal  

Code, 1860 (hereinafter called “lPC”) against the appellant, on  

27.04.1982,  in  Police  Station,  City  Kaithal.   Appellant  was  

tried  for  the  said  offence.   After  conclusion  of  trial,  the  

appellant was convicted by the competent Criminal Court vide  

Judgment and Order dated 28.01.1988.  The respondent-Bank  

issued  a  Show  Cause  Notice  dated  01.03.1988  to  the  

appellant,  proposing  dismissal  from  service  and  asked  the  

appellant to show cause within a period of seven days. The  

appellant submitted the reply dated 08.03.1988.  However, the  

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respondent-Bank  dismissed  the  appellant  from  service  vide  

order dated 09.03.1988.   

4. Being  aggrieved,  the  appellant  raised  an  industrial  

dispute  under  the  Industrial  Disputes  Act,  1947  and  the  

matter was referred to the Tribunal.   In the meanwhile, the  

appeal filed by the appellant against the order of conviction  

was decided by the appellate Court vide judgment and order  

dated  29.5.1989.   The  appellate  Court  maintained  the  

conviction, but granted him the benefit of probation under The  

Probation of Offenders Act,  1958 (hereinafter called as, ”Act  

1958) and released the appellant on probation.  The Tribunal  

made the award dated 03.01.2007, rejecting the claim of the  

appellant and holding his dismissal from service to be justified  

and in accordance with law.   

5. Being aggrieved, the appellant challenged the said award  

of the Tribunal by filing the writ petition No. 14014 of 2007,  

before the High Court.  His petition also stood dismissed vide  

impugned Judgment and order dated 10.09.2007.  Hence, this  

appeal.   

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6. Sh.  Pradeep  Gupta,  learned  counsel  appearing  for  the  

appellant,  has  submitted  that  once  the  appellant  had been  

granted  the  benefit  of  the  Act,  1958,  the  respondent-Bank  

ought to have considered his case for reinstatement, as the  

benefit granted by the appellate Court under the provisions of  

Act,  1958,  had  taken  away  “disqualification”  by  virtue  of  

Section 12 of the Act, 1958.  The appeal deserves to be allowed  

and the Judgment and Order of the High Court as well as the  

Award of the Tribunal are liable to be set aside.   

7. Per contra, Sh. Rajesh Kumar, learned counsel appearing  

for the respondent-Bank, has vehemently opposed the appeal  

contending  that  grant  of  benefit  under  the  Act,  1958 takes  

away only the punishment (sentence) and not the factum of  

conviction, therefore, in case, an employee of the Bank stands  

convicted  in  an  offence  involving  moral  turpitude,  it  is  

permissible  for  the  respondent-Bank  to  remove  him  from  

service.  Appeal lacks merit and is liable to be dismissed.   

8. We have considered the rival submissions made by the  

learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.  The  

facts  of  the  case  are  not  in  dispute.   The  Trial  Court  has  

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convicted the appellant under Section 409 IPC after recording  

the finding of  fact  that the appellant  had not deposited the  

telephone bill in spite of receiving a sum of Rs. 5000/- for that  

purpose  on  26.04.1982  and  he  deposited  the  said  amount  

with  the  Bank  on  27.07.1982  vide  voucher  (Exhibit  PH).  

Appellant had also taken away the Bicycle of the Bank. The  

appellate Court maintained the conviction, however, it granted  

the appellant the benefit of probation under the Act, 1958.   

9. The sole  question  involved in this  case is  whether  the  

benefit granted to the appellant under the provisions of Act,  

1958 makes him entitled to reinstatement in service.   

The issue involved herein is no more res integra.   

In  Aitha Chander Rao Vs.  State of  Andhra Pradesh,  

1981 (Suppl.) SCC 17, this Court held:-

“As  the  appellant  has been  released  on  probation,  this may not affect his service  career  in  view  of  Section  12  of  the   Probation of offenders Act.”

10. The said judgment in  Aitha Chander Rao (Supra) was  

not  approved  by  this  Court  in  Harichand  Vs.  Director  of  

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School Education, (1998) 2 SCC 383, observing that due to  

the  peculiar  circumstances  of  the  case,  the  benefit  of  the  

provisions of 1958 Act had been given to him and as in that  

case  there  had  been  no  discussion  on  the  words  

“disqualification, if any attaching to a conviction of an offence  

under such law”, the said judgment cannot be treated as a  

binding  precedent.  This  Court  interpreted  the  provisions  of  

Section 12 of the 1958, Act and held as under :-

“In our view, Section 12 of the probation of   offenders Act would apply only in respect  of  a  disqualification  that  goes  with  a  conviction  under  law which  provides  for  the  offence  and  its  punishment.  That  is  the  plain  meaning  of  the  words  “disqualification,  if  any,  attaching  to  a  conviction of an offence under such law”   therein.  Where  the  law that  provides for  an  offence  and  its  punishment  also   stipulates  a  disqualification,  a  person  convicted  of  the  offence  but  released  on  probation  does  not  by  reason  of  Section  12, suffers the disqualification.  It cannot  be held that by reason of Section 12,  a conviction for an offence should not  be  taken  into  account  for  the  purposes  of  dismissal  of  the  person  convicted  from  government  service.”  (Emphasis added).  

