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PETITIONER: SURYAKUMAR GOVINDJEE

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: KRISHNAMMAL AND ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT26/04/1990

BENCH: RANGNATHAN, S. BENCH: RANGNATHAN, S. AHMADI, A.M. (J)

CITATION:  1990 SCR  (2) 782        1990 SCC  (4) 343  JT 1990 (3)   343        1990 SCALE  (1)77

ACT:     Tamil   Nadu   Buildings  (Lease   and   Rent   Control) Act--Section 2(2)--’Building’--What is  ’kaichalai’--Whether included.

HEADNOTE:     On 9.6.1936 the predecessor-in-interest of the  respond- ents executed a lease deed in favour of the  predecessor-in- interest  of  the appellant, for a period of 15  years.  The property leased out was vacant land, well and Kaichalai, and the lessee was permitted to construct on the vacant land and install  petrol selling business. It was further  stipulated that  after the expiry of the lease period the lessee  shall at  his own expense remove the structure put up by  him  and deliver possession of the vacant land together with well and Kaichalai. The lease was extended from time to time.       The  lessor  had filed petitions in 1962  and  1979  to evict the lessee under the Madras Buildings (lease and  Rent Control) Act, 1950 but without success. Thereafter, in  1979 the  present respondents instituted a petition for  eviction of  the lessee on the ground of demolition  and  reconstruc- tion,  and of wilful denial of title, within the meaning  of Sections 14(1)(b) and 10(2)(vii) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act.     In  the meantime, the provisions of the Tamil Nadu  City Tenants’ Protection Act, 1922 were extended to the municipal limits of Udamalpettai. Taking advantage of this, the lessee filed  petition claiming the benefit of compulsory  purchase conferred  on tenants of land under the said Act.  The  Dis- trict Munsif-cum-Rent Controller allowed the lessor’s  peti- tion  for eviction and dismissed the lessee’s  petition  for compulsory purchase. The Sub-Judge dismissed the appeals.     The lessee fried two revision petitions before the  High Court which declined to interfere.     Before  this  Court it was contended on  behalf  of  the appellant  that  the original lease comprised  only  of  the vacant site, well and Kaichalai; the kaichalai was merely in the nature of a shed put up for the tethering 783 of cattle and it was not a ’building’ within the meaning  of Section  2(2)  of  the Rent Control Act;  though  the  small Kaichalai  was situated in a corner of the site,  the  lease

