IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5423  OF 2008

  (@ Special Leave Petition(C) No.12971 of 2008)

Supri Advertising & Entertainment  Pvt. Ltd. ... Appellant

Vs.

Dr. Anahita Pandole & Ors.        ... RespondentS

With CIVIL APPEAL NO.       OF 2008

(@ Special Leave Petition (C) No.14822 of 2008)

J U D G M E N T

ALTAMAS KABIR,J.

1. Leave  granted  in  both  the  Special  Leave

Petitions.  

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Having regard to the common issues involved in

the  two  appeals  and  the  connected  applications,

they were taken up for hearing together.

2. The  respondent  herein,  Dr.  Anahita  Pandole,

filed Writ Petition no.1132 of 2002 before the

Bombay High Court for relief mainly against the

Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai and its

authorities  in  granting  licences  for  mobile

hoardings,  purportedly  in  violation  of  the

provisions of Sections 308, 328 and 328A of the

Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act, 1888, Section

116 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and the

provisions  of  the  Maharashtra  (Urban  Areas)

Preservation  of  Trees  Act  1975.   The  writ

petition appears to have been filed on account

of the writ petitioner’s concern regarding the

destruction  of  flora  and  fauna  and  the

environment of Mumbai, the damage to heritage

buildings in the city and also the prejudice

purportedly caused to the safety of pedestrians

and motorists in Mumbai.  By the writ petition,

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the respondent no.1 sought the intervention of

the High Court to put a check on hoardings,

which  according  to  the  respondent  no.1,  had

proliferated alarmingly in the city of Mumbai.

3. In  the  writ  petition,  the  respondent  no.1

herein  challenged  the  permission  granted  to

various  advertising  agencies  for  display  of

hoardings in breach of the guidelines framed by

the  Municipal  Corporation  of  Brihan  Mumbai

under  Sections  328  and  328A  of  the  Mumbai

Municipal  Corporation  Act,  1888,  hereinafter

referred  to  as  “the  1888  Act”,  and  the

provisions  of the  other enactments  mentioned

hereinabove.  In fact, the writ petitioner also

challenged  the  provisions  of  the  guidelines

which had been framed on the ground that they

were  contrary  to  the  provisions  of  the

aforesaid enactments.

4. The case made out in the writ petition is that

Section  328  of  the  1888  Act,  inter  alia,

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prohibits  any  person,  without  the  written

permission  of the  Municipal Commissioner,  to

erect,  fix  or  retain  any  sky-sign,  which

includes  hoardings.   Section  328  further

provides that no permission under the Section

is to be granted or renewed, for any period

exceeding two years from the date of each such

permission  or  renewal.   Sub-section  (3)  of

Section  328  provides  that  the  Municipal

Commissioner may by written notice require the

removal of any sky-sign which is erected, fixed

or retained in contravention of the provisions

of Section 328 or after the permission for such

erection,  fixing  or  retention  thereof  shall

have  expired  or  become  void.   In  addition,

Section  328  A  of  the  Act  provides  that  no

person shall, without the written permission of

the Municipal Commissioner, erect, exhibit, fix

or  retain  any  advertisement  upon  any  land,

building, wall, hoarding or structure.  Certain

types  of  advertisements  exempted  from  the

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aforesaid restriction, are also included in the

Section.

5. In  the  writ  petition  it  was  alleged  that

permission to display mobile hoardings had been

granted to different applicants which has not

only caused environmental problems but had also

resulted  in  serious  damage  to  heritage

buildings of the city, besides causing traffic

hazards, even on the arterial roads of the city

and disrupting the smooth flow of traffic.  It

may be pointed out at this stage that neither

of the appellants herein had been made parties

to the writ petition, but on their application

they  had  been  allowed  to  intervene  in  the

proceedings.

6. The writ petition, however, focuses more on the

alleged  violation  of  the  provisions  of  the

Maharashtra (Urban Areas) Preservation of Trees

Act, 1975, and reference to the provisions of

the Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act and the

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, have been made to

buttress such contention.

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7. The allegations made in the Writ Petition were

denied  on  behalf  of  the  Mumbai  Municipal

Corporation.   It  was  contended  that  the

permission granted to the appellant in these

appeals  was  in  complete  conformity  with  the

provisions of the different enactments referred

to in the writ petition and it was significant

that  apart  from  the  complaint  of  the  writ

petitioner no other complaint had been received

from any of the inhabitants of Mumbai, either

with regard to environmental problems, traffic

hazards or obstruction to the smooth flow of

traffic on account of grant of such permission.