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11. In  Divisional Personnel Officer, Southern Railway &  

Anr.  Vs.  T.R.  Chellappan, AIR  1975  SC  2216,  this  Court  

observed that the conviction of an accused, or the finding of  

the  Court  that  he  is  guilty,  does  not  stand  washed  away  

because that is the sine-qua-non for the order of release on  

probation.  The  order  of  release  on  probation  is  merely  in  

substitution of the sentence to be imposed by the Court. Thus,  

the factum of guilt on the criminal charge is not swept away  

merely by passing the order under the Act, 1958.  

12. In Trikha Ram Vs. V.K. Seth & Anr, (1987) Supp. SCC  

39, this  Court had held that if a person stands convicted and  

is given the benefit of the provisions of the 1958, Act, he can  

be removed from service  only  on the  ground that  he  stood  

convicted. But by virtue of the provisions of Section 12 of the  

1958, Act, his removal cannot be a “disqualification” for the  

purposes  provided  in  other  Statutes  such  as  the  

Representation of the People Act, 1950.   The same view has  

been reiterated by this Court in  Union of India & Ors. Vs.  

Bakshi Ram, (1990) 2 SCC 426;  Karam Singh Vs. State of  

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Punjab & Anr., (1996) 7 SCC 748; and  Additional Deputy  

Inspector General of Police, Hyderabad Vs. P.R.K. Mohan,  

(1997) 11 SCC 571.  

13. In Shankar Dass Vs. Union of India & Anr.,  AIR 1985  

SC 772, this Court has held that the order of dismissal from  

service, consequent upon a conviction, is not a disqualification  

within the meaning of Section 12 of the 1958, Act. The court  

held as under :-

“There are Statutes which provide that the   persons,  who  are  convicted  for  certain   offences,  shall  incur  certain   disqualification; for example, Chapter III of   the  Representation  of  Peoples  Act,  1951  entitles 'disqualification' for Membership of   Parliament  and  State  Legislatures,  and  Chapter  IV  entitles  'disqualification'  for  voting,  contains  the  provisions  which  disqualify  persons  convicted  of  certain   charges  from  being  the  Members  of   Legislatures  or  from voting  at  election  to   the legislature. That is the sense in which   the  word  'disqualification'  is  used  in  Section  12 of  the  Probation  of  Offenders  Act…….Therefore,  it  is  not  possible  to   accept  the  reasoning  of  the  High  Court  that  Section  12  of  the  1958  Act  takes  away  the  effect  of  conviction  for  the  purpose of service also.”

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14. In  State of U.P. Vs. Ranjit Singh, AIR 1999 SC 1201,  

this  Court  has  held  that  the  High  Court,  while  deciding  a  

criminal case and giving the benefit of the U.P. First Offenders  

Probation Act, 1958, or similar enactment, has no competence  

to issue any direction that the accused shall not suffer any  

civil consequences. The Court has held as under:  

“We also fail to understand, how the High  Court, while deciding a criminal case, can  direct that the accused must be deemed to   have  been  in  continuous  service  without   break,  and,  therefore, he should be paid  his  full  pay  and  dearness  allowance  during the period of his suspension. This  direction  and  observation  is  wholly  without jurisdiction....”  

15. In  Union of  India  Vs.  Trilochan Patel, AIR  1985 SC  

1612, some part of the Judgment in T.R. Chellappan (supra)  

was overruled by the Constitution Bench of this Court.  But  

the observations cited hereinbefore were not overruled.   

16. In  Punjab Water  Supply  Sewerage Board & Anr.  Vs.  

Ram Sajivan & Anr., (2007) 9 SCC 86, this Court explained  

that the Judgment in Aitha Chander Rao (supra) did not lay  

down any law as no reason has been assigned in support of  

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the  order.   Thus,  the  same  remained  merely  an  order  

purported  to  have  been  passed  under  Article  142  of  the  

Constitution  of  India.   This  Court  allowed  the  disciplinary  

authority to initiate the disciplinary proceedings in accordance  

with law and pass an appropriate order, in spite of the fact  

that in the said case, the court, after recording the conviction,  

had granted benefits of the provisions of the Act, 1958  to the  

employee.     

