REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICITON

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.   1289      OF 2008 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.1585 of 2007)

Superintendent of Police, Karnataka …Appellants Lokayuktha and Anr.

Versus

B. Srinivas …Respondent

JUDGMENT

Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.

1. Leave granted.  

2. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of a  learned

Single  Judge  of  the  Karnataka  High  Court  accepting  the

petition  filed  by  the  respondent  under  Section  482  of   the

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short the ‘Code’). Prayer

in the petition was to quash the order dated 12.6.2000 passed

by the Superintendent of Police, Karnataka Lokayuktha and

investigation pursuant to the said order, including lodging of

the first information report.  

3. At the relevant point of time the respondent was working

as  an  Engineer-in-Chief  of  Rural  Development  Engineering

Department,  Bangalore.   The  Lokayuktha  police  had

registered  a  case  in  respect  of  offences  punishable  under

Section 13(1)(e)  read with Section 13(2)  of  the Prevention of

Corruption Act, 1988 (in short the ‘Act’).

4. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

Search was conducted in the house of the respondent on

15th/16th June, 2000 and certain records and documents were

seized. Documents relating to the respondent, his son-in-law,

his  daughter  and  son  were  seized.  The  Superintendent  of

Police  had  authorized  the  Inspector  of  Police  to  conduct

investigation.  The  petition  was  filed  essentially  on  three

grounds; firstly, the authorization given by the Superintendent

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of Police to conduct the investigation was contrary to the view

expressed  by  this  Court  in  State  of Haryana  and  Ors. v.

Bhajan Lal and Ors. (1992 Supp (1) SCC 335). The basis for

such stand was that no reason had been indicated as to why it

was entrusted to the Inspector. When the petition was finally

heard in the year 2006, second stand taken was that there

was inordinate delay of 6 years in filing the charge sheet.  The

High  Court  accepted  both  the  stands  and  quashed  the

proceedings.  The  third  stand  was  that  exaggerated  figures

were shown in the chargesheet.  This aspect does not appear

to  have  been  dealt  with  by  the  High  Court.  It,  however,

permitted the prosecution to take action on the facts afresh

keeping in view certain aspects referred to in the judgment.  

5. In  support  of  the  appeal,  Mr.  Sanjay  Hegde,  learned

counsel  for  the  appellants  submitted  that  the  High  Court

erroneously exercised jurisdiction under Section 482 of Code.

When the petition was initially filed, there was no question of

any delay. An amendment had been sought for in the petition

and  prayer  was  to  quash  the  order  passed  by  the

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Superintendent of Police and further part of the investigation

done by the Inspector of Police-respondent No.2. It is pointed

out that the High Court erroneously observed that there was

delay in filing the charge sheet.  In any event, the delay was

occasioned on account of the part played by the respondent

and  delay,  if  any,  alone  cannot  be  a  ground  to  quash  the

legitimate proceedings. Further, it is pointed out that the High

Court has erroneously held that no reasons were indicated.

Reference is made in the order passed by the Superintendent

of Police to contend that reasons in fact had been indicated.  

6. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent submitted

that though the High Court has not specifically referred to this

aspect, the fact that after completing investigation the amount

of alleged disproportionate asset which was initially stated to

be more than one crore has been sealed down substantially

cannot  be  lost  sight  of.  Further,  it  is  submitted  that  delay

itself  can be  a  ground to  quash the proceedings.  It  is  also

submitted  that  the  High  Court  has  rightly  observed  that

reasons  are  not  discernible  from  the  order  passed  by  the

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Superintendent of Police while authorizing investigation by the

Inspector.  

7. We shall first deal with the question of alleged delay.  It

is  of  some  significance  to  note  that  an  FIR  was  lodged  on

12.6.2000 and few days thereafter the petition under Section

482 was filed. On the basis of FIR the house of respondent

was searched on 15th and 16th June. The petition was filed on

11.7.2000.  Application  seeking  permission  to  substitute

additional grounds was filed in the year 2005. It is not a case

where charge sheet had not been filed or that there was no

explanation  for  the  delay.  There  is  no  general  and  wide

proposition of law formulated that whenever there is delay on

the  part  of  the  investigating  agency  in  completing  the

investigation, such a delay can be a ground for quashing the

FIR. It would be difficult to formulate inflexible guidelines or

rigid principles in determining as to whether the accused has

been deprived of fair trial on account of delay or protracted

investigation  would  depend  on  various  factors  including

whether  such  a  delay  was  reasonably  long  or  caused

deliberately  or  intentionally  to  hamper  the  defence  of  the

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accused  or  whether  delay  was  inevitable  in  the  nature  of

things or whether it was due to dilatory tactics adopted by the

accused.  It  would  depend  upon  certain  peculiar  facts  and

circumstances  of  each  case  i.e.  the  volume  of  evidence

collected by the investigating agency, the nature and gravity of

the offence for which accused has been charge sheeted in a

given case. The nexus between whole and some of the above

factors is of considerable  relevance.   Therefore,  whether the

accused  has  been  deprived  of  fair  trial  on  account  of

protracted investigation has to come on facts. He has also to

establish that he had no role in the delay.  Every delay does

not necessarily occur because of the accused.  