8. On  consideration  of  the  submissions  made  on

behalf  of  the  respective  parties  and  the

documents  produced  on  their  behalf  and  the

Policy Guidelines on Grant of Permission for

Display of Advertisements and Similar Devices,

2007, the Bombay High Court dismissed Notices

of Motion Nos.155/2008, 156/2008 and 171/2008,

with the following directions:

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“1. In  view  of  the  relevant statutory  provisions,  settled principles  of  law  and  for  the reasons  aforerecorded,  we  direct that  ‘the  mobile  hoarding  vehicles shall  not  be  parked  on  the  main roads of Mumbai or even the carriage ways  and  would  not  obstruct  free flow  of  traffic  in  any  manner whatsoever  at  main  roads  and carriage  ways  of  Mumbai’. Resultantly,  we  see  no  reason  to vacate the interim orders dated 13th March 2008 and 3rd April 2008.  On the contrary, the above orders are made absolute.

2. We direct the State Government and  the  Corporation  to  make appropriate regulations in exercise of their respective statutory powers and  in  consultation  with  the appropriate  bodies  in  relation  to advertisement hoardings.  It need to be  examined  by  these  authorities whether  such  mobile  hoarding vehicles can at all be granted such permissions and/or licences in light of  this  judgment  and  the  law  in force.

3. We further direct the concerned Police authorities and the competent authorities  in  the  Corporation  and the registering authorities to take action  against  such  vehicles,  and after  giving  them  proper opportunity, in accordance with law and in light of the provisions of the  Motor  Vehicles  Act,  1988, particularly in relation to design, manufacturing,  construction, equipping and alteration of vehicles

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and  consequential  impact  thereupon upon registration of such vehicles.

4. We also issue further directions to the Chief Secretary of the State of Maharashtra to examine all these cases and fix responsibility in all the concerned Department and Public Authorities,  if  the  officers  are found  to  be  erring.   Further  the State  should,  in  consultation  with other  Authorities,  including Municipal  Corporation  and  Police, should frame proper policy in regard to  various  facets  examined  by  the court in this judgment.

5. All concerned authorities shall ensure compliance of this order in spirit and substance.

6. Notices  of  Motion  Nos.155  of 2008, 156 of 2008 and 171 of 2008 are accordingly dismissed.  In the circumstances, we do not propose to award any costs.”

9. It  is  against  the  said  decision  of  the

Bombay High Court that the present appeals have

been filed.

10. Appearing  for  the  appellant,  Mr.  Aspi

Chinoy,  learned  senior  counsel,  submitted  that

the  initial  contract  granted  to  the  appellant

under  Section  328-A  (4)  of  1988  Act  was  in

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January, 2003, and, thereafter, a fresh contract

was  granted  in  favour  of  the  appellant  on

21.5.2007 for a period of 2 years for a licence

fee of Rs.10 crores. In this regard, Mr. Chinoy

referred to an affidavit filed by the then Joint

Commissioner  Police,  ATS,  holding  additional

charge of Joint Commissioner of Police (Traffic),

affirmed  on  15.4.2008,  wherein  it  has  been

mentioned  that  the  Traffic  Control  Branch,

Mumbai,  had  been  granting  “no  objection

certificates”  since  2003  to  Mobile  Hoarding

Vehicles.  It has also been stated that 61 such

licences for Mobile Hoarding Vehicles had been

granted by the Municipal Corporation of Greater

Mumbai  and  that  advertisers  were  permitted  to

park  such  Mobile  Hoarding  Vehicles  at  89

locations  on  public  roads.   In  addition,  “no

objection certificates” had also  been granted by

the Traffic Control Branch, Mumbai, to 11 Mobile

Hoarding Vehicles which have been permitted to

park at places other than public roads, i.e. 2

inside the BEST Bus Depot, Juhu Tara Road, Haveli

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Hotel, inside Juhu Car parking-I, and at Andheri

Sahar  Road  inside the premises of  New  Airport

Colony, Vile Parle  and the land belonging to

Maharashtra Maritime Board  at Mahim Causeway. In

Sub-paragraph (c) of paragraph 1 of the affidavit

it has been further mentioned that on receipt of

the  applications  for  issue  of  “no  objection

certificate” the officers of the Traffic Control

Branch, who were in charge of the local traffic

division, visited the spots in respect of which

requests had been received and they studied the

traffic  conditions  on  those  particular  spots.

