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PETITIONER: SURESH LOHIYA

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ANOTHER

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       23/08/1996

BENCH: G.N.RAY, B.L.HANSARIA

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                       J U D G M E N T HANSARIA. J.      Whether bamboo  mat as  a  forest-produce  as  is  this expression known  to the  Indian forest  Act ?  requires our determination on  this appeal.  This question  would  decide Whether the order of confiscation of bamboo mat belonging to the appellant  was in  accordance with  law. The Bombay High Court, having  been approached  in  revision  by  the  State against the order of the Additional Sessions Judge directing release of  the bamboo  mat, has reversed the order being of the view  that the product confiscated was "forest-produce". The owner  of the  bamboo mat  has approached  this Court by filing this appeal. 2.   "Forest-produce" has  been defined in The Indian Forest Act, 1927 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") as below:      "2(4) "forest-produce" includes :-      (a) the  following she  their found      in, or  brought from,  a forest  or      not,  that   is  to   say   timber,      charcoal,   caoutchouc,    catechu,      wood-oil, resin,  natural  varnish,      bark,  lac,  mahua  flowers,  mahua      seeds, kuth and myrabolams, and      (b) the following when found in, or      brought from  a forest,  that is to      say -      (i) trees  and leaves,  flowers and      fruits,  and  all  other  parts  or      produce    not     herein    before      mentioned, of trees.      (ii)   plants   not   being   trees      (including grass,  creepers,  reeds      and moss), and all parts or produce      of such plants,      (iii) wild animals an skins, tusks,      horns, bones,  silk,  horns,  honey      and was,  and all  other  parts  or      produce of animals, and      (iv) peat,  surface soil,  rock and      minerals   (including   lime-stone,

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    laterite.  mineral  oils,  and  all      products of mines or quarries)."      We must  also note  the definition of "timber" as given in sub-clause (6) and of "tree’ in sub-clause (7) - the same being as below :      "(6) "  timber’ includes trees when      they  have   fallen  or  have  been      felled, and all wood whether cut up      or fashioned  or hollowed  out  for      any purpose or not; and      (7) "tree" includes palms, bamboos,      stumps, brush-wood and canes." 3.   The High  Court’s decision  is principally  based on  a conjoint reading  of definition  of "timber"  and "tree". It has stated that as definition of "tree" includes bamboo, and as definition  of "timber"  includes tree,  even a fashioned bamboo would  be a  tree. It  was then  stated that "forest- produce" having  been defined as any produce of tree in sub- clause (i)  of clause  (b) of sub section (4), bamboo mat is forest-produce. In  taking this view the High Court differed from what had been held Gujarat High Court in Fatesang Gimba Vasava Vs.  State of  Gujarat High  Court in  Fatesang Gimba Vasava vs. State of Gujarat, AIR 1987 Gujarat 9. 4.   Shri Bhatia, appearing for the appellant, who was  duly assisted by  Ms. Verma,  submitted that the High Court erred in holding  that a  product like bamboo mat would be forest- produce by  relying on  the definition  of "timber"  because that definition  is in  two parts  and the second part which speaks of  "all   wood ......fashioned....... or not" has no application so  far trees  are concerned,  which  have  been dealt in  the first part of the definition. It has also been urged that  bamboo mat  being a  separate commercial product what was stated by the Gujarat High Court in Fatesang’s case merits our acceptance. 5.   Shri Dholakia,  who was  duly assisted  by Shri Jadhav, however, contends  that if  bamboo mat  is held  to be not a forest-produce, the  object of  the Act  would be frustrated inasmuch as it would debar the forest authorities to inquire about the  removal of  such goods  from the  forests,  which would be  used as a handle by unscrupulous dealers to denude the  country   of  his   forest  wealth.   To  buttress  his submission, reference  has been  made in  the definition  of "produce" in  Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary which reads : the expression  ’produce   of  mines   or  minerals’   does  not necessarily mean  produce in  its native  state; coke may be such produce,  although by combustion its chemical nature is changed." 6.   We have  given our  considered  thought  to  the  rival contentions. It  appears to  us that the High Court erred in taking the  abovesaid view by referring to the definition of "timber" inasmuch  as we  agree with  Shri Bhatia  that  the second part  of the definition does not take within its fold fashioned bamboo  as that part is relatable to wood, and not tree. We  have  said  so  because  the  definition  of  tree includes even  canes, and  a cane cannot be taken as a wood, even if  a tree  could be. But then, the High Court has also referred to  sub-clause (i)  (supra) which speaks of produce of tree  as well.  As to this, submission of the appellant’s counsel has been that when sub-clause (i) is read as a whole the same  would clearly  indicate that  such produce of tree alone is  contemplated which  is a natural growth or product like flowers  and fruits. This submission has force when the definition of  forest-produce is  read in its entirety which would show  that the  definition  either  includes  nature’s gifts like charcoal, mahua flowers or minerals. Wild animals

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of which sub-clause (iii) speaks of is also a God’s gift and not man-made.  Wherever the  legislature wanted  to  include article produced  with the  aid of human labour, it has said so specifically  as would appear from sub-clause (iv), as it speaks, apart   from minerals etc. of "all products of mines or quarries". 7.   The legislature  having defined "forest-produce", it is not permissible  to us  to read  in the definition something which is not there. We are conscious of the fact that forest wealth is  required to  be preserved; but, it is not open to us to  legislate, as what a court can do in a matter like at hand is  to iron out cresses; it cannot weave a new texture. If there  be any  lacuna in  the definition it is really for the legislature to take care of the same. 8.   We may  also state  that according to us the view taken by the  Gujarat High  Court in  Fatesang’s case  is correct, because though  bamboo as  a whole  is forest  produce, if a product,  commercially   new  and  distinct,  known  to  the business community  as totally  different  is  brought  into existence by  human labour,  such an  article   and  product would cease  to be  a forest-produce. The definition of this expression leaves  nothing to  doubt that  it would dot take within its  fold an  article or    thing  which  is  totally different  from,   forest-produce,     having   a   distinct character. May  it be  stated that  where    a  word  or  an expression is  defined by  the legislature,   courts have to look to that definition; the general understanding of it can not be  determinative. So,  what has been stated in Strouds’ Judicial  Dictionary   regarding  a  "produce"  can  not  be decisive.  Therefore,   where  a   product  from  bamboo  is commercially different  from it and in common parlance taken as a  distinct product,  the same  would not  be encompassed within the expression "forest-produce" as defined in section 2 (4) of the Act, despite it being inclusive in nature. that bamboo mat is taken as a product distinct from bamboo in the commercial world,  has  not  been  disputed  before  us  and rightly. 9.   In view  of all  the above,  we hold that bamboo mat is not a  forest-produce in  the eye  of the Act, and so, allow the appeal,  set aside  the impugned  judgment of  the  High Court and state that the order of confiscation passed by the Conservator of Forest was not in accordance with law.