8. A 7-Judge Bench of this Court in P. Ramachandra Rao v.

State of Karnataka (2002 (4) SCC 578) affirmed the view taken

in  Abdul Rehman Antulay v.  R.S. Nayak (1992 (1) SCC 225)

and  clarified  confusion  created  by  certain  observations  in

‘Common Cause’ a Registered Society v. Union of India (1996

(4) SCC 33),  ‘Common Cause’ a Registered Society v. Union of

India (1996 (6) SCC, 775),  Raj Deo Sharma v.  State of Bihar

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(1998 (7) SCC 507) and Raj Deo Sharma (II) v. State of Bihar

(1999 (7) SCC 604).  It was observed that the decision in A.R.

Antulay’s case (supra) still holds the field and the guidelines

laid down in said case are not exhaustive but only illustrative.

They are not intended to operate as hard and fast rules or to

be  applied  like  a  straitjacket  formula.   Their  applicability

would  depend  on  the  factual  situations  of  each  case.  It  is

difficult to foresee all situations and no generalization can be

made.  It  has also been held that it is neither advisable nor

feasible  nor  judicially  permissible  to  draw  or  prescribe  an

outer  limit  for  conclusion  of  all  criminal  proceedings.

Whenever there is any allegation of violation of right to speedy

trial the Court has to perform by balancing the act by taking

into consideration all attending circumstances and to decide

whether the right to speedy trial has been denied in a given

case.  As noted above, one month after  the order relating to

investigation and lodging of FIR, a petition under Section 482

of Code was filed before the High Court.  

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9. It  is  interesting  to  note  that  while  the  High  Court

quashed  the  proceedings  because  of  alleged  delayed

investigation, it permitted the authorities to take decision to

continue  the  proceedings.   Therefore,  the  first  ground  on

which the High Court interfered cannot be maintained.  

10. The  other  question  relates  to  the  alleged  deficiency  in

authorization made  by  Superintendent  of  Police  authorizing

the Inspector to investigate the case. The High Court placed

strong  reliance  on  Bhajan  Lal’s case  (supra),  more

particularly, in para 134. Though the High Court referred to

certain decisions of this Court, the decision in  State of M.P.

and Ors. v. Ram Singh (2000 (5) SCC 88), was not followed. It

is  to  be  noted  that  in  Ram  Singh’s case  (supra)  the  view

expressed  in  Bhajan  Lal’s case  (supra)  has  been  explained

after referring to the relevant para.   

11. The order passed by Superintendent of Police reads as

follows:

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“KARNATAKA LOKAYUKTA

NO: KLA/PW/SP/City.Dn./99-2000 Superintendent of Police   City Division, M.S. Buildings, Dr. Ambedkar Veedhi, Bangalore-560 001.  Dated: 12th June, 2000.

M E M 0

Sub: Possession of Disproportionate Assets to the known source of income by Sri. B. Srinivasa, Engineer-in-chief, Rural Development Engineering Department-reg.

Ref: Report of Sri. M.D. Khalander Presently working as police Inspector, Police Wing, City Division, Karnataka Lokayukta.

I  have  gone through  the  report  of  Sri.  Md.

Khalander, presently working as Police Inspector, Police

Wing  City  division,  Karnataka  Lokayukta,  Bangalore

relating  to  Inquiry  report  (IE)  receipt  of  credible

information that Sri.  B. Srinivas at present working as

Engineer-in-chief,  Rural  Development  Engineering

Department has acquired properties disproportionate to

his known source of income to the extent of about Rs.

1,13,000,00/-  and  thereby  committed  offence  U/s.  13

(12)(e) R/W. 13(2) of the P.C. Act, 1988.  

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From  the  materials  placed  before  me  with  the

application of my mind I am satisfied that a prima facie

case is made against Sri B. Srinivas U/s 13(1)(e) r/w 13

(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

Therefore by virtue of the power vested in me, S.G.