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intended  by the parties was only that of the site.  It  was further contended that where a lease was a composite one  of land  and buildings, the court had to address itself to  the primary or dominant intention of the parties; if the  inten- tion  was to lease a building--the lease of land  being  ad- junct  or incidental, the Rent Control Act would  apply;  on the  other  hand, if the dominant intention was to  lease  a site--the  presence of a building thereon not being  consid- ered material by either party--the lease would not be one of a ’building’ covered by the Rent Control Act. Larsen & Toubro case [1988] 4 SCC 260, relied upon.     On  behalf of the respondents it was contended that,  in the  case of a composite lease; the existence of a  building or  hut on the land (howsoever small, insignificant or  use- less  it  may be) was sufficient per se to bring  the  lease within the scope of the Rent Control Act.     Irani  v. Chidambaram Chettiar, AIR 1953 Madras 650  and Salay  Mohd.  Sait v.J.M.S. Charity, [1969] 1  MLJ---SC  16, relied upon. Dismissing the appeals, this Court,     HELD:  (1) The Tamil word "kaichalai" seems to denote  a structure  or  a roof put up by hand. Whatever  may  be  the precise meaning of the term, the definition in Section  2(2) of  the  Rent Act clearly includes the  ’kaichalai’  in  the present case. [789D]     (2)  Since the Rent Act applies to residential and  non- residential buildings alike, the expression ’hut’ cannot  be restricted only to huts or cottages intended to be lived in. It  will also take in any shed, hut or other crude or  third class construction consisting of an enclosure made of mud or by  poles supporting a tin or asbestos roof that can be  put to  use for any purpose, residential or non-residential,  in the  same  manner  as any other  first  class  construction. [789E-F]     (3) In the case of composite lease of land and building, a  question may well arise whether the lease is one of  land although  there is a small building or hut (which  does  not really  figure  in  the transaction) or of a  lease  of  the building  (in  which the lease of land is incidental)  or  a lease  of  both regardless of their  respective  dimensions. [790G] 784     (4)  It is not always necessary that there should  be  a dominant  intention swaying the parties. There may be  cases where all that is intended is a joint lease of both the land and  the  building  without there  being  any  consideration sufficient  to  justify spelling out an  intention  to  give primacy  to the land or the building. The test  of  dominant intention  or purpose may not be very helpful in such  cases in the context of this legislation. [791F; 792B]     Sivarajan v. Official Receiver, AIR 1953 Trav. Co.  105; Nagamony v. Tiruchittambalam, AIR 1953 Trav. Co. 369;  Offi- cial  Trustee v. United Commercial Syndicate, [1955]  1  MLJ 220;  Raj Narain v. Shiv Raj Saran, AIR 1969 RCJ  409;  Ven- kayya v. Subba Rao, AIR 1957 AP 619; Uttam Chand v. Lalwani, AIR 1965 SC 716 and Dwarka Prasad v. Dwarkadas, [1976] 1 SCR 277.     (5) In the context of this case, we should be guided not by  any theory of dominant purpose but by the  consideration as  to  whether the parties intended that the  building  and land  should  go together or whether the lessor  could  have intended to let out the land without the building. [794B] Sultan  Bros. P. Ltd. v. C.I.T., [1964] 5 SCR 807,  referred to.     (6)  Having regard to all the facts  and  circumstances,

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the  correct  inference appears to be that what  the  lessor intended was a lease of both the land and the building, this being  a composite lease with a composite purpose. In  these circumstances,  this letting would come in within the  scope of Rent Control Act. [795C]     (7) Where a person leases a building together with land, it  seems  impermissible in the absence of  clear  intention spelt out in the deed, to dissect the lease as (a) of build- ing and appurtenant land covered by the Rent Control Act and (b)  of  land  alone governed by  other  relevant  statutory provisions.  What the parties have joined, the court  cannot tear as under. [796B]

JUDGMENT:     CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos.  2044-45 of 1990.     From  the  Judgment  and Order dated  18.8.1989  of  the Madras High Court in C.R.P. Nos. 4797 and 4798 of 1984.     C.S.  Vaidyanathan, K.V. Vishwanathan, K.V. Mohan,  S.R. Bhat and S.R. Setia for the Appellant. 785 K. Parsaran and V. Balachandran for the Respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by     RANGANATHAN,  J. Special leave to appeal is granted  and the appeals are disposed of by a common order.     On  9.6.1936,  Ramaswamy  Gounder  (the  predecessor-in- interest of the respondents) executed a lease deed in favour of   Gopal   Sait  (the   predecessor-in-interest   of   the appellant). Certain passages from an English translation  of the  lease deed (which was in vernacular) are  relevant  for the purposes of the present case and they read thus: "Whereas  the property viz. vacant land well  and  Kaichalai etc. belongs to the party of the First part as his ancestral property; Whereas  the  said property was leased out to party  of  the Second  Part on a monthly rental of Rs.12-8-0 for  15  years and  taken possession by the party of the second  part  from party  of the First part on 3.12.1935  .....  and the  party of  the Second part for his convenience and at his  own  ex- penses  and costs (was) permitted to construct in  the  said vacant land and install petrol selling business  .......... After  the expiry of lease period of 15 years i.e. on  12.2. 1950  the lessee shall at his own expense remove the  struc- ture put up by him and deliver possession of the vacant land together with well and kaichalai in the present state  ....                           SCHEDULE  ....  vacant land situated in this bounded on the North  by vacant land leased out for Burmah Oil Co. by the said Ramas- wamy  Gounder  Gopalji Ratnaswami  .....  all  these  vacant lands  together  with in the fourth plot measuring  East  to west  84 and North to South 16 together with half  share  in well therein together with tiled Kaichalai ... together with door, doorways etc. There is no number for Kaichalai. It  is common ground that the total vacant area  covered  by the 786 lease  was 3600 sq. ft. and that the kaichalai, referred  to therein,  was thirty seven and a half by sixteen and a  half feet i.e. of the extent of about 600 sq. ft. It also appears that even though there was initially no door number for  the Kaichalai, it was eventually given door No. 82 and the  suit premises we are concerned with bear door Nos. 80, 81 and 82.     The  lease was extended for a period of two  years  from

