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PETITIONER: SURINDER SINGH SIBIA

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: VIJAY KUMAR SOOD

DATE OF JUDGMENT10/10/1991

BENCH: SAHAI, R.M. (J) BENCH: SAHAI, R.M. (J) THOMMEN, T.K. (J)

CITATION:  1992 AIR 1540            1991 SCR  Supl. (1) 467  1992 SCC  (1)  70        JT 1991 (4)   125  1991 SCALE  (2)781

ACT: Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1987:     Section  14(3)-  Second  Proviso---Expression  "has  not vacated  such  building  without  sufficient   cause"--Scope of--Possession  given  be consequence of  requisition  order cannot be held vacation not without sufficient cause.     Himachal Pradesh Requisition and Acquisition of  Immova- ble Property Act, 1972:     Validity  or  invalidity  of  requisition  order--Cannot reflect   on   sufficiency   cause   under   Rent    Control Act----Requisition  Proceedings--Non-filing of objection  by Landlord--Effect of. Words and Phrases:

HEADNOTE: "Vacation "--"Sufficient Cause"-- Meaning of.     Section 14(3) of the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act 1987 enables a landlord to obtain an order for  eviction of the tenant if he requires the building for his own  occu- pation and he has no other building  in the area  concerned. This right however stands deferred under second proviso  for a period of five years if the landlord has vacated a  build- ing in use without sufficient cause. The  appellant,  an owner of a house, was in  occupation  of first floor of the house, while the second floor was let out to a Judge. His entire house is requisitioned for occupation of a Judge. The appellant did not file any  objection  under section 3(2) of the Requisition Act. However, after vacating the  building  he applied for eviction  of  respondent.  The Courts  in  view rejected his application  by  applying  the second proviso to section 14(3) of the Himachal Rent Control Act. 468     Allowing  the  Landlord’s appeal and setting  aside  the order of Courts below, this Court,     HELD:  1. ’Sufficient cause’ is an expression  which  is found  in various statutes. It has been construed  liberally in keeping with its ordinary dictionary meaning as  adequate or  enough.  That  is any justifiable  reason  resulting  in vacation  has  to  be understood as  sufficient  cause.  For instance  economic  difficulty or  financial  stringency  or

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family  reasons may compel a landlord to let out a  building in  his  occupation. So long it is found to be  genuine  and bona fide it would amount to vacating a building for  suffi- cient cause. And the bar of second proviso stands lifted  In other  words if the vacation of the building was not a  pre- tence  or pretext the proviso could not frustrate the  right of landlord to approach the controller for necessary  direc- tion to tenant to hand over possession to him. [470 B-C]     1.1  Vacation of a building by landlord in pursuance  of an order of requisition by the competent authority could not be characterised as ’not without sufficient cause’. A  land- lord  has  no option. He is required to  vacate  under  con- straint of law. Therefore the statutory restriction  created by second proviso would not apply in such a case. [470-D]     2. Validity or invalidity of an order under  Requisition Act  could  not adversely reflect on  sufficiency  of  cause under Rent Control Act. Reason for either arises in  differ- ent circumstances. Vacating a building, even under an incor- rect order passed by a competent authority under Requisition Act would be for sufficient reason. The Rent Control author- ities could not examine merit of the order under Requisition Act  Therefore  it could not be a  valid  consideration  for holding  that  the building was vacated  without  sufficient cause.  The courts below thus committed an error of  law  in applying  second proviso to reject the application filed  on behalf of the appellant. [470-H, 471-A-B]

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2383 of 1988.     From the Judgment and Order dated 1.4.1988 of the  Hima- chal Pradesh High Court in Civil Revision No. 29 of 1988. N.S. Hegde and Ms. Madhu Moolchandani for the Appellant. 469 Ms. Asha Jain Madan for the Respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by R.M.  SAHAI,  J. The short but interesting question  of  law that  arises  or  consideration  in  this  appeal,  directed against  judgment of the Himachal Pradesh High Court, is  if possession  given  to  competent  authority  under  Himachal Pradesh  Requisition and Acquisition of  Immovable  Property Act,  1972  (for brevity ’Requisition Act’) is  vacation  of premises  without sufficient cause within second proviso  to sub-section (3) of Section 14 of Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 deemed to have come into force with effect from  17th  November 1971 (hereinafter referred  to  as  the Act’). Sub-section (3) of Section 14 is extracted below:                 "(3) A landlord may apply to the  Controller               for  an order directing the tenant to put  the               landlord  in possession (a) in the case  of  a               residential building, if -               (i) he requires it for his own occupation:               Provided  that  he is  not  occupying  another               residential  building  owned by  him,  in  the               urban area concerned: Provided further that he               has not vacated such a building without suffi-               cient cause within five years of the filing of               the application, in the said urban area;"     It enables a landlord to obtain an order for eviction of the  tenant if he requires the building for his own  occupa- tion  and  he has no other building in the  area  concerned. This right however stands deferred under second proviso  for