Ramesh  Superintendent  of  Police,  Police  Wing  City

Division, Karnataka Lokayukta, Bangalore,  order under

the provisions of S.C. 17 of the Prevention of corruption

Act,  1988,  Sri.  M.D.  Khalander  Police  Inspector,  Police

Wing  City  Dn.  Karnataka  Lokayukta  Bangalore  to

register  a case U/s. 13(1)(e) read with 13(2) of the P.C.

Act,  1988  against  Sri  B  Srinivas,  Engineer-in-Chief,

Rural  Development Engineering Department,  Bangalore

and investigate the said case.  

Further  U/W.18  of  the  Prevention  of  Corruption

Act, 1988, Sri. M.D. Khalander is authorised to inspect

the  Bankers  books,  so  far  as  it  relates  to  money  on

behalf  of  such person and  take or cause  to be taken

certified copies of the relevant entries therefrom and the

Bank  concerned  shall  be  bound  to  assist  the  Police

Inspector, Police wing City Dn.,  Karnataka Lokayukta,

Bangalore  in  the  exercise  of  his  powers  under  this

section.  

To:

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M.D. Khalander Sd/- Police Inspector, Superintendent Police Wing, City Division, of Police, City Division, Bangalore Office of the Lokyukta

              Bangalore.”

12. In  Ram  Singh’s case  (supra)  this  Court  indicated  the

position lucidly after referring to  Bhajan Lal’s case (supra) in

para 14. The same reads as follows:

“14. It  may  be  noticed  at  this  stage  that  a three-Judge  Bench  of  this  Court  in  H.N. Rishbud v.  State  of  Delhi  (AIR  1955  SC 196) had  held  that  a  defect  or  illegality  in investigation,  however  serious,  has  no direct bearing  on the competence  or  the  procedure relating to cognizance or trial. Referring to the provisions  of  Sections  190,  193,  195  to  199 and  537  of  the  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure (1898) in the context of an offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, the Court held: “A defect or illegality in investigation, however serious,  has  no  direct  bearing  on  the competence  or  the  procedure  relating  to cognizance  or  trial.  No doubt  a  police  report which results from an investigation is provided in Section 190 Cr.P.C as the material on which cognizance  is  taken.  But  it  cannot  be maintained that a valid and legal police report is  the  foundation  of  the  jurisdiction  of  the court to take cognizance.  Section 190 Cr.P.C

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is  one  out  of  a  group  of  sections  under  the heading ‘Conditions  requisite  for  initiation of proceedings’. The language of this section is in marked  contrast  with  that  of  the  other sections of the group under the same heading, i.e., Sections 193 and 195 to 199.

These  latter  sections  regulate  the competence  of  the  court  and  bar  its jurisdiction  in  certain  cases  excepting  in compliance  therewith.  But  Section  190  does not. While no doubt, in one sense, clauses (a), (b)  and  (c)  of  Section  190(1)  are  conditions requisite  for  taking  of  cognizance,  it  is  not possible to say that cognizance on an invalid police  report  is  prohibited  and is therefore  a nullity.  Such  an  invalid  report  may  still  fall either under clause (a) or (b) of Section 190(1), (whether it is the one or the other we need not pause to consider) and in any case cognizance so taken  is  only  in  the  nature  of  error  in  a proceeding antecedent to the trial. To such a situation  Section  537  CrPC  which  is  in  the following terms is attracted:

‘Subject  to  the  provisions hereinbefore  contained,  no  finding, sentence or order passed by a court of  competent  jurisdiction  shall  be reversed  or  altered  on  appeal  or revision  on  account  of  any  error, omission  or  irregularity  in  the complaint,  summons,  warrant, charge,  proclamation,  order, judgment  or  other  proceedings before  or  during  trial  or  in  any inquiry or other proceedings under this  Code,  unless  such  error,

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omission or irregularity, has in fact occasioned a failure of justice.’