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1.1.51  by a fresh deed dated 15.1.51 at an  enhanced  rent. This lease deed recited: "On  the expiry of two years, i.e. on 31.12.52,  the  lessor has no objection for the removal of the structure put up  by Burmah Shell petrol pump etc  except the extent of structure of  thirty seven and a half feet by sixteen and a half  feet put up by the lessor  ......  " There was a fresh lease deed, again, executed on 2.1.53  for a further period of three years at a higher rent. This  deed also required the lessee, when delivering possession back to the lessor on the expiry of the lease, to remove the  struc- tures put up by him or the Burmah Shell Co. Ltd. "except the structure  measuring thirty seven and a half ft. by  sixteen and a half ft.".     The  lessee  appears  to have continued  to  occupy  the property even beyond 31.12.55 at a further enhanced rent. In 1962, we are told, the lessor flied a petition to evict  the lessee  under  s.  10(3)(a)(i) and 14(1)(b)  of  the  Madras Buildings  (Lease and Rent Control) Act 1960, alleging  that he  required  the premises for personal occupation  and  for bona  fide  immediate demolition. "The lessee  defended  the petition saying that the premises do not require any immedi- ate demolition, that the premises are used for  non-residen- tial purposes and kept in good condition and that the  peti- tioner’s  requirement  for personal occupation is  not  bona fide."  The  petition was dismissed by the  Rent  Controller observing  that  the premises did not  need  demolition  and further  that, as the premises had been leased out for  non- residential  purposes  and the landlord could not  seek  its conversion  into  residential use without  the  controller’s application, the petitioner’s allegation that he required it for personal use was neither tenable nor bona fide.     Ramaswamy Gounder filed a petition again in 1979 for the eviction of the respondent but he died in February 1979  and the petition filed by him was dismissed for default.  There- after  his legal representatives (the  present  respondents) instituted a petition for eviction 787 (R.C.O.P.  19/79 out of which the present  proceedings  have arisen) of the respondents on the grounds of demolition  and re-construction  and  of wilful denial of title  within  the meaning  of  Ss. 14(1)(b) and 10(2)(vii) of the  Tamil  Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act.     In  the  meantime,  the provisions of  the  Madras  City Tenants’ Protection Act, 1922 (Later renamed the Tamil  Nadu City Tenants’ Protection Act) were extended to the municipal limits of Udumalpettai within which the premises in question were located. Taking advantage of this, the respondent filed O.P.  1/79  (in the same court of  District  Munsif-cum-Rent Controller)  claiming  the benefit  of  compulsory  purchase conferred  on tenants of land under the said Act.  The  Dis- trict Munsif-cum-Rent Controller allowed the lessor’s  peti- tion  for eviction and dismissed the lessee’s petition.  The sub-judge,  on appeal, dismissed the appeals with  a  slight modification.  He was of the view that, except for the  kai- chalai, the other buildings had been put up by the  respond- ents  with the permission of the lessor and that, hence,  he was entitled to obtain compensation therefore by institution of separate appropriate proceedings.     The  respondent filed two revision petitions before  the High  Court which declined to interfere. The  learned  Judge held: "I do not see any reason to interfere with the orders of the courts below negativing the claim of the revision  petition- er.  In as much as admittedly the property situated in  door