17. In  view  of  the  above,  the  law  on  the  issue  can  be  

summarized to the effect that the conviction of an employee in  

an  offence  permits  the  disciplinary  authority  to  initiate  

disciplinary  proceedings  against  the  employee  or  to  take  

appropriate steps for his dismissal/removal only on the basis  

of  his  conviction.   The  word  ‘Disqualification’  contained  in  

Section 12 of the Act, 1958 refers to a disqualification provided  

in  other  Statutes,  as  explained  by  this  Court  in  the  above  

referred  cases,  and  the  employee  cannot  claim  a  right  to  

continue in service merely on the ground that he had been  

given the benefit of probation under the Act, 1958.   

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18. Sh. Gupta, learned counsel for the appellant has placed  

very heavy reliance on the Judgment of this Court in  Shankar  

Dass (supra) and submitted that this Court has held otherwise  

in that case.  We have gone through the entire judgment and  

found that there is a complete fallacy in the submissions made  

by Sh. Gupta in this regard.  In fact, in that case, this Court  

came to the conclusion that in spite of the fact that the benefit  

of  the  provisions  of  Act,  1958  had  been  granted  by  the  

Criminal  Court,  disciplinary  proceedings  could  be  initiated  

against the employee. However, in the facts and circumstances  

of the case involved therein, the Court asked the Management  

to reconsider the issue of quantum of punishment.  This Court  

had  taken  note  of  the  observations  made  by  the  Criminal  

Court while granting the benefit of the Act, 1958, which are as  

under :-

“Misfortune dogged the accused for about  a year……and it seems that it was under  the  force  of  adverse  circumstances  that  he  held  back  the  money  in  question.  Shankar Dass is a middle-aged man and  it is obvious that it was under compelling  circumstances that he could not deposit  the money in question in time.  He is not  a previous convict.”     

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The Court also took further note of his other problems as  

under :-

“The  appellant  was  a  victim  of  adverse  circumstances; his son died in February,  1962,  which  was  followed  by  another  misfortune;  his  wife  fell  down  from  an  upper storey and was seriously injured; it  was then the  turn of  his  daughter  who  fell seriously ill and that illness lasted for  eight months.”     

In  the  aforesaid  facts  and  circumstances,  this  Court  

asked the Management to consider whether some other lesser  

punishment  commensurate  to  the  misconduct  could  be  

awarded. In fact the punishment of dismissal  was found to be  

disproportionate  to  the  delinquency  committed  by  the  

appellant therein.  Had this Court intended to say that once  

benefit  of  the  Act,  1958  is  extended  to  a  delinquent,  his  

conviction  also  stands  washed  off,  the  court  could  have  

directed  the  Management  to  re-instate  the  employee  rather  

than  asking  to  impose  a  lesser  punishment.  Thus,  the  

submission so advanced by Shri Gupta is preposterous.   

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19. This Court reconsidered the said case i.e. Shankar Dass  

(supra)  in  Swarn  Singh Vs.  State  Bank  of  India  &  Anr.,  

(1986) Supp. SCC 566, and held that the provisions of Article  

311(2) of the Constitution of India conferred the power on the  

Government  to  dismiss  a  person on the  ground of  conduct  

which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge.   It is  

thus, clear that it was open to the respondent-Bank to initiate  

the  disciplinary  proceedings  and impose  the  punishment  in  

view of  the provisions of  The Banking Regulation Act,  1949  

(hereinafter called as, “Act 1949”).   

20. Section 10(1)(b)(i) of the Act, 1949,  reads as under :-

“No banking company – (a) ……. (b) Shall  employ  or  continue  the  

employment of any  person –

(i) who  is,  or  at  any  time  has  been,  adjudicated  insolvent,  or  has  suspended  payment  or  has  compounded with his creditors, or who  is,  or  has  been,  convicted  by  a  criminal  court  of  an  offence  involving  moral  turpitude.”  (emphasis supplied)

The  aforesaid  provision  makes  it  clear  that  the  

Management is under an obligation to discontinue the services  

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of an employee who is or has been convicted by a Criminal  

Court for an offence involving moral turpitude.   

21. Moral Turpitude means [Per Black’s Law Dictionary (8th  

Edn.,2004)] :-

“Conduct  that  is  contrary  to  justice,   honesty,  or morality.  In  the area of legal   ethics,  offenses involving moral turpitude  such as  fraud or  breach of  trust.    Also  termed moral depravity.

Moral  turpitude  means,  in  general,   shameful  wickedness-  so  extreme  a  departure  from  ordinary  standards  of   honest,  good morals, justice, or ethics as   to  be shocking to the moral sense of the   community.   It  has also been defined as  an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity   in the private and social duties which one  person owes  to  another,  or  to  society  in  general,  contrary  to  the  accepted  and  customary rule of right and duty between  people.”  

22. In Pawan Kumar Vs. State of Haryana & Anr., AIR 1996  

SC 3300, this Court has observed as under:–

“‘Moral turpitude’ is an expression which is used in  legal as also societal parlance to describe conduct  which is inherently base, vile,  depraved or having  any connection showing depravity.”  

