http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 10  

PETITIONER: SURESH KOSHY GEORGE

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE UNIVERSITY OF KERALA & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 15/07/1968

BENCH: HEGDE, K.S. BENCH: HEGDE, K.S. SHELAT, J.M.

CITATION:  1969 AIR  198            1969 SCR  (1) 317  CITATOR INFO :  R          1970 SC 150  (20)  E          1970 SC1896  (22)  R          1973 SC1124  (11,12)  RF         1975 SC2045  (6,7)  R          1976 SC2002  (3)  F          1977 SC1627  (2)  R          1978 SC 597  (61)  E&R        1978 SC 851  (45)  R          1985 SC1416  (96,98)  RF         1986 SC 555  (6)

ACT: Kerala  University  Act,  1957,-Rules  framed  by  Syndicate delegating  power  to Vice-chancellor to hold  inquiries  on malpractices   during  examinations-rules  not   followed-if inquiry invalid. Natural  Justice-principles   of-if  require  that   inquiry report must be furnished with show-cause notice.

HEADNOTE: As certain preliminary reports indicated that the  appellant had  indulged  in malpractices during  an  examination,  the Vice-Chancellor  of the respondent University appointed  the second  respondent  to  conduct  an  enquiry.   The   second respondent  submitted a report holding the appellant  guilty of  the malpractice and on the basis of this report, a  show cause  notice  was  issued to the  appellant  by  the  Vice- Chancellor.    After   the  appellant  had   submitted   his explanation  in  response  to  the  notice,  and  not  being satisfied  with his explanation, the Vice-chancellor  passed an  order  debarring  the appellant from  appearing  in  any examination  for  a  year.   This  order  was   subsequently approved by the Syndicate of the University. The  appellant challenged the Vice-Chancellor’s order  by  a writ  petition under Article 226 contending inter alia  that (i) the rules framed by the Syndicate delegating its  powers to  the  Vice-Chancellor required that  for  conducting  the inquiry  should have appointed an officer designated by  the principal of the college in which the appellant appeared for his  examination; this was not done in the present case  and hence  there  was no proper inquiry; and (ii)  the  impugned order was invalid inasmuch as no copy of the report made  by

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 10  

the  second respondent was made available to  the  appellant before  he  was  called upon to submit  his  explanation  in response  to the show cause notice.  A Single Bench  of  the High  Court  allowed  the petition,  but  his  decision  was reversed in appeal by a Division Bench,. On appeal to this Court, HELD : Dismissing the appeal. (i)  The rules made by the Syndicate of the University under which  the inquiry was ordered were not statutory rules  but merely rules framed for guidance.  The rule under which  the Vice-Chancellor was required to request the principal of the concerned college to appoint -an Inquiry Officer merely laid down  a  convenient procedure.   Hence  the  Vice-Chancellor cannot be said to have contravened any law in appointing the Inquiry   Officer   not   designated   by   the   principal. Furthermore.  the  principal  in the present  case  was  the father  of the appellant; the Vice-Chancellor was  therefore right in not appointing him but an independent person as the Inquiry Officer. [321 B-C, F-H] (ii) There  was  no  breach of  the  principles  of  natural justice in the appellant not being furnished with a copy  of the  report  of the second respondent before he  was  called upon  to give his explanation.  The appellant had been  duly informed  of the charge against him long before the  inquiry began; the inquiry was held after due notice to him and in 12 Sup C.I./68-6 318 his presence; he was allowed to cross-examimne the witnesses examined in the case and he was permitted to adduce evidence in  rebuttal  of the charge.  No rule, either  statutory  or otherwise, required th Vice-Chancellor to make available  to the appellant a copy of the report submitted by the  Inquiry Officer. [322 B-C] Russel v. Duke of Norfolk and others, [1949] 1 All E.R.  108 (at  118);  Local Government Board v. Alridge,  [1915]  A.C. 120, De Verteuil v. Knaggs and Anr., [1918] A.C. 557;  Byrne and  Anr.  v.  Kinematograph Renters Society  Ltd.  &  Ors., [1958]   All  E.R.  579;  The  Board  of  High  School   and Intermediate Education U.P. v. Bagleshwar Prasad. and  Ors., [1963] 3 S.C.R. 767 (775), referred to. B.Surinder  Singh Kanda v. Government of the  Federation  of Malaya,   [1962]  A.C.  322;  General  Council  of   Medical Education   and  Registration  of  the  United  Kingdom   v. Spackman,  [1943]  2  All  E.  Reports,  337;  New   Prakash Transport  Co. v. New Savarna Transport Co.,  [1957]  S.C.R. 98; distinguished. There is an erroneous impression evidently influenced by the provisions  in Art. 311 of the Constitution particularly  as they  stood before the amendment of that Article that  every disciplinary  proceeding must consist of two inquiries,  one before  issuing  the, show cause notice to  be  followed  by another inquiry thereafter.  Such is not the requirement  of the  principles  of  natural justice.  Law may  or  may  not prescribe  such  a course.  Even if a show cause  notice  is provided by law from that it does not follow that a copy  of the  report on the basis of which the show cause  notice  is issued  should  be made available to the  per-,on  proceeded against  or that another inquiry should be held  thereafter. [326 G-327 A]