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No.  82  belonged to the landlord, this is a case  to  which section 14(1)(b) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act 1960 will apply. However, the property  bearing door Nos. 80 and 81 belonged to the petitioner is the  find- ing.  On that all that the tenant could ask for will be  for removal  of  the superstructure. Beyond that his  claim  for compensation  also could not be ordered since there  was  no prayer  for the same. The decision in M/s. Larsen  &  Toubro Ltd.  v. The Trustees of Dharmamoorthy Rao Bahadur,  Calvala Cunnan  Chetty’s Charities by its Trustees, [1988] 2 LW  380 is distinguishable because this is a case of only one and  a half grounds wherein there is a kaichalai of 600 sq. ft. The removal  shall  take place within a period of  three  months from today. The Civil revision petitions are dismissed." Hence these two appeals. 788     Though  there have been claims made under the Rent  Con- trol  Act by the lessor and under the City Tenants’  Protec- tion  Act by the lessee, the claim under the latter has  not been pressed before us by the learned counsel for the appel- lant  who has confined his arguments before us to  the  only question  whether the demised premises constitute a  "build- ing" within the meaning of s. 2(2) of the Rent Control Act.     Sri  C.S. Vaidyanathan, learned counsel for  the  appel- lants  submitted that the first appellate court  has  found, modifying  the trial court’s findings in this  regard,  that the  original lease comprised only of the vacant site,  well and  kaichalai and that all the other superstructures  found in the demised premises had been put up by the appellant. He contended that the ’kaichalai’ was merely in the nature of a shed put up for the tethering of cattle and that it was  not a  ’building’  within the meaning of the Rent  Control  Act. Alternatively, he contended, even if the Kaichalai could  be considered to be a building this was not a case of the lease of  a  building  or hut with its appurtenant  land:  it  was really a case of the lease of a vacant site to the petition- er  on  which was situated a small hut in  one  corner.  The lease  deed itself recites that the appellant had taken  the premises for putting up a petrol pump. In fact he did put in an underground storage tank, a petrol pump and other  struc- tures and carried on a petrol and kerosene business thereon. Though  the small Kaichalai was situate in a corner  of  the site, the lease intended by the parties was only that of the site.  The Kaichalai was no doubt not demolished  and,  per- haps, the appellant also made use of it for the purposes  of his  business but, says Sri Vaidyanathan, this made no  dif- ference  to the obvious and clear and dominant intention  of both parties that it was the site that was leased out for  a petrol  pump business. Sri Vaidyanathan contended  that  the issue  is directly governed by the decision in the Larsen  & Toubro  case  [1988]  4 SCC 260, to which one of  us  was  a party.  He submitted that, where a lease is a composite  one of  land and buildings, the court has to address  itself  to the primary or dominant intention of the parties. If this is to  lease  a building--the lease of land  being  adjunct  or incidental--as  in  the Larsen & Toubro, case  (supra),  the Rent  Control  Act would apply. On the other  hand,  if  the dominant  intention  is to lease a site--the presence  of  a building  thereon  not being considered material  by  either party--the lease would not be one of a ’building’ covered by the Rent Control Act, whether or not it can be considered as a lease only of a vacant site governed by the City  Tenant’s Protection  Act. Counsel contended that it is possible  that there  may be a grey area of leases which might  fall  under neither Act and proceedings in respect of which

