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PETITIONER: SUPDT. & REMEMBRANCER OF LEGAL AFFAIRS WEST BENGAL

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: ANIL KUMAR BHUNJA & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT23/08/1979

BENCH: SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH BENCH: SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH SHINGAL, P.N. REDDY, O. CHINNAPPA (J)

CITATION:  1980 AIR   52            1980 SCR  (1) 323  1979 SCC  (4) 274  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1986 SC2045  (45)  RF         1990 SC1962  (7)

ACT:      Arms Act  1959 (4  of 1959)-S. 29(b)-Scope of-Giving of fire-arms for  limited purpose of repairs-Whether amounts to delivery  of   ’possession’-Great  caution  and  discernment necessary in  the application  of the ratio of cases decided under the Arms Act of 1878 to those under the present Act.      Words &  Phrases-"Possession" meaning  of-S. 29(b) Arms Act, 1959.

HEADNOTE:      The prosecution alleged that the police officers of the appellant state  while investigating  a  case  discovered  a workshop run  by a mechanic who was then actually working on a revolver.  Several other  guns, revolvers  and rifles were found in  the workshop  and all these fire-arms were seized. The mechanic  claimed to  have received  one of  the guns so seized from  a gun-licensee  and the rest from respondents 1 to 4  for repairs.  The mechanic  had no valid licence under the  Arms   Act  to  keep  or  repair  these  fire-arms  but respondent No. 4 however possessed licences under the Act to run the  business of repairing and dealing in fire-arms. The police charge-sheeted  the mechanic,  the gun  licensee  and respondents 1  to 4,  for having  committed  offences  under Sections 25(1)(a) and 27 of the Act.      The Magistrate  held that  there were materials to make out a  prima facie case under s. 25(1)(c) of the Act against the gun-licensee  and under  s. 29(b) of the Act against the mechanic  and   charged   them   accordingly.   As   regards Respondents 1  to 4  taking the view that giving of the arms to the  mechanic by  the respondents for the limited purpose of repairs,  did not  amount to  delivery of ’possession’ of those arms  within the  meaning of  s. 29(b)  of the Act, he discharged the said respondents.      The appellant’s  criminal  revision  against  the  said order,  was   dismissed,  the   High  Court   holding   that Respondents 1  to 4  could not be said to have delivered the fire-arms into  the ’possession’  of the mechanic within the meaning of  s. 29(b)  of the  Act, because  the  respondents

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possessed valid  licences for repairs as well as for sale of fire-arms and  had given  only ’temporary’  custody of those arms to the mechanic for the limited purpose of carrying out the repair  job, while the effective control over those arms all the time remained with the respondents.      In appeal  to this  Court it was contended on behalf of the appellant-State that the question whether a person is in possession of a fire-arm or had transferred and delivered it to another,  is largely  one of  fact; that  in the  instant case, the  mechanic was  not a  servant or  employee of  the respondents but  was independently  running his own business of repairing  fire-arms; that the fire-arms were handed over by the  respondents to  the mechanic  to be  repaired at the latter’s   residence-cum-workshop    which   was   not   the respondent’s licensed place 324 of business;  that the mechanic had no licence for repairing or keeping  fire-arms and  the respondents were either aware of this  fact or  did not ascertain it before delivering the fire-arms to him, that ’possession’ within the purview of s. 29(b) means  immediate possession and consequently, delivery of even  temporary possession and control to an unauthorised person falls within the mischief of the section; that in the circumstances of  the instant  case there  was a clear prima facie case not only under s. 29(b) but also under s. 30 read with  s.   5  of   the  Act,  against  the  Respondents  and consequently the Magistrate was not justified in discharging them.      On behalf  of the Respondents it was contended that the mechanic was  only in temporary custody of the fire-arms for the limited  purpose of  repairing them,  as an agent of the owners, who  being licencees  in Form  IX entitled to repair and keep  these fire  arms,  throughout  remained  in  their lawful possession  and control.  The delivery  of possession contemplated by  s. 29(b)  is something more than entrusting the arms to an ’agent’ for the limited purpose of repairs.      Allowing the appeal, ^      HELD: 1.  "Possession" is a polymorphous term which may have  different   meanings  in  different  contexts.  It  is impossible to  work out  a completely  logical  and  precise definition  of  "possession"  uniformly  applicable  to  all situations in  the contexts  of all  statutes.  "Possession" implies a  right and  a fact;  the right to enjoy annexed to the right of property and the fact of the real intention. It involves power of control and intent to control. [328D-E]      "Possession" is  not a  purely legal concept but also a matter of fact, and the broad test for determining whether a person is  in possession  of anything  is whether  he is  in general control of it. [328H-329A]      Salmond’s Jurisprudence 11th Edn. p. 52 referred to.      In the  instant  case  although  the  respondents  held licences in  Form IX  for repairing and dealing in fire-arms at  the  place  of  business,  factory  or  shop  which  was specified in  Column 3  of their  licences, they handed over the fire-arms  to the mechanic who had no such licence to be repaired at  the latters  own workshop.  Since that workshop and the  repairing business  being run  therein, was  in the exclusive  control  and  occupation  of  the  mechanic,  the inference would be that by handing over the fire-arms to the mechanic for  repair the respondents had divested themselves for the  time being not only of physical possession but also of effective  control over  those fire-arms. The respondents had not  done anything to ascertain whether the mechanic was legally authorised  to retain  those fire-arms  even for the