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 990 of 1968. Appeal  by special leave from the judgment and  order  dated

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 10  

October 16, 1967 of the Kerala High Court in Writ Appeal No. 128 of 1967. S.V.  Gupte, A. S. Nambiar and Lily Thomas, for  the  appel- lant. V.S.  Seyid Muhamad, P. Keshava Pillai for M. R. K.  Pillai, for respondents Nos.  1 and 3. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Hegde  J. This appeal by special leave from the decision  of the Division Bench of the Kerala High Court arises from  the disciplinary  action taken by the Kerala University  against the  appellant.   He was a student in the I st  year  Degree Course of the Five Year Integrated Course of Engineering, in the  Engineering College, Trichur during the  academic  year 1964-1965.  The Vice Chancellor of the said University  came to  the conclusion that he was guilty of malpractice  during the examination held in April 1965 and consequently debarred him from appearing in any examination till April, 1966. In  the examination in question the appellant bad to  appear in two papers in Mathematics.  In this case we are concerned with 319 the Mathematics I paper.  The Additional Examiner who valued that  paper  awarded the appellant 14% marks but  the  Chief Examiner  gave  him 64% in that paper.   The  appellant  had answered  questions  Nos. 1(a), 5(a), 9(a) and 4(a)  in  the main  answer  book and secured 0.2 out of 6.0  and  0  marks respectively from the Additional Examiner.  Pages 611 of his main   answer  book  were  left  blank.   There  were   some additional  answer books, certain pages of which  were  also left  blank.  Two of the additional answer books  were  also unused  and left blank.  In the used additional answer  book questions  1(a)  and 9(a) which the  appellant  had  already answered  in  the  main answer book and  for  which  he  had secured 0 marks from the Additional Examiner were found  re- answered and for these he Secured 100% marks from the  Chief Examiner.  The Chairman of the Board of Examinations, notic- ing this unusual feature reported the matter to the Board of Examiners  in  Mathematics.  The Board  suggested  that  the University  should  take  up  the  matter.   The  University thereafter called for the answer books of the appellant  and the  same  was  handed over to the Dean of  the  Faculty  of Science  who is the Convener of the Standing  Committee  for Examinations of the University for scrutiny.  That  official suspected that the additional books must have been  inserted after  the  Additional  Examiner had valued  the  paper  and therefore  suggested to the University that a  high  powered committee  should  be  constituted to go  into  the  matter. Accordingly  a committee consisting of the Chairman  of  the Board  of  Engineering Examinations who is the Dean  of  the Faculty of Engineering, Chairman of the Mathematics  Section of  the  Engineering Examinations, the Dean  of  Faculty  of Science  who  is the Convener of the Standing  Committee  on Examinations,  and  the  Registrar  of  the  University  was constituted  to  go into the matter.  That  committee  after inquiry in which the Additional Examiner, the Chief Examiner as  well  as  the  appellant  were  examined  came  to   the conclusion  that  the appellant was  guilty  of  malpractice which called for disciplinary action.  Consequently the Vice Chancellor  ordered a formal inquiry as required  by  rules. He  appointed the second respondent, a retired Principal  of the  University College, Trivandrum as Inquiry  Officer  for conducting the inquiry.  After inquiry the second respondent submitted   a  report  holding  the  appellant   guilty   of malpractice  during the examination in question.  He  opined that  subsequent  to  the valuation of  the  paper  by  the,

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 10  

Additional  Examiner, the appellant had inserted  additional answer  books with the collusion of the Chief Examiner.   On the  basis of that report a show cause notice was issued  to the  appellant  by  the  Vice  Chancellor.   The   appellant submitted  his explanation in response to that notice.   Not being  satisfied with that explanation the  Vice  Chancellor passed  an order debarring the appellant from appearing  for any examination till April, 1966.  The same was subsequently approved by the Syndicate.  The Order of the Vi 320 Chancellor was impugned before the High Court in a  Petition under  Art. 226 of the Constitution.  A Single Judge of  the High  ,Court  who  heard the matter at  the  first  instance allowed  the,  petition  and set aside that  order  but  his decision was reversed in appeal by a Division Bench of  that High Court.  The appellant appeals to the Court against that decision. Before the High Court as well as in this court the  impugned order  was  assailed  on two  grounds  viz.-(1)  the  formal inquiry required under the rules should have been  conducted by an officer designated by the Principal of the College  in which  the  appellant  appeared  for  his  examination  i.e. Examination Centre and hence there was no proper inquiry and (2)  the impugned order was invalid inasmuch as no  copy  of the report made ’by the second respondent was made available to  the  appellant before he was called upon to  submit  his explanation in response to the show ,cause notice issued  to him by the Vice Chancellor. Those contentions appealed to, the learned Single Judge  but the  Judges  of the Division Bench found no merit  in  them. Those very contentions have again been repeated before us. Before examining those contentions, it is necessary to  men- tion a few more facts.  The Kerala University is governed by Kerala  University  Act,  1957.   The  Engineering  College, Trichur  is affiliated to the Kerala University.   Under  s. 19(N)  of  the Kerala University Act, the control  over  the discipline  of the students is vested with the Syndicate  of the  University.   Cl.  (V) of  that  section  empowers  the Syndicate  to  delegate  any  of  its  powers  to  the  Vice Chancellor.  Cl. 3(xxvii) of Chapter VII of the 1st Statutes says :               "The  Syndicate  shall,  in  addition  to  the               powers and duties conferred and imposed on  it               by  the  Act  and subject  to  the  provisions               thereof,  have  and  exercise  the   following               powers and functions :-                                 .........               (xxvii)    subject  to the provisions  in  the               laws, to take cognizance of any misconduct  by               any student in a college or institution or  in               a  hostel  or  approved  lodging,  or  by  any                             student  who  seeks admission to  a  U niversity               course  of study, or by any candidate for  any               University Examination, brought to the  notice               of   the   Syndicate  by  the  head   of   the               institution or by a member of any Authority of               the  University  or by the  Registrar  of  the               University  or  by a Chairman of  a  Board  of               Examiners or by a Chief Superintendent at  any               centre  of  examination  and  to  punish  such               misconduct  by exclusion from  any  University               examination or from any University course in a                321               college  or  in  the University  or  from  any