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789 may continue to be governed by the Transfer of Property Act, unaffected by these special laws.     The  Rent Control Act contains a definition of  the  ex- pression ’building’ which reads as follows: "2(2)  ’building’  means any building or hut or  part  of  a building or a hut, let or to be let separately for  residen- tial or non-residential purposes and includes-- (a) the gardens, grounds and out-houses, if any, appurtenant to  such building, hut or part of such building or  hut  and let or to be let along with such building or hut, (b)  any furniture supplied by the landlord for use in  such building or hut or part of a building or hut, but does not include a room in a hotel or boarding house."     We have not been able to get at the exact meaning of the Tamil  word  ’kaichalai’.  It, however, seems  to  denote  a structure  or  a roof put up by hand. Whatever  may  be  the precise meaning of the term, we think that the definition in S. 2(2) clearly includes the kaichalai in the present  case. Since  the  Act applies to residential  and  non-residential buildings  alike, the expression ’hut’ cannot be  restricted only  to huts or cottages intended to be lived in.  It  will also  take  in any shed, hut or other crude or  third  class construction  consisting of an enclosure made of mud  or  by poles  supporting a tin or asbestos roof that can be put  to use for any purpose, residential or non-residential, in  the same  manner  as  any other first  class  construction.  The kaichalat  is a structure which falls within the purview  of the definition. Counsel for the appellant is perhaps  under- stating its utility by describing it as a mere cattle  shed. The  area of the shed is quite substantial and, as  will  be explained  later, the parties also appear to  have  attached some  importance  to its existence on the site. It  is  very difficult to hold, in view of the above definition, that the kaichalai is not a ’building’ within the meaning of S. 2(2).     On behalf of the respondents, it is contended that, in a composite  lease, the existence of a building or hut on  the land (however small, insignificant or useless it may be)  is sufficient per se to bring the lease within the scope of the Rent Control Act. It is suggested for the respondent that it would be inarguable, once it is admitted or held 790 that the Kaichalai is a building and that the same has  been let  out, that still there is no letting out of  a  building within the meaning of the Act. In support of his contention, Sri  Parasaran,  for  the  respondent,  placed  considerable reliance  on Irani v. Chidarnbaram Chettiar, AIR  1953  Mad. 650.  He  pointed out that, in that case there  was  a  vast vacant  land with only some stalls in one corner and a  com- pound  wall  but it was nevertheless held to be  a  case  of lease  of  a building. According to him, this case  was  not disapproved,  but indeed indirectly approved, by this  Court in  Salay  Md. Sait v.J.M.S. Charity, [1969]  1  MLJ--SC  16 though  certain  other cases (where leases of  vacant  sites with  only  the lessees’ buildings thereon were held  to  be leases  of buildings) were overruled in that decision.  This case, according to him, decides that, once there is a build- ing  on the land, however insignificant, and it is let  out, the case will be governed by the Rent Control Act. We do not think  this case is an authority for such an  extreme  posi- tion.  It rather seems that the case was one decided on  its own special facts. At the time of the original lease by  the landlord  there  was  only a vacant site  and  a  few  small stalls. But, by the time the relevant lease deed (which came up  for consideration) was executed, it had become the  site

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of  a  theatre. No doubt the theatre did not belong  to  the lessor;  nevertheless for several years the leased  property had  been sued as a theatre and the purpose of  the  parties was clearly that the leased premises should continue be used as  a cinema theatre. It was in this special situation  that the  Court came to the conclusion that it was  plausible  to hold the lease to be one of a building though if the  struc- tures  not  belonging to the landlord were left out  of  ac- count,  there  was only a vacant site and a few  stalls.  We think  it  would not be correct to draw  support  from  this decision for the extreme proposition contended for on behalf of the respondent. In our opinion, we have to travel  beyond this solitary fact, go further to look at the, terms of  the lease and the surrounding circumstances to find out what  it is that the parties really intended.     There  is no difficulty in determining the scope of  the lease  where a building and a piece of land  are  separately let  out.  But in the case of composite lease  of  land  and building, a question may well arise whether the lease is one of  land  although there is a small building or  hut  on  it (which does not really figure in the transaction) or one  of a  lease  of  the building (in which the lease  of  land  is incidental)  or a lease of both regardless of their  respec- tive  dimensions. In determining whether a particular  lease is of the one kind of another, difficulties are always bound to  arise  and it will be necessary to examine  whether  the parties  intended  to let out the building  along  with  the lands or vice 791 versa. The decisions in Sivarajan v. Official Receiver,  AIR 1953  Trav. Co. 105; Nagamony v. Tiruchittambalam, AIR  1953 Trav. Co. 369; Official Trustee v. United Commercial  Syndi- cate, [1955] 1 MLJ 220 and Raj Narain v. Shiv Raj Saran, AIR 1969  RCJ  409, relied upon by Sri  Vaidyanathan,  were  in- stances  where  what the parties had in mind  was  only  the lease of land, although there were certain petty  structures thereon  which were not demolished or kept out of the  lease but were also let out. They were clearly cases in which,  we think,  the applicability of the Rent Act was rightly  ruled out. On the other hand, Larsen & Toubro, [1988] 4 SCC 260 is a  case where there was the lease of a building  although  a vast extent of land was also included in the lease. That was not  a  case which arose under the Rent Control Act  but  it illustrates  the converse situation. Sri Vaidyanathan  wants to derive, from the case referred to above and certain cases which  deal with other aspects which become  relevant  while considering  a  composite letting, a  proposition  that  the dominant purpose of the letting should govern. For instance, there  are cases where factories, mills or  cinema  theatres are leased out and cases have held that the dominant  object is to lease a factory, mill or theatre and that, even though in  all these cases, the letting out of a building would  be involved,  the provisions of the Rent Control Act would  not apply  vide Venkayya v. Subba Rao, AIR 1957 A.P. 619;  Uttam Chand  v.  Lalwani.  AIR 1965 SC 716 and  Dwarka  Prasad  v. Dwarkadas, [1976] 1 SCR 277. But we think that this approach also  seeks to over simplify the problem. When we come  down to  consider the terms of a particular lease and the  inten- tion  of the parties, there are bound to be a large  variety of  cases. If the transaction clearly brings out a  dominant intention and purpose as in the cases cited above, there may be  on  difficulty in drawing a conclusion one  way  or  the other. But it is not always necessary that there should be a dominant  intention swaying the parties. There may be  cases where all that is intended is a joint lease of both the land