If, therefore, cognizance is in fact taken, on a police  report  vitiated  by  the  breach  of  a mandatory provision relating to investigation, there can be no doubt that the result  of  the trial  which  follows  it  cannot  be  set  aside unless the illegality in the investigation can be shown to have brought about a miscarriage of justice.  That  an  illegality  committed  in  the course  of  investigation  does  not  affect  the competence  and the jurisdiction of  the court for  trial  is  well  settled  as  appears  from  the cases in - ‘Parbhu v. Emperor’(AIR 1944 PC (73) and - ‘Lumbhardar Zutshi   v.  R. (AIR 1950 PC 26).”   It further held:

“In  our  opinion,  therefore,  when such  a  breach  is  brought  to  the notice of the court at an early stage of  the  trial,  the  court  will  have  to consider  the  nature  and  extent  of the  violation  and  pass  appropriate orders  for  such  reinvestigation  as may be called for, wholly or partly, and by such officer as it considers appropriate  with  reference  to  the requirements  of  Section 5-A of  the Act.  It  is  in  the  light  of  the  above considerations  that  the  validity  or otherwise of the objection as to the violation of  Section 5(4)  of  the  Act has to be decided and the course to

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be  adopted  in  these  proceedings, determined.”

In  Bhajan  Lal  case (1992 Supp (1)  SCC 335) this Court had found on facts that the SP had passed the order mechanically  and in a very casual  manner  regardless  of  the  settled principles of law. The provisions of Section 17 of  the  Act  had  not  been  complied  with.  As earlier  noticed  the  SP  while  authorising  the SHO  to  investigate  had  made  only  an endorsement to the effect “Please register the case and investigate”. The SP was shown to be not  aware  either  of  the  allegations  or  the nature of the offences and the pressure of the workload  requiring  investigation  by  an Inspector. There is no denial of the fact that in cases  against  the  respondents  in  these appeals, even in the absence of the authority of the SP the investigating officer was in law authorised  to  investigate  the  offence  falling under Section 13 of the Act with the exception of one as is described under sub-section (1)(e) of  the  Act.  After  registration  of  the  FIR  the Superintendent of Police in the instant appeals is  shown  to  be  aware  and  conscious  of  the allegations made against the respondents, the FIR  registered  against  them  and  pending investigations. The order passed by the SP in the  case  of  Ram Singh  on  12-12-1994  with respect  to a crime registered in 1992 was to the effect:

“In exercise of powers conferred by the provisions on me, under Section 17 of  the  Prevention of  Corruption Act,  1988,  I,  P.K.  Runwal,

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Superintendent  of  Police,  Special Police  Establishment,  Division  I, Lokayukta  Karyalaya,  Gwalior Division, Gwalior (M.P.),  authorised Shri  D.S.  Rana,  Inspector  (SPE), Lak-Gwl (M.P.) to investigate Crime No. 103 of 1992 under Sections 13 (1)(e),  23(2)  of  the  Prevention  of Corruption  Act,  1988  against  Shri Ram  Singh,  DO,  Excise,  Batul (M.P.).”

Similar orders have been passed in the other two cases as well. The reasons for entrustment of  investigation  to  the  Inspector  can  be discerned from the order itself. The appellant State is, therefore, justified in submitting that the  facts  of  Bhajan  Lal  case were distinguishable  as  in  the  instant  case  the Superintendent  of  Police  appears  to  have applied  his  mind  and  passed  the  order authorising the investigation by an Inspector under the peculiar circumstances of the case. The  reasons  for  entrustment  of  investigation were obvious. The High Court should not have liberally construed the provisions of the Act in favour of  the accused resulting in closure  of the trial of the serious charges made against the respondents in relation to commission of offences punishable under an Act legislated to curb  the  illegal  and  corrupt  practices  of  the public officers. It is brought to our notice that under  similar  circumstances  the  High  Court had quashed the investigation and consequent proceedings in a case registered against Shri Ram  Babu  Gupta  against  which  Criminal Appeal  No.  1754  of  1986  was  filed  in  this Court  which  was  allowed  on  27-9-1986  by setting aside the order of the High Court with

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a direction to the trial  court to proceed with the  case  in  accordance  with  law  and  in  the light of the observations made therein.”  

13. If  one  looks  at  the  order  passed,  which  formed  the

subject matter of challenge in  Ram Singh’s case (supra) it is

crystal clear that the order passed in the present case by the

Superintendent  of  Police  is  more  elaborate  and  as  rightly

submitted by learned counsel  for the appellant, the reasons

are clearly discernible.  Even otherwise, the effect of Section

19(3) of the Act relating to prejudice has been completely lost

sight of by the High Court. The second reason indicated by the

High Court to quash the proceedings also has no substance.   

14. The inevitable conclusion is that the order passed by the

High Court is indefensible and is set aside. However, it would

be in the  interest  of  justice  if  the trial  is  completed on the

basis  of  the  charge  sheet  filed  as  early  as  practicable

preferably by the end of February, 2009.  

15. The appeal is allowed.  

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……….………….……………….J. (Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT)

………………….…………………J. (Dr. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA)

New Delhi, August 18, 2008

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