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 10  

             Convocation  for  the  purpose  of  conferring               degrees, either permanently or for a specified               period,  or  by the cancellation of  the  Uni-               versity  examination for which he appeared  or               by   the   deprivation   of   any   University               scholarship held by him or by cancellation  of               any  University prize or medal awarded to  him               or by such other penalty as it deems fit." Admittedly  the Syndicate delegated the above power  to  the Vice  Chancellor under Exh.  R. 5, a set of rules framed  by the  Syndicate.  These rules are not statutory rules.   They are  merely  rules for guidance.  They could not  have  been framed  under s. 28 of the Kerala University Act.  No  other provision in that Act empowers the Syndicate to frame rules. But the delegation of powers made under those rules is valid as  no fixed procedure is prescribed in that regard.   Those rules  provide that on the receipt of a complaint against  a student  the Vice Chancellor should get an inquiry  made  in respect  of that complaint by an officer designated  by  the Principal  of  the College in which  the  concerned  student appeared for his examination.  They further provide that  on receipt  of  the  report of the  Inquiry  Officer  the  Vice Chancellor  after  consultation with  the  sub-committee  on discipline should take a provisional decision, that decision should  be communicated to the student who should be  called upon  to  show cause against the  provisional  decision  and after  receiving  his  representation,  if  any,  the   Vice Chancellor should pass appropriate final orders. In  this  case  the Principal of the College  in  which  the appellant appeared for his examination was not requested  to appoint  an  Inquiry  Officer.   The  Inquiry  Officer   was directly  appointed  by the Vice  Chancellor  himself.   The reason  for  this  course  is  obvious.   The  Principal  in question   was  the  father  of  the  appellants  The   Vice Chancellor,  therefore,  thought it proper that  be  himself should  appoint  some  independent  person  as  the  Inquiry Officer.  We have earlier seen that the rule under which the Vice Chancellor was required to request the Principal of the concerned  college  to appoint an Inquiry Officer is  not  a statutory  rule.   That rule merely laid down  a  convenient procedure.   Hence  the Vice Chancellor cannot  be  said  to have; contravened any law in appointing the Inquiry Officer. It  cannot be said and it was not said that the steps  taken by  the  Vice  Chancellor  were  in  contravention  of   the principles  of  natural justice.  The second  respondent  as mentioned  earlier is a retired Principal of an  Engineering College,  a responsible person and highly qualified for  the task  entrusted  to him.  His  disinterestedness  was  never challenged at any stage of the inquiry.  In our opinion, the Divison  Bench  of  the High  Court  rightly  negatived  the contention  that by appointing the second respondent as  the Inquiry Officer, the Vice Chancellor had either breached any statutory  rule  or  contravened any  principle  of  natural justice. 322 The only other contention that was taken before the Division Bench  and repeated in this Court was that inasmuch  as  the Vice  Chancellor did not make available to the  appellant  a copy of the report submitted by the second respondent before he  was called upon to make his representations against  the provisional  decision taken by him, there was breach of  the principles of natural justice.  The appellant had been  duly informed  of the charge against him long before the  inquiry began;  the inquiry was held after due notice to him and  in his presence; he was allowed to cross-examine the  witnesses

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 10  

examined in the case and he was permitted to adduce evidence in  rebuttal  of the charge.  No rule  either  statutory  or otherwise was brought to our notice which required the  Vice Chancellor to make available to the appellant a copy of  the report submitted by the Inquiry Officer.  It is not the case of the appellant that he asked for a copy of that report and that  was denied to him.  The rules of natural  justice  are not  embodied rules.  The question whether the  requirements of natural justice have been met by the procedure adopted in a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts  and circumstances of the case in point, the constitution of  the Tribunal and the rules under which it functions.                In  Russel v. Duke of Norfolk and  others(1),               Tucker, L.J. observed :                 "There  are, in my view, no words which  are               of  universal  application to  every  kind  of               inquiry  and every kind of domestic  tribunal.               The  requirements  of  natural  justice   must                             depend  on the circumstances of the  c ase,  the               nature  of the inquiry, the rules under  which               the  tribunal  is acting, the  subject  matter               that  is  being  dealt  with,  and  so  forth.               Accordingly,  I do not derive much  assistance               from the definitions of natural justice  which               have  been  from  time  to  time  used,   but,               whatever standard is adopted, one essential is               that  the  person  concerned  should  have   a               reasonable  opportunity  of  presenting   his-               case."                In  Local  Government  Board  v.   Alridge(2)               Viscount Haldane  L.C. observed                "My  Lords,  when  the duty  of  deciding  an               appeal  is imposed, those whose duty it is  to               decide it must act judicially.  They must deal               with  the  question referred to  them  without               bias,  and  they  must give  to  each  of  the               parties   the   opportunity   of    adequately               presenting  the case made.  The decision  must               become to in the spirit and with the sense  of               responsibility of a tribunal whose duty               (1) [1949](1) All E.R. p. 108 (at 118).               (2) [1915] A.C. p. 120.               323                it is to mete, out justice.  But it does  not               follow  that  the  procedure  of  every   such               tribunal  must be the same.  In the case of  a               Court  of  law tradition in this  country  has               prescribed certain principles to which in  the               main  the  procedure must conform.   But  what               that procedure is to be in detail must  depend               on the nature of the tribunal.  In modem times               it   has   become  increasingly   common   for               Parliament to give an appeal in matters  which               really  pertain to administration rather  than               to  the exercise of the judicial functions  of               an   ordinary  Court,  to  authorities   whose               functions  are administrative and not  in  the               ordinary  sense judicial.  Such a body as  the               Local   Government  Board  has  the  duty   of               enforcing obligations on the individual  which               are imposed in the interests of the community.               Its character is that of an organization  with               executive  functions.   In this  it  resembles               other  great departments of the State.   When,

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 10  

                           therefore, Parliament entrusts it with  judicial               duties,  Parliament  must  be  taken,  in  the               absence,  of any declaration to the  contrary,               to  have intended it to follow  the  procedure               which is its own and is necessary if it is  to               be, capable of doing its work efficiently.   I               agree with the view expressed in an  analogous               case  by  my  noble and  learned  friend  Lord               Loreburn.  In Board of Education v. Rice(1) he               laid  down  that, in disposing of  a  question               which was the subject of an appeal to it,  the               Board of Education was under a duty to act  in               good  faith,  and  to listen  fairly  to  both               sides,  inasmuch as that was a duty which  lay               on everyone who decided anything.  But he went               on  to say that he did not think it was  bound               to  treat such a question as though it were  a               trial.   The Board had no power to  administer               an  oath, and need not examine witnesses.   It               could.  he thought, obtain information in  any               way  it  thought best, always  giving  a  fair               opportunity to those who were, parties in  the               controversy  to  correct  or  contradict   any               relevant statement prejudicial to their  view.               If  the Board failed in this duty,  its  order               might be the subject of certiorari and it must               itself be the subject of mandamus." In the above case the Local Government Board acted solely on the  basis  of  a report submitted by  one  of  the  Housing Inspectors  of the Board after a public inquiry.  The  House of Lords held that the procedure adopted did not  contravene the principles of natural justice.  In De Verteuil v. Knaggs and  Anr.(2)  the ,Judicial Committee of the  Privy  Council observed  while considering the scope of the powers  of  the Governor under s. 2 of the Immigration Ordinance of Trinidad (1) [1911] A. C. 179.               (2) [1918] A.C. 557. 324 "Their  Lordships  are  of opinion that in  making  such  an inquiry  there is, apart from special circumstances, a  duty of giving to any person against whom the complaint is made a fair opportunity to make any relevant statement which he may desire to bring forward and a fair opportunity to correct or controvert  any  relevant statement brought forward  to  his prejudice." In  Byrne and anr. v. Kinematograph Renters Society  Ltd.  & ors.(1) Lord Harman J. observed: "What,  then, are the requirements of natural justice  in  a case  of this kind ? First, I think that the person  accused should know the nature of the accusation made; secondly that he  should  be given an opportunity to state his  case;  and thirdly,  of  course, that the tribunal should act  in  good faith.  I do not think that there really is anything more." The  decision  of the Judicial Committee  in  University  of Ceylon V. Fernando (2 ) appears to go much further than what was laid down in the aforementioned cases.  For the  purpose of this case it is not necessary to take assistance from the ratio of that derision.  Suffice it to say that in the  case before  us there was a fair inquiry against  the  appellant; the officer appointed to inquire was an impartial person- he cannot  be said to have been biassed against the  appellant; the  charge  against  the appellant was made  known  to  him before  the commencement of the inquiry; the  witnesses  who gave evidence against him were examined in his presence  and he was allowed to cross-examine them and lastly he was given

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 8 of 10  

every  opportunity  to present his case before  the  Inquiry Officer.  Hence we see no merit in the contention that there was any breach of the principles of natural justice.  It  is true  that the Vice Chancelor did not make available to  the appellant  a  copy of the report submitted  by  the  Inquiry Officer.  Admittedly the appellant did not ask for a copy of the report.  There is no rule requiring the Vice  Chancellor to  provide the appellant with a copy of the report  of  the Inquiry  Officer before he was called upon to make  his  re- presentation against the provisional decision taken by  him. If   the  appellant  felt  any  difficulty  in  making   his representation  without  looking  into  the  report  of  the Inquiry Officer, he could have very well asked for a copy of that  report., His present grievance appears to be an  after thought and we see no substance in it. Mr.  S. V. Gupte, the learned counsel for the appellant,  in support  of  his  contention that the failure  of  the  Vice Chancellor to make available to the appellant a copy of  the report  submitted by the Inquiry Officer is an  infringement of the principles of natural justice, placed strong reliance on the decision of the Judicial (1)  [1958] All E.R. 579.                        (2)  [1960] (1) All E.R. 631. 325. Committee  in B. Surinder Singh Kanda v. Government  of  the Federation  of Malaya(1).  Therein, at the instance  of  the Commissioner  of  Police,  a preliminary  inquiry  was  held against  S.  S.  Kanda.  Thereafter  a  formal  inquiry  was ordered  On  the  basis of the conclusions  reached  at  the formal  inquiry Surinder Singh Kanda was  dismissed.   Kanda challenged  his dismissal in an action brought in  the  High Court of Malaya.  During the pendency of that proceeding, it came  to light that the report made by the Board which  held the  preliminary  inquiry, a report which  was  highly  pre- judicial  to  Kanda  had been placed in  the  hands  of  the officer who held the formal inquiry but neither the copy  of that  report  nor its substance had been made  available  to Kanda.   That  report  was likely  to  have  prejudiced  the Inquiry  Officer against Kanda.  Under  those  circumstances the  Judicial  Committee  came to the  conclusion  that  the inquiry held was not fair and consequently quashed the order dismissing  Kanda.   The  ratio  of  that  decision  has  no application to the present case.  The decision of the  House of  Lords  in  General  Council  of  Medical  Education  and Registration  of the United Kingdom v. Spackman ( 2  )  does not  bear on the question under consideration.  Therein  the House of Lords held that the General Medical Council was not right  in  declining  an  opportunity  being  given  to  Dr. Spackman  to show that the conclusion of the  Divorce  Court that he was guilty of infamous conduct was not correct.   In that  case the General Medical Council took  action  against Dr. Spackman solely on the basis of the conclusions  reached by  the  Divorce Court in Pepper v.  Pepper.   Dr.  Spackman wanted  to  negative  the court’s  finding  of  adultery  by tendering evidence which though available was not called  in the  divorce proceedings.  The House of Lords held that  the Council’s  refusal  to take fresh evidence  prevented  their being the due inquiry required by s. 29 of the Medical  Act, 1858 and therefore an order of certiorari was granted. The scope of the principles of natural justice as  explained by  the English Courts was adopted by this Court in a  large number  of  cases.   See New Prakash Transport  Co.  v.  New Savarna  Transport  Co.(3)  and Nagendra Nath  Bora  v.  The Commissioner of Hill Divisions (4 ). Before  closing  this  case  we would  like  to  recall  the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 9 of 10  