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and the building without there being any considerations’suf- ficient to justify spelling out an intention to give primacy to  the land or the building. For instance, where  a  person owns a building surrounded by a vast extent of vacant  lands (which may not all be capable of being described appurtenant thereto,  in  the sense of being necessary for its  use  and enjoyment)  and a party comes to him and desires to  take  a lease thereof, he may do so because he is interested  either in  the building or the land (as the case may be).  But  the owner  may very well say: "I am not interested in your  need or  purpose.  You  may do what you like with  the  land  (or building). 1 have got a compact property consisting of  both and  I want to let it out as such. You may take it or  leave it." The fact in such cases is that the owner has a building and land and he lets them 792 out together. He is not bothered about the purpose for which the lease is being taken by the other party. In such  cases, it is very difficult to say that there is no lease of build- ing  at  all unless there is some contra indication  in  the terms  of  the lease such as, for example, that  the  lessee could demolish the structure. The test of dominant intention or  purpose  may not be very helpful in such  cases  in  the context of this legislation. Sri Vaidyanathan sought to contend that the words of S. 2(2) "any building  .....  and gardens, grounds  .....  let or to be let along with it", import the concept that the  dominant purpose should be a letting of the building. We do not think that  this is necessarily so. The decision of this Court  in Sultan Bros. P. Ltd. v. C.I.T., [ 1964] 5 SCR 807 is of some relevance  in  this  context. There the  Supreme  Court  was concerned with the interpretation of S. 12(4) of the  Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 which read: "(4)  Where  an  assessee lets on hire  machinery  plant  or furniture  belonging  to  him and also  buildings,  and  the letting of the buildings inseparable from the letting of the said machinery, plant or furniture, he shall be entitled  to allowances in accordance with the provisions of the  clauses (iv),  (v)  and (vii) of sub-section (2) of  section  10  in respect of such buildings." The  High Court took the view that the plant  and  machinery and  buildings  should not only be inseparably let  out  but also  that  "the primary letting must be of  the  machinery, plant  or furniture and that together with such  letting  or along with such letting there (should be) letting of  build- ings."  1n that case, the High Court held, the primary  let- ting  was of the building and so S. 12(4) would  not  apply. The  Supreme  Court did not approve of  this  reasoning.  It said: "Now the difficulty that we feel in accepting the view which appealed to the High Court and the Tribunal is that we  find nothing  in the language of sub-s. (4) of S. 12  to  support it.  No doubt the sub-section first mentions the letting  of the  machinery,  plant or furniture and then refers  to  the letting of the building and further uses the word ’also’  in connection  with the letting of the building.  We,  however, think that this is too slender a foundation for the  conclu- sion that the intention was that the primary letting must be of  the machinery, plant or furnitures. In the absence of  a much 793 stronger  indication in the language used, there is no  war- rant  for saying that the sub-section contemplated that  the letting of the building had to be incidental to the  letting of the plant, machinery or furniture. It is pertinent to ask

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that  if  the intention was that the letting of  the  plant, machinery-or  furniture should be primary, why did  not  the section say so? Furthermore, we find it practically impossi- ble  to  imagine how the letting of a building could  be  in cidental to the letting of furniture, though we can see that the  letting of a factory building may be incidental to  the letting of the machinery or plant in it for the object there may be really to work the machinery. If we are right in  our view, as we think we are, that the letting of a building can never be incidental to the letting of furniture contained in it, then it must be held that no consideration of primary or secondary lettings arises inconstruing the section for  what must  apply  when furniture is let and also  buildings  must equally  apply  when plant and machinery are  let  and  also buildings.  We  think all that sub-s. (4) of s.  12  contem- plates is that the letting of machinery, plant or  furniture should be inseparable from the letting of the buildings." The Court proceeded then to consider the concept of ’insepa- rable letting’ and observed: "It seems to us that the inseparability referred to in  sub- s.  (4) is an inseparability arising from the  intention  of the  parties. That intention may be ascertained  by  flaming the following questions: Was it the intention in making  the lease--and it matters not whether there is one lease or two, that is, separate leases in respect of the furniture and the building--that  the two should be enjoyed together?  Was  it the intention to make the letting of the two practically one letting?  Would  one have been let alone or a  lease  of  it accepted without the other? If the answers to the first  two questions are in the affirmative, and the last in the  nega- tive  then, in our view, it has to be held that it  was  in- tended  that  the lettings would be inseparable.  This  view also  provides  a justification for taking the case  of  the income from the lease of a building out of s. 9 and  putting it  under s. 12 as a residuary head of income. It  then  be- comes  a new kind of income, not covered by s. 9,  that  is, income  not from the ownership of the building alone but  an income which 794 though arising from a building would not have arisen if  the plant,  machinery and furniture had not also been let  along with it." Though the context was somewhat different, the  observations in that case are of great assistance. We think that, in  the context here also, we should be guided not by any theory  of dominant purpose but by the consideration as to whether  the parties  intended that that the building and land should  go together  or whether the lessor could have intended  to  let out the land without the building. The latter inference  can perhaps  be generally drawn in certain cases where only  the lease of land dominated the thoughts of the parties but  the mere  fact  that the building is small or that the  land  is vast  or  that the lessee had in mind a  particular  purpose cannot be conclusive.     Let us now turn, in the above background, to a consider- ation  of  the lease deed in the present  case.  As  already mentioned, counsel for the appellant strongly relies on  the purpose of the lease and seeks to make out that the building (kaichalai) was not really a significant part of the  lease. This contention is stoutly refuted on behalf of the respond- ents.  It is pointed out that the kaichalai was of  substan- tial  dimensions and that counsel for the appellant  is  not fight  in  characterising it as a mere cattle  shed.  It  is pointed  out that the shed was also admittedly used  by  the appellants  for  the purposes of its business and  there  is