Only if it was found that the proposed parking

locations  did  not  create  any  traffic  problems

then  only  such  locations  were  approved.

Furthermore, periodical checking is carried out

by the Traffic Control Branch officers to ensure

that the Mobile Hoarding Vehicles are not parked

on any location other than the approved locations

for which the no objection had been issued.

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11.  Mr.  Chinoy  also  referred  to  an  affidavit

filed by the then Joint Commissioner of Police,

Traffic, Mumbai, which was affirmed on 21.4.08 on

the basis of directions given by the High Court

regarding details of the Mobile Hoarding Vehicles

and  the  places where they were  located.  While

answering  the  queries  formulated  by  the  High

Court, it was also stated that while granting “no

objection  certificates”  to  the  concerned

agencies, the Traffic Control Branch had studied

the flow of traffic at every particular location.

In respect of 14 locations permission had earlier

been  granted  to  park  Mobile  Hoarding  Vehicles

near Heritage precincts. However, once the same

was brought to the notice of the traffic police,

the mobile hoarding advertisers were directed not

to  park  the  Mobile  Hoarding  Vehicles  near

Heritage precincts. It has been further indicated

that though the Municipal Corporation had given

permission for displaying hoardings on Municipal

roads, advertising agencies were not allowed to

park  their  vehicles  arbitrarily.  It  was

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categorically  mentioned  that  generally  in  the

morning hours, south bound traffic is very heavy,

and,  therefore,  Mobile  Hoarding  Vehicles  are

allowed to be parked on the north-bound carriage

way  and  in  the  evening  when  the  north-bound

traffic  is  very  heavy,  the  Mobile  Hoarding

Vehicles are allowed to be parked on the south-

bound carriage way. Due care is taken to ensure

that the Mobile Hoarding Vans are not parked near

signals, turns, bottlenecks or any other place

which may cause traffic problems hampering the

smooth flow of traffic.  

12. In addition to the above, it has also been

stated that even when permission is granted for

Mobile  Hoarding  Vehicles  to  be  parked  at  a

particular spot, at times when it is found that

parking at such spots causes a disruption in the

flow of traffic, officers of the traffic police

at times request the vehicles to be removed. Even

when  situations  arise  like  heavy  traffic,

diversions,  natural  calamities,  law  and  order,

VVIP visits etc., these vehicles are asked to be

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removed  even  from  the  marked  spots  to  ensure

smooth flow of traffic.

13  Mr.  Chinoy  submitted  that  the  appellant

company  had  always  acted  upon  the  contract

executed in their favour and it has entered into

third  party  agreements  for  display  of

advertisement  and  mobile  vans.  Consequently,

neither  the  traffic  police  nor  the  Municipal

Council of Greater Mumbai had any authority to

determine such contract.  Mr. Chinoy submitted

that the appellant company had at no point of

time violated any of the terms of the contract

and till 17.3.2008 no objections had been raised

from any quarter objecting to the parking of the

mobile  vans  at  the  spots  identified  by  the

traffic police. He submitted that at no point of

time had any of the Mobile Hoarding vans been

directly responsible for any incident of traffic

congestion  and  the  alleged  obstruction  of  the

flow  of  traffic  was  never  an  issue  till  the

respondent  No.1  took  up  cudgels  allegedly  on

behalf  of  the  general  public  of  Mumbai.  Mr.

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Chinoy urged that in the counter affidavit filed

on  behalf  of the respondent, no  objection  had

been taken regarding the statements made in the

affidavits of the appellant hereinabove referred

to.  In  addition  to  the  above,  Mr.  Chinoy,  in

reference  to  the  prayers  made  in  the  writ

petition filed by the respondent No.1, urged that

no where is there any mention of Mobile Hoarding

Vans  nor  has  any  relief  been  prayed  for  in

respect thereof.

14. Mr.  Chinoy  contended  that  instead  of

focusing  on  the main issue regarding  grant  of

licence for display of hoarding on mobile vans

the High Court involved itself with other issues

such as types of vehicles which could be used for

the purpose of displaying Mobile hoardings. The

High  Court  also  took  up  another  issue  inter-

connected  with  the  first  issue  involving  the

alteration  of  vehicles/vans  which  were  altered

after registration to make them compatible for

the  purpose  of  carrying  Mobile  Hoardings.  The

High Court held that the same had been done in

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contravention  of  the  provisions  of  the  Motor

Vehicles Act, 1988 and the licenced granted to

such  vehicles  for  display  of  mobile  hoardings

were liable to be cancelled.