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limited purpose of repairing them. Prima facie the materials before  the  Magistrate  showed  that  the  respondents  had delivered the  fire-arms in  question into the possession of the mechanic  without previously  ascertaining that  he  was legally authorised  to have  the same in his possession, and as such, they appeared to have committed an offence under s. 29(b) of the Act. [330B-C, 330G-331A]      3. By  allowing the  fire-arms to be removed to a place other than  the place  of business  or factory  specified in Column 3  of  the  licences  in  Form  IX,  the  respondents contravened condition (1)(c) of the licence, amounting to an offence punishable under s. 30 of the Act. [331 B-C] 325      The  materials   before  the  Magistrate,  prima  facie disclosed the  commission of  offences under  Sections 29(b) and 30  of the Act by Respondents 1 to 4. The Magistrate was thus clearly  in error  in  discharging  these  respondents. [331D]      4. The  ratio of  cases decided  under the Old Arms Act (Act 11  of 1878)  should not  be blindly  applied to  cases under the  Act of 1959 which has in several aspects modified or changed the law relating to the regulation of arms.      [331H]      5. Trial  of summons  case as  a warrant  case does not amount to an illegality but is a mere irregularity that does not vitiate the trial unless there is a prejudice.      [333 B]      6. Case  remitted to trial Magistrate with direction to frame charges  in respect  of offences  under Sections 29(b) and 30  of the Act against Respondents 1 to 4 and to proceed further with the trial. [333C]      Manzur Hussain  v. Emperor,  AIR 1928  All. 55(1); Sadh Ram v.  State, AIR  1953 HP  121; Emperor v. Harpal Raj, ILR XXIV All.  454; A.  Malcom v.  Emperor, AIR  1933 Cal.  218; Emperor v.  Koya Hansji,  14 Bom. L.R. 964; Parmeshwar Singh v. Emperor, AIR 1933 Pat. 600; Murli v. Crown, AIR 1929 All. 720; Tola Ram v. Crown, ILR 16 All. 276; held inapplicable.

JUDGMENT:      CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 98 of 1973.      Appeal by  Special Leave  from the  Judgment and  Order dated 16-8-1972  of the  Calcutta  High  Court  in  Criminal Revision No. 85/72.      M.M. Kshatriya,  G.S. Chatterjee and D.N. Mukherjee for the Appellant.      A.K. Gupta for Respondents 1 and 3.      H.K. Puri for Respondents 2 and 4.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      SARKARIA, J.-Whether  the  giving  of  fire-arms  by  a person holding  a licence for repairing and dealing in fire- arms for  repairs to mechanic who holds no such licence, but does the  repair job  at his  workshop at  a place different from the factory or place of business of the licence holder, amounts to  "delivery of  those arms  into the possession of another person" within the contemplation of Section 29(b) of the Arms  Act, 1959  (For short,  called the  ’Act’), is the principal question  that falls to be answered in this appeal by special  leave directed  against a judgment, dated August 16, 1972,  of the High Court of Calcutta. It arises in these circumstances:      On or  about April  17, 1971, the Calcutta Police while investigating a  case, went  to premises  No. 4,  Ram  Kanai

