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PETITIONER: SURENDRA PAL SINGH

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE BOARD OF REVENUE FOR RAJASTHAN AND ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT13/05/1993

BENCH: YOGESHWAR DAYAL (J) BENCH: YOGESHWAR DAYAL (J) KULDIP SINGH (J)

CITATION:  1994 AIR 1439            1993 SCR  (3) 722  1993 SCC  Supl.  (3) 229 JT 1993 (3)   465  1993 SCALE  (2)889

ACT: Rajasthan Tenancy Act 1955-S. 221-General powers of superin- tendency  and control of Board of Revenue over  all  revenue courts,  held  includes  both  administrative  and  judicial powers--Ch.III-B, Ss 225,230-Rajasthan Imposition of Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act, 1973.

HEADNOTE: Proceedings  were  commenced  under  Chapter  III-B  of  the Rajasthan Tenancy Act 1955 for determining the ceiling  area for  Raghubir  Singh,  the father of the  appellant.   In  a revision application in the first round of litigation.   The Board of Revenue directed that the ceiling area for Raghubir Singh  may be determined according to the old law, i.e.  Act of  1955, and not according to the Rajasthan  Imposition  of Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act, 1973. Thereafter,  by  his order dt. 5.5.76, the SDO  held,  inter alia,  that tile father and the son, appellant,  constituted two  separate units and each of them was entitled to get  62 bighas and 8 biswas. Aggrieved by the SDO’s order, Raghubir Singh filed an appeal before Revenue Appellate Authority, which was dismissed.  He then filed a revision application under S.230 of the Act  of 1955 before the Board of Revenue for Rajasthan. He  urged that he was in possession of 112 bighas  only  and sought  permission to adduce additional evidence, which  was disallowed.   However,  the Member of the Board  held  inter alia that the provisions of the old law applied to the case, but the SDO had committed an error of law in determining the ceiling  area under the new Act of 1973.  The Board  further held  that  there  is no provision  for  separate  units  in Chapter  III-B of the Act of 1955, and remanded the case  to the SDO, Hanumangarh, for fresh determination of the Ceiling area for Raghubir Singh. Before  the High Court, it was urged that the  State  having not  appealed against the order of the SDO dated 5.5.76,  it became final, and the Board of 723 Revenue  had no jurisdiction to set aside that part  of  the SDO’s  order  which had gone against the State  and  in  his favour.   It  was  submitted  that  the  power  of   general

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superintendence  and control over all revenue  courts  which vested in the Board could not be exercised to the  detriment of  the  writ  petitioners  much less by  way  of  suo  motu exercise of powers. The High Court dismissed the petitions. Before this court it was submitted that the State not having filed  an appeal, or a revision, the Board of Revenue  could not, while hearing the revision petition of Raghubir  Singh, set  aside  the  orders of the  SDO  and  Revenue  Appellate Authority under S.221 of the Act of 1955. Dismissing the appeal, this court, HELD:.....(1)  S.221 is not subject to the other  provisions of the Act.  It is clear from the language of Section 221 of the Act 1955 that the Board of Revenue has general powers of superintendence and control over all revenue courts.  It  is both administrative as well as judicial powers.  It is  open to  the Board to exercise its powers of  superintendence  on all  its  subordinate  courts  in  order  to  regulate   the functioning  of  the subordinate courts so as to  keep  them within  their  respective spheres of jurisdiction.   If  the subordinate  court disregards any specific provision of  law and  does  something  illegal it is open  to  the  Board  of Revenue to interfere and set the matter right. (727-E) Karan  Singh v. Board of revenue, Rajasthan 1962 Raj LW  178 and  Permessar Singh v. Kailaspati AIR 1916 Pat.  292  (FB), distinguished. Kana v. Board of Revenue ILR (1955) 5 Raj. 55, approved. (2)  There is no restriction on the powers of the  Board  to set  aside  the order of the SDO provided it  comes  to  the conclusion  that  interest of justice requires  exercise  of such powers. (728-D) (3) In not determining the ceiling area according to the Act of 1955, the SDO committed a grave illegality in not  merely ignoring  the  law but also ignoring the directions  of  the Board of Revenue itself. (728-F) 724

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1367 of 1980. From the Judgment and Order dated 19.7.1979 of the Rajasthan High Court in D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 769 of 1979. Subhash Mallick and S.K. Jain for the Appellant. B.D. Sharma for the Respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by YOGESHWAR  DAYAL,J.  This is an appeal against the  judgment of the Rajasthan High Court dated 19th July, 1979 passed  in D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 681 of 1978 (Raghubir Singh  v. The  Board  of Revenue for Rajasthan and  others)  and  D.B. Civil  Writ Petition No. 769 of 1979 (Surendrapal  Singh  v. The Board of Revenue for Rajasthan and others).  These  writ petitions  were  decided by the aforesaid  common  judgment. The  first  writ petition was filed by the  father  Raghubir Singh  whereas  the second writ petition was  filed  by  his minor  son  Surendrapal Singh through his next  friend  Shri Jagjit  Singh,  maternal  grand-father of  the  minor.   The relief  claimed in both the petitions before the High  Court was the same, namely - for setting aside of the order  dated 6th  August,  1977  passed  by  the  Board  of  Revenue  for Rajasthan, Ajmer. The  facts  of the case briefly are-that  proceedings  under Chapter  III-B  of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act (Act No.  3  of 1955)  (hereinafter  referred to as ’the Act of  1955)  were commenced  for  determining the ceiling  area  for  Raghubir

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Singh.   The  Sub-Divisional Officer,  Hanumangarh,  by  his order dated 10th August, 1972, determined the ceiling  area, but  an  appeal  by Raghubir Singh,  the  Revenue  Appellate Authority, set aside the order of the sub-Divisional Officer on  March  6, 1973 and remanded the case.   The  matter  was taken  to the Board of Revenue for Rajasthan by  a  revision application  and  the Board by its order dated  14th  April, 1975  directed that the ceiling area for Raghubir Singh  may be determined  according to the old law i.e. Act of 1955 and not  according to the new law i.e. Rajasthan  Imposition  of Ceiling  on  Agricultural  Holding  Act,  1973  (hereinafter referred to as ’the Act of 1973). In  pursuance  of  the  direction of  the  Board,  the  Sub- Divisional Officer, Hanumangarh, by his order dated 5th May, 1976 held that Surendrapal Singh, (appellant herein) aged 12 years, was a minor son of Raghubir Singh and used to 725 study in Punjab and further held that the land in possession of   Raghubir  Singh  was  ancestral.   The   Sub-Divisional Officer, then came to the conclusion that the father and the son  constitute two separate units and each one of them  was entitled  to get 62 Bighas and 8 Biswas.  It was  thus  held that  Raghubir  Singh  and his  son  Surendrapal  Singh  are entitled  to  retain 124 Bighas and 16 Biswas only  and  the surplus  land  measuring,  4  Bighas and  6  Biswas  may  be resumed. Aggrieved  by  the  order  of  the  Sub-Divisional  Officer, Raghubir  Singh  filed appeal before the  Revenue  Appellate Authority,  Bikaner, who by his order dated  6th  September, 1976  dismissed  the same and upheld the order of  the  Sub- Divisional  Officer.   Dissatisfied with the  order  of  the Revenue Appellate Authority, Raghubir Singh filed a revision application under Section 230 of the Act of 1955 before  the Board of Revenue for Rajasthan. On  behalf of raghubir Singh it was urged before  the  Board that the petitioner was in possession of 112 Bighas only and not 129 Bighas and 3 Biswas as held by the lower courts.  He sought  permission to adduce additional evidence in  support of his contention.  The application for adducing  additional evidence  was disallowed.  However, the member of the  Board came  to  the conclusion that Surendrapal  Singh  (appellant here in) was born to Raghubir Singh on 14th March, 1963  and was  only 13 years of age when the ceiling proceedings  were finalized  by the Sub-Divisional Officer on 5th  May,  1976. He  further held that the provisions of the old ceiling  law applied  to  the  case but the  Sub-Divisional  Officer  had committed  an error of law in determining the  ceiling  area under  the new law i.e. the Act of 1973.  The Board went  on to  hold  that there is no provision for separate  units  in Chapter III-B of the Act of 1955.  In the ultimate  analysis the  Member  of the Board found that there was a  gross  and patent illegality in the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer and, consequently, set aside the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer  dated  5th May, 1976 as well as the  order  of  the Appellate  Authority dated 6th September, 1976 and  remanded the  case  to the Sub-Divisional Officer,  Hanumangarh,  for fresh determination of the calling area for Raghubir Singh. Before  the  Division Bench of the High Court  in  the  writ petitions  it was urged on behalf of Raghubir Singh that  no appeal  having  been filed by the State from the  order  the Sub-Divisional  Officer dated 5th May, 1976, the said  order became final and the Board of Revenue had no jurisdiction to set  aside that part of the Sub-Divisional  Officer’s  order which had gone against the State and in his favour.  It  was submitted  that  the power of  general  superintendence  and

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control  over all revenue courts vested in the  Board  could not be exercised to the detriment of the 726 writ  petitioners much less by way of suo motu  exercise  of powers. The  High  Court by the impugned judgment dated  19th  July, 1979 upheld the order of the Board of Revenue for  Rajasthan and dismissed the writ petitions. Surendrapal Singh, the erstwhile minor son of Raghubir Singh has come up to this Court by way of special leave which  was granted and hence the present appeal. Mr.  Subhagh  Mal Jain learned senior counsel  appearing  on behalf of the appellant submitted that the State having  not filed an appeal under section 225 of the Act of 1955 and  or revision under Section 230 of the Act of 1955, the Board  of the  Revenue could not, while hearing the revision  petition filed  by  Raghubir  Singh, set aside  the  orders  of  Sub- Divisional Officer and the revenue appellate authority under Section  221 of the Act of 1955.  Section 221 of the Act  of 1955 provides as under:-               "221.Subordination  of  revenue  courts.-  The               general  superintendence and control over  all               revenue courts shall be vested in, an all such               Courts shall be subordinate to the Board;  and               subject  to such superintendence, control  and               subordination-               (a)       x       x      x       (omitted)               (b)    all   Additional   Collectors,    Sub.-               Divisional  Officer, Assistant Collectors  and               Tehsildars in a district shall be  subordinate               to the Collector thereof,               (c)all  Assistant Collectors,  Tehsildars  and               Naib-Tehsildars  in  a sub-division  shall  be               subordinate  to  the  Sub-Divisional   Officer               thereof, and               (d)   All  Additional  Tehsildars  and   Naib-               Tehsildars in a tehsil shall be subordinate to               the Tehsildar thereof." The contention of learned counsel for the appellant is  that the section confers executive powers of superintendence  and control  on  the  Board and it does not vest  any  power  of superintendence  on  the Board on judicial side.   For  this purpose  he relied or the decision of the Division Bench  of the Rajasthan High Court reported as 19 RLW 178: Karan Singh v.  Board of Revenue, Rajasthan.  The Division 727 Bench in that case was concerned with the interpretation  of Section  9  of  the Land Revenue  Act.   Section  9  whereof provides as under:-               "9  Subject  to the other provisions  of  this               Act,  the general superintendence and  control               over  all revenue courts and over all  revenue               officers  shall  be vested in,  and  all  such               Courts  and Officers shall be subordinate  to,               the Board." In  that case also the High Court took the view that  it  is not  correct  to  say  that Section  9  is  limited  to  the executive  control  and superintendence of  the  Board  over subordinate revenue courts and it does not apply to judicial proceedings.   The contention on behalf of the appellant  to that effect was negatived but on merits the High Court  held that  it was not appropriate for the Board to  exercise  the powers  conferred  by Section 9 of the land Revenue  Act  in view  of the fact that the Board had appellate  jurisdiction and  it  could  not, therefore, make use of  its  powers  of

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superintendence and control and the order of the Board could not  be held proper with reference to Section 9 of the  Land Revenue   Act.    This   case   has   no   application   for interpretation  of  the present Section 221 of  the  Act  of 1955.  Section 221 of the Act of 1955 is not subject to  the other provisions of the Act.  It is clear from the  language of Section 221 of the Act of 1955 that the Board of  Revenue has  general powers of superintendence and control over  all revenue  courts.   It  is both  administrative  as  well  as judicial  powers.  It is open to the Board to  exercise  its powers  of superintendence on all its subordinate courts  in order to regulate the functioning of’ the subordinate courts so  as  to  keep them within  their  respective  spheres  of jurisdiction.   If  the  subordinate  court  disregards  any specific  provision of law and does something illegal it  is open to the Board of Revenue to interfere and set the matter right.   A similar question arose before the Rajasthan  High Court in Kana and others v.Board of Revenue. Rajasthan:  ILR (1955)  5 Raj. 55 where the High Court had to  construe  the power of the Board of Revenue, Rajasthan, conferred on it by the Rajasthan Board of Revenue Ordinance (NO.XXII of  1949). There also there was similar provision like Section 9 of the Land Revenue Act and it was held that Section 12 of the said Ordinance must be held to give powers to the Board to revise judicial orders also passed by courts in appropriate  cases. It  was observed at page 63 of the report-"of course,  -such powers  would generally not be exercised where a  party  had remedy  by way of appeal and revision, and did not avail  of it.   At  the same time, the power is there, and-it  may  be exercised  sparingly in extraordinary case,, where  interest of  justice  requires  that the Board  should  exercise  the power". Under Section 107 of the Government of India Act, 1955 there was  provision  of superintendence by High  Court  in  these terms :- 728               Each  of the High Courts  has  superintendence               over all the courts for the time being subject               to its appellate jurisdiction." These words have been consistently interpreted to mean  that the  High Court had power in appropriate cases to  interfere with the judicial orders of the courts. Reference may in this connection be made to Parmessar  Singh v. Kailaspati AIR 1916 Pat. 292 (F.B.). In the Government of India Act of 1935, there was provision under Section 224 for superintendence by the High Courts’, but subsection(2)  made it clear that this superintendence would not be construed as giving  to the High Court any jurisdiction to  question  any judgment  of  any  inferior court which  was  not  otherwise subject  to appeal or revision.  Section 221 of the  Act  of 1955  is similar to Section 107 of the Government  of  India Act,  1915 and there is no section like sub-section  (2)  of Section  224 of the Government of India Act of 1935  in  the Act of 1955.  Thus there is no restriction on the powers  of the  Board  to  set aside the order  of  the  Sub-Divisional Officer provided it comes to the conclusion that interest of justice requires exercise of such powers.  The Board noticed that  there  was no provision for separate unit  in  Chapter III-B  of tile Act of 1955 and the applicant Raghubir  Singh and  his son Surendrapal Singh constituted one unit and  not two  units  and  the case  was  remanded  to  Sub-Divisional Officer,  Hanumangarh,  for  de novo  determination  of  the ceiling area for the appellant in law.  The High Court  also did  not go into the merits of the controversy nor  we  have thought it advisable to into it and it would be for the Sub-

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Divisional Officer, Hanumangarh to decide it in the light of the  observations  of  the  Board.  It  is  clear  from  the judgment under appeal that the Board had by its order  dated 14th  April,  1975 directed that the ceiling,  area  may  be determined  according  to old law i.e. Act of  1955  and  it spite  of it the Sub-Divisional Officer committed the  grave illegality on not merely ignoring the law but also  ignoring the directions of the Board of Revenue itself. The appeal consequently fails and is dismissed with costs. U. R.                  Appeal dismissed. 729