15 Mr. Chinoy submitted that the High Court had

also erroneously relied on newspaper reports and

photographs   which  were  produced  by  the  writ

petitioner  to  bolster  her  case  regarding

obstruction and impediment of  traffic allegedly

caused by such Mobile Hoarding Vehicles.

16 Mr. Chinoy submitted that it is on the basis

of  such  newspaper  reports  that  certain

presumptions  had  been drawn by the  High  Court

relating  to  parking  places  allotted  by  the

traffic police for parking of the Mobile Hoarding

Vans.   In  this  regard,  reference  was  made  to

Section  117  of  the  Motor  Vehicles  Act,  1988,

which,  inter  alia,  provides  that  the  State

Government may, in consultation with the local

authority  having  jurisdiction  in  the  area

concerned,  determine  places  at  which  motor

vehicles may stand either indefinitely or for a

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specific period of time. It was urged that the

Mobile Hoarding Vehicles were either parked on

the spots allotted by the Municipal Corporation

in  consultation  with the traffic police  or  in

parking zones which, in any event, were meant for

parking of vehicles.

17. Mr. Chinoy submitted that the writ petition

filed  by  the  respondent  No.1  and  the  reliefs

sought  for  therein  were  entirely  misconceived

and without any foundation. He submitted that the

High Court had erred in dismissing the Notice of

Motion  No.155  of  2008  filed  on  behalf  of  the

appellant herein in the writ petition filed by

the respondent No.1 giving a  blanket direction

that no Mobile Hoarding Vehicle should be parked

in the main roads and carriageways.

18. Appearing  for  the  appellant,  Imaan

Publicity, in Special Leave Petition (C)No.14822

of 2008, Syed Tanvir Shah learned advocate, while

adopting Mr. Chinoy’s submissions, added a few

facts which were peculiar to the said case.

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19. He firstly mentioned that the licence which

had been granted by the Public Works Department

on  28.11.2005  was  for  parking  mobile  hoarding

vans on the Eastern Express Highway, which did

not in any way cause any blockage which could

have  a  cascading affect on traffic  within  the

city of Mumbai. In the permission so granted, it

was also indicated that the appellant would also

have  to  obtain  necessary  permission  from  the

Traffic  Police  and  the  Brihan  Mumbai  Electric

Supply  and  Transport  Undertaking  (hereinafter

referred to as “the BEST Undertaking”) and the

Greater Bombay Municipal Corporation and it was

stipulated  that  if  any  one  of  the  three

authorities chose not to grant permission, the

permission granted by the Public Works Department

would be cancelled.

20.  Mr.  Shah  submitted  that,  thereafter,  the

appellant  also  obtained  “no  objection

certificate”  from  the  BEST  Undertaking  which

granted such “no objection certificate” for 10

mobile  hoarding  vans  on  the  Eastern  Express

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Highway  on  14.3.2006.  This  was  followed  by

permission granted on 18.4.2006 by the office of

the  Joint  Commissioner  of  Police  (Traffic)  in

respect of such 10 mobile hoarding vans on the

Eastern Express Highway.  The permission granted

by the said three authorities was supported by

the  permission  granted  by  the  Municipal

Corporation of Greater Mumbai on 23.6.2006 for a

period of 5 years up to the year 2011. As many as

32  conditions  were  included  by  the  said

Corporation in its letter granting permission for

parking/plying  10  Mobile  Hoarding  Vans  or

vehicles/lorries on the Eastern Express Highway.

Mr.  Shah  urged  that  when  all  the  concerned

authorities  who  were  required  to  give  “no

objection  certificates”  for  permission  to  the

appellants  to  display  advertisements  on  Mobile

Hoarding Vans had given such certificates, it was

quite erroneous on the part of the High Court in

giving  the  directions  impugned  in  the  appeal

relying  on  newspaper  reports  and  photographs

produced by the writ petitioner in support of her

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case  of  alleged  obstruction  and  impediment  of

traffic said to have been caused by some of the

mobile hoarding vehicles. Reference was made by

Mr. Shah to the decision of this Court in Ramarao

vs.  All  India  Backward  Class  Bank  Employees

Welfare Association, (2004) 2 SCC 76), for the

proposition  that  though  the  High  Court  is

entitled  to  take  into  consideration  subsequent

events, the same can only be a relevant factor

for  the  purpose  of  moulding  the  reliefs,  but

while moulding such reliefs the High Court could

not have considered grant of a relief where no

factual  foundation  existed or was laid  in  the

pleadings  of  the  parties,  which  has  been

explained in paragraph 25 of the judgment.