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Adhikari Lane  in Calcutta,  and, on the ground floor of the building, they  discovered  a  workshop  run  by  Mrityunjoy Dutta, who was then working on a re- 326 volver. In the said premises, the police found several other guns, revolvers  and rifles. All these fire-arms were seized by the police.      Mrityunjoy Dutta  claimed to  have received  one of the guns so  seized from one Matiar Rahaman gun-licensee and the rest from  respondents 1  to 4 for repairs. Mrityunjoy Dutta had no valid licence to keep or repair these fire-arms under the Act.  Respondents 1 to 4, however, were holding licences under the  Act to  run the business of repairing and dealing in fire-arms.      On April 17, 1970, the police charge-sheeted Mrityunjoy Dutta, Matiar  Rahaman and respondents 1 to 4 to stand their trial in  the Court of the Presidency Magistrate, in respect of offences under Sections 25(1) (a) and 27 of the Act.      The trial Magistrate, while considering the question of framing charges,  held that there were materials to make out a prima  facie case  under Section  25(1)  (c)  of  the  Act against Mrityunjoy  Dutta and under Section 29(b) of the Act against Matiar Rahaman, and charged them accordingly. So far as respondents 1 to 4 are concerned, the Magistrate took the view that  the giving  of the  arms to the accused Dutta, by respondents 1  to 4  for the limited purpose of repairs, did not amount  to delivery  of possession  of those arms within the meaning  of Section 29(b) of the Arms Act (Act IV/1959), and in  the result,  he discharged  the  respondents  by  an order, dated November 17, 1971.      Aggrieved, the  State of  West Bengal  filed a Criminal Revision against  the Magistrate’s  order  before  the  High Court, contending  that  delivery  of  the  arms,  into  the possession of  a person who did not have a valid licence for repairs of  fire-arms, is  not only  a contravention  of the provisions of  Section 5  of the  Act, but  also amounts  to delivery of fire-arms by the respondents into the possession of Mrityunjoy Dutta and, as such, the respondents were prima facie liable for an offence under Section 29(b) of the Act.      The Division  Bench of  the High  Court, who  heard the Revision, dismissed  it with the reasoning, that Respondents 1 to  4, could  not be said to have delivered the fire-arms, concerned into the possession of Mrityunjoy Dutta within the meaning of Section 29(b) of the Act, because the respondents who possessed valid licences for repairs as well as for sale of fire-arms, had given only temporary custody of those arms to Mrityunjoy  Dutta for the limited purpose of carrying the repair job,  while the effective control over those arms all the time  remained with  the respondents. In its view, there is no  delivery of  possession of  the fire-arms  so long as control over the arms and the authority to use those arms is not transferred to the custodian. 327 Hence, this appeal. The  whole   case  pivots   around  the  interpretation  and application of  the term "possession", used in Section 29(b) of the Act.      Learned counsel  for the  appellant-State contends that the question  whether a person is in possession of an arm or had transferred  and delivered it to another, is largely one of fact.  It is  submitted that  in the  instant case, there were  three   stark  facts   which  more   than  any  other, unmistakably  showed   that  the   respondents   had   given possession of  these  fire-arms  to  Mrityunjoy  Dutta:  (a) Mrityunjoy Dutta  was not  a  servant  or  employee  of  the