observations  made  by Gajendragadkar J. (as  he  then  was) speaking  for  the  Court in The Board of  High  School  and Intermediate   Education  U.P.  v.  Bagleshwar  Prasad   and ors.(5). His Lordship observed :               "In dealing with petitions of this type, it is               necessary  to  bear in mind  that  educational               institutions like the               (1)  [1962] A.C. 322.           (2) [1943] (2)               All E. R. 337.               (3)   [1957]  S.C.R. 98.           (4)  [1958]               S.C.R. 1240 (1261).               (5)   [1963] (3) S.C.R. 767 (775).                326               Universities or appellant No. 1 set up Enquiry               Committees  to deal with the problem posed  by               the  adoption of unfair means  by  candidates,               and normally it is within the jurisdiction  of               such domestic tribunals to decide all relevant               questions  in  the  light  of  the   evidence,               adduced  before  them.  In the matter  of  the               adoption of unfair means, direct evidence  may               sometimes  be available, but cases  may  arise               where direct evidence is not available and the               question  will  have to be considered  in  the               light  of  probabilities  and   circumstantial               evidence.   This  problem  which   educational               institutions have to face from time to time is               a  serious problem and unless there is  justi-               fication  ’Lo do so, courts should be slow  to               interfere  with  the  decisions  of   domestic               Tribunals appointed by educational bodies like               the   Universities.   In  dealing   with   the               validity  of  the impugned  orders  passed  by               Universities under Art. 226, the High Court is               not  sitting in a appeal over the decision  in               question;  its  jurisdiction  is  limited  and               though  it is true that if the impugned  order               is  not supported by any evidence at all,  the               High  Court would be justified to  quash  that               order.   But the conclusion that the  impugned               order is not supported by any evidence must be               reached  after considering the question as  to               whether   probabilities   and   circumstantial               evidence  do not justify the said  conclusion.               Enquiries  held by domestic Tribunals in  such               cases  must,  no doubt, be fair  and  students               against whom charges are framed must be  given               adequate  opportunities to defend  themselves,               and  in holding such enquiries, the  Tribunal,               must  scrupulously  follow  rules  of  natural               justice;  but  it  would,  we  think,  not  be               reasonable to import into these enquiries  all               considerations which govern criminal trials in               ordinary courts of law.  In the present  case,               no animal is suggested and no mala fides  have               been  pleaded.  The enquiry has been fair  and               the  respondent  has  bad  an  opportunity  of               making  his defence.  That being so, we  think               the   High   Court  was   not   justified   in               interfering with the order passed against  the               respondent." There  seems to be an erroneous impression in certain  quar- ters evidently influenced by the provisions in Art. 31 1  of the  Constitution  particularly  as they  stood  before  the amendment of that article that every disciplinary proceeding

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 10 of 10  

must  consist of two inquiries, one before issuing the  show cause  notice to be followed by another inquiry  thereafter. Such  is  not the requirement of the principles  of  natural justice.  Law may or may not prescribe such a course.   Even if a show cause notice is provided by law from that it  does not  follow that a copy of the report on the basis of  which the show cause notice is issued should be made available 327 to  the  person proceeded against or  that  another  inquiry should be held thereafter. For  the  reasons mentioned above the appeal  fails  and  is dismissed with costs. R.K.P.S. Appeal dismissed. 328