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a period of five years if the landlord has vacated a  build- ing in his use without sufficient cause. The question is how the  expression  he has not vacated  such  building  without sufficient cause’ in the second proviso should be construed. It has two aspects one whether the proviso applies to volun- tary vacation only or it extends to vacating under  pressure of legal proceedings such as requisition order by  competent Authority. Second even assuming that the expression  ’vacate such  building’ is given wide interpretation does giving  up possession in consequence of a requisition order amounts  to vacation  without sufficient cause? Vacate, normally,  means to  go away, to leave. The setting or context in  which  the word has been used does not indicate ,my different  meaning. Nor it is 470 necessary to decide if it applies to voluntary vacation only as it was urged that even assuming that giving up possession in pursuance of requisition order is included in the proviso can  it  be said to be without sufficient  cause  Sufficient cause  is an expression which is found in various  statutes. It  has  been construed liberally in keeping with its  ordi- nary  dictionary meaning of adequate or enough. That is  any justifiable  reason resulting in vacation has to  be  under- stood as sufficient. cause. For instance economic difficulty in financial stringency or family reasons may compel a land- lord  to let out building in his occupation. So long  it  is found to be genuine and bona fide and would amount to vacat- ing  a building for sufficient cause. And the bar of  second proviso stands lifted. In other words if the vacation of the building was not a pretence or pretext the proviso could not frustrate  the right of landlord to approach the  controller for necessary direction to tenant to hand over possession to him.     Vacation  of a building by landlord in pursuance  of  an order of requisition by the competent authority could not be characterised as, ’not without sufficient cause’. A landlord has no option. He is required to vacate under constraint  of law.  Therefore the statutory restriction created by  second proviso  would  not apply in such a case. Does it  make  any difference in law or the action of the landlord is  rendered without  sufficient cause as  he did not file any  objection in  requisition proceedings either under mistaken advice  or ignorance of law? For this it is necessary to narrate  facts in brief. The appellant is owner of Kennilworth  house/Simla and  its  annexure He was in occupation of  first  floor  of Kennilworth house. Second floor was let out to the  District Judge, who, later was elevated to the Bench. For his occupa- tion  the entire house was requisitioned. The appellant  did not  file  any objection. After vacating,  the  building  he applied  for  eviction to respondent from  the  annexe.  His application was rejected as it would found to be in teeth of the  second proviso. It was held that the order of  requisi- tion was passed because the appellant did not show any cause be  filing any objection under sub-section (2) of Section  3 of  the Requisition Act even though proviso to the  sub-sec- tion precluded any property or part from being requisitioned if  it was in bonafide use by the owner. The explanation  of the appellant that he was advised by his lawyer not to  file an  objection as the building was required for a High  Court judge, was not accepted.     Validity or invalidity of an order under Requisition Act could  not adversely reflect on sufficiency of  cause  under Rent  Control  Act. Reason for either  arises  in  different circumstances. Vacating a building, even under an  incorrect order passed by a competent authority under Requis-

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471 tion  Act would be for sufficient reason. The  Rent  Control authorities  could  not  examine merit of  the  order  under Requisition Act. Therefore it could not be a valid consider- ation  for  holding that the building  was  vacated  without sufficient  cause. The courts below thus committed an  error of law in applying second proviso to reject the  application filed on behalf of the appellant.     Even  the  finding on requirement of  the  appellant  to occupy the building is not well founded. The inference drawn by the two courts below that the appellant being a rich  man would  not occupy the annexe or that he would use  it  occa- sionally  is not well founded. It being undisputed that  the appellant  has  no other building in the urban area  and  it having  been  found that he vacated the other  building  for sufficient reason there was no fetter on the right of appel- lant to seek eviction of the tenant.     In  the result this appeal succeeds and is allowed.  The orders  of all the courts below are set aside. The  applica- tion of appellant shall stand allowed. He shall approach the Rent Control authorities for appropriate directions. Parties shall bear their own costs. T.N.A                                                 Appeal allowed. 472