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CASE NO.: Appeal (crl.) 186  of  2001 Special Leave Petition (crl.)   2436     of  2000

PETITIONER: DR.SURAJMANI STELLA KUJUR

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: DURGA CHARAN HANSDAH & ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       14/02/2001

BENCH: K.T.Thomas, R.P.Sethi

JUDGMENT:

L.....I.........T.......T.......T.......T.......T.......T..J

     SETHI,J.

     Leave  granted.  Who is a "Hindu" for the purposes  of the   applicability   of  the   Hindu  Marriage  Act,   1955 (hereinafter  referred  to as "the Act")?  is a question  of law  to be determined in this appeal.  Section 2 of the  Act specifies  the  persons  to  whom  the  Act  is  applicable. Clauses  (a),  (b) and (c) of Sub-section (1) of  Section  2 make  the  Act  applicable  to a person who is  a  Hindu  by religion  in  any of its forms or developments  including  a Virashaiva,   a  Lingayat  or  a  follower  of  the  Brahmo, Prarthana  or  Arya Samaj and to persons who is a  Buddhist, Jaina  or  Sikh by religion.  It is also applicable  to  any other  person  domiciled in the territories of India who  is not  a  Muslim,  Christian, Parsi or Jew by  religion.   The applicability  of  the Act is, therefore, comprehensive  and applicable  to  all  persons domiciled in the  territory  of India  who  are not Muslims, Christians, Parsis or  Jews  by religion.   The  term  "Hindu" has not been  defined  either under  the  Act  or  Indian  Succession  Act  or  any  other enactment  of  the Legislature.  As far back as in 1903  the Privy  Council  in Bhagwan Koer v.  J.C.  Bose & Ors.   [ILR (XXXI)  Calcutta Series 11] observed:  "We shall not attempt here  to  lay down a general definition of what is meant  by the  term ’Hindu’.  to make it accurate and at the same time sufficiently  comprehensive  as  well   as  distinctive   is extremely  difficult.   The Hindu religion  is  marvellously catholic and elastic.  Its theology is marked by eclecticism and  tolerance  and  almost  unlimited  freedom  of  private worship.   Its  social  code  is much  more  stringent,  but amongst  its  different  castes and sections  exhibits  wide diversity  of  practice.  No trait is more marked  of  Hindu society  in general than its horror of using the meat of the cow.   Yet  the Chamaras who profess Hinduism, but  who  eat beef  and the flesh of dead animals, are however low in  the scale included within its pale.  It is easier to say who are not  Hindus,  not practically and separation of Hindus  from

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non-Hindus  is  not  a matter of so  much  difficulty.   The people know the differences well and can easily tell who are Hindus and who are not."

     The  Act,  is,  therefore, applicable  to:   "(1)  All Hindus  including  a  Virashaiva,  a  Lingayat,  a   Brahmo, Prarthana Samajist and an Arya Samajist.

     (2) Budhists

     (3) Jains

     (4) Sikhs"

     In this appeal the parties are admittedly tribals, the appellant  being  a Oraon and the respondent a Santhal.   In the  absence of a notification or order under Article 342 of the  Constitution  they are deemed to be Hindus.  Even if  a notification  is issued under the Constitution, the Act  can be  applied  to  Scheduled  Tribes  as  well  by  a  further notification in terms of Sub-section (2) of Section 2 of the Act.   It is not disputed before us that in the Constitution (Scheduled  Tribes)  Order,  1950 as  amended  by  Scheduled Castes  and  Scheduled Tribes Order (Amendment) Acts  63  of 1956,  108  of  1976, 18 of 1987 and 15 of  1990,  both  the tribes  to  which the parties belong are specified  in  Part XII.  It is conceded even by the appellant that "the parties to  the  petition  are two Tribals,  who  otherwise  profess Hinduism,  but  their marriage being out of the  purview  of Hindu  Marriage  Act, 1955 in light of Section 2(2)  of  the Act,  are  thus  governed only by their Santal  Customs  and usage".   The appellant has, however, relied upon an alleged custom  in the Tribe which mandates monogamy as a rule.   It is  submitted that as the respondent has solemnised a second marriage  during the subsistence of the first marriage  with the   appellant,  the  second   marriage  being  void,   the respondent  is  liable  to  be prosecuted  for  the  offence punishable  under Section 494 of the Indian Penal Code.   No custom  can  create an offence as it essentially deals  with the  civil  rights  of  the parties and  no  person  can  be convicted  of  any  offence except for violation of  law  in force  at the time of commission of the act charged.  Custom may  be proved for the determination of the civil rights  of the  parties  including their status, the  establishment  of which   may  be  used  for   the  purposes  of  proving  the ingredients  of an offence which, under Section 3(37) of the General  Clauses  Act,  would  mean   an  act  or   omission punishable  by  any  law  by way of  fine  or  imprisonment. Article  20 of the Constitution, guaranteeing protection  in respect  of  conviction of offence, provides that no  person shall  be  convicted of any offence except for violation  of law in force at the time of commission of the act charged as an  offence.   Law  under  Article  13  clause  (3)  of  the Constitution means the law made by the Legislature including intravires  statutory, orders and orders made in exercise of powers  conferred  by the statutory rules.   The  expression "custom  and  usage" has been defined under Section 3(a)  of the  Act as:  "the expression ’custom’ and ’usage’ and  rule which, having been continuously and uniformly observed for a long time, has obtained the force of law among Hindus in any local area, tribe, community, group or family:

     Provided that the rule is certain and not unreasonable

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or opposed to public policy;  and

     Provided further that in the case of a rule applicable only  to  a  family  it has not  been  discontinued  by  the family."