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respondents, but  was running  his own business of repairing fire-arms. (b)  The fire-arms were handed over to Mrityunjoy Dutta to be repaired at his own residence-cum-workshop which was not  the respondents licensed place of business, and was in the  exclusive  control  and  occupation  of  Dutta.  (c) Mrityunjoy Dutta  had no  licence for  repairing or  keeping fire-arms and the respondents were either aware of this fact or did  not ascertain it before  delivering the fire-arms to him. It  is maintained  that "possession, within the purview of   Section   29(b)   means   immediate   possession,   and consequently, delivery  of  even  temporary  possession  and control to  an unauthorised person falls within the mischief of the  Section. It  is further  urged that  the delivery of fire-arms  for   repairs  to  the  unlicensed  mechanic  for repairs, to be carried out at a place other than the factory or place of business specified in the licence of the owners, will amount to an offence under Section 30 read with Section 5 of the Act also.      As against  this, Mr.  Anil Kumar  Gupta has  addressed lengthy arguments  to support  the judgments  of the  Courts below. The  sum and  substance of  his arguments is that the mechanic, Dutta, was only in temporary custody of these arms for the  limited purpose  of repairing  them, as an agent of the owners,  who being  licensees in  Form  IX  entitled  to repair and  keep these  fire-arms,  throughout  remained  in their lawful  possession and  control. It is maintained that the delivery  of possession contemplated by Section 29(b) is something more  than entrusting the arms to an agent for the limited purpose  of repairs.  In support of this contention, Mr. Gupta  has cited  several decisions. Particular reliance has been  placed on  Manzur Hussain  v. Emperor  Sadh Ram v. State; Emperor  v. Harpal Rai; A. Malcom v. Emperor; Emperor v. Koya Hansji; Parmeshwar Singh v. 328 Emperor; Gunwantlal v. State of Madhya Pradesh; and Sullivan v. Earl of Caithness. Reference was  also made to Halsbury’s Laws of England, Vol. 25, Third  Edition, page  874, and  Salmond’s Jurisprudence, 11th Edition.      It  was   next  contended   that  even   if  the   term "possession"  in   Section  29(b)   is  susceptible  of  two interpretations,  the  one  favourable  to  the  accused  be adopted. In  this connection  reference  has  been  made  to Woodage v. Moss.      The last  submission of  Mr. Gupta  is that since these criminal proceedings  have been  brooding over  the heads of the respondents  for the last eight years, this Court should not, even  if it  reverses the  opinion of the courts below, direct  the   Magistrate  to   frame  charges   against  the respondents and  to proceed with the trial. It is emphasised that  in  any  event,  the  offence  disclosed  against  the respondents was purely technical.      "Possession" is  a polymorphous  term  which  may  have different meanings  in different  contexts. It is impossible to work  out a  completely logical and precise definition of "possession" uniformly  applicable to  all situations in the contexts of  all statutes.  Dias &  Hughes in  their book on Jurisprudence say  that if  a topic  ever suffered  from too much theorizing  it is  that of  "possession". Much  of this difficulty and  confusion is  (as pointed  out in  Salmond’s Jurisprudence, 12th  Edition, 1966)  caused by  the fact the possession is  not purely  a  legal  concept.  "Possession", implies a  right and  a fact;  the right to enjoy annexed to the right of property and the fact of the real intention. It involves power of control and intent to control.

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                                (See Dias and Hughes, ibid)      According to Pollock & Wright "when a person is in such a relation  to a thing that, so far as regards the thing, he can assume,  exercise or  resume manual  control  of  it  at pleasure, and  so far as regards other persons, the thing is under the protection of his personal presence, or in or on a house or land occupied by him or in any receptacle belonging to him  and under  his control, he is in physical possession of the thing".      While recognising  that "possession"  is not  a  purely legal concept  but also  a matter  of  fact;  Salmond  (12th Edition, page  52) describes  "possession, in  fact",  as  a relationship between a person and a thing. 329 According to  the learned  author the  test for  determining "whether a person is in possession of anything is whether he is in general control of it".      In Gunwantlal  (ibid), this Court while noting that the concept of  possession is  not easy to comprehend, held that in the  context of  Section 25(a) of the Arms Act, 1959, the possession of  a fire-arm must have, firstly, the element of consciousness or  knowledge of that possession in the person charged with  such offence,  and secondly, he has either the actual physical  possession of the fire-arm, or where he has not such  physical possession, he has nonetheless a power or control over  that weapon.  It was  further recognised  that whether or  not the  accused had such control or dominion to constitute his  possession of the fire-arm, is a question of fact  depending   on  the   facts  of  each  case.  In  that connection, it  was observed:  "In any  disputed question of possession, specific  facts admitted  or proved  will  alone establish the  existence of the de facto relation of control or the dominion of the person over it necessary to determine whether that  person was  or was  not in  possession of  the thing in question".      With this guiding criterion in mind, the Magistrate had to see  whether the facts alleged and sought to be proved by the prosecution  prima facie  disclose the  delivery of  the fire-arms  by   the  respondents   into  the  possession  of Mrityunjoy Dutta,  without previously  ascertaining  whether the recipient  had any  licence to  retain and  repair those fire-arms within the contemplation of Section 29(b).      It may  be remembered that the case was at the stage of framing  charges;  the  prosecution  evidence  had  not  yet commenced. The  Magistrate had  therefore, to  consider  the above question  on a  general consideration of the materials placed before  him by  the investigating  police officer. At this stage,  as was  pointed out  by this  Court in State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh, the truth, veracity and effect of the evidence which  the prosecutor proposes to adduce are not to be meticulously  judged. The  standard of  test,  proof  and judgment which  is to  be applied finally before finding the accused guilty or otherwise, is not exactly to be applied at the stage  of Section  227 or  228 of  the Code  of Criminal Procedure, 1973. At this stage, even a very strong suspicion founded upon  materials before  the Magistrate,  which leads him to  form a  presumptive opinion  as the existence of the factual ingredients  constituting the  offence alleged;  may justify the framing of charge against the accused in respect of the commission of the offence. 330      Now, in the instant case, at that initial stage, it was apparent from  the materials before the Magistrate, that the basic facts proposed to be proved by the prosecution against the accused-respondents were as follows:

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    (a) That  the respondents held licences, inter alia, in Form IX  for repairing and dealing in fire-arms at the place of business,  factory or  shop specified  in the Column 3 of their licences.      (i)  The  respondents  handed  over  the  fire-arms  in question to Mrityunjoy Dutta for repairs.      (ii) Mrityunjoy  Dutta did  not have  any  license  for repairing or dealing in fire-arms;      (iii) (a)  Mrityunjoy Dutta was doing the repair job in respect of these fire-arms at his own residence-cum-workshop which was  situated at  a place  different from the business places specified in the licences of the respondents.      (b) The  fire-arms in  question were  seized  from  the workshop-cum-house  in   the  occupation   and  control   of Mrityunjoy Dutta, when the latter was actually in the act of repairing working on a revolver.      There is nothing in these materials to show that at the time  of   the  seizure  of  these  fire-arms,  any  of  the respondents or  any Manager  of their  concerns,  was  found present and  personally supervising the repair work that was being done by the mechanic, Mrityunjoy Dutta.      These positive  and negative facts, in conjunction with other  subsidiary   facts,   appearing   expressly   or   by implication  from   the  materials  which  were  before  the Magistrate at  that initial stage were, at least, sufficient to show  that there  were grounds  for  presuming  that  the accused-respondents had  committed offences  under  Sections 29(b) and 30 of the Act. Facts (iii) (a) & (b) listed above, inferentially show  that by  handing over  the fire-arms  to Mrityunjoy Dutta  to be repaired at the latter’s independent workshop, the  respondents had  divested themselves, for the time being,  not only  of physical  possession but  also  of effective control  over those fire-arms. There is nothing in those materials to show that before handing over those fire- arms to  Mrityunjoy Dutta  for repairs,  the respondents had done anything to ascertain that Mrityunjoy Dutta was legally authorised to retain those arms even for the limited purpose of repairing  them. Thus,  prima facie  the materials before the Magistrate showed that the respondents had delivered the fire-arms in  question into  the  possession  of  Mrityunjoy Dutta, without  previously ascertaining  that he was legally authorised to have the same in his pos- 331 session, and  as such,  the  respondents  appeared  to  have committed and offence under Section 29(b) of the Act.      Further, by  allowing the  fire-arms to be removed to a place other  than the  places of  their business  or factory specified in  Column 3  of their  licences in  Form IX,  the respondents appear  to have  contravened condition  1(c)  of their licence, the material part of which reads as under:           "(c) This  licence is  valid only  so long  as the      licensee carries  on  the  trade  or  business  in  the      permises shown in Column 3 thereof.. "      Contravention of  any condition  of the licence amounts to an offence punishable under Section 30 of the Act.      In sum,  the materials  before  the  Magistrate,  prima facie disclosed  the commission  of offences  under Sections 29(b) and  30  of  the  Act  by  respondents  1  to  4.  The Magistrate was  thus clearly  in error  in discharging these accused-respondents.      We do  not think  it necessary to notice and discuss in detail the  various decisions  cited by  the counsel  at the bar, because,  as mentioned  earlier, the question whether a particular person  is or continues to be in possession of an arm (in the context of the Act) is, to a substantial extent,