21. Mr. Shah urged that the impugned judgment of

the High Court was based more on conjecture than

actual facts and was, therefore, liable to be set

aside.

22. Learned  counsel  for  the  Mumbai  Municipal

Corporation,  Mr. Pallav Shisodia, submitted that

the High Court had failed to appreciate the fact

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that  granting  of  licences  by  the  Municipal

Corporation was part of its legitimate commercial

activity on which fetters could not be imposed

except  on  grounds  of  public  interest  and

disruption of normal life within the area of its

jurisdiction.  He  submitted  that  the  Municipal

area of Greater Mumbai was divided into 3 zones,

namely:

i) City zone which extends up to Mahim;

ii) Eastern zone which extends from Sion to Mulund; and  

iii)East-Western zone  which extends from Mahim to Gaisal.

He submitted that in each zone permission has been

given  for  10  vehicles  to  be  used  as  Mobile

Hoarding  Vans  for  the  purpose  of  display  of

advertisements. He submitted that the guidelines

which  had  been  issued  in  the  year  2000  had

subsequently  been  superseded  by  the  guidelines

published in 2008 wherein several other criteria

were  included  for  the  purpose  of  grant  of

permission  for  display  of  sky-signs  and

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advertisements under Sections 328 and 328-A of the

1888 Act.  Mr. Shisodia submitted that all the

said  restrictions  have  been  included  in  the

conditions  for  grant  of  permit  either  by  the

Bombay  Municipal  Corporation  or  the  Traffic

Police. He urged that the High Court had taken

note of the said conditions and the powers of the

Corporation  flowing  from  the  provisions  of

Sections  328  and  328-A  of  the  Act  and  had

elaborately  discussed  the  same.   While  holding

that  the  guidelines  had  been  framed  by  the

Commissioner only for the purpose of exercising

the discretion vested in him under Section 328-A,

the High Court also held that the same do not and

cannot  have  the  force  of  law  per  se and  are

nothing but guidelines prepared for exercise of

administrative power by the authorities concerned.

23. One of the points raised by the respondent

No.1  was  with  regard  to  the  height  of  the

hoardings which were erected on the chassis of the

Mobile Vans by means of a hydraulic system, which

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was not permitted under the Motor Vehicles Rules.

Replying to the same, Mr. Shisodia submitted that

the said condition would relate to the fabrication

of the display vehicles which was in the domain of

the Motor Vehicles Department, and in the absence

of the views of the Motor Vehicles authorities and

also having regard to the fact that permission for

parking the said vehicles had been  given by the

Traffic Department, the same could not be a reason

not to grant permission to the appellants to use

Mobile  Hoarding  Vans  for  the  display  of

advertisements.

24. Mr. Shisodia concluded his submissions on the

note that the directions ultimately given in the

impugned judgment were completely beyond the scope

of the writ petition and the prayers made therein.

He submitted that the High Court had exceeded its

jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution

in  giving  the  directions  complained  of  without

there being any factual foundation for the same.  

25. No counter affidavit has been filed on behalf

of the State of Maharashtra. However, Mr. Kaushik,

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learned counsel appearing for the State, relied

upon  the  affidavit  affirmed  by  the  Joint

Commissioner of Police (Traffic), Mumbai, whereby

grant of licence to the appellant and others for

parking  Mobile  Hoarding  Vans  for  display  of

advertisements had been sought to be justified.

Mr. Kaushik also referred to paragraph 10 of the

impugned judgment wherein it had been stated that

the State Government had issued permits for the

vans which were found road-worthy and it had no

serious  objection  to  the  continuation  of  these

vehicles on the road. He objected to the finding

of the High Court in paragraph 10 of the judgment

that the State had not been able to come  out with

a clear and definite stand on the matter in issue.