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23. The  aforesaid  judgment  in  Pawan  Kumar (supra)  has  

been considered  by  this  Court  again  in  Allahabad Bank &  

Anr. Vs.  Deepak Kumar Bhola, (1997) 4 SCC 1; and placed  

reliance  on  Baleshwar  Singh Vs.  District  Magistrate  and  

Collector, AIR  1959 All.  71,   wherein  it  has  been held  as  

under:–

“The  expression  ‘moral  turpitude’  is  not  defined  anywhere. But it means anything done contrary to  justice, honesty, modesty or good morals. It implies  depravity  and  wickedness  of  character  or  disposition  of  the  person  charged  with  the  particular conduct. Every false statement made by a  person may not be moral turpitude, but it would be  so if it discloses vileness or depravity in the doing of  any private and social duty which a person owes to  his  fellow  men  or  to  the  society  in  general.  If  therefore  the  individual  charged  with  a  certain  conduct owes a duty, either to another individual or  to the society in general, to act in a specific manner  or not to so act and he still acts contrary to it and  does so knowingly, his conduct must be held to be  due to vileness and depravity. It will be contrary to  accepted  customary  rule  and  duty  between  man  and man.”

24. In view of the above, it is evident that moral turpitude  

means anything contrary to honesty, modesty or good morals.  

It means vileness and depravity.  In fact, the conviction of a  

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person  in  a  crime  involving  moral  turpitude  impeaches  his  

credibility as he has been found to have indulged in shameful,  

wicked, and base activities.  

25. Undoubtedly,  the  embezzlement  of  Rs.5000/-  by  the  

appellant,  for which he had been convicted,  was an offence  

involving moral turpitude.  The Statutory provisions of the Act,  

1949,  provide  that  the  Management  shall not  permit  any  

person convicted for an offence involving  moral turpitude to  

continue in employment.   

26. In Manish Goel Vs. Rohini Goel, AIR 2010 SC 1099, this  

Court  after  placing  reliance  on  large  number  of  its  earlier  

judgments held as under :-

“No  Court  has  competence  to  issue  a  direction  contrary  to  law nor  the  Court  can  direct  an  authority  to  act  in  contravention of the statutory provisions.  The courts are meant to enforce the rule  of  law  and  not  to  pass  the  orders  or  directions which are contrary to what has  been injuncted by law.”      

Thus, in such a fact-situation,  it  is not permissible for this  

Court to issue any direction as had been issued in the case of  

Shankar Dass (supra).   

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27. In view of the above, we reach the conclusion that once a  

Criminal  Court  grants  a  delinquent  employee the  benefit  of  

Act, 1958, its order does not have any bearing so far as the  

service  of  such  employee  is  concerned.   The  word  

“disqualification” in Section 12 of the Act, 1958 provides that  

such a person shall not stand disqualified for the purposes of  

other Acts like the Representation of the People Act, 1950 etc.  

The conviction in a criminal case is one part of the case  

and  release  on  probation  is  another.   Therefore,  grant  of  

benefit  of  the  provisions  of  Act,  1958,  only  enables  the  

delinquent not to undergo the sentence on showing his good  

conduct during the period of probation.  In case, after being  

released,  the delinquent  commits another offence,  benefit  of  

Act,  1958 gets terminated and the delinquent can be made  

liable  to  undergo  the  sentence.   Therefore,  in  case  of  an  

employee who stands convicted for an offence involving moral  

turpitude, it is his misconduct that leads to his dismissal.   

28. Undoubtedly,  the  appellant  was  convicted  by  the  

Criminal  Court  for  having  committed  the  offence  under  

Section 409 IPC and was awarded two years’  sentence. The  

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appellate  court  granted  him  the  benefit  of  Act,  1958.  The  

Tribunal  rejected  his  claim  for  re-instatement  and  other  

benefits taking note of the fact that appellant was given an  

opportunity by the Management to show cause as to why he  

should not be dismissed from service. The appellant submitted  

his  reply  to  the  said  show  cause  notice.  The  Management  

passed the order of dismissal in view of the provisions of the  

Act,  1949.  The  Tribunal  also  took  into  consideration  the  

contents  of  the  Bi-Partite  Settlement  applicable  in  the  case  

and rejected the appellant’s claim. The High Court considered  

appellant’s  grievance  elaborately  as  is  evident  from  the  

impugned judgment. We could not persuade ourselves, in the  

aforesaid  fact-situation,  that  any  other  view  could  also  be  

possible.   

29. In view of the above, we find no force in the appeal and it  

is accordingly dismissed.  No order as to costs.   

…………………………….J.        (P.  

SATHASIVAM)

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……………………..… …..J. New Delhi, (Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN) August 10, 2010

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