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nothing  to show that this was also not in contemplation  at the time of the lease. Again it is pointed out that, in some parts of the lease deeds, the vernacular version gives first place to the kaichalai rather than to the vacant site. Also, every one of the lease deeds attaches special emphasis  that the  kaichalai should not be removed but should be  returned to the lessor without any damage. We may also advert to  one more circumstance which shows beyond doubt that the  kaicha- lai  was  not an insignificant structure.  We  have  earlier referred  to  the fact that Ramaswamy Gounder had  filed  an earlier  eviction petition on the ground that he needed  the premises  for personal occupation and immediate  demolition. The lessee’s defence to this was not that the kaichalai  was a cattle-shed unfit for personal occupation, The defence was that  it had been let out for a non-residential purpose  and could  not be converted to residential use  without  permis- sion.  This  certainly demonstrates that the  kaichalai  was capable  of  use both for  residential  and  non-residential purposes. Counsel for the respondent, in fact, wanted to  go a  little further and hold it against the appellant that  he had  not taken in those proceedings the plea, now  put  for- ward, that the Rent Control Act could not at all be invoked. We will not, however, 795 hold  this  against  the appellant ’as, at  that  time,  the benefits of the Tenants’ Protection Act had not been extend- ed  to  Udumalpettai and the tenant would  not  have  gained anything  by  raising any such point. But the  pleadings  in those proceedings as well as the order of the Rent  Control- ler therein leave no doubt that the kaichalai was a material structure let out as such to the lessee for  non-residential purposes  and which, with necessary permission,  could  also have  been used for residential purposes. Having  regard  to all these circumstances, the correct inference appears to be that  what the lessor intended was a lease of both the  land and the building. The land was to be put to use for a petrol pump;  so far as the building was concerned, the lessee  was at  liberty to use it as he liked but he had to maintain  it in  good  condition and return it at the end of  the  lease. This  was a composite lease with a composite purpose. It  is difficult  to break up the integrity of the lease as one  of land alone or of building alone. In these circumstances,  we think  this  letting would come in within the scope  of  the Rent Control Act, for the reasons already explained.     Before  concluding, we may touch upon two more  relevant aspects. The first is the use of the word "separately" in s. 2(2). This, however, does not affect our above  construction of the section. That word is intended to emphasise that, for purposes  of the Act, a building means any  unit  comprising the whole or part of a building that is separately let  out. It  does not mean--it cannot mean--that composite leases  of land and building would not be covered by it. That would  be clearly  contrary to the language of the whole clause  which specifically  talks of joint letting of land  and  building. The  second  is the restriction of the applicability  of  s. 2(2)  to cases of letting of building and appurtenant  lands only.  It  may  be suggested that the  lands  here  are  not "appurtenant"  except  perhaps to the  extent  required  for providing access to the Kaichalai. This argument is not very helpful  to  the appellants. At best, it can mean  that  the Kaichalai  and only a part of land needed for its  enjoyment or  use would be governed by the Rent Control Act. But  this was  not the contention of the appellant and no attempt  has been made to ascertain what the extent of such "appurtenant" land could be. That apart, we are inclined to think that the

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word  "appurtenant" has, in the context, a much wider  mean- ing. It is not just restricted to land which, on a consider- ation  of the circumstances, a court may consider  necessary or  imperative for its enjoyment. It should be construed  as comprehending  the land which the parties considered  appro- priate  to let along with the building. To hold to the  con- trary may give rise to practical difficulties. Suppose there is,  in the middle of a metropolis, a bungalow with  a  vast extent of land sur- 796 rounding it such as for e.g. in the Larsen & Toubro case and this  is  let out to a tenant. If a very strict  and  narrow interpretation  is  given to the word "appurtenant",  it  is arguable that a considerable part of the surrounding land is surplus  to the requirements of the lessee of the  building. But,  we  think, no argument is needed to say  that  such  a lease  would be a lease of building for the purposes of  the Rent Control Act. Where a person leases a building  together with  land, it seems impermissible in the absence  of  clear intention spelt out in the deed, to dissect the lease as (a) of building and appurtenant land covered by the Rent Control Act and (b) of land alone governed by other relevant  statu- tory  provisions.  What the parties have joined,  one  would think, the court cannot tear as under. In fact, we may point out  that  a wider meaning for this word  was  convassed  in Irani v. Chidambaram Chettiar, AIR 1953 Madras 650 which the court had no necessity to go into in the view taken by it on the  interpretation of the lease deed. In this case also  no contention  has been raised in regard to this aspect and  so we shall also leave open the precise connotation of the word except  to  say that it may warrant a wide  meaning  in  the context.     For  the reasons discussed above, we see no  grounds  to interfere with the judgments of the courts below. The appeal is dismissed but we make no order as to costs. R.S.S.                                          Appeal  dis- missed. ?797