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one of  fact. This  question, often resolves into the issue: whether that  person is  or continues to be, at the material time, in  physical possession  or effective  control of that arm. This  issue, in turn, is a mixed issue of fact and law, depending  on   proof  of   specific   facts   or   definite circumstances by the prosecution.      At  this   preliminary  stage,   therefore,  when   the prosecution has  yet to lead evidence to prove all the facts relevant to substantiate the ingredients of the charge under Section 29(b) levelled against these respondents, a detailed discussion  of   the  principles  enunciated  in  the  cited decisions,  is   apt  to  partake  of  the  character  of  a speculative exercise.      It will be sufficient to say in passing that almost all the decisions  of the High Courts cited before us were cases under the  ’Old’ Arms  Act (Act  11 of  1878). The  ratio of cases decided  under the  ’Old’ Act  should not  be  blindly applied to cases under the Act of 1959 which has, in several aspects  modified   or  changed  the  law  relating  to  the regulation of  arms.  For  instance  under  the  ’Old’  Act, repairing of  arms without a licence, was not punishable, as ’repair’ was different and distinct 332 from manufacture. In Murli v. Crown and Tola Ram v. Crown it was held  that a  person in  temporary  possession  of  arms without a  licence, for  repairing purposes  was not  guilty under Section  19 of  the Act  of 1878. But section 5 of the present Act of 1959, has materially altered this position by requiring the obtaining of a licence for-repairing fire-arms (or other  arms if  so prescribed). Further, the word "keep" occurring in Section 5 of the ’Old’ Act has been replaced by the words "have in his possession" in the present Section.      Then in  three of  these cases,  namely, Manzur Husain, Sadh Ram v. State, Emperor v. Harpal Rai, the license-holder sent his  licensed firearm  for repairs through a person who had  the   license-holders’  oral  authority,  expressly  or impliedly given,  to carry  it to  the repairer. It was held that the  carrier, though  he held  no licence  to keep  the fire-arm, could not be said to be in "possession" of it, nor could the  license-holder be  said to  have parted  with the "possession" of  the fire-arm or delivered its possession to an unauthorised  person. Similarly,  in  one  of  the  cases cited,  the   license-holder  sent   his  fire-arm   to  the Magistrate through  his servant  or agent  for  getting  the licence renewed.  In that  case also,  it was  held that the servant was  not guilty  of any  offence for  having in  his possession or  "carrying"  a  gun  without  a  licence.  The possession was  held to  be still  with the  license-holder- owner of the weapon.      The rule enunciated in these decisions has been given a limited recognition  in the  Proviso to Section 3 of the Act of 1959. Under this Proviso, if a licensed weapon is carried to an  authorised repairer  by another having no licence, he will not  be guilty  for carrying that fire-arm, if he has a written authority  of the  license-holder for  carrying that weapon to  a repairer.  Similarly, for  carrying a  licensed fire-arm to  the appropriate  authority for  renewal of  the license, written  authority of  the owner  of the  weapon is essential to bring him within the protection of the Proviso. In some  of these cases referred to by the counsel, a person was carrying  or was in custody of a licensed weapon for use by the  licensee. Now,  the Proviso  to  Section  3  of  the present Act, protects such carriers or custodians of weapons for use  by the  license holder,  only if  they do so in the presence of  the license-holder concerned. We have referred,

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by way  of example,  some of  these changes brought about by the Act  of 1959, only to impress on the trial court that in considering the  application  of  the  ratio  of  the  cases decided under  the Act  of 1878,  to those under the present Act great caution and discernment is necessary. 333      For all the reasons aforesaid, we allow this appeal and set  aside   the     orders  of  the  Courts  below  whereby respondents  1  to  4,  herein,  were  discharged.  Although offences under  Section 29(b)  and 30 of the Act are summons cases, the  Magistrate has  followed the  warrant procedure, obviously because  an offence  under Section  25 of the Act, for which  Mrityunjoy Dutta  was being  jointly  tried  with Respondents 1 to 4, was a warrant case. Moreover, trial of a summons case  as a  warrant  case  does  not  amount  to  an illegality, but is a mere irregularity that does not vitiate the trial  unless there is prejudice. We therefore, send the case back to the trial Magistrate with the direction that he should frame  charges in  respect of offences under Sections 29(b) and  Section  30  of  the  Act  against  the  accused- respondents 1  to 4  and proceed  further with  the trial in accordance with  law. We  decline  the  submission  made  on behalf  of  these  respondents  that  on  account  of  their prolonged harassment  and expense,  which are  the necessary concomitants of  protracted criminal  proceedings  extending over eight  years, they  should not  be put on trial now for offences  which,   according  to  the  counsel,  are  merely technical. Even  so, we  think, this is a circumstance to be taken into  consideration by  the trial  court in fixing the nature and  quantum of sentence, in the event of the accused being found guilty.      Before parting,  with this  judgment, we  will however, set it  down by  way of  caution that  the Magistrate  while assessing the  evidence and  recording his  findings on  its basis  with   regard  to  proof  or  otherwise  the  factual ingredients of the offences with which the accused may stand charged, shall  not allow himself to be unduly influenced by anything said  in this  judgment in  regard to the merits of the case. N.V.K.                                       Appeal allowed. 334