According to Mr. Kaushik, the stand of the State

Government  was  quite  clear  that  it  had  no

objection  to  the  grant  of  permission  by  the

concerned authorities to the Mobile Hoarding Vans

subject to the condition that the flow of traffic

was not impaired by the parking of such vehicles,

though, of course, it had been submitted on behalf

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of the Corporation that in certain eventualities

if there was any interference with free flow of

traffic for any particular reason, where a Mobile

Hoarding  Van  was  parked,  the  same  had  been

directed  to  be  removed  to  another  location  to

enable  the  Traffic  Police  to  clear  the  traffic

jam.  

26. Replying to the submissions made on behalf of

the appellant, the State of Maharashtra and the

Bombay  Municipal  Corporation,  Mr.  Arvind  Kumar,

appearing  for  the  respondent  No.1  (the  writ

petitioner before the High Court), submitted that

the problem posed in the writ petition before the

High Court was not of recent origin and had also

fallen for consideration in other matters, such as

the case of M.C. Mehta vs. Union of India, (1997)

8 SCC 770, regarding some of the provisions of the

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, and their relevance in

the  management  of  control  of  traffic  in  the

National Capital Region and the National Capital

Territory of Delhi.  It was submitted that the

questions  raised  involved  public  safety  and,

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therefore, came within the ambit of Article 21 of

the Constitution.  It was also held that the Motor

Vehicles  Act  provides  sufficient  powers  to  the

Transport  and  Police  authorities  to  effectively

deal  with  the  problem  and  the  same  had  to  be

construed  so  as  to  keep  individual  or  a  class

interest  subordinate  to  the  larger  public

interest. In fact, certain directions were also

given by this Court to the police and all other

authorities entrusted with the administration and

enforcement of the Motor Vehicles Act and control

and  regulation  of  traffic,  in  exercise  of  the

powers vested in this Court under Article 32 read

with Article 142 of the Constitution.

27. The said directions were given mainly with the

intention of ensuring public safety and to ensure

that the vehicles used on the roads did not impair

public safety.

28. Mr.  Arvind  Kumar  submitted  that  after  the

aforesaid decision of this Court in M.C. Mehta’s

case (supra), certain other writ petitions on the

same issues were also taken up for consideration

25

along  with  several  Interlocutory  Applications

filed in the disposed of writ petition, being Writ

Petition  (Civil)  No.13029  of  1985.   I.A.No.12,

which was filed in the said writ petition, was

made by the Delhi Outdoor Advertising Association

praying  for  clarification/modification  of  the

Order dated 20.11.1997 in so far as it related to

the direction given therein for the removal of all

hoardings  which  are  on  roadsides  and  which  are

alleged  to  be  a  disturbance  to  safe  traffic

movement. Mr. Arvind Kumar pointed out that this

Court rejected the said prayer upon observing that

the order dated 20.11.1997 was quite clear and had

been correctly understood by the authorities and

all concerned. This Court observed that the order

directed that every hoarding, other than traffic

signs  and  road-signs  on  road  sides  have  to  be

removed irrespective of its kind; every hoarding

irrespective of whether it is on the road side or

not, which is hazardous and a disturbance to safe

traffic movement so as to adversely affect free

and  safe  flow  of  traffic,  is  required  to  be

26

identified  by  the  authorities  and  promptly

removed. It was also observed that obviously the

hazardous hoarding which is a disturbance to safe

traffic movement has to be a hoarding visible to

the traffic on the road.

29. Mr. Arvind Kumar then pointed out that the

Certificate of Registration of one of the Mobile

Hoarding  Vans  for  which  permission  had  been

granted to the appellant for display of hoardings

clearly indicated that the vehicle in question was

a Medium Goods Vehicle which had been referred to

as a Display Vehicle.  Furthermore, in the Goods

Carriage Permit the usage of the vehicle was shown

to  be  for  carrying  general  goods.   Mr.  Arvind

Kumar urged that the vehicle in question had been

altered  to  meet  the  requirements  for  raising

hoardings on the vehicle in violation of the Motor

Vehicles Act and the Motor Vehicles Rules.  In

addition  to  the  above,  Mr.  Arvind  Kumar  also

pointed  out  from  the  pictures  annexed  to  the

affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent No.1

that the hoardings on the mobile vans had been

27

raised and placed in such a manner when parked

that a portion of the hoarding was jutting out on

the main carriageway which in itself was a traffic

hazard.  He also pointed out that Mobile Hoarding

Vans were also parked at will even in “No Parking”

Zones.

30. Mr. Arvind Kumar urged that in addition to the

above, the raised hoardings were raised above the

height permitted for carrying goods on transport

vehicles  and  created  distraction  for  motorists

which could lead to serious consequences as far as

the pedestrian public was concerned.

31.  Mr.  Arvind  Kumar  submitted  that  after

meticulously  considering  all  the  materials  on

record and the submissions made on behalf of the

parties, the High Court had rightly dismissed the

writ  petition  with  the  directions  given  in  the

impugned  judgment  keeping  in  mind  the  general

public interest as against the commercial interest

of  a few.  It was submitted that the impugned

judgment of the High Court was just and equitable

and no interference was called for therewith.   

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32 We have carefully considered the submissions

made on behalf of the respective parties, having

particular  regard  to  the  issues  that  have  been

raised,  which  undoubtedly  concerned  the  public

interest and safety of motorists and pedestrians

and seek to ensure free and smooth flow of traffic

in the city of Mumbai. We have also considered the

writ  petitioner’s  concern  with  regard  to  the

damage to the flora and fauna and the environment

of Mumbai, together with the damage to heritage

buildings in the city.  However, all the actions

taken by the respondents in permitting erection of

hoardings, either fixed or otherwise, appear to

have been taken within the confines of the Mumbai

Municipal Corporation Act, 1888.  While generally

considering the complaint made by the respondent

No.1 in her writ petition, the Bombay High Court

has tangentially taken up another issue involving

the eligibility under the Motor Vehicles Act and

Rules of Mobile Hoarding Vans to operate on the

roads in their modified form. One of the issues

raised by the respondent No.1 is that the vehicles

29

which  were  used  as  Mobile  Hoarding  Vans  had

originally  been  registered  as  “goods  carrying

vehicles” or “display vehicles”. It was urged that

after  their  modification  the  Mobile  Hoarding

Vehicles  underwent a complete    transformation

which    necessitated  the  grant  of  fresh

Certificates  of  Registration  from  the  Motor

Vehicles authorities.

33. Though the said issue has been given a good

deal of thought by the High Court, the authority

to  decide  such  a  question  would  be  authorities

under the Motor Vehicles Act and not the Court.

Secondly, the authorities who are entitled in law

to  grant  licence  for  displaying  such

advertisements,  such  as  the  Mumbai  Municipal

Corporation and the traffic police, have assented

to the grant of such licences upon holding that

they do not constitute a traffic hazard nor did

they disrupt the smooth flow of traffic on the

roads on which they are permitted to be parked.

The respondent No.1 has not been able to provide

30

any data on the frequency of the obstruction of

smooth flow of traffic along the roads on which

the Mobile Hoarding Vans had been allowed to be

parked.   All that has been pointed out by the

respondent No.1 is that the height and width of

the  displayed  hoardings  tend  to  distract

motorists  and  obstruct  vehicular  traffic  of  a

certain height.

34. On the other hand, the affidavits filed on

behalf of the Mumbai Municipal Corporation and the

Mumbai Traffic Police clearly indicate that they

have  no  objection  to  the  grant  of  licences  to

Mobile  Hoarding  Vans  and  that  those  already

granted had been so granted after a proper study

had been made of the traffic conditions and the

flow  of  traffic  at  the  spots  where  the  Mobile

Hoarding  Vans  were  ultimately  permitted  to  be

parked for displaying their hoardings.  It is also

significant that except for the respondent No.1 no

other citizen of the city of Mumbai has joined the

litigation  to  support  the  stand  taken  by  the

respondent No.1/writ petitioner.  Care has been

31

taken by the Municipal authorities, as well as the

traffic police, to ensure that the cone of vision

of the person driving a vehicle was not obstructed

by  such  Mobile  Hoardings.  As  indicated

hereinabove, the objection taken by the respondent

No.1 with regard to the damage being caused to the

heritage buildings in the city had been taken note

of by the concerned authorities and such hoardings

and  advertisements  have  been  directed  to  be

removed, either from the buildings themselves or

from in front of them. In this connection we may

also add that though the destruction to the flora

and fauna of Mumbai city was not treated as the

principal issue before us, it would certainly be

in the interest of the public to see that such

greenery  within  the  city  is  not  destroyed  or

interfered with. It is well accepted that trees

provide an ecological respite against the amount

of pollution generated in a commercial city like

Mumbai on account of the sheer number of vehicles

that travel on the roads and the volume of people

moving in and out of Mumbai city in connection

32

with their work. It would definitely be in the

interest of the residents as well as the mobile

population of Mumbai if the green cover available

in  Mumbai  is  not  only  preserved  but  also

increased. In this regard we are in agreement with

the  concern  shown  by  the  writ

petitioner/respondent No.1 herein.

35. Care has also been taken where the flow of traffic  is  high  in  a  given  direction  to  allow

parking of Mobile Hoarding Vans on the opposite

carriageway so that no distraction or obstruction

is caused to the cone of vision of the motorists

while proceeding with the flow of traffic. Care

has also been taken to ensure that Mobile Hoarding

Vans  are  not  parked  near  signals,  turns,

bottlenecks or any other place which may interrupt

the smooth flow of traffic. Inspite of the above,

in case of a traffic blockage at a spot where such

Mobile  Hoarding  Vans  are  parked,  it  has  been

stated that they are asked to move to some other

location to clear such blockage.  

33

36. Mr. Chinoy has referred to Section 117 of the

Motor  Vehicles  Act,  which  empowers  the  State

Government  or  any  Authority  authorized  in  this

regard by the State Government, in consultation

with the local authority having jurisdiction in

the  area  concerned,  inter  alia,  to  determine

places at which motor vehicles may stand either

indefinitely or for a specified period of time. In

the  instant  case,  the  State  Government,  in

consultation  with  the  Mumbai  Municipal

Corporation,  appears  to  have  invoked  the

provisions  of  the  said  Section  to  indicate  the

spots at which the Mobile Hoarding Vans could be

allowed to park and that too after a study of the

flow of traffic at such given spots.  Similarly,

the  Mumbai  Municipal  Corporation  has  also

exercised its jurisdiction under Sections 328 and

328-A of the Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act in

granting  licences  for  the  parking  of  Mobile

Hoarding Vans for the display of advertisements.

Since the authorities which have been empowered to

grant  such  licences  and  to  specify  spots  for

34

parking, have exercised their authority, it would

not be safe for the Court to question the decision

taken  by  the  said  authorities  on  the  basis  of

allegations made by an individual, without having

anything  more  to  rely  upon,  especially,  in  the

face of the affidavits affirmed both on behalf of

the Mumbai Municipal Corporation and the Mumbai

Traffic Police.

37. There is, however, one sphere which possibly

requires further inquiry and that is with regard

to the modification of the vehicles carrying the

mobile hoardings from their original form to make

them  suitable  for  display  of  such  hoardings.

Although, the same is not directly in issue in the

instant case, the said question has been gone into

by the High Court in some detail. However, as has

been rightly submitted by Mr. Shisodia appearing

for the Mumbai Municipal Corporation, the same is

within  the  domain  of  the  Motor  Vehicles

Authorities  and  not  the  concern  of  the  Mumbai

Municipal  Corporation  or  the  Mumbai  Traffic

Police.  In  respect  of  such  grievance,  the

35

respondent No.1 may take up the issue with the

authorities under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988,

who are competent to deal with the same.

38. The High Court, in our view, in its anxiety to

ensure the free movement of traffic and the safety

of both motorists and pedestrians and to avert any

untoward incident, has proceeded to question the

decision  taken  by  the  competent  authorities

without having proper material before it to do so.

Contrary  to  the  authority  vested  in  the  State

Government  and  the  local  authority  under  the

provisions of Section 117 of the Motor Vehicles

Act, 1988 and Sections 328 and 328-A of the 1888

Act, the High Court has given directions which, in

our  view,  are  beyond  the  scope  of  the  writ

petition.

39. We,  accordingly,  allow  the  appeal  and  set

aside the judgment of the High Court impugned in

this appeal and the directions contained therein,

but  we  also  make  it  clear  that  this  will  not

prevent  the  respondent  No.1  from  moving  the

appropriate authorities regarding the modification

36

of vehicles as Mobile Hoarding Vans.  We also make

it clear that we have not expressed any opinion as

far as the said issue is concerned and it will be

within  the  domain  of  the  Motor  Vehicles

authorities to take such decision in the matter as

appears to them to be fit and proper.

40. Having regard to the nature of the case the

parties shall bear their own costs in the appeal.  

…………………………………J. (ALTAMAS KABIR)

………………………………J. (G.S. SINGHVI)

New Delhi Dated: 02.09.2008

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