     For  custom to have the colour of a rule or law, it is necessary  for the party claiming it to plead and thereafter prove  that such custom is ancient, certain and  reasonable. Custom  being in derogation of the general rule is  required to  be construed strictly.  The party relying upon a  custom is  obliged  to  establish  it   by  clear  and  unambiguous evidence.   In  Ramalakshmi  Ammal   v.   Sivanatha  Perumal Sethuraya, [14 Moo.  Ind.  App.  570 at p.585] held:  "It is of  the essence of special usage modifying the ordinary  law of  succession  that they should be ancient and  invariable; and  it is further essential that they should be established to  be so by clear and unambiguous evidence.  It is only  by means  of  such evidence that the courts can be  assured  of their  existence,  and that they possess the  conditions  of antiquity  and certainty on which alone their legal title to recognition depends."

     This   Court  in  Mirza   Raja  Pushpavati   Vijayaram Gajapathi   Raj  &  ors.   v.   Sri   Pushavathi   Visweswar Gajapathiraj  Rajkumar  of Vizianagram & Ors.  [AIR 1964  SC 118] again reiterated the same position of law regarding the establishment  of  a  custom upon which a party  intends  to rely.   The  importance  of the custom in  relation  to  the applicability  of  the  Act  has been  acknowledged  by  the Legislature  by incorporating Section 29 saving the validity of  a  marriage solemnised prior to the commencement of  the Act which may otherwise be invalid after passing of the Act. Nothing  in  the  Act can affect any  right,  recognised  by custom  or  conferred  by any said enactment to  obtain  the dissolution of a Hindu Marriage whether solemnised before or after  the commencement of the Act even without the proof of the  conditions precedent for declaring the marriage invalid as  incorporated  in Sections 10 to 13 of the Act.  In  this case  the appellant filed a complaint in the Court of  Chief Metropolitan  Magistrate, New Delhi stating therein that her marriage  was  solemnised  with   the  respondent  in  Delhi "according  to Hindu rites and customs".  Alleging that  the respondent  has solemnised another marriage with the Accused No.2,  the complainant pleaded:  "That the accused No.1  has not  obtained  any divorce thro’ the Court of Law upto  this date and hence the action of the accused No.1 is illegal and contravene  the provision of law as laid down under  Section 494 IPC."

     Nowhere in the complaint the appellant has referred to any  alleged custom having the force of law which  prohibits the  solemnisation of second marriage by the respondent  and the  consequences  thereof.  It may be emphasised that  mere pleading  of  a custom stressing for monogamy by itself  was not  sufficient  unless it was further pleaded  that  second marriage  was void by reason of its taking place during  the life  of such husband or wife.  In order to prove the second marriage  being void, the appellant was under an  obligation to  show the existence of a custom which made such  marriage null, ineffectual, having no force of law or binding effect, incapable of being enforced in law or non- est.  The fact of

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second  marriage  being  void  is a sine  qua  non  for  the applicability of Section 494 IPC.  It is settled position of law   that  for  fastening   the  criminal  liability,   the prosecution  or  the  complainant is obliged  to  prove  the existence  of  all  the ingredients constituting  the  crime which  is  normally and usually defined by a  statute.   The appellant  herself  appears  to be not clear  in  her  stand inasmuch  as in her statement in the court recorded on  24th October,  1992  she  has  stated  that  "I  am  a  Hindu  by religion".   The complaint was dismissed by the trial  court holding,  "there  is  no mention of any such custom  in  the complaint  nor  there  is evidence of such custom.   In  the absence of pleadings and evidence reference to Book alone is not  sufficient".  the High Court vide the judgment impugned in  this appeal held that in the absence of notification  in terms of sub-section (2) of Section 2 of the Act no case for prosecution  for the offence of bigamy was made out  against the respondent because the alleged second marriage cannot be termed to be void either under the Act or any alleged custom having  the force of law.  In view of the fact that  parties admittedly belong to the Scheduled Tribes within the meaning of  clause  (25)  of  Article 366  of  the  Constitution  as notified  by the Constitution (Scheduled Tribes) Order, 1950 as  amended  by Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes  Order (Amendment)  Acts 63 of 1956, 108 of 1976, 18 of 1987 and 15 of 1990 passed in terms of Article 342 and in the absence of specific pleadings, evidence and proof of the alleged custom making  the  second marriage void, no offence under  Section 494  of  the  Indian  Penal Code can possibly  be  made  out against  the respondent.  The Trial Magistrate and the  High Court have rightly dismissed the complaint of the appellant. Learned  Counsel  appearing  for   the  appellant,  however, submitted  that even if the second marriage was not void for the  purposes of attracting the applicability of Section 494 and  holding the respondent guilty of bigamy, the  appellant is entitled to maintenance, succession and other benefits on account  of  her  being  the  legally  wedded  wife  of  the respondent.   We  cannot adjudicate upon such  a  proclaimed right  of the appellant.  The appellant is at liberty to get her  right  established  by way of civil  proceedings  in  a competent  court  of jurisdiction.  If any such  proceedings are  initiated, the same would be decided on their merits in accordance  with the principles of pleadings and proof,  not being  influenced  by  any of the observations made  by  the trial  magistrate  or the High Court.  There is